FILED March 8, 2016 In the Office of the Clerk of Court WA State Court of Appeals, Division Ill
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION THREE
STATE OF WASHINGTON, ) ) No. 32873-2-111 Respondent, ) ) v. ) ) CECILY ZORADA MC FARLAND, ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION ) Appellant. )
KORSMO, J. - Cecily McFarland challenges her convictions and sentences for
first degree burglary, ten counts of theft of a firearm, and three counts of unlawful
possession of a firearm. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
the trial rulings and did not err at sentencing. Likewise, the record does not support a
contention that trial counsel erred. Therefore,·we affirm.
FACTS
Ms. McFarland once dated and lived with Derek Sterling at the home of his
parents, the Legaults. That relationship ended and she began dating Chad Faircloth. On
the evening of the day she moved in with the Faircloth family, June 21, 2014, Ms.
McFarland and Chad Faircloth went to the Legault home. Over multiple vehicle trips
extending to the early morning of June 22, the two took a number of items from the No. 32873-2-III State v. McFarland
home, including firearms. 1 Ms. McFarland told the Faircloths that she was retrieving her
personal property. She also texted Derek Sterling that evening and told him she was at
his parents' home.
When he awoke on the 22nd, Mr. Legault discovered that his television, Blu-ray
player, eighteen weapons, ammunition, alcohol, and numerous other items, including
checkbooks belonging to the Legaults, were missing. Around 8:00 a.m. that morning, a
deputy sheriff stopped a vehicle driven by Ms. McFarland on suspicion of DUI. Chad
Faircloth was her passenger. She took a portable breath test that reported she had no
alcohol on her breath; she was released after a blood sample was taken to check for
suspected narcotics impairment.
Later that day law enforcement searched the Faircloth home and retrieved property
taken from the Legault home, including ten firearms. Chad Faircloth and Ms. McFarland
were arrested and charged with various offenses. In addition to the previously mentioned
14 felonies, the State also charged Ms. McFarland with one count of second degree
trafficking in stolen property. Her case proceeded to jury trial.
Prior to jury selection, Ms. McFarland made a number of motions in limine,
including one prohibiting the State or its witnesses from referring to the complaining
witness as the victim. The court denied this motion. During the trial one of the deputies
1 On one trip around 6:00 a.m., Jeffrey Faircloth drove the younger couple to the house and waited in his vehicle while the two retrieved some items.
2 No. 32873-2-III State v. McFarland
referred to Mr. Legault as the victim. The prosecutor also used the word victim when
questioning the deputy. In sum, the word "victim" was used in front of the jury around
six times.
The State offered a "bodycam" video of Ms. McFarland's arrest into evidence.
Ms. McFarland made a number of objections to the video based on relevancy and
prejudice, including that it showed her in handcuffs, referenced that she had served time
in jail, included a portion where the deputy was defining the crime of burglary, and
included a discussion about Ms. McFarland's drug use. She argued that the only thing
probative in the whole ten-minute video was her denial of involvement in any burglary.
The State conceded that "some of the stuff probably shouldn't come in," including what
constitutes burglary, and the fact that she just got out of jail.
Originally, the prosecutor sought to admit about ten minutes of the video. 2 The
trial court, however, ordered that a five minute portion of the video be cut to remove any
reference to the fact that she had been in jail. The remaining video was a little less than
six minutes in length. Ex. 44. Ms. McFarland still objected on the grounds that it was
prejudicial and mostly lacking in probative value. The trial court, however, felt that it
was important to show her demeanor. Believing that it was "impossible to sanitize this
2 The original video is not part of the record on appeal.
3 No. 32873-2-III State v. McFarland
completely," the trial court admitted this truncated video and played it for the jury.
Verbatim Report of Proceedings (VRP) at 213-214, 216. 3
The video begins with a handcuffed Ms. McFarland in the house. Ex. 44 at 11 sec.
to 15 sec. Then, a deputy took her outside and asked her to sit down in front of the house.
Id. at 15 sec. to 35 sec. Ms. McFarland was belligerent and appeared possibly intoxicated
or under the influence of a drug. Id. at 43 sec. to 1 min., 3 sec. ("I want to know what the
hell is going on," and "this is fucking crazy and bullshit"). Then, Ms. McFarland asked
about burglary. Id. at 1 min., 14 sec. to 1 min., 17 sec. ("I don't know why it's a burglary,
burglary for what? I didn't burglary [sic] anything"). The deputy responded that another
officer soon would explain that to her. Id.
About two minutes went by where nothing happened other than occasional
disgruntled comments from Ms. McFarland. Id. at 1 min., 17 sec. to 3 min., 13 sec. Then
the conversation turned back to burglary. Id. at 3 min., 12 sec. to 3 min., 21 sec.
("Burglary, what the fuck you mean burglary, I was here the whole time except when I
went out to go get my clothes.") The deputy then explained what burglary means. Id. at 3
min., 21 sec. to 3 min., 32 sec. (correcting Ms. McFarland "you don't have to break in ...
it means being any place, or entering or remaining unlawfully in a building while
committing another crime.") Ms. McFarland asked wh_ere this burglary happened, and the
3 VRP denotes the consecutively numbered transcripts covering the trial, while VTP will be used to denote the transcript of the pretrial and posttrial proceedings.
4 No. 32873-2-III State v. McFarland
deputy said he did not know. Id. at 3 min., 33 sec. to 3 min., 37 sec. Ms. McFarland then
reiterated that she did not leave at all last night except to go get her clothes. Id. at 3 min.,
37 sec. to 3 min., 41 sec. The deputy then said, they're "probably talking about last night,
where were you last night?" and Ms. McFarland states, "I was here." Id. at 3 min., 41 sec.
to 3 min., 48 sec.
In the final portion of the video, the deputy explained to Ms. McFarland that she
was detained. He then asked her if her rights had been read to her, and when she did not
respond, he proceeded to read the Miranda 4 rights. Id. at 4 min. to 5 min., 8 sec. Ms.
McFarland was belligerent while the deputy read the Miranda rights, quoting the right to
remain silent back to him. Id. at 4 min., 30 sec. to 4 min., 45 sec. At the end, she said
she understood the rights he read to her. Id. at 5 min., 5 sec. to 5 min., 10 sec.
The deputy then explained the situation to her as he saw it. Id. at 5 min., 23 sec. to
5 min., 33 sec. ("As far as I know there was a burglary that occurred last night, and
apparently somehow your name or some video or fingerprints or ... I don't know,
something came up that's leading us back to you"). Ms. McFarland responded, "What
the hell, I was here the whole fucking all last night." Id. at 5 min., 35 sec. Right after
that statement, the video ended.
4 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966).
5 No. 32873-2-III State v. McFarland
The State dismissed the trafficking charge during trial. The defense did not put on
a case. During closing arguments, both the State and defense referenced the video. The
defense theory of the case was that small, weak Ms. McFarland was a bystander to the
theft of the guns by the Faircloths. Nonetheless, the jury ultimately found Ms.
McFarland guilty of all 14 remaining charges: three counts of unlawful possession of a
firearm, ten counts of theft of a firearm, and the first degree burglary count.
At sentencing, the court calculated Ms. McFarland's offender score at two on the
ten firearm theft counts based on her two prior adult felony convictions. 5 The offender
score was calculated at three on the remaining four counts, with the burglary offense
counting as one point on the unlawful possession charges and the unlawful possession
charges collectively adding one point to the burglary scoring. Clerk's Papers (CP) at
214-215. The defense agreed with the calculation of the standard ranges and did not
dispute the scoring. VTP at 22-23. Defense counsel asked for low end sentences, noting
the harshness of the resulting sentence. VTP at 24. The trial court agreed that the
sentence was harsh, but stated that judges "apparently don't have much discretion here."
VTP at 25. The court then imposed a mid-range term on the burglary count and
consecutive low-end sentences totaling 23 7 months on the remaining charges. VTP at
25-26; CP at 216.
5 Ms. McFarland actually had three prior convictions, but two of them were considered the same criminal conduct and counted as one offense. Clerk's Papers at 214.
6 No. 32873-2-III State v. McFarland
Ms. McFarland timely appealed to this court.
ARGUMENT
This appeal challenges the trial court's ruling on the "victim" nomenclature and
the admission of the bodycam video of the defendant, as well as the calculation of the
offender score and the standard range sentence. We address those four matters in the
order stated.
"Victim" Reference
Ms. McFarland challenges the court's denial of her pre-trial motion to prohibit
witnesses from referring to the Legaults as victims. While we believe that there are
situations where such testimony would be erroneous, this was not one of those cases.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion.
As a general rule, trial judges have broad discretion in their evidentiary rulings.
State v. Sharp, 80 Wn. App. 457, 460, 909 P.2d 1333 (1996). Accordingly, we review
rulings on motions in limine for abuse of discretion. State v. Powell, 126 Wn.2d 244,
258, 893 P.2d 615 (1995). Discretion is abused when it is exercised on untenable
grounds or for untenable reasons. State ex rel. Carroll v. Junker, 79 Wn.2d 12, 26, 482
P.2d 775 (1971).
It is improper for a witness to testify that a defendant is guilty. State v. Black, 109
Wn.2d 336, 348, 745 P.2d 12 (1987). Ms. McFarland argues that use of the word
"victim" is the equivalent of expressing the opinion that she is guilty. It is not. As with
7 No. 32873-2-III State v. McFarland
many words, "victim" has several connotations that are dependent on the context in
which the word is used. Someone who has been shot is regularly referred to as a victim
by law enforcement and medical professionals without regard to whether the shooting is
justified. A person who has been swindled of all her savings is a victim of theft or fraud.
Law enforcement frequently refers to the complainant in a criminal case as the victim.
The word simply serves as a designation that places a person in a particular category.
Nonetheless, the word could on some occasions serve as an opinion. Other states
have held in certain circumstances that using the term victim is not permissible. The
Vermont Supreme Court explained that "where the commission of a crime is in dispute
and the core issue is one of the complainant's credibility, it is error for a trial court to
permit a police detective to refer to the complainant as the 'victim.'" State v. Wigg, 2005
VT 91, 179 Vt. 65, 889 A.2d 233, 236. Other jurisdictions agree with this determination.
See State v. Devey, 2006 UT App. 219, 138 P.3d 90, 95-96 (holding it may have been
error to deny a motion in limine prohibiting the State and witnesses from referring to the
complaining witness as a "victim" when the existence of a crime was at issue); State v.
Albino, 130 Conn. App. 745, 762, 24 A.3d 602 (2011) (holding that "in a case where
there is a challenge as to whether a crime occurred, the repeated use of the words victim,
murder and murder weapon is improper"); Jackson v. State, 600 A.2d 21 (Del. 1991)
(recognizing that "victim" may be appropriate when there is no doubt that a crime was
committed and identity was at issue); Veteto v. State, 8 S.W.3d 805, 816-817 (Tex. App.
8 No. 32873-2-III State v. McFarland
2000), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Crook, 248 S.W.3d 172 (2008) (reference
to child as "the victim" instead of "the alleged victim" could lend credence to her
testimony that the assaults occurred).
The only Washington case to address this issue in a published opinion did so in an
entirely different context. State v. Alger, 31 Wn. App. 244, 640 P .2d 44 (1982). Alger
was a prosecution for statutory rape. The court read the jury a stipulation of the parties
concerning the defendant's age and the fact that he had not been married to "the victim."
Id. at 248-249. On appeal, the defendant challenged the reference as a judicial comment
on the evidence in violation of our state constitution. Id. at 249. Without deciding
whether it was error, the court determined that the single reference did not prejudice the
defendant. Id.
We believe that in some circumstances it could be error for a witness to use the
word "victim" to express an opinion or for a judge to use the word to refer to a disputed
fact. That does not justify a blanket prohibition on use of the word. More to the point,
there was no error in using the word in this case. There was no dispute that the Legaults
were burglarized. The defense theory simply was that Ms. McFarland was not actively
involved. Use of the word "victim" to refer to the Legaults was not error in this context.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion in limine.
Video ofDefendant
9 No. 32873-2-111 State v. McFarland
Ms. McFarland contends that the trial court erred in permitting use of the reduced
six minute video of her arrest. While we share her concerns that more of the video was
shown than was necessary, we again conclude that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in allowing the exhibit into evidence.
As mentioned previously, trial courts have broad discretion in admitting evidence.
Sharp, 80 Wn. App. at 460. Accordingly, we review those rulings for abuse of
discretion. State v. Slocum, 183 Wn. App. 438, 449, 333 P.3d 541 (2014).
Ms. McFarland challenges the video exhibit on three grounds. She argues that it
was not relevant, a deputy's discussion of the elements of the crime of burglary was
improper, and the exhibit was unduly prejudicial. We look at those arguments in the
The video was relevant because it included Ms. McFarland's denial of
involvement in the crime, a facet of the recording that she agreed was relevant. The State
offered that evidence to show her consciousness of guilt. That type of evidence long has
been admissible. State v. Bruton, 66 Wn.2d 111, 112-113, 401 P.2d 340 (1965). The
statement also tied the defense down to theories consistent with her alleged non-
involvement with the incident. Thus, that aspect of the video was relevant and
admissibl~. ER 401, 402.
More problematic is Ms. McFarland's second complaint that the discussion of the
elements of burglary discussion was improper. The prosecutor conceded at trial that it
10 No. 32873-2-III State v. McFarland
should not be admitted. Nonetheless, the discussion was part and parcel of the defendant's
discussion and denial of involvement in the crime. Statements she made prompted the
deputy to correct her understanding of what constituted a burglary. 6 As the trial court
acknowledged, it was not possible to completely sanitize the video. VRP 213-214.
The record does not establish abuse of discretion. The deputy's discussion of the
elements of the offense was limited and also was consistent with the court's later
instruction to the jury. The discussion was not offered to the jury as a statement oflaw
for their consideration. It simply put the denial of involvement in its proper context.
Finally, the court's written instructions repeatedly reminded jurors that it must accept the
law as contained in the written instructions. CP at 135, 136. Given all, we cannot say the
court erred in its decision. There was minimal prejudice from this discussion and it did
relate to relevant statements made by the defendant.
Finally, Ms. McFarland does complain that the redacted video was unduly
prejudicial by showing her in handcuffs 7 and showing her demeanor over several minutes
6 The exchange in question began with Ms. McFarland, stating: "Burglary, what the f--- actually you mean burglary. I've been here the whole time except when I went out to go get my clothes." Deputy Linscott asks if she understood "what burglary actually is?" She responded, "Yeah, when you're breaking and entering." The deputy answered back: "Eh, you don't have to break in. It means being in any place, or entering or remaining unlawfully in a building while committing another crime." Ex. 44 at 3 min., 13 sec. to 3 min., 34 sec. 7 The trial court offered to give a limiting instruction concerning the handcuffs. However, no limiting instruction was requested. VRP at 214.
11 No. 32873-2-111 State v. McFarland
while she was not being questioned or making any statements relevant to the proceedings.
The trial court excised nearly six minutes of the video, but left in this evidence of her
demeanor, believing it to be important for the jury to consider. While we question
whether the value of that evidence was outweighed by its prejudice, we acknowledge that
this was the trial court's decision to make. In large part the demeanor evidence was
cumulative to that shown in the admittedly relevant portions of the video. "The
admission of evidence which is merely cumulative is not prejudicial error." State v.
Todd, 78 Wn.2d 362, 372, 474 P.2d 542 (1970). We conclude that Ms. McFarland has
not shown that the court abused its discretion in its editing of the video.
The admission of the redacted video in exhibit 44 was not error.
Offender Score Calculation
Ms. McFarland also challenges the offender score calculation, arguing that all of
the offenses should have been considered the same criminal conduct. Because this
argument fails for several reasons, it is discussed summarily.
The governing principle is found in RCW 9.94A.589(l)(a). When imposing
sentence under that subsection, courts are required to include each other current offense
in the offender score unless one or more of those offenses constitute the same criminal
conduct, in which case they shall be "counted as one crime." The statute then defines
that particular exception to the scoring rule: "' Same criminal conduct,' as used in this
subsection, means two or more crimes that require the same criminal intent, are
12 No. 32873-2-III State v. McFarland
committed at the same time and place, and involve the same victim." Id. It is the
defendant's burden to establish that offenses constitute the same criminal conduct. State
v. Graciano, 176 Wn.2d 531, 540-541, 295 P.3d 219 (2013).
Ms. McFarland did not raise this claim to the trial court. In fact, her counsel,
under questioning by the trial judge, conceded that the score and range were correct.
Since she failed to raise this challenge in the trial court, it is waived. State v. Nitsch, 100
Wn. App. 512, 520-521, 997 P.2d 1000 (2000). She never attempted to meet her burden
under Graciano.
A second reason that the argument fails is that it does not satisfy the statutory test.
Among the statutory factors is a requirement that the offenses involve the same victim.
While the burglary and theft counts could constitute the same criminal conduct, and were
in fact so treated by the trial court, the unlawful possession counts could not constitute
the same conduct with the burglary charge because the victims were different. The
Legaults were the victims of the burglary and theft counts. However, the public at large
is the victim of an unlawful firearm possession charge. See State v. Haddock, 141 Wn.2d
103, 110-111, 3 P.3d 733 (2000).
A third reason that the argument could fail is the burglary anti-merger statute,
RCW 9A.52.050. This statute gives trial courts the authority to treat burglary offenses
separately even when the underlying crime would otherwise constitute the same criminal
conduct. State v. Lessley, 118 Wn.2d 773, 781-782, 827 P.2d 996 (1992).
13 No. 32873-2-111 State v. McFarland
Finally, application of the same criminal conduct standard is problematic with
respect to the scoring of the theft and firearm offenses. The same criminal conduct
exception is found in RCW 9.94A.589(l)(a) and by its terms applies only to offenses
scored under that subsection. See first sentence (expressly exempting subsections (b) and
(c) from its application). In this case, the only offense to which the same criminal
conduct exception could have been applied was to the burglary count. However, that
standard has no application to the scoring of the theft and unlawful possession counts that
were sentenced under subsection (c ). Thus, while the theft counts could be the same
criminal conduct as the burglary, the burglary could not be the same criminal conduct as
the theft counts. 8
For all of these reasons, the offender score argument is without merit.
Exceptional Sentence
Lastly, Ms. McFarland contends that the trial court erred in imposing a standard
range sentence because it did not recognize it had any discretion to. do otherwise. She
attacks this issue on both statutory and ineffective assistance rationales. For differing
reasons, both of them fail.
8 It appears the scoring of the theft counts as "2" instead of "3" was error, although it inured to the benefit of Ms. McFarland. As the State committed the same error in its briefing to the trial court, it cannot complain here.
14 No. 32873-2-III State v. McFarland
For over three decades since its original enactment, the Sentencing Reform Act of
1981 (SRA), ch. 9.94A RCW, has always stated that a "sentence within the standard
sentence range ... shall not be appealed." RCW 9.94A.585(1). Accordingly, an
offender who receives a standard range sentence, such as Ms. McFarland, cannot
challenge the sentence on appeal. Instead, any challenge that might exist is to the process
by which the sentence was imposed. A challenger must show that the judge failed to
consider something he was required to consider or otherwise refused to follow a
mandatory process. State v. Mail, 121 Wn.2d 707, 712, 854 P.2d 1042 (1993). For
instance, the categorical refusal to consider an alternative sentence is a failure to comply
with the procedural requirements of the SRA. State v. Grayson, 154 Wn.2d 333, 342-
343, 111 P.3d 1183 (2005). Ms. McFarland argues that the trial court failed to recognize
that it had power to impose an exceptional sentence, likening the case to In re
Mulholland, 161 Wn.2d 322, 166 P.3d 677 (2007) (reversing trial court for failure to
consider an exceptional sentence when sentencing multiple serious violent felonies under
RCW 9.94A.589(l)(b)).
Ms. McFarland's initial problem here is that she never asked the trial judge to
impose an exceptional sentence. Her counsel made no such request at sentencing and
there is no sentencing memorandum or other writing suggesting the possibility.
Likewise, the prosecutor's sentencing brief does not address the topic. It simply was not
15 No. 32873-2-III State v. McFarland
before the court. Accordingly, the judge cannot have erred for failing to do something he
was never asked to do. 9
Alternatively, Ms. McFarland argues that her counsel rendered ineffective
assistance by failing to seek an exceptional sentence. Again, very familiar standards
govern review of this contention. The Sixth Amendment to the United States
Constitution guarantees the effective assistance of counsel. Counsel's failure to live up to
those standards will require a new trial when the client has been prejudiced by counsel's
failure. State v. McFarland, 127 Wn.2d 322, 334-335, 899 P.2d 1251 (1995). In
evaluating ineffectiveness claims, courts must be highly deferential to counsel's
decisions. A strategic or tactical decision is not a basis for finding ·error. Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689-691, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984). Under
Strickland, courts apply a two-prong test, evaluating whether or not (1) counsel's
performance failed to meet a standard of reasonableness and (2) actual prejudice resulted
from counsel's failures. Id. at 690-692. When a claim can be disposed of on one ground,
a reviewing court need not consider both Strickland prongs. Id. at 697; State v. Foster,
140 Wn. App. 266, 273, 166 P.3d 726, review denied, 162 Wn.2d 1007 (2007).
9 It is in this context that we read the judge's "no discretion" comment to mean that there was nothing presented to him other than a standard range sentence, leaving the judge little room to maneuver.
16 No. 32873-2-111 State v. McFarland
The first Strickland prong is dispositive here as Ms. McFarland has not
demonstrated that her counsel erred. Specifically, she has not shown that a basis existed
for an exceptional sentence in her case that counsel unreasonably failed to pursue. For
instance, there was evidence in the record that Ms. McFarland had used narcotics around
the time of the burglary. This record does not reflect whether she was sufficiently
impaired that she was unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of her actions. See RCW
9.94A.535(1)(e). We simply do not know what efforts the defense made to investigate
that mitigating factor or some other mitigating factor that might have been applicable.
Ms. McFarland suggests now that an exceptional sentence was appropriate under
RCW 9.94A.535(l)(g). That provision allows an exceptional sentence when the
"operation of the multiple offense policy of RCW 9.94A.589 results in a presumptive
sentence that is clearly excessive in light of the purpose of this chapter." She likens this
case to Mulholland where the court applied the mitigating factor to a sentence imposed
under RCW 9.94A.589(l)(b). However, there are two factual differences between this
case and Mulholland.
First, sentencing here was under subsection .589(1 )( c), not (1 )(b) as in that case.
While the reasoning in Mulholland might well also apply to subsection ( 1)( c), Ms.
McFarland has presented no published authority indicating that any court has ever done
so before, thus suggesting that her counsel did not err by failing to make the argument. A
problem with comparing the two subsections is that RCW 9.41.040(6) expressly states
17 No. 32873-2-III State v. McFarland
that "notwithstanding any other law," an offender committing unlawful possession of a
firearm or theft of a firearm "shall serve consecutive sentences for each of the felony
crimes of conviction listed in this subsection." On its face, that provision appears to
prohibit any exceptional sentence that would alter the consecutive ordering of the
sentences, but does not otherwise prohibit use of the exceptional sentence power in these
cases. Thus, it would not prohibit the reduction of each of the consecutive terms in the
event an exceptional sentence is appropriate. We need not resolve the question of
whether the rationale of Mulholland would authorize an exceptional sentence here due to
the second critical factual difference between that case and this one. 10
That critical difference is that there was no request for an exceptional sentence
here, although there was one in Mulholland. 161 Wn.2d at 326. That means that to raise
this issue at all, Ms. McFarland has to attack her counsel's performance and show that
her representation fell below professional norms. In light of the lack of any history of
other counsel successfully making a similar argument, we cannot conclude as a matter of
law that counsel failed to meet professional standards. Nonetheless, it is still possible for
Ms. McFarland to prevail on this point if she can present evidence that her counsel erred
10 An argument on this point should involve any legislative history materials that would shed light on the meaning ofRCW 9.41.040(6). See State v. Murphy, 98 Wn. App. 42, 47-49, 988 P.2d 1018 (1999) (discussing legislative intent).
18 No. 32873-2-111 State v. McFarland
because he did not pursue an exceptional sentence that was in fact available to her. 11 To
do so, however, she will have to marshal that evidence and argument in a personal
restraint petition (PRP) since the necessary evidence is not in the record of this appeal.
See McFarland, 127 Wn.2d at 338 (PRP appropriate vehicle for establishing counsel
ineffectiveness when necessary facts are not in the record).
Accordingly, we conclude that Ms. McFarland has not established that her counsel
rendered ineffective assistance at sentencing. The convictions are therefore affirmed.
Affirmed.
A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the
Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW
2.06.040.
I CONCUR:
57dh f!(1) Siddoway,
11 Mere disagreement with a standard sentence range is not a basis for an exceptional sentence. State v. Freitag, 127 Wn.2d 141, 144-145, 896 P.2d 1254, 905 P .2d 3 55 ( 1995). Sentencing for this type of offense is harsh by legislative design. Murphy, 98 Wn. App. at 49 n.8.
19 No. 32873-2-111
FEARING, J. (concurring)- I concur in the majority's affirmation of the
convictions of Cecily McFarland. I write separately because I disagree with one of the
rulings of the majority. I would rule that the trial court abused its discretion when
allowing the State to show the jury large portions of the five-minute, thirty-nine seconds
arrest video.
The majority writes that the State offered that portion of the video, in which
Cecily McFarland denies being present at the Legault home, as evidence to show
McFarland's consciousness of guilt. Majority at 10. I question how one's denial of
being present during a crime shows consciousness of guilt. Perhaps the tone of voice or
mannerism accompanying the denial could tend to show a guilty conscience, but the State
does not base a claim of relevance on these airy considerations. Nevertheless, at trial,
defense counsel agreed that these portions of the video may be shown.
The majority writes that "[t]hat type of evidence long has been admissible," citing
State v. Bruton, 66 Wn.2d 111, 112-13, 401 P.2d 340 (1965). Majority at 10. Our high
court wrote, in Bruton, that evidence of flight is admissible. The high court reversed the
conviction of Virgie Washington, nonetheless, because of lack of evidence of flight. No. 32873-2-III State v. McFarland
More importantly, the Bruton court did not address whether one's denial of guilt tends to
establish one's guilt.
During the video, Cecily McFarland occasionally denied being present at the
Legault home during the theft. Because of the prejudicial nature of the video, the trial
court should have limited the State to playing one instance of the denial. The cumulative
nature of evidence is a basis for excluding evidence. ER 403. Nevertheless, again,
defense counsel agreed that the denial could be shown to the jury and counsel did not
object to repetitive showing of the denial.
The video was highly prejudicial to Cecily McFarland. The video showed her
slovenly dressed and in handcuffs, included a discussion of her drug use, contained a
discussion of the legal nature of burglary, captured the reading of the Miranda rights
during which McFarland quoted some of the rights, and recorded her repeated use of the
"f' word. A perceptive viewer might conclude McFarland to be intoxicated or under the
influence of drugs while videotaped. During the video, the arresting officer suggested
that McFarland was a flight risk and falsely suggested that fingerprints might link
McFarland to the crime. None of this video material tended to prove that McFarland
committed any crime. A jury should not see an accused in handcuffs at trial. State v.
Finch, 137 Wn.2d 792, 859, 975 P.2d 967 (1999). No purpose serves to not extending
this rule to a video. McFarland's potty mouth could lead a juror with a stereotypical view
of a criminal to regard such language to imply guilt. McFarland's quoting of Miranda
rights would signal to jurors that she had been arrested before.
2 No. 32873-2-111 State v. McFarland
Despite an abuse of discretion in playing the entire video to the jury, I would
affirm the conviction because the error was harmless. Erroneous evidentiary rulings that
do not impact a constitutional right are not reversible error unless, within reasonable
probabilities, the outcome of the trial would have been materially affected if the error had
not occurred. State v. Brown, 113 Wn.2d 520, 554, 782 P.2d 1013, 787 P.2d 906 (1989).
Cecily McFarland does not claim constitutional error.
At trial, Cecily McFarland admitted to being present at the Legault home during
the burglary. She previously lived at the home and would have knowledge as to the
location inside the residence of the pilfered property. Her codefendant would not have
sought to burglarize the home without input from McFarland. The portions of the video
admitted with the consent of McFarland also showed her handcuffed and broadcasted her
use of the "f' word. Therefore, showing the permissible portion of the video already
caused harm.
Fea~ 1 J.