FILED COURT OF APPEALS WASHINGTONSfaN II IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF 2015 HAP 31 API 8: 37 DIVISION II STAT S" TON STATE OF WASHINGTON, No. 45768 -7 -II s DEP Respondent,
v.
BRUCE J. LENNARTZ, UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appellant.
MELNICK, J. — Bruce J. Lennartz appeals his conviction for tampering with a witness,
arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction, that prosecutorial misconduct
during closing argument deprived him of a fair trial, and that his attorney' s failure to object to that
misconduct deprived him of his right to effective assistance of counsel. In a pro se statement of
additional grounds ( SAG), Lennartz makes additional claims of prosecutorial misconduct and
ineffective assistance of counsel.
Because sufficient evidence showed that Lennartz attempted to alter the victim' s testimony
and because the prosecutor did not make any improper statements during closing argument, we
reject Lennartz' s claims of insufficient evidence, prosecutorial misconduct and ineffective
assistance of counsel. The record does not support his remaining claims of error, and we affirm
his conviction.
FACTS
Shortly after midnight on July 14, 2013, Thurston County Deputy Sheriff Donald Wall
responded to a 911 call from Samantha Youckton. When he arrived, Youckton pointed across the
street, and Wall went over to talk to a hysterical and crying Doresa Klampe. l Klampe' s face was
1 Youckton lived near Klampe. Youckton was not available to testify at Lennartz' s trial. 45768 -7 -II
scratched and swollen, and she had a gash on her finger. Klampe said that she had argued with
Lennartz, her boyfriend, and that he had punched, choked, and kicked her. Klampe added that
Lennartz had prevented her from calling 911 by breaking one cell phone and knocking another out
of her hands. Klampe gave written and recorded statements supporting these accusations. The
police arrested Lennartz a few hours later in an RV parked next to Klampe' s trailer.
The State charged Lennartz with assault in the second degree, assault in the fourth degree,
and interfering with the reporting of domestic violence. The trial court entered a pretrial no- contact
order that prohibited Lennartz from having any contact with Klampe and from coming within 500
feet of her residence. After his release on bail, Lennartz drove by Klampe' s residence and sent her
60 text messages. Klampe reported those contacts to law enforcement and gave another recorded
statement describing them. Following his return to custody, Lennartz phoned Klampe almost 30
times and attempted more than 100 additional calls.
The State then charged Lennartz by amended information with assault in the second degree,
tampering with a witness, assault in the fourth degree, interfering with the reporting of domestic
violence, and five counts of violating the pretrial no- contact order. Each count named Klampe as
the victim and alleged domestic violence.
While testifying at Lennartz' s trial, Klampe could not recall most of what happened on
July 13, but she denied that Lennartz kicked and choked her or broke her cell phone. She testified
that her injuries occurred when she entered her trailer through a window. She denied that her cell
phone broke when Lennartz hit her hand with it, stating instead that the battery fell out when she
threw the phone at him. The trial court admitted Klampe' s written statement describing the assault
as substantive evidence, and it admitted her recorded statement for impeachment purposes. The 45768 -7 -II
trial court also admitted Deputy Wall' s testimony about Klampe' s initial oral statements under the
excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule.
Deputy Ryan Hoover testified about responding to Klampe' s complaint concerning the no-
contact order violations and about photographing some of Lennartz' s text messages. One text
stated, " It' s our fault. That' s what I' m saying, our fault, not mine or yours, ours. That' s what you
should say too." Report of Proceedings ( RP) at 275.
After Deputy Ryan Russell testified about taking Klampe' s recorded statement describing
the no- contact order violations, the trial court admitted Klampe' s statement as substantive
evidence. In that statement, Klampe responded as follows when Russell asked whether Lennartz
had threatened her:
In a vague sense that only I would understand, knowing him like I do, he might not come right out and say, I' m coming over there, I' m going to kill you, or I' m going to come over there and beat you up some more, but he has said things like, I' m coming back for more, and you' re a weakling and a crybaby ` cause you called the cops, and things like that and that nature that, you know, to me are threatening.
Ex. 26, at 3.
When the deputy asked whether Lennartz was contacting her in an attempt to change her
story, Klampe replied,
He has been coercing me and he texted saying that I caused all this trouble, that I need to go down to the courthouse and I need to fix it, and so, you know, things like that.
Ex. 26, at 4. Klampe then explained why she supported the no- contact order:
I do because I feel even more so now than in the beginning that, that I could be endanger [ sic] of, of another assault if, you know, if I don' t do what he... tells me
to do, fix this so he can come back.
Ex. 26, at 5.
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The trial court also admitted recordings of four telephone calls that Lennartz made to
Klampe from jail in October 2013. During a call on October 10, Lennartz told Klampe to write to
the judge or prosecutor " saying we' ll go to classes together, they have to drop the domestic deal."
RP at 324. When he told her "just do all you can do," she replied that she was trying, and he said,
How are you trying? Who you been talking to ?" RP at 325. He then said, " Tell them it was them
texting me on your phone." RP at 326. Klampe replied, " It could have been anybody. I have
texted on your phone before." RP at 326. Lennartz responded, " Yeah. We' ll just see what comes
about it. We' ll just see what comes about it. Okay ?" RP at 326.
On October 12, Lennartz told her, " And as far as me texting stuff like that, you know,
had RP 330. He I want to get out Sammy had your phone too, or a phone too, right ?" at added, "
of this thing, you know.... I want you to set up, honey, I' m tired of this." RP at 330 -31. He also
stated, "[ Y] ou' re helping me, you' ll help anybody[,] I know you will." RP at 336.
On October 14, Lennartz raised the subject of Klampe' s injuries: " I don' t know what
you' re going to do. I don' t know. But the prosecutor wants to know where these marks came
from, okay ?" RP at 341. Klampe replied, " Probably from when she . . broke through the window
2 in there that locked her keys in. " RP 341. Lennartz then appeared to get day ... when she at
to tell his version of events:
I don' t know what kind of marks there were. I want to know why she was sitting in a bar in that trailer house with two half gallons of whiskey. I don' t drink whiskey, you know what I mean? I' m not pushing this off on nobody, like I said, but why was somebody sitting in a bar in that trailer house when I got a motor home, you' re sitting over there all alone, I just woke up from a nap. I just woke up from a nap and I went over there and asked if somebody had made a wood delivery.... Yeah, you tried to hit me, somebody tried to hit me[,] ... phone come out of her hand, battery, phone hit the ground, battery fell out of it.
2 Klampe was apparently referring to herself in the third person. 45768 -7 -II
RP at 341 -42.
On October 22, Lennartz told Klampe, " I just want [ to] tel[ 1] somebody to tell the truth, or
just tell what the hell happened, you know what I mean?" RP at 349. Lennartz then said, " You
had a chance to talk to the investigator, he was there. I was told that you didn' t want to say nothing,
you know. You know what I mean ?" RP at 350. He added, " If somebody don' t speak up,
somebody lies, somebody got hurt some other way, you know, it' s making me look bad." RP at
350. When Klampe said that she wanted to do the right thing, he replied, " Well, what' s right now
is fighting something that somebody put me in here, okay? ... Sammy has got to admit to lying,
okay ?" RP at 351. He continued:
And she' s going to have to admit to lying or something, something, you know, but marks on you, where did the marks come from? Everybody says I put them on there. Where did they come from? I love you with all my heart, okay? Okay?
RPat351.
Lennartz then stated, "[ A] 11 I did is asked yo[ u] if you sold wood to a customer and then
you raged, started yelling and screaming. I just took off." RP at 352. Klampe responded, " I' ll do
whatever it takes, I swear I will." RP at 353. She added that Sammy had told her she wasn' t there,
that she didn' t see anything, and that she lied about what she said. RP 355. Lennartz replied,
That' s what I' m talking about. I know the marks — but did you put marks on yourself or I don' t
know, somebody said marks through the window or something." RP at 355.
During closing argument, the prosecutor referred to these conversations and quoted
Lennartz as saying, " Well, as far as me texting, Sammy could have had your phone." RP at 413.
The prosecutor also quoted Lennartz as telling Klampe to tell the prosecutor " it wasn' t even you I
was texting." RP at 413. The prosecutor then referred to the number of phone calls that Lennartz
made and the pressure that those calls put on Klampe. After defense counsel argued that Klampe' s 45768 -7 -II
testimony was confused, the prosecutor asked the jury to put itself in Klampe' s shoes in explaining
why she changed her story. Defense counsel did not object to any of these statements.
The jury could not reach a verdict on the charge of assault in the second degree but found
Lennartz guilty of the remaining charges. The trial court sentenced Lennartz to a standard range
sentence of 51 months for witness tampering and to 364 days on each of the remaining gross
misdemeanor counts. Lennartz appeals the witness tampering conviction.
ANALYSIS
I. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
Lennartz argues that insufficient evidence existed to prove that he tampered with a witness
because the State' s case was based on speculation rather than reasonable inferences from the
evidence. We disagree.
Due process requires the State to prove all elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
State v. Aver, 109 Wn.2d 303, 310, 745 P. 2d 479 ( 1987). Evidence is sufficient to support a
conviction if, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, it permits any rational trier of
fact to find the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Green, 94
Wn.2d 216, 221, 616 P. 2d 628 ( 1980). " A claim of insufficiency admits the truth of the State' s
evidence and all inferences that reasonably can be drawn therefrom." State v. Salinas, 119 Wn.2d
192, 201, 829 P. 2d 1068 ( 1992). Circumstantial and direct evidence are equally reliable. State v.
Delmarter, 94 Wn.2d 634, 638, 618 P. 2d 99 ( 1980). We defer to the trier of fact on issues of
testimony, credibility of witnesses, and the persuasiveness of the evidence. State v. conflicting
Walton, 64 Wn. App. 410, 415 -16, 824 P. 2d 533 ( 1992).
To convict Lennartz of tampering with a witness, the State had to prove that he attempted
to induce a witness to testify falsely or to withhold relevant testimony. RCW 9A.72. 120( 1)( a); see
6 45768 -7 -II
State v. Williamson, 131 Wn. App. 1, 6, 86 P. 3d 1221 ( 2004) ( a person tampers with a witness if
he attempts to alter the witness' s testimony). Proof of such an attempt does not depend only on
the literal meaning of the words used. State v. Rempel, 114 Wn.2d 77, 83, 785 P. 2d 1134 ( 1990).
The State is entitled to rely on the inferential meaning of the words and the context in which they
were used. Rempel, 114 Wn.2d at 83 -84. Relevant to that context is the effect of the inducement
attempt on the prospective witness. Rempel, 114 Wn.2d at 84.
Lennartz claims that the facts here resemble those in Rempel, where the defendant' s alleged
attempts to induce the victim not to testify included telephone calls containing an apology, a
statement that " it" was going to ruin his life, and a request that she " drop the charges." 114 Wn.2d
at 83. The victim testified that the defendant' s calls did not concern her and that he was only a
nuisance. Rempel, 114 Wn.2d at 84. This evidence was not sufficient to support the witness
tampering conviction. Rempel, 114 Wn.2d at 84.
In contrast, Klampe stated that she understood that Lennartz was coercing her into fixing
things so that he could come back to her, and she added that she was in danger of another assault
if she did not do as he said. Although Lennartz did not expressly tell Klampe to change her
testimony, his attempt to persuade her to do so was clear. He suggested that someone else texted
her, that she caused her own injuries, and that he was not responsible for damaging her cell phone.
He also told her repeatedly to keep trying to help him. When viewed in the light most favorable
to the State, we hold that the evidence and the reasonable inferences therefrom were sufficient to
show that Lennartz attempted to induce Klampe to testify falsely.
II. PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT
Lennartz also argues that the prosecutor' s misstatements during closing argument deprived
him of a fair trial. We disagree.
7 45768 -7 -II
A defendant who alleges prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument first must
establish that the prosecutor' s statements were improper. State v. Emery, 174 Wn.2d 741, 759,
278 P. 3d 653 ( 2012). Once a defendant does so, we must determine whether the improper
statements prejudiced the defendant. Emery, 174 Wn.2d at 760. If the defendant did not object to
the statements at trial, he is deemed to have waived any error unless the misconduct was so flagrant
and ill-intentioned that an instruction could not have cured the resulting prejudice. Emery, 174
Wn.2d at 760 -61.
Lennartz urges us to apply the standard of review for constitutional error because the
prosecutor' s alleged misstatements violated his right to a fair trial. The constitutional error
standard requires us to vacate a conviction unless it appears, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the
misconduct did not affect the verdict. State v. Monday, 171 Wn.2d 667, 680, 257 P. 3d 551 ( 2011).
Courts have applied this standard to a prosecutor' s direct comments on a defendant' s exercise of
a constitutional right and to a prosecutor' s injection of improper racial biases into a trial. Monday,
171 Wn.2d at 680; State v. Gregory,, 158 Wn.2d 759, 808 n.24, 147 P. 3d 1201 ( 2006), overruled
on other grounds, State v. W.R. Jr., 181 Wn. 2d 959, 336 P. 3d 1134 ( 2014). No such comments
are at issue here. Because the purpose of the standard of review articulated in Emery is to
determine whether a defendant' s right to a fair trial was violated, we apply that standard here. 174
Wn.2d at 762.
A. Mischaracterizing the Evidence
Lennartz first takes issue with the prosecutor' s argument that he told Klampe "[ a] s far as
me texting, Sammy had your phone too, right ?" RP at 413. The record shows that Lennartz
actually said, " And as far as me texting stuff like that, you know, Sammy had your phone too, or
had a phone too, right ?" RP at 330. Lennartz complains that by omitting the final clause of his
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statement, the prosecutor relied on " subtle omission" to support the argument that he was
attempting to make up a new story. Brief of Appellant, at 16.
Lennartz also complains about these statements:
But we do know that on October the 10th the defendant said, " Tell him it wasn' t even you I was texting." And this happened during the time when he was talking about you need to write a letter to the prosecutor. You need to write a letter to the judge. It was right after he said, " You need to write a letter to the prosecutor." He said, " Tell him it wasn' t even you I was texting."
RP at 412 -13. The record shows that Lennartz actually said, " Tell them we' ll both go through
counseling, tell them, tell them you knew I was texting. Tell them it was them texting me on your
phone." RP at 325 -26. Lennartz earlier had urged Klampe to write a letter to the judge or
prosecutor " saying we' ll go to classes together, they have to drop the domestic deal." RP at 324.
Lennartz complains that the prosecutor improperly argued that he told Klampe to say that he had
not texted her, and he maintains that their conversation about writing letters was aimed solely at
changing the no- contact order.
We view allegedly improper statements within the context of the prosecutor' s entire
argument, the issues in the case, the evidence discussed in the argument, and the jury instructions.
State v. Dhaliwal, 150 Wn.2d 559, 578, 79 P. 3d 432 ( 2003). ' A prosecutor has "` wide latitude in
arguments to the jury and ... [ may] draw reasonable inferences from the evidence. ' State making
v. Fisher, 165 Wn.2d 727, 747, 202 P. 3d 937 ( 2009) ( quoting Gregory, 158 Wn.2d at 860).
We do not believe the prosecutor' s paraphrasing of Lennartz' s statements to Klampe
mischaracterized the evidence. Furthermore, the prosecutor began her argument by reminding the
jury about the court' s instruction that her statements during closing argument were not evidence. The prosecutor drew reasonable inferences from the evidence in arguing that Lennartz had
9 45768 -7 -II
attempted to influence Klampe' s testimony, and we do not see her failure to quote his statements
verbatim as misconduct.
B. Violating the " Golden Rule"
Lennartz argues further that the prosecuting attorney improperly invoked the " golden rule"
during her initial argument and later in her rebuttal argument:
In addition, we have over 100 attempted phone calls during this period of time. You can imagine, I submit to you, that it would be quite influencing to have your phone ringing from the Thurston County Jail over 100 times over a period of a few months knowing that the defendant can contact you, knowing that as you' re about to testify that the defendant is still trying to contact you and what sort of affect [ sic] that had on Mrs. Klampe.
RP at 418 -19.
So you have to ask yourself if you were in her position, in her shoes, not in yours but in hers, you were homeless where the defendant provided you a place to live, the defendant has dirt on you, apparently, apparently has some dirt on some people you hang out with, ask yourselves why she maybe was motivated to change her story.
RP at 450.
A " golden rule" argument urges the jury to place themselves in the position of a party or
to grant a party the same recovery that they would want if they were in the same position. Adkins v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 110 Wn.2d 128, 139, 750 P. 2d 1257, 756 P. 2d 142 ( 1988). It is
improper because it encourages the jury to depart from neutrality and to decide the case on the
basis of personal interest and bias rather than on the evidence. ' Adkins, 110 Wn.2d at 139
quoting Rojas v. Richardson, 703 F. 2d 186, 191 ( 5th Cir. 1983)). Our Supreme Court has
suggested that the prohibition on golden rule arguments may not apply in the criminal context,
where such arguments may be better addressed simply as improper appeals to the jury' s sympathy
or passions. State v. Borboa, 157 Wn.2d 108, 124 n. 5, 135 P. 3d 469 ( 2006). Regardless of the
10 45768 -7 -II
proper way to frame the argument, we are not convinced that the prosecutor committed misconduct
with his remarks at issue.
The prosecutor' s initial invitation to the jury to imagine how Klampe felt was a reasonable
attempt to explain her inconsistent testimony. The prosecutor' s subsequent suggestion that jurors
put themselves in Klampe' s position was a legitimate response to defense counsel' s closing
argument about Klampe' s confusing testimony. See State v. Davenport, 100 Wn.2d 757, 761, 675
P. 2d 1213 ( 1984) ( prosecutor' s remarks in rebuttal are not misconduct if they were invited by
defense counsel' s closing argument as long as the remarks do not go beyond that required for
pertinent reply) ( quoting State v. LaPorte, 58 Wn.2d 816, 822, 365 P. 2d 24 ( 1961)). We hold that
the prosecutor made no improper appeal to the jury' s sympathy or passion in the language cited
above. We reject Lennartz' s claim of prosecutorial misconduct.3
III. SAG Arguments
Lennartz makes additional claims of prosecutorial misconduct and ineffective assistance
of counsel in his pro se SAG. We reject these claims.
First, Lennartz contends that his attorney waived his speedy trial rights against his
direction. The record shows otherwise. On October 28, 2013, the trial court granted the State' s
request for a two -day continuance because both the prosecutor and defense counsel were
to begin trial that The does that Lennartz The unavailable day. record not show objected.
following day, defense counsel sought a continuance of the trial date to December 16 because a
key defense witness could not appear on the scheduled date. Defense counsel stated that Lennartz
3 Lennartz also argues that his attorney rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by not objecting to the prosecutor' s Because there was no misconduct, defense counsel was not arguments.
deficient in failing to object to these statements. See State v. Thomas, 109 Wn.2d 222, 225 -26, 743 P. 2d 816 ( 1987) ( to prevail on ineffective assistance claim, defendant must show that counsel' s performance was deficient and that the deficiency was prejudicial).
11 45768 -7 -II
had signed the agreed order of continuance. The court granted the continuance after noting
Lennartz' s agreement. Nothing in the record supports Lennartz' s current claim that his case was
continued against his will. Nor is there any support for his claim that pretrial matters were
repeatedly postponed due to defense counsel' s personal matters.
Second, Lennartz contends that his attorney tampered with Klampe by asking her to
provide clothing for Lennartz to wear during trial. We do not see this request as an attempt to
influence Klampe' s testimony. Lennartz argues further that when Klampe arrived at his attorney' s
office, his attorney threatened her " to entice cooperation in his favor." SAG at 2. There is nothing
in the record to support this claim. If Lennartz has evidence outside the record, his argument is
best raised in a personal restraint petition. See State v. McFarland, 127 Wn.2d 322, 335, 899 P. 2d
1251 ( 1995) ( the proper procedure for raising issues dependent on matters outside the record is a
personal restraint petition).
Third, Lennartz argues that both the prosecutor and his attorney " projected the outcome of
the trial" and that defense counsel never represented that he had Lennartz' s best interests at hand.
SAG at 2. Without specific examples of misconduct supporting these statements, they are too
vague to consider further. RAP 10. 10( c).
Fourth, Lennartz complains that his attorney refused to withdraw when Lennartz wanted
to fire him. Here again, the record contains no support for this claim. Lennartz may provide
supporting evidence in a personal restraint petition.
Finally, Lennartz contends that defense counsel never addressed the concerns that Lennartz
was allowed to communicate only in writing. Again, this statement is too general to entitle
Lennartz to relief. If he has specific information supporting his claims, he may file a personal
restraint petition. McFarland, 127 Wn.2d at 335, 338 n.2.
12 45768 -7 -II
We affirm Lennartz' s conviction.
A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the
Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW 2. 06. 040,
it is so ordered.
We concur: