FILED
AUG 21, 2025 In the Office of the Clerk of Court WA State Court of Appeals, Division III
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION THREE
STATE OF WASHINGTON, ) No. 39561-8-III ) Respondent, ) ) v. ) ) BILLY JEAN NEAL, JR., ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION ) Appellant. )
FEARING, J. — On resentencing, the superior court sentenced Billy Jean Neal, Jr.
(Billy Neal), who committed three homicides at age 19, to 480 months to life on the two
aggravated first degree murder charges and 344 months on the first degree murder
charge. We reverse the sentence for the aggravated first degree murder convictions and
remand for a second resentencing because the resentencing court imposed an
indeterminate sentence of 480 months to life on a 19-year-old after finding Neal to have
acted with youthful immaturity. We also remand for the superior court to strike a $500
victim penalty assessment (VPA) and a $100 DNA collection fee.
FACTS
Billy Neal was born June 26, 1979. On December 31, 1998, when Neal was 19
years of age, he and his father killed three people. No. 39561-8-III State v. Neal
On April 23, 2001, the State of Washington charged Billy Neal, in a third
amended information, with two counts of aggravated murder in the first degree
(counts 1 and 2) and one count of first degree murder (count 3) for the killings. Neal pled
guilty to the crimes that same day. Also, on April 23, the superior court sentenced Neal
to a life sentence without the possibility of parole for counts 1 and 2. The court imposed
a prison sentence of 344 months on count 3.
PROCEDURE
On June 28, 2021, Billy Neal moved for resentencing in accordance with the
Washington Supreme Court’s recent decision in In re Personal Restraint of Monschke,
197 Wn.2d 305, 482 P.3d 276 (2021). On October 8, 2021, the resentencing court
granted the motion. During resentencing, the trial court found that the acts of Neal “were
not those of an irreparably corrupt, permanently incorrigible youth.” Rep. of Proc. (RP)
at 153. The court further stated:
The Court finds that, when considering the mitigating factors that account for the diminished capacity of youth, that a minimum sentence of 480 months for Counts 1 and 2, the aggravated murder charges, and a maximum of life is appropriate.
RP at 153. In addition to sentencing Neal to 480 months to life on counts 1 and 2, the
resentencing court sentenced him to 344 months on count 3 and imposed a $500 VPA
and $100 DNA collection fee. The court found Neal indigent at the time of sentencing.
2 No. 39561-8-III State v. Neal
On October 11, 2023, after Billy Neal appealed his 2021 sentence, the State filed a
motion to stay appeal proceedings due to State v. Carter, 3 Wn.3d 198, 548 P.3d 935
(2024) pending before the Washington State Supreme Court. This court entered a stay
but lifted the stay when the Supreme Court filed its decision in State v. Carter, 3 Wn.3d
198 (2024). Neal thereafter filed a supplemental appeal brief that addressed the
applicability of State v. Carter.
LAW AND ANALYSIS
On appeal, Billy Neal challenges his resentencing that includes the possibility of
life without parole in prison. He further attacks the imposition of a VPA and a DNA
collection fee. We accept Neal’s challenges.
Life Without Parole
Billy Neal argues that the recent Washington Supreme Court decision in State v.
Carter, 3 Wn.3d 198 (2024), invalidates his indeterminate sentence for his aggravated
murder convictions. Neal asserts that the resentencing court sentenced him to a de facto
life without parole sentence because of the lack of a mechanism to release him on parole
after 480 months of incarceration. Neal emphasizes the resentencing court’s finding that
his offenses reflected the acts of youthful immaturity, impetuosity, and a failure to
appreciate risks and consequences. According to Neal, the constitution and the Supreme
Court’s decision in State v. Carter, 3 Wn.3d 198 (2024), prohibit a life without parole
3 No. 39561-8-III State v. Neal
sentence for such an offender. The State concedes this issue and joins Neal in asking for
resentencing. We grant the parties’ request.
In State v. Carter, 3 Wn.3d 198 (2024), Kimonti Carter and Shawn Reite
committed aggravated first degree murder at the respective ages of 18 and 20. The trial
court sentenced both Carter and Reite to life without parole. Pursuant to a personal
restraint petition seeking resentencing, Carter and Reite argued that the Cruel Punishment
Clause and Washington State Supreme Court’s decision, in In re Pers. Restraint of
Monschke, 197 3 Wn.3d 305 (2021), precluded mandatory indeterminate sentences for
persons 18 to 20 years of age. The resentencing court considered Carter and Reite’s
mitigating qualities of youth and their demonstrated commitment to change before
resentencing them to determinate sentences. The State appealed the decisions, while
arguing that no statute authorized a determinate sentence for aggravated first degree
murder. The Washington State Supreme Court framed the issue for review as whether
the resentencing court had the authority to impose determinate sentences for aggravated
first degree murder.
RCW 10.95.030(1) provides that “any person convicted of the crime of aggravated
first degree murder shall be sentenced to life imprisonment without possibility of release
or parole.” In State v. Carter, 3 Wn.3d 198, 213 (2024), the parties agreed that,
according to In re Pers. Restraint of Monschke, 197 Wn.2d 305 (2021),
4 No. 39561-8-III State v. Neal
RCW 10.95.030(1) is invalid for someone 18 to 20 years old because it prevents the trial
court from considering mitigating qualities of youth. The parties disagreed about what
language they would sever from the statute. By agreeing with Carter and Reite’s
proposed wording of the statute, the Supreme Court agreed that “may” should be used in
the statute instead of “shall.” State v. Carter, 3 Wn. 3d 198, 219 (2024).
Under RCW 10.95.030(1), the court has the discretion to impose a life without
parole sentence or anything less for first degree aggravated murder. Constitutional
principles prohibit a life without parole sentence for someone who committed first degree
aggravated murder between ages 18 and 20 if the sentencing court determines that the
offense occurred in part because of the mitigating qualities of youth.
Billy Neal’s resentencing court imposed an indeterminate sentence of 480 months
to life for the first degree aggravated murder convictions. In imposing this sentence, the
court found Neal’s youth to be a mitigating factor. Due to this finding, the court could
not impose an indeterminate sentence for the crimes. The parties agree that a minimum
sentence of 480 months with an accompanying maximum sentence of life functions as an
indeterminate sentence.
Billy Neal goes further and argues that the court imposed a de facto life sentence
on him at 19 years of age, an unconstitutional sentence. Therefore, he must be
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FILED
AUG 21, 2025 In the Office of the Clerk of Court WA State Court of Appeals, Division III
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION THREE
STATE OF WASHINGTON, ) No. 39561-8-III ) Respondent, ) ) v. ) ) BILLY JEAN NEAL, JR., ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION ) Appellant. )
FEARING, J. — On resentencing, the superior court sentenced Billy Jean Neal, Jr.
(Billy Neal), who committed three homicides at age 19, to 480 months to life on the two
aggravated first degree murder charges and 344 months on the first degree murder
charge. We reverse the sentence for the aggravated first degree murder convictions and
remand for a second resentencing because the resentencing court imposed an
indeterminate sentence of 480 months to life on a 19-year-old after finding Neal to have
acted with youthful immaturity. We also remand for the superior court to strike a $500
victim penalty assessment (VPA) and a $100 DNA collection fee.
FACTS
Billy Neal was born June 26, 1979. On December 31, 1998, when Neal was 19
years of age, he and his father killed three people. No. 39561-8-III State v. Neal
On April 23, 2001, the State of Washington charged Billy Neal, in a third
amended information, with two counts of aggravated murder in the first degree
(counts 1 and 2) and one count of first degree murder (count 3) for the killings. Neal pled
guilty to the crimes that same day. Also, on April 23, the superior court sentenced Neal
to a life sentence without the possibility of parole for counts 1 and 2. The court imposed
a prison sentence of 344 months on count 3.
PROCEDURE
On June 28, 2021, Billy Neal moved for resentencing in accordance with the
Washington Supreme Court’s recent decision in In re Personal Restraint of Monschke,
197 Wn.2d 305, 482 P.3d 276 (2021). On October 8, 2021, the resentencing court
granted the motion. During resentencing, the trial court found that the acts of Neal “were
not those of an irreparably corrupt, permanently incorrigible youth.” Rep. of Proc. (RP)
at 153. The court further stated:
The Court finds that, when considering the mitigating factors that account for the diminished capacity of youth, that a minimum sentence of 480 months for Counts 1 and 2, the aggravated murder charges, and a maximum of life is appropriate.
RP at 153. In addition to sentencing Neal to 480 months to life on counts 1 and 2, the
resentencing court sentenced him to 344 months on count 3 and imposed a $500 VPA
and $100 DNA collection fee. The court found Neal indigent at the time of sentencing.
2 No. 39561-8-III State v. Neal
On October 11, 2023, after Billy Neal appealed his 2021 sentence, the State filed a
motion to stay appeal proceedings due to State v. Carter, 3 Wn.3d 198, 548 P.3d 935
(2024) pending before the Washington State Supreme Court. This court entered a stay
but lifted the stay when the Supreme Court filed its decision in State v. Carter, 3 Wn.3d
198 (2024). Neal thereafter filed a supplemental appeal brief that addressed the
applicability of State v. Carter.
LAW AND ANALYSIS
On appeal, Billy Neal challenges his resentencing that includes the possibility of
life without parole in prison. He further attacks the imposition of a VPA and a DNA
collection fee. We accept Neal’s challenges.
Life Without Parole
Billy Neal argues that the recent Washington Supreme Court decision in State v.
Carter, 3 Wn.3d 198 (2024), invalidates his indeterminate sentence for his aggravated
murder convictions. Neal asserts that the resentencing court sentenced him to a de facto
life without parole sentence because of the lack of a mechanism to release him on parole
after 480 months of incarceration. Neal emphasizes the resentencing court’s finding that
his offenses reflected the acts of youthful immaturity, impetuosity, and a failure to
appreciate risks and consequences. According to Neal, the constitution and the Supreme
Court’s decision in State v. Carter, 3 Wn.3d 198 (2024), prohibit a life without parole
3 No. 39561-8-III State v. Neal
sentence for such an offender. The State concedes this issue and joins Neal in asking for
resentencing. We grant the parties’ request.
In State v. Carter, 3 Wn.3d 198 (2024), Kimonti Carter and Shawn Reite
committed aggravated first degree murder at the respective ages of 18 and 20. The trial
court sentenced both Carter and Reite to life without parole. Pursuant to a personal
restraint petition seeking resentencing, Carter and Reite argued that the Cruel Punishment
Clause and Washington State Supreme Court’s decision, in In re Pers. Restraint of
Monschke, 197 3 Wn.3d 305 (2021), precluded mandatory indeterminate sentences for
persons 18 to 20 years of age. The resentencing court considered Carter and Reite’s
mitigating qualities of youth and their demonstrated commitment to change before
resentencing them to determinate sentences. The State appealed the decisions, while
arguing that no statute authorized a determinate sentence for aggravated first degree
murder. The Washington State Supreme Court framed the issue for review as whether
the resentencing court had the authority to impose determinate sentences for aggravated
first degree murder.
RCW 10.95.030(1) provides that “any person convicted of the crime of aggravated
first degree murder shall be sentenced to life imprisonment without possibility of release
or parole.” In State v. Carter, 3 Wn.3d 198, 213 (2024), the parties agreed that,
according to In re Pers. Restraint of Monschke, 197 Wn.2d 305 (2021),
4 No. 39561-8-III State v. Neal
RCW 10.95.030(1) is invalid for someone 18 to 20 years old because it prevents the trial
court from considering mitigating qualities of youth. The parties disagreed about what
language they would sever from the statute. By agreeing with Carter and Reite’s
proposed wording of the statute, the Supreme Court agreed that “may” should be used in
the statute instead of “shall.” State v. Carter, 3 Wn. 3d 198, 219 (2024).
Under RCW 10.95.030(1), the court has the discretion to impose a life without
parole sentence or anything less for first degree aggravated murder. Constitutional
principles prohibit a life without parole sentence for someone who committed first degree
aggravated murder between ages 18 and 20 if the sentencing court determines that the
offense occurred in part because of the mitigating qualities of youth.
Billy Neal’s resentencing court imposed an indeterminate sentence of 480 months
to life for the first degree aggravated murder convictions. In imposing this sentence, the
court found Neal’s youth to be a mitigating factor. Due to this finding, the court could
not impose an indeterminate sentence for the crimes. The parties agree that a minimum
sentence of 480 months with an accompanying maximum sentence of life functions as an
indeterminate sentence.
Billy Neal goes further and argues that the court imposed a de facto life sentence
on him at 19 years of age, an unconstitutional sentence. Therefore, he must be
resentenced. The State disagrees. We have already concluded that, under State v. Carter,
5 No. 39561-8-III State v. Neal
3 Wn.3d 198, 213 (2024), remand is necessary to resentence Neal. On remand, Neal and
the State may litigate this question.
VPA and DNA Fees
Billy Neal argues that, because of his indigency, a change in state law demands the
striking of the VPA and DNA collection fee. Therefore, according to Neal, this court
must strike the $100 DNA fee and $500 VPA fee imposed on him by the resentencing
court. The State does not assert any argument in response. We agree with Neal.
A change in this state’s law on criminal procedure took effect on July 1, 2023.
Beginning on July 1, 2023, Washington courts may no longer impose a VPA on a
defendant “if the court finds that the defendant is indigent at the time of sentencing.”
RCW 7.68.035(4). See Laws of 2023 ch. 449, § 1(4). Additionally, “[u]pon motion, the
court must waive any crime victim penalty assessment previously imposed against an
adult defendant who does not have the ability to pay. A person does not have the ability
to pay if the person is indigent.” RCW 7.68.035(4). See Laws of 2023 ch. 449, § 1(4).
“Upon motion by the offender, the court shall waive any fee for the collection of the
offender’s DNA imposed prior to the effective date of this section.” RCW 7.68.035(4).
See Laws of 2023 ch. 449, § 4,5 (b). “The DNA database fee is eliminated.”
Courts apply a new rule for the conduct of criminal prosecutions to all cases, state
or federal, pending on direct review or not yet final. In re Personal Restraint of
6 No. 39561-8-III State v. Neal
Eastmond, 173 Wn.2d 632, 638, 272 P.3d 188 (2012). Because this matter is not yet
final, the changes in the law apply. The VPA must be stricken because the resentencing
court found Billy Neal indigent at the time of resentencing. The DNA fee must also be
stricken because imposition of that fee is no longer permitted, regardless of the offender’s
indigency status.
Statement of Additional Grounds
In a statement of additional grounds, Billy Neal challenges the State’s filing of the
Membership Validation Report of Department of Corrections three days before his
resentencing hearing because the submission (1) was untimely and (2) unduly prejudiced
his presentation of evidence at the time of resentencing. Neal cites to no caselaw or legal
authority supporting his arguments. We will not entertain an argument not supported by
authority or inadequately argued. Cowiche Canyon Conservancy v. Bosley, 118 Wn.2d
801, 809, 828 P.2d 549 (1992); State v. Elliott, 114 Wn.2d 6, 15, 785 P.2d 440 (1990).
CONCLUSION
We remand for resentencing consistent with this opinion. On remand, the
resentencing court should strike the VPA and the DNA collection fee.
A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the
Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW
2.06.040.
7 No. 39561-8-III State v. Neal
_________________________________ Fearing, J.
WE CONCUR:
______________________________ Cooney, J.
______________________________ Staab, A.C.J.