IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
STATE OF WASHINGTON, ) No. 80578-9-I ) Respondent, ) DIVISION ONE ) v. ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION ) AURORA LILLIAN ANDERSON, ) ) Appellant. ) )
ANDRUS, A.C.J. — Aurora Anderson challenges her criminal impersonation
conviction on the basis that the police officer who stopped her and asked her
identity lacked reasonable suspicion to detain her. She also challenges her
second degree assault conviction, arguing that the State presented insufficient
evidence. Lastly, she argues the trial court erred in imposing Department of
Corrections (DOC) supervision fees.
Because the police officer who detained Anderson did so based on a
reliable report that the DOC had issued a warrant for her arrest, we conclude the
officer had reasonable suspicion to detain her. We also conclude the State
presented sufficient evidence to support the second degree assault conviction. We
therefore affirm both convictions. We remand to the trial court to strike the DOC
supervision fees.
Citations and pin cites are based on the Westlaw online version of the cited material. 80578-9-I/2
FACTS
On May 17, 2019, around 1 a.m., Everett Police Officer Jarred Snyder saw
a white Honda Civic parked in the parking lot of an AM/PM gas station. He
observed a female in the driver’s seat of the car. She was later identified as the
appellant, Aurora Anderson.
Officer Snyder conducted a computer records check of the license plate and
discovered that a month earlier, a female named Aurora Anderson had been
contacted in the car and arrested. He conducted a computer records check of the
name Aurora Anderson and discovered a report of an active felony warrant issued
by the DOC. He reviewed the most recent Department of Licensing photograph
associated with Anderson’s driver’s license and believed the driver was more likely
than not Aurora Anderson.
Officer Snyder approached Anderson’s car and opened the driver’s door.
He told Anderson he believed she was Aurora Anderson and there was a felony
warrant for her arrest. Anderson identified herself as Alyssa Anderson, Aurora’s
sister. Officer Snyder returned to his patrol car, located a more recent photograph
of Aurora Anderson, and determined that it looked exactly the same as Anderson.
Officer Snyder returned to Anderson’s car, opened her door again, and told
her she was under arrest because he believed she was Aurora Anderson and she
had a felony warrant for her arrest. Anderson remained adamant that she was
Alyssa, not Aurora. He repeatedly told Anderson to get out of the car but she
refused to do so.
Anderson then started the car, which had a manual transmission, and tried
to put it into gear, but the car stalled and died. -2- 80578-9-I/3
At this point, Officer Snyder reached into the car with his right arm, reached
behind Anderson’s head and wrapped his arm around the right side of her face.
Anderson restarted the car and again attempted to put it into gear. Officer Snyder
reached his right arm underneath Anderson’s right armpit and attempted to pull
her out of the car. Anderson grabbed the gearshift with her right hand, pinning
Officer Snyder’s right arm between her right arm and body. Because Anderson
was actively trying to shift the car into gear, Officer Snyder, fearing that he would
be dragged by the car and injured, pulled out his stun gun. 1
Seeing the stun gun, Anderson leaned back and put her hands up. But then
the car in front of her, which had been blocking her in, pulled away. Anderson
almost immediately began accelerating, driving away at close to 10 miles per hour
with the officer’s arm still pinned. Officer Snyder testified that the pillar behind the
driver’s seat impacted his upper right arm and the side skirt bottom of the car
impacted his right shin and pulled him forward a few feet.
After the car started moving, Officer Snyder deployed his stun gun into
Anderson’s chest. Anderson’s body moved forward and Officer Snyder pulled his
arm out and separated from Anderson and the car. As soon as Officer Snyder
pulled his arm out, Anderson fled, driving over a curb and small embankment. She
was arrested on May 21, 2019.
The State charged Anderson with second degree assault and first degree
criminal impersonation.
1 The witnesses used the word “taser,” but we refer to the device generically as a “stun gun.” We intend the two terms to be interchangeable here. -3- 80578-9-I/4
Anderson moved to suppress her statements to Officer Snyder regarding
her identity arguing the State failed to prove that the report of an active DOC
warrant was reliable enough to give rise to reasonable suspicion to detain her. The
trial court denied the motion to suppress.
The jury found Anderson guilty on both counts. At sentencing, the trial court
found Anderson indigent and imposed only the mandatory victim penalty
assessment. The written judgment and sentence, however, ordered Anderson to
pay community custody supervision fees.
ANALYSIS
A. Anderson’s Assault Conviction
Anderson argues that the State failed to prove the second degree assault
charge because it did not present sufficient evidence to demonstrate that Anderson
intended to assault Officer Snyder with a deadly weapon. We disagree.
Due process of law requires that the State prove every element of a charged
crime beyond a reasonable doubt in order to obtain a criminal conviction. State v.
O’Hara, 167 Wn.2d 91, 105, 217 P.3d 756 (2009). Sufficiency of the evidence is
a question of constitutional law that we review de novo. State v. Rich, 184 Wn.2d
897, 903, 365 P.3d 746 (2016).
Evidence is sufficient to support a conviction if, viewed in the light most
favorable to the State, it permits any rational trier of fact to find the essential
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Salinas, 119 Wn.2d
192, 201, 829 P.2d 1068 (1992). A claim of insufficiency admits the truth of the
State’s evidence and all inferences that reasonably can be drawn from that
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evidence. Id. Circumstantial and direct evidence are equally reliable. State v.
Delmarter, 94 Wn.2d 634, 638, 618 P.2d 99 (1980).
As charged here, a person is guilty of second degree assault if he or she
“under circumstances not amounting to assault in the first degree . . . [a]ssaults
another with a deadly weapon.” RCW 9A.36.021(c). Assault is defined as “an
intentional touching or striking of another person, with unlawful force, that is
harmful or offensive regardless of whether any physical injury is done to the
person. A touching or striking is offensive if the touching or striking would offend
an ordinary person who is not unduly sensitive.”
Where there is no direct evidence of the actor’s intended objective or
purpose, intent may be inferred from circumstantial evidence. State v. Bea, 162
Wn. App. 570, 579, 254 P.3d 948 (2011). A jury may infer criminal intent from a
defendant’s conduct where it is plainly indicated as a matter of logical probability.
Id. This includes inferring or permissively presuming that a defendant intends the
natural and probable consequences of his or her acts. Id.
Anderson first challenges the element of intent, arguing that her intent was
solely to escape Officer Snyder. Indeed, the circumstantial evidence would
indicate that her apparent intent was to free herself from Officer Snyder’s grip and
evade arrest. To this end, she chose to drive her car forward while Officer Snyder’s
arm was pinned inside. The fact that Officer Snyder would be touched or struck
by the car when she shifted the car into gear and drove while his arm was trapped
inside the car is plainly indicated as a matter of logical probability. The jury was
permitted to infer that Anderson intended the natural and probable consequence
of driving her car with Officer Snyder pinned at the side and thus intended to strike -5- 80578-9-I/6
Officer Snyder with the car to force him to release her from his grasp. Viewed in
the light most favorable to the State, there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable
jury to find intent.
Anderson also challenges the “deadly weapon” element of the offense,
arguing that the car was not a deadly weapon. A deadly weapon means any device
“which, under the circumstances in which it is used, attempted to be used, or
threatened to be used, is readily capable of causing death or substantial bodily
harm.” RCW 9A.04.110(6). Anderson used the moving car to free herself from
Officer Snyder’s grasp while his arm was pinned inside the car. The jury could
infer from the circumstantial evidence that the car was readily capable of causing
death or substantial bodily harm to Officer Snyder. Again, viewed in the light most
favorable to the State, there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find
that the assault was committed with a “deadly weapon.”
Anderson argues that “[i]ntent to assault may be inferred from operation of
a motor vehicle only where the defendant steers the vehicle toward the alleged
victim, or otherwise indicates a purpose to bring the alleged victim in contact with
the vehicle,” citing State v. Baker, 136 Wn. App. 878, 151 P.3d 237 (2007) and
State v. Toscano, 166 Wn. App. 546, 271 P.3d 912 (2012). Both cases did involve
defendants who drove their cars toward law enforcement officers. But neither case
limits the inference of intent to commit an assault to only those situations where a
defendant drives toward another person or tries to bring the car into contact with
another person. Anderson fails to cite any legal authority imposing such a
limitation, and we decline to create such a limitation.
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Anderson also analogizes her case to State v. Melland, 9 Wn. App. 2d 786,
452 P.3d 562 (2019). In Melland, the defendant was charged with second degree
assault based on “recklessly” inflicting “substantial bodily harm.” Id. at 803. The
victim did not testify and the only evidence describing the assault was a medical
record which indicated the defendant “grabbed the phone from patient’s hand
which hurt her finger.” Id. at 804-05. We held the evidence was sufficient to prove
Melland fractured the victim’s finger, but there was no evidence that Melland knew
of or disregarded the risk that he would fracture her finger when he grabbed the
phone from her hand, the standard for proving recklessness. Id.
Melland is not analogous. In this case, the victim of Anderson’s assault,
Officer Snyder, testified as to how Anderson assaulted him with her car and her
repeated attempts to flee while his arm was pinned inside her car. This testimony
allowed the jury to infer Anderson’s intent. We are unpersuaded by the
comparison to Melland.
Lastly, Anderson argues that no rational jury could conclude she had the
requisite intent because Officer Snyder testified that he believed the use of the
stun gun affected her ability to drive the car. Officer Snyder did state “I believe she
didn’t have much control over her actions probably due to the effect of the taser.”
But Officer Snyder also testified that Anderson put the car into gear and began
driving away before he deployed his stun gun; he did not deploy the stun gun until
after the car started moving. Because Anderson drove away with his arm pinned
inside the car before he deployed his stun gun, a rational jury could infer that
Anderson possessed the requisite intent before she lost physical control of her
body movements. -7- 80578-9-I/8
Viewed in the light most favorable to the State, there was sufficient
circumstantial evidence from which a jury could draw reasonable inferences, and
the jury’s verdict is supported by substantial evidence. We conclude that the State
met its burden to prove that Anderson intentionally assaulted Officer Snyder with
her car, using it as a deadly weapon.
B. Anderson’s Criminal Impersonation Conviction
Anderson argues her conviction for criminal impersonation must be
reversed because Officer Snyder lacked reasonable suspicion to detain her.
Without reasonable suspicion, she contends, her statements to Officer Snyder that
she was Alyssa Anderson were inadmissible. We disagree because the trial
court’s findings support its conclusion that Officer Snyder had a reasonable and
articulable suspicion to justify detaining Anderson.
After conducting a CrR 3.6 suppression hearing, the trial court found Officer
Snyder ran Anderson’s license plate number on his mobile data terminal and saw
that a month earlier she had been contacted in that vehicle and arrested on a DOC
warrant. He also discovered, when he ran Anderson’s name, that she had an
active warrant for her arrest. After reviewing Anderson’s Department of Licensing
photograph, he believed that the driver of the Honda was more likely than not the
person named in the arrest warrant. Officer Snyder informed dispatch he intended
to contact the vehicle, but he did not confirm the existence of the warrant through
dispatch. When he approached the car and asked the driver her name, she
identified herself by a different name. She then fled the scene and was not booked
into custody that night.
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From these facts, the trial court concluded the officer had a reasonable and
articulable suspicion that the driver of the car was Aurora Anderson and that she
had an active warrant for her arrest. It reasoned that there is no requirement that
an officer must confirm the validity of a warrant when the existence of the warrant
is presumptively reliable. The court cited Officer Snyder’s testimony that he
believed the warrant existed and deemed the report of the warrant to be reliable.
It further determined that once the arrest warrant information became known to
Officer Snyder, he had “an affirmative duty to effectuate an arrest [of] the person
for whom the warrant has been issued.” Finally, it concluded the State had proved
by clear and convincing evidence that Anderson’s detention and the inquiry into
her name were part of a permissible Terry stop.
Anderson does not assign error to the trial court’s findings of fact. We
therefore accept the unchallenged findings of fact as verities on appeal. State v.
O’Cain, 108 Wn. App. 542, 547-48, 31 P.3d 733 (2001). Our review is limited to a
de novo determination of whether the trial court derived proper conclusions of law
from those unchallenged findings. Id. at 548.
As a general rule, warrantless searches and seizures are per se
unreasonable. O’Cain, 108 Wn. App. at 548. However, under the Terry 2
exception, police may conduct a warrantless investigatory stop of an individual
where the officer has a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity based on specific
and articulable facts. Id.
2 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed.2d 889 (1968). -9- 80578-9-I/10
Anderson contends the trial court’s findings are insufficient to support the
conclusion that Officer Snyder’s Terry stop was permissible and that under the
“fellow officer” rule, the State had to prove the DOC—not Officer Snyder—had
reasonable suspicion that a valid warrant existed.
Under the fellow officer rule, an arresting officer who does not personally
possess sufficient information to constitute probable cause may make a
warrantless arrest if (1) he acts on the direction or as the result of a communication
from a fellow officer and (2) the police, as a whole, possess sufficient information
to constitute probable cause. State v. Butler, 2 Wn. App. 2d 549, 570, 411 P.3d
393 (2018) (quoting State v. Maesse, 29 Wn. App. 642, 646-47, 629 P.2d 1349
(1981)). This rule, also known as the police team rule, allows a court to consider
the cumulative knowledge of police officers in determining whether there was
probable cause to arrest a suspect without first obtaining a judicial arrest warrant.
State v. Ortega, 177 Wn.2d 116, 297 P.3d 57 (2013).
We have held that the fellow officer rule also applies to warrantless Terry
stops. O'Cain, 108 Wn. App. at 550-51. In that case, a police officer conducted a
Terry stop after reading a dispatch bulletin that the car in which O’Cain sat had
been reported stolen. We held that “an officer who acts in good-faith reliance upon
[a police bulletin reporting the theft of a vehicle] does not need to have personal
knowledge of the evidence supplying good cause for the stop, so long as the
issuing agency has the necessary information to support the Terry stop.” Id. at
551-52. The State failed to prove the law enforcement agency that reported the
vehicle stolen had a factual basis for the reported theft. This court held that when
a defendant challenges the legality of a warrantless seizure based on a police - 10 - 80578-9-I/11
bulletin, the State may not justify the seizure merely by showing that the officer
making the stop did so in good faith reliance on that bulletin. Id. at 552. Because
the State failed to prove the police bulletin information was reliable, we concluded
the Terry stop was unlawful. Id. at 556.
Anderson asks us to apply the same rule here. The State argues the fellow
officer rule and the evidentiary requirements of O’Cain do not apply to a stop
predicated on the existence of a DOC arrest warrant. We agree. First, unlike
O’Cain, this was not a warrantless Terry stop. Officer Snyder stopped Anderson
because he learned there was a warrant for her arrest. The fellow officer rule is
confined to warrantless arrests or detentions and is thus inapplicable here.
Second, the report of an active warrant is unlike a police bulletin in which
the facts of alleged criminal conduct are untested. The secretary of DOC is
authorized by statute to issue a warrant for the arrest of any offender under its
supervision who violates a condition of community custody. RCW 9.94A.716(1).
That warrant may issue only if a community corrections officer first proves to the
secretary that he or she has reasonable cause to believe a violation has occurred.
RCW 9.94A.716(2). Under this statutory scheme, a DOC warrant is analogous to
a judicially issued arrest warrant because the warrant does not issue based on a
single officer’s report that a crime has been committed but is tested by the
secretary of that agency.
Anderson argues the State failed to establish that the warrant was in fact
active on May 17 and the only warrant in the record bears a date of May 21, several
days after Officer Snyder detained her. Had Snyder actually arrested Anderson
on May 17, she could have challenged the legal validity of the arrest warrant. But - 11 - 80578-9-I/12
Anderson fled before she could be arrested. The standard here is whether Officer
Snyder had a well-founded articulable suspicion to justify the stop. That a warrant
may later be found defective does not render that suspicion unreasonable.
The evidence supports the trial court’s conclusion that Officer Snyder acted
reasonably in deeming reliable the reported DOC warrant. Officer Snyder testified
that his search of computer records indicated an active felony warrant, that he
believed his computer system was accurate, and that he routinely relied on this
information to do his job. Under these circumstances, Officer Snyder had what he
believed to be a reliable and accurate report of an active DOC arrest warrant which
provided him with a reasonable and articulable suspicion for initiating a Terry stop.
Anderson contends we should treat DOC arrest warrants the same as we
treat police bulletins and extend the fellow officer rule to this case because the
DOC is a law enforcement agency and performs law enforcement functions. We
do not find this argument persuasive because the fellow officer rule applies to
warrantless arrests and detentions. Anderson presents the court with no authority
to support extending the fellow officer rule to a case in which the officer initiated a
Terry stop based on what the officer reasonably believed to be an accurate report
of the existence of an arrest warrant.
We therefore affirm the trial court’s conclusion that Officer Snyder had
reasonable suspicion to detain Anderson and it did not err by admitting Anderson’s
statements to Officer Snyder.
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C. Department of Corrections Supervision Fees
Anderson argues that the trial court erred by ordering her to pay DOC
supervision fees as a condition of community custody in its written judgment and
sentence. We agree.
As a threshold matter, the State contends that we should not review this
issue because it was not raised at the trial court. However, Anderson had no
reason to object to the imposition of supervision fees because the court found her
indigent and indicated that it would “only impose the mandatory $500 victim penalty
assessment.” There was no indication the court intended to impose supervision
fees. Further, conditions of community custody may be challenged for the first
time on appeal. State v. Wallmuller, 194 Wn.2d 234, 238, 449 P.3d 619 (2019).
Anderson’s failure to object to the supervision fees is understandable in light of the
surrounding circumstances, and the record is sufficient for us to address the issue.
“Unless waived by the court, as part of any term of community custody, the
court shall order an offender to . . . [p]ay supervision fees as determined by the
department”. RCW 9.94A.703(2)(d). Supervision fees are discretionary legal
financial obligations because they may be waived by the court. See State v Dillon,
12 Wn. App.2d 133, 152, 456 P.3d 1199 (2020). In Dillon, we struck the community
custody supervision fee because the record demonstrated that the trial court
intended to impose only mandatory legal financial obligations. Id. at 152.
Here, as in Dillon, the record demonstrates the trial court intended to impose
only mandatory legal financial obligations. At sentencing, the trial court judge
verbally went through the recommended indigency screening form with Anderson
and found her indigent: “So I am persuaded that you are indigent and I will, - 13 - 80578-9-I/14
therefore, only impose the mandatory $500 victim penalty assessment. I will not
impose the $200 filing fee.” The trial court did not mention supervision fees. Under
the section in the judgment and sentence on legal financial obligations, the trial
court ordered Anderson to pay a $500 victim assessment fee. The trial court then
listed the total legal financial obligations as $500. There is no option to order the
payment of supervision fees in this legal financial obligations section. Under the
section in the judgment and sentence on community custody conditions, the
requirement that Anderson “pay supervision fees as determined by DOC” is buried
in a lengthy boilerplate paragraph regarding conditions of community custody. See
Dillon, 12 Wn. App.2d at 152. From this record, it appears that the trial court
intended to waive all discretionary legal financial obligations, but inadvertently
imposed supervision fees because of its location in the judgment and sentence.
We remand to the trial court to correct this error.
We affirm Anderson’s convictions for second degree assault and first
degree criminal impersonation, and remand to the trial court to strike the DOC
WE CONCUR:
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