FILED FEBRUARY 18, 2025 In the Office of the Clerk of Court WA State Court of Appeals, Division III
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION THREE
STATE OF WASHINGTON, ) No. 40026-3-III ) Respondent, ) ) v. ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION ) ANGELA KATHERINE CAMP, ) ) Appellant. )
LAWRENCE-BERREY, C.J. — Angela Camp appeals her convictions for attempting
to elude a police vehicle and driving under the influence (DUI). She argues her counsel
was ineffective for failing to object to certain evidence and her legal financial obligations
(LFOs) were wrongly imposed. We reject her ineffective assistance of counsel claim and
conclude that invited error warrants not reviewing most of her LFOs. We affirm her
convictions and all but $325.48 of her LFOs.
FACTS
Corporal Mark Ward of the Wenatchee Police Department saw a sport utility
vehicle (SUV) parked oddly one night. When he approached the SUV, it sped away and
briefly drove in the oncoming lane. He pursued it long enough to provide police dispatch No. 40026-3-III State v. Camp
with the license plate number. Dispatch advised Corporal Ward that Angela Camp was
the registered owner of the SUV.
A few minutes later, Deputy Jordan Kynaston saw an SUV with the same license
plate driving dangerously. About five minutes later, Deputy Kynaston found the SUV
parked behind a bar in Cashmere, Washington. Soon after, Ms. Camp left the bar and
told the deputy that the SUV was hers. Bar staff and police both noted that Ms. Camp
was obviously intoxicated. She smelled of alcohol, had bloodshot eyes, and was uneasy
on her feet. She was detained and the SUV’s keys were found on her.
Deputy Kynaston reviewed security footage from a nearby store that matched the
timeline in which he saw Ms. Camp’s SUV. The footage showed a woman holding the
same items later found on Ms. Camp, getting out of the SUV and walking toward the bar.
After Corporal Ward transported Ms. Camp to the Chelan County jail, he observed the
blood draw from Ms. Camp. Blood analysis showed a blood alcohol concentration of
0.20.
At trial, Corporal Ward testified that dispatch told him that Ms. Camp was the
registered owner of the SUV. Deputy Kynaston also testified about reviewing the
surveillance footage. The paramedic who performed the blood draw, the forensic
toxicologist who analyzed the blood sample, and Corporal Ward each testified about the
general process by which a blood sample is taken and tested in a DUI investigation.
2 No. 40026-3-III State v. Camp
They did not, however, explicitly state that each step of that procedure was followed with
respect to Ms. Camp’s blood sample.
The jury found Ms. Camp guilty of attempting to elude a police vehicle and DUI.
As part of her sentence, Ms. Camp was ordered to pay $1,245.50 in court costs and
$325.48 for “WPD DUI cost recovery,” listed as an item of restitution. Clerk’s Papers
(CP) at 68. Ms. Camp’s trial counsel told the trial court that $1,245.50 was the
“mandatory minimum” fee in a DUI case. Rep. of Proc. (Oct. 4, 2023) (RP) at 254. The
court found Ms. Camp indigent.
ANALYSIS
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
Ms. Camp asserts she received ineffective assistance of counsel when her trial
counsel failed to object to three pieces of evidence: (1) testimony relating to the
surveillance video not in evidence, claimed to violate the best evidence rule, ER 1002;
(2) testimony by Corporal Ward that Ms. Camp was the registered owner of the SUV,
claimed to be two layers of inadmissible hearsay, ER 802, 805; and (3) admission of Ms.
Camp’s blood test results, claimed insufficient chain of custody established,1 ER 901.
1 Ms. Camp’s argument on the blood sample relies heavily on two cases: State v. Russell, No. 26789-0-III, 2011 WL 1238303 (Wash. Ct. App. Apr. 5, 2011) and State v. Zanghi, No. 30921-1-II, 2005 WL 895812 (Wash. Ct. App. Apr. 19, 2005). Although GR 14.1(a) allows parties to cite unpublished opinions as persuasive authority, this
3 No. 40026-3-III State v. Camp
For the reasons below, we reject Ms. Camp’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
An ineffective assistance of counsel claim requires Ms. Camp to show that (1) her
trial counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and
(2) there is a reasonable probability that, except for the counsel’s unprofessional errors,
the result of the proceeding would have been different. In re Pers. Restraint of Davis,
152 Wn.2d 647, 672-73, 101 P.3d 1 (2004). A reasonable probability is one “‘sufficient
to undermine confidence in the outcome.’” Id. at 673 (quoting Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668, 694, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984)). We strongly presume
defense counsel’s performance was reasonable. State v. Brockob, 159 Wn.2d 311, 345,
150 P.3d 59 (2006). “[A] criminal defendant can rebut the presumption of reasonable
performance by demonstrating that ‘there is no conceivable legitimate tactic explaining
counsel’s performance.’” State v. Grier, 171 Wn.2d 17, 33, 246 P.3d 1260 (2011)
(quoting State v. Reichenbach, 153 Wn.2d 126, 130, 101 P.3d 80 (2004)).
One legitimate reason not to object to potentially inadmissible evidence is to avoid
emphasizing it if the inadmissibility is readily cured. If Ms. Camp had objected to the
surveillance video testimony, the State may have admitted the video itself, which could
have been more damaging. If Ms. Camp had objected to the vehicle registration
generally only applies to opinions filed on or after March 1, 2013. Both Russell and Zanghi, along with other unpublished opinions cited by Ms. Camp, were decided before March 1, 2013.
4 No. 40026-3-III State v. Camp
testimony, the State may have admitted the vehicle registration information itself,
emphasizing it to the jury. If Ms. Camp had objected to the blood draw testimony, the
State could have cured it by simply asking those witnesses whether they followed the
usual procedures in this case. Ms. Camp’s trial counsel could reasonably have believed
that all this evidence would have made it in whether he objected or not, and strategically
chose not to emphasize it to the jury. That his tactic was ultimately unsuccessful does not
make it unreasonable or illegitimate. Ms. Camp thus fails on the first prong of her
ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
Even without the challenged evidence, the State presented enough evidence for the
jury to convict. A version of the facts that does not include any challenged evidence
could proceed as follows: Corporal Ward watched an SUV accelerate quickly away from
him and swerve briefly into an oncoming lane. He reported the license plate before
discontinuing the chase. A few minutes later, Deputy Kynaston saw an SUV with the
same license plate. About five minutes after that, Deputy Kynaston saw the SUV parked
behind a bar in Cashmere. Ms. Camp left the bar shortly thereafter, acknowledged the
SUV was hers, and had the SUV’s keys on her person. When Corporal Ward arrived on
the scene shortly after that, he noted that it was the same SUV he had seen before.
Officers on the scene noted that Ms.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
FILED FEBRUARY 18, 2025 In the Office of the Clerk of Court WA State Court of Appeals, Division III
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION THREE
STATE OF WASHINGTON, ) No. 40026-3-III ) Respondent, ) ) v. ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION ) ANGELA KATHERINE CAMP, ) ) Appellant. )
LAWRENCE-BERREY, C.J. — Angela Camp appeals her convictions for attempting
to elude a police vehicle and driving under the influence (DUI). She argues her counsel
was ineffective for failing to object to certain evidence and her legal financial obligations
(LFOs) were wrongly imposed. We reject her ineffective assistance of counsel claim and
conclude that invited error warrants not reviewing most of her LFOs. We affirm her
convictions and all but $325.48 of her LFOs.
FACTS
Corporal Mark Ward of the Wenatchee Police Department saw a sport utility
vehicle (SUV) parked oddly one night. When he approached the SUV, it sped away and
briefly drove in the oncoming lane. He pursued it long enough to provide police dispatch No. 40026-3-III State v. Camp
with the license plate number. Dispatch advised Corporal Ward that Angela Camp was
the registered owner of the SUV.
A few minutes later, Deputy Jordan Kynaston saw an SUV with the same license
plate driving dangerously. About five minutes later, Deputy Kynaston found the SUV
parked behind a bar in Cashmere, Washington. Soon after, Ms. Camp left the bar and
told the deputy that the SUV was hers. Bar staff and police both noted that Ms. Camp
was obviously intoxicated. She smelled of alcohol, had bloodshot eyes, and was uneasy
on her feet. She was detained and the SUV’s keys were found on her.
Deputy Kynaston reviewed security footage from a nearby store that matched the
timeline in which he saw Ms. Camp’s SUV. The footage showed a woman holding the
same items later found on Ms. Camp, getting out of the SUV and walking toward the bar.
After Corporal Ward transported Ms. Camp to the Chelan County jail, he observed the
blood draw from Ms. Camp. Blood analysis showed a blood alcohol concentration of
0.20.
At trial, Corporal Ward testified that dispatch told him that Ms. Camp was the
registered owner of the SUV. Deputy Kynaston also testified about reviewing the
surveillance footage. The paramedic who performed the blood draw, the forensic
toxicologist who analyzed the blood sample, and Corporal Ward each testified about the
general process by which a blood sample is taken and tested in a DUI investigation.
2 No. 40026-3-III State v. Camp
They did not, however, explicitly state that each step of that procedure was followed with
respect to Ms. Camp’s blood sample.
The jury found Ms. Camp guilty of attempting to elude a police vehicle and DUI.
As part of her sentence, Ms. Camp was ordered to pay $1,245.50 in court costs and
$325.48 for “WPD DUI cost recovery,” listed as an item of restitution. Clerk’s Papers
(CP) at 68. Ms. Camp’s trial counsel told the trial court that $1,245.50 was the
“mandatory minimum” fee in a DUI case. Rep. of Proc. (Oct. 4, 2023) (RP) at 254. The
court found Ms. Camp indigent.
ANALYSIS
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
Ms. Camp asserts she received ineffective assistance of counsel when her trial
counsel failed to object to three pieces of evidence: (1) testimony relating to the
surveillance video not in evidence, claimed to violate the best evidence rule, ER 1002;
(2) testimony by Corporal Ward that Ms. Camp was the registered owner of the SUV,
claimed to be two layers of inadmissible hearsay, ER 802, 805; and (3) admission of Ms.
Camp’s blood test results, claimed insufficient chain of custody established,1 ER 901.
1 Ms. Camp’s argument on the blood sample relies heavily on two cases: State v. Russell, No. 26789-0-III, 2011 WL 1238303 (Wash. Ct. App. Apr. 5, 2011) and State v. Zanghi, No. 30921-1-II, 2005 WL 895812 (Wash. Ct. App. Apr. 19, 2005). Although GR 14.1(a) allows parties to cite unpublished opinions as persuasive authority, this
3 No. 40026-3-III State v. Camp
For the reasons below, we reject Ms. Camp’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
An ineffective assistance of counsel claim requires Ms. Camp to show that (1) her
trial counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and
(2) there is a reasonable probability that, except for the counsel’s unprofessional errors,
the result of the proceeding would have been different. In re Pers. Restraint of Davis,
152 Wn.2d 647, 672-73, 101 P.3d 1 (2004). A reasonable probability is one “‘sufficient
to undermine confidence in the outcome.’” Id. at 673 (quoting Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668, 694, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984)). We strongly presume
defense counsel’s performance was reasonable. State v. Brockob, 159 Wn.2d 311, 345,
150 P.3d 59 (2006). “[A] criminal defendant can rebut the presumption of reasonable
performance by demonstrating that ‘there is no conceivable legitimate tactic explaining
counsel’s performance.’” State v. Grier, 171 Wn.2d 17, 33, 246 P.3d 1260 (2011)
(quoting State v. Reichenbach, 153 Wn.2d 126, 130, 101 P.3d 80 (2004)).
One legitimate reason not to object to potentially inadmissible evidence is to avoid
emphasizing it if the inadmissibility is readily cured. If Ms. Camp had objected to the
surveillance video testimony, the State may have admitted the video itself, which could
have been more damaging. If Ms. Camp had objected to the vehicle registration
generally only applies to opinions filed on or after March 1, 2013. Both Russell and Zanghi, along with other unpublished opinions cited by Ms. Camp, were decided before March 1, 2013.
4 No. 40026-3-III State v. Camp
testimony, the State may have admitted the vehicle registration information itself,
emphasizing it to the jury. If Ms. Camp had objected to the blood draw testimony, the
State could have cured it by simply asking those witnesses whether they followed the
usual procedures in this case. Ms. Camp’s trial counsel could reasonably have believed
that all this evidence would have made it in whether he objected or not, and strategically
chose not to emphasize it to the jury. That his tactic was ultimately unsuccessful does not
make it unreasonable or illegitimate. Ms. Camp thus fails on the first prong of her
ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
Even without the challenged evidence, the State presented enough evidence for the
jury to convict. A version of the facts that does not include any challenged evidence
could proceed as follows: Corporal Ward watched an SUV accelerate quickly away from
him and swerve briefly into an oncoming lane. He reported the license plate before
discontinuing the chase. A few minutes later, Deputy Kynaston saw an SUV with the
same license plate. About five minutes after that, Deputy Kynaston saw the SUV parked
behind a bar in Cashmere. Ms. Camp left the bar shortly thereafter, acknowledged the
SUV was hers, and had the SUV’s keys on her person. When Corporal Ward arrived on
the scene shortly after that, he noted that it was the same SUV he had seen before.
Officers on the scene noted that Ms. Camp had an obvious odor of alcohol coming from
her, bloodshot eyes, and poor coordination.
5 No. 40026-3-III State v. Camp
These facts would have presented the jury with enough evidence to convict Ms.
Camp of both charges. Ms. Camp fails to show there is a reasonable probability that the
result of the proceeding would have been different absent the challenged evidence. We
conclude that Ms. Camp fails to establish either prong of ineffective assistance of
counsel.
LFOS
Appellate courts typically review claims that LFOs were improperly imposed even
though no objection was raised to the trial court. Nevertheless, there are times when
review is not warranted.
The invited error doctrine applies where a defendant engaged in some affirmative
action by which they set up the error. State v. Phelps, 113 Wn. App. 347, 353, 57 P.3d
624 (2002). Here, Ms. Camp’s counsel described the $1,245.50 as the “mandatory
minimum” fee in a DUI case. RP at 254. Due to invited error, we decline to review Ms.
Camp’s LFO claim to this extent.
The remaining LFO, $325.48, was “restitution” to the Wenatchee Police
Department DUI cost recovery program. CP at 68. We question whether an item of
general restitution is imposable. See RCW 10.01.160(2) (“Costs . . . cannot include . . .
expenditures in connection with the maintenance and operation of government agencies
that must be made by the public irrespective of specific violations of law.”). Here, the
6 I i • 1 1 No. 40026-3-III
I State v. Camp
Department's cost would have been incurred even had Ms. Camp not been arrested for
DUI. But even if the cost was imposable, the trial court found Ms. Camp indigent and
the cost should not have been imposed. RCW 10.01.160(3).
Affirmed, but remanded to strike $325.48 cost.
A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the
Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to
RCW 2.06.040.
Lawrence-Berrey, C .J.
WE CONCUR:
Cooney, J. Murphy, J.