State Of Washington, V. Angela Frances Wells Palmer

• Court: Court of Appeals of Washington
• Decided: April 7, 2026
• Docket: 60898-7
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

Filed Washington State Court of Appeals Division Two

April 7, 2026

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

DIVISION II

STATE OF WASHINGTON, No. 60898-7-II

Respondent,

v. UNPUBLISHED OPINION ANGELA FRANCES WELLS PALMER,

Appellant.

Veljacic, C.J. — Angela Frances Wells Palmer appeals her conviction for one count of

malicious mischief in the second degree. Wells Palmer raises two arguments on appeal. First,

Wells Palmer argues that insufficient evidence supports her conviction. Second, Wells Palmer

argues she received ineffective assistance of counsel because defense counsel did not object to the

admission of hearsay testimony at trial. We conclude that Wells Palmer’s conviction is supported

by sufficient evidence. But because we conclude that Wells Palmer received ineffective assistance

of counsel, we reverse her conviction and remand for a new trial.

FACTS

I. BACKGROUND

Richard Palmer and Wells Palmer were married 32 years. They lived together in Ariel at a

home they jointly owned. Both Palmer and Wells Palmer were listed on the deed to the house.

On November 5, 2019, the parties legally separated and Wells Palmer filed for divorce. In

light of their pending divorce, Palmer moved out. 60898-7-II

In 2021, Palmer and Wells Palmer entered into a separation agreement. The agreement

dictated that Palmer would stay at the residence in Ariel. Pursuant to the agreement, Wells Palmer

moved out, leaving her keys behind, and Palmer moved in on October 31.

II. THE INCIDENT

On May 23, 2022, Wells Palmer went back to the residence in Ariel. Wells Palmer was

“beating on [the] windows and . . . front door.” Rep. of Proc. (RP) at 207. Palmer, armed with a

gun,1 went to the front door and yelled “Who’s out there?” RP at 207. When Palmer realized it

was Wells Palmer, he “opened the door” and told her to “[g]et off [his] porch because she didn’t

belong there.” RP at 207-08.

Wells Palmer did not leave. Wells Palmer “went into the shed and got [a] sledgehammer,”

and she proceeded to pound on the door, breaking the handle and the locks. RP at 332. Then,

Wells Palmer smashed one of the windows and shattered the “sliding glass door in the back of the

house.” RP at 208.

Palmer called 911 while Wells Palmer was damaging the house. Palmer requested the

officers come out and remove Wells Palmer from the property.2 After Wells Palmer broke the

sliding glass door, she put down the sledgehammer and entered the house. Upon doing so, Wells

Palmer cut herself and she got blood on the wall and the carpet.

During this time, the 911 operator stayed on the line with Palmer. In the background, Wells

Palmer could be heard saying, “It’s my house, I’m not leaving,” and she was “screaming

belligerently.” RP at 226, 233. There is conflicting testimony whether Palmer pointed the gun

1 Palmer testified at trial that he had his gun because he “live[d] by [himself] out in the middle of nowhere.” RP at 218. 2 At the time of the incident, Palmer and Wells Palmer were not officially divorced because Wells Palmer had not completed the paperwork.

2 60898-7-II

and/or threatened Wells Palmer, but he ultimately put the gun in a safe at the request of the 911

operator.

Cowlitz County Sheriff’s Office Detective Christopher Moore and Deputy Kelly Pattison

arrived at the residence approximately 20 to 30 minutes after the 911 call. Pattison observed that

the front door “was all busted up,” the sliding glass door was gone, and the window was broken.

RP at 239. When Pattison talked with Wells Palmer, she told Pattison that “Palmer would not let

her in, so she made her way in with the sledgehammer.” RP at 241. Moore made similar

observations regarding the extent of the damage.

Wells Palmer was taken into custody and was charged with one count of residential

burglary (domestic violence) and one count of malicious mischief in the second degree (domestic

violence).

III. WELLS PALMER’S TRIAL

At trial, Palmer testified that he had to board up the sliding glass door and window with

plywood. Palmer also had to “put a foot lock[er] on the front door” because the front door could

not be shut and locked. RP at 210. When asked how much it was going to cost to repair the

damage, Palmer testified that the “estimate [he] got was [for] approximately $9,500.” RP at 211.

Defense counsel did not object to this testimony.

After the State rested its case, Wells Palmer moved to dismiss both charges. The trial court

denied the motion, reasoning that there was enough evidence for the case to go to the jury.

The jury found Wells Palmer not guilty for the one count of residential burglary, and it

found her guilty of malicious mischief in the second degree. The jury found the one count of

malicious mischief in the second degree was a crime of domestic violence. The trial court

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subsequently sentenced Wells Palmer to 10 days of confinement and 72 hours of community

restitution. The trial court also ordered Wells Palmer to pay $10,181.36 in restitution.

Wells Palmer appeals.

ANALYSIS

I. SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE SUPPORTS WELLS PALMER’S CONVICTION

Wells Palmer argues that insufficient evidence supports her conviction because the State

relied “solely on the hearsay testimony of . . . Palmer to prove that he was an owner of the property

. . . and that the damage caused by [Wells Palmer] exceeded [$750].” Br. of Appellant at 9. We

disagree.

To satisfy due process, the State must prove every element of the crimes charged beyond a

reasonable doubt. State v. Smith, 155 Wn.2d 496, 502, 120 P.3d 559 (2005). The test for

determining the sufficiency of the evidence is “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light

most favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact could have found [the defendant] guilt[y]

beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Salinas, 119 Wn.2d 192, 201, 829 P.2d 1068 (1992).

Under a sufficiency challenge, our review is “highly deferential to the jury’s decision”

because “questions of credibility, persuasiveness, and conflicting testimony must be left to the

jury.” State v. Davis, 182 Wn.2d 222, 227, 340 P.3d 820 (2014); In re Pers. Restraint of Martinez,

171 Wn.2d 354, 364, 256 P.3d 277 (2011). A defendant challenging the sufficiency of the evidence

admits “the truth of the State’s evidence and accepts the reasonable inferences to be made from

it.” State v. O’Neal, 159 Wn.2d 500, 505, 150 P.3d 1121 (2007). Therefore, we must draw “all

reasonable inferences from the evidence in favor of the State and against the defendant.” In re

Pers. Restraint of Arntsen, 2 Wn.3d 716, 724, 543 P.3d 821 (2024).

4 60898-7-II

When we evaluate the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a conviction, we consider

circumstantial evidence to be as reliable as direct evidence. State v. Delmarter, 94 Wn.2d 634,

638, 618 P.2d 99 (1980); see also O’Neal, 159 Wn.2d at 506 (“Direct evidence is not required to

uphold a jury’s verdict; circumstantial evidence can be sufficient.”). “[E]ven if the only evidence

of guilt is circumstantial, the jury need only be convinced of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”

State v. Couch, 44 Wn. App. 26, 30, 720 P.2d 1387 (1986).

“A person is guilty of malicious mischief in the second degree if he or she knowingly and

maliciously . . . [c]auses physical damage to the property of another in an amount exceeding

[$750].” RCW 9A.48.080(1)(a) (emphasis added).3 For the purpose of determining the degree of

malicious mischief, “damages,” in addition to its ordinary meaning, “includes any diminution in

the value of any property as the consequence of an act.” RCW 9A.48.100; State v. Gilbert, 79 Wn.

App. 383, 385, 902 P.2d 182 (1995). The ordinary meaning of damages includes the reasonable

cost of repairs to restore injured property to its former condition. Gilbert, 79 Wn. App. at 385.

A. Palmer’s Ownership of the Residence

At the outset, Wells Palmer claims that the State failed to establish that she damaged the

“property of another” because she co-owned the home with Palmer. Br. of Appellant at 11. To

that end, Wells Palmer cites to several cases that purportedly stand for the proposition the State

needed to introduce “[e]vidence corroborating [Palmer’s] claim of interest[,] such as . . . the

separation agreement.”4 Br. of Appellant at 11.

3 On appeal, Wells Palmer does not challenge that she “knowingly and maliciously” damaged the property. RCW 9A.48.080(1)(a) (emphasis added). 4 Wells Palmer relies on: State v. Pike, 118 Wn.2d 585, 826 P.2d 152 (1992); State v. Lee, 128 Wn.2d 151, 904 P.2d 1143 (1995); State v. Wooten, 178 Wn.2d 890, 312 P.3d 41 (2013); State v. Newcomb, 160 Wn. App. 184, 246 P.3d 1286 (2001).

5 60898-7-II

Even if we were to assume that Wells Palmer co-owned the house with Palmer because

they were still married at the time of the incident, her reliance on these cases is misplaced. In State

v. Coria, 146 Wn.2d 631, 633-34, 48 P.3d 980 (2002), our Supreme Court addressed a similar

situation like the case at bar. There, the defendant, who lived with his wife and daughter, damaged

their home after getting into an argument with his wife. Id. Coria broke a mirror, threw over a

television, tore a microwave out of the wall, slashed “the kitchen linoleum,” killed the family’s pet

cockatiel, and “smashed in . . . the door leading from the garage into the house.” Id. at 634. A jury

convicted Coria of assault in the second degree and malicious mischief in the second degree. Id.

at 635.

On appeal, Coria argued that insufficient evidence supported his conviction because he did

not damage “property of another” since he was married to his wife and had “an equal equitable

stake” in their property. Id. at 636. Our Supreme Court disagreed. The court explained that “[b]oth

spouses have undivided half interests in community property.” Id. at 639. Consequently, the court

concluded that Coria’s “right to possess his community property [was] not a defense. . . because

his right was not exclusive of his wife’s right to possession.” Id.

Here, Because Palmer, at a minimum,5 had an “undivided half interest[]” in the home, a

jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Wells Palmer damaged the “property of

another.” Id.; RCW 9A.48.080(1)(a). Wells Palmer’s argument fails.

5 Wells Palmer’s argument would also fail if, on the other hand, Palmer had exclusive possession of the home because of their agreement. See State v. Webb, 64 Wn. App. 480, 490-91, 824 P.2d 1257 (1992).

6 60898-7-II

B. Damages Exceeding $750

Next, Wells Palmer argues that the State failed to establish that she caused damage

exceeding $750. Wells Palmer cites to State v. Claybourne, 14 Wn. App. 314, 315, 541 P.2d 1230

(1972), for the proposition that “proof of damage alone is not sufficient to prove the actual amount

of damage sustained.” Br. of Appellant at 16. Coria likewise forecloses this argument.

In Coria, the defendant also challenged the basis on which the officer provided their

estimate of damages. 146 Wn.2d at 640-41. At trial, an officer “estimated the damage [to be]

around $620.” Id. at 634. There was no other evidence presented at trial corroborating the officer’s

estimate. Id.

Despite there being no other corroborating evidence, our Supreme Court concluded that

the evidence was “sufficient to convince the jury beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did

more than $250 worth of damage.” Id. at 641.6 Wells Palmer’s argument requiring corroborative

evidence fails.

Here, like in Coria, Palmer’s admitted testimony7 regarding the damage was sufficient to

support that the damages exceeded $750. At trial, Palmer testified that he obtained an estimate for

“approximately $9,500,” well above what is required for a conviction of malicious mischief in the

second degree. RP at 211; RCW 9A.48.080(1)(a).

6 RCW 9A.48.080(1)(a) has since been amended to increase the value of the damage caused by a defendant from $250 to $750. Former RCW 9A.48.080(1)(a) (2009). 7 This testimony was not objected to at trial. Consequently, any alleged error unpreserved, and we will not review for the first time on appeal for Wells Palmer’s sufficiency of the evidence challenge. E.g., State v. Perez-Cervantes, 141 Wn.2d 468, 482, 6 P.3d 1160 (2000) (explaining that a defendant may not argue the erroneous admission of hearsay at trial on for the first time on appeal under RAP 2.5(a)).

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Therefore, we conclude that when viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the

State, a rational trier of fact could have found Wells Palmer guilty of malicious mischief in the

second degree.

II. WELLS PALMER RECEIVED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

Wells Palmer argues that she received ineffective assistance of counsel because defense

counsel “failed to object to hearsay statements . . . about damages and ownership of the property.”

Br. of Appellant at 18. We agree, in part.8

Criminal defendants have a right to effective assistance of counsel. U.S. CONST. amend.

VI; WASH. CONST. art. 1, § 22.

To prove ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show (1) counsel’s

representation was so deficient it fell “below an objective standard of reasonableness” and (2) that

deficiency prejudiced the defendant. State v. Grier, 171 Wn.2d 17, 32-33, 246 P.3d 1260 (2011)

(quoting and applying test from Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 104 S. Ct. 2052,

80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984)). Failure to satisfy either requirement defeats the claim. State v. Bertrand,

3 Wn.3d 116, 128, 546 P.3d 1020 (2024).

To show ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to object, “a defendant must [first]

show that an objection would likely have been sustained.” State v. Fortun-Cebada, 158 Wn. App.

158, 172, 241 P.3d 800 (2010). “The defendant must overcome ‘a strong presumption that

counsel’s performance was reasonable.’” Bertrand, 3 Wn.3d at 130 (quoting State v. Kyllo, 166

8 In Wells Palmer’s brief, she appears to claim that defense counsel’s failure to object to any testimony regarding “ownership of the property” prejudiced her. Br. of Appellant at 18. We surmise Wells Palmer is referencing testimony regarding the separation agreement, but she does not elaborate further in the body of her brief. Again, our discussion above regarding Coria forecloses the notion that Wells Palmer could be prejudiced by the admission of such testimony. 146 Wn.2d at 636-39.

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Wn.2d 856, 862, 215 P.3d 177 (2009)). “The reasonableness of counsel’s performance is to be

evaluated from counsel’s perspective at the time of the alleged error and in the light of all the

circumstances.” State v. Stotts, 26 Wn. App. 2d 154, 165, 527 P.3d 842 (2023).

Legitimate trial strategy or tactics cannot serve as the basis for a claim of ineffective

assistance of counsel. Kyllo, 166 Wn.2d at 863. A “defendant can rebut the presumption of

reasonable performance by demonstrating that ‘there is no conceivable legitimate tactic explaining

counsel’s performance.’” Grier, 171 Wn.2d at 33 (quoting State v. Reichenbach, 153 Wn.2d 126,

130, 101 P.3d 80 (2004)). When “inadmissible evidence is significant to the State’s case, either in

quantity or in quality, there is generally no legitimate reason for failing to object.” Stotts, 26 Wn.

App. 2d at 166 (emphasis added); State v. Vazquez, 198 Wn.2d 239, 248-49, 494 P.3d 424 (2021).

Second, prejudice requires showing that, but for counsel’s deficient performance, “there is

a reasonable probability . . . the result of the proceeding would have differed.” State v. Estes, 193

Wn. App. 479, 488, 372 P.3d 163 (2016). “‘A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to

undermine confidence in the outcome.’” In re Pers. Restraint of Crace, 174 Wn.2d 835, 840, 280

P.3d 1102 (2012) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694).

A. Deficiency

At issue here is Palmer’s testimony regarding the dollar amount associated with the

damages caused by Wells Palmer. At trial, Palmer testified that the “estimate [he] got was [for]

approximately $9,500.” RP at 211 (emphasis added). Had counsel objected, the trial court would

have likely sustained an objection because the testimony is hearsay.

“‘Hearsay’ is a statement” made by a declarant outside of court that is being “offered [into]

evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” ER 801(c). Absent an exception, “[h]earsay

is not admissible.” ER 802.

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Palmer’s testimony suggests that, unlike Coria, the amount introduced at trial was not

Palmer’s estimate. 146 Wn.2d at 634 (explaining that the testifying officer “estimated the damage

around $620”).9 Instead, his testimony suggests that the estimate was from a company and/or

person that provided an estimate for repairs, which was based on their assessment of the damages.

The estimate is a statement that was made outside of court that was offered by the State, through

Palmer, to be admitted for the truth of the matter asserted, i.e., that the damages exceeded $750.

Had defense counsel objected, the trial court would have likely sustained an objection. Moreover,

the State does not identify any applicable hearsay exception that would have rendered Palmer’s

testimony admissible.

Defense counsel’s failure to object to the admission of this testimony cannot be

characterized as a strategic decision because Palmer’s testimony focused on an important element

of the offense. Stotts, 26 Wn. App. 2d at 166. As explained in State v. Timothy K., 107 Wn. App.

784, 789, 27 P.3d 1263 (2001), “[t]he sum of the damage caused is precisely what determines the

degree of [malicious mischief], and for that reason[, it] is a true element that must be proved

beyond a reasonable doubt.”

Therefore, we conclude that defense counsel’s performance was deficient.

9 The State relies on State v. Hammond, 6 Wn. App. 459, 493 P.2d 1249 (1972), for the proposition that a property owner can testify to the value of their property. We do not disagree with the holding in Hammond, but the case before us is a different situation. When carefully reading Palmer’s testimony, it is clear that his testimony is not his own determination of the value associated with the damages of his property. Palmer is instead providing the estimate of another person. And Palmer did not further elaborate on whether the estimate was an accurate valuation of the damages based on his personal knowledge of his property.

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B. Prejudice

Wells Palmer was prejudiced by defense counsel’s failure to object to the admission of

Palmer’s testimony. Critically, Palmer’s testimony is the only evidence admitted at trial regarding

the actual dollar value of the damages caused by Wells Palmer from which the jury can infer

diminution in value. Defense counsel’s failure to object to the only evidence of value admitted at

trial, where the objection would likely have been granted, was the difference between a

misdemeanor and a felony; the prejudice to the outcome is apparent.

As previously discussed, in Coria, our Supreme Court concluded that sufficient evidence

supported the defendant’s conviction for malicious mischief in the second degree. 146 Wn.2d at

641. The court’s analysis regarding “the dollar value of the property damage” focused entirely on

“Officer Haddow’s testimony,” who “estimated the total amount of damage at $620.” Id. Nowhere

in Coria did our Supreme Court explain that the jury could speculate to the dollar value of damages

in the absence of such evidence. Id. Here, the State similarly cites to no authority for such a

proposition. DeHeer v. Seattle Post-Intelligencer, 60 Wn.2d 122, 126, 372 P.2d 193 (1962)

(“Where no authorities are cited in support of a proposition, the court is not required to search out

authorities, but may assume that counsel, after diligent search, has found none.”).

Therefore, we conclude that Wells Palmer has met her burden in establishing that she

received ineffective assistance of counsel, and she is entitled to a new trial.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, we reverse Wells Palmer’s conviction and remand for a new trial.

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A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the

Washington Appellate Reports but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW

2.06.040, it is so ordered.

Veljacic, C.J.

We concur:

Maxa, J.

Price, J.