FILED NOVEMBER 6, 2025 In the Office of the Clerk of Court WA State Court of Appeals, Division III
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION THREE
STATE OF WASHINGTON, ) No. 40107-3-III ) Respondent, ) ) v. ) ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION ANDREW STAWICKI, ) ) Appellant. )
FEARING, J. — This appeal asks the court to construe a little used section of the
sentencing reform act, RCW 9.94A.535(3)(t), which attaches an aggravator to an
offender’s sentence if the offender committed the current crime “shortly after being
released from incarceration.” Andrew Stawicki committed crimes 109 days after being
released from prison. He challenges imposition of the aggravator. We affirm
FACTS
On January 19, 2023, the Kittitas County Corrections Center released Andrew
Stawicki from confinement after completing his sentence for residential burglary and
fourth degree assault, both with domestic violence aggravators. On May 8, 2023, 109
days later, Stawicki accidentally shot himself in the leg. Stawicki called 911 and met law
enforcement officers outside his residence. He commented to the officers: “That’s why
you don’t put a gun underneath your pillow.” Report of Proceedings (RP) at 266. No. 40107-3-III State v. Stawicki
Law enforcement officers, knowing that the law prohibited Andrew Stawicki from
possessing firearms, searched his home. During the search, officers stopped, obtained a
warrant, and seized three firearms, ammunition, and a holster.
In addition to the crimes previously listed, Andrew Stawicki was convicted of
unlawful possession of a firearm on December 23, 2021.
PROCEDURE
The State of Washington charged Andrew Stawicki with three counts of unlawful
possession of a firearm in the second degree. The State later dismissed one charge
because one firearm was nonfunctional. The trial court, in response to a CrR 3.6 motion,
suppressed additional evidence because of the unlawfulness of the initial warrantless
search of the home. The State’s third amended information charged Stawicki with two
counts of unlawful possession of a firearm with the rapid recidivism aggravator, found in
RCW 9.94A.535(3)(t), added to each count.
The parties agreed to bifurcated trials that separated the underlying offenses of
unlawful possession of a firearm from their aggravators. Andrew Stawicki stipulated to
his release from the Kittitas County Corrections Center on January 19, 2023. The jury
found Stawicki guilty of both counts of unlawful possession of a firearm in the second
degree.
Later, the jury considered whether Andrew Stawicki committed the aggravating
2 No. 40107-3-III State v. Stawicki
circumstance of committing the offenses shortly after being released from incarceration.
The State argued to the jury:
So, he’s released from jail, and 109 days later he has acquired and has in his possession the firearms that you found him guilty of. The State’s asking you to answer the question whether that’s shortly after being released from incarceration as yes.
RP at 460-61.
Andrew Stawicki argued to the jury that 109 days did not constitute a short period
of time.
I mean, short or long depends on what we’re talking about. I mean, short for — I — I would just ask that you give my client the benefit of the doubt that 109 days is not shortly. It’s not like he got out of jail and ran out and bought a gun. Okay? I would say that’s a — significant amount of time rather than shortly after he was released.
RP 4 at 61. The State offered a brief rebuttal:
I mean, I guess the question is interpreting what the law is for you, whether it’s shortly. Do you want somebody who gets out of jail 109 days later to have two guns? Is that too soon? That’s the question you’re being asked, and the answer is yes. Thank you.
RP at 462.
The jury found that Andrew Stawicki committed the offenses shortly after his
release from incarceration. The superior court sentenced him to concurrent terms of 18
months of confinement for each count of unlawful possession of a firearm in the second
degree. Stawicki appeals.
3 No. 40107-3-III State v. Stawicki
LAW AND ANALYSIS
Rapid Recidivism Aggravator
Andrew Stawicki contends that obtaining firearms and accidentally shooting
himself in the leg 109 days after his release from confinement does not make him a rapid
recidivist. Thus, he challenges the sufficiency of evidence to convict him of the
aggravator.
In a criminal case, the State must prove each element of the charged offense
beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 316 (1979). This rule
extends to a sentencing aggravator. We test the sufficiency of the evidence by asking
whether viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, any rational trier of
fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
State v. Gordon, 172 Wn.2d 671, 680, 260 P.3d 884 (2011).
The “rapid recidivism” aggravating circumstance permits a sentencing court to
impose an exceptional sentence when the jury finds that “[t]he defendant committed the
current offense shortly after being released from incarceration.” RCW 9.94A.535(3)(t).
The aggravator expresses a core concern over the defendant’s “disdain for the law,”
which increases the culpability for the present offense. State v. Combs, 156 Wn. App.
502, 506, 232 P.3d 1179 (2010). In determining rapidity, the factfinder must consider, in
addition to the days since release, any similar offenses and the heightened harm or
4 No. 40107-3-III State v. Stawicki
culpability that pattern indicates. State v. Saltz, 137 Wn. App. 576, 584, 154 P.3d 282
(2007). An offender’s violation, on release, of the same crime or harm to the same victim
shows a disregard for the law. State v. Hughes, 154 Wn.2d 118, 141, 110 P.3d 192
(2005); State v. Saltz, 137 Wn. App. 576, 585 (2007); State v. Butler, 75 Wn. App. 47
(1994). Whether a defendant’s conduct qualifies as rapid recidivism depends on the facts
of each case. State v. Combs, 156 Wn. App. 502, 506 (2010).
The legislature could have written the aggravator to include a set time, such as two
months after release, as the cutoff point for the aggravator instead of the language:
“shortly after being released from incarceration.” Thus, the legislature must have
intended the courts to consider more than the duration of time since release from
imprisonment.
In State v. Butler, 75 Wn. App. 47 (1994), Donald Butler, in separate events,
committed second degree robbery and an attempted second degree rape 12 hours after his
release from prison after serving a sentence for first degree robbery. The court upheld the
exceptional sentence. Butler’s immediate reoffense, within hours of his release, reflected
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FILED NOVEMBER 6, 2025 In the Office of the Clerk of Court WA State Court of Appeals, Division III
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION THREE
STATE OF WASHINGTON, ) No. 40107-3-III ) Respondent, ) ) v. ) ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION ANDREW STAWICKI, ) ) Appellant. )
FEARING, J. — This appeal asks the court to construe a little used section of the
sentencing reform act, RCW 9.94A.535(3)(t), which attaches an aggravator to an
offender’s sentence if the offender committed the current crime “shortly after being
released from incarceration.” Andrew Stawicki committed crimes 109 days after being
released from prison. He challenges imposition of the aggravator. We affirm
FACTS
On January 19, 2023, the Kittitas County Corrections Center released Andrew
Stawicki from confinement after completing his sentence for residential burglary and
fourth degree assault, both with domestic violence aggravators. On May 8, 2023, 109
days later, Stawicki accidentally shot himself in the leg. Stawicki called 911 and met law
enforcement officers outside his residence. He commented to the officers: “That’s why
you don’t put a gun underneath your pillow.” Report of Proceedings (RP) at 266. No. 40107-3-III State v. Stawicki
Law enforcement officers, knowing that the law prohibited Andrew Stawicki from
possessing firearms, searched his home. During the search, officers stopped, obtained a
warrant, and seized three firearms, ammunition, and a holster.
In addition to the crimes previously listed, Andrew Stawicki was convicted of
unlawful possession of a firearm on December 23, 2021.
PROCEDURE
The State of Washington charged Andrew Stawicki with three counts of unlawful
possession of a firearm in the second degree. The State later dismissed one charge
because one firearm was nonfunctional. The trial court, in response to a CrR 3.6 motion,
suppressed additional evidence because of the unlawfulness of the initial warrantless
search of the home. The State’s third amended information charged Stawicki with two
counts of unlawful possession of a firearm with the rapid recidivism aggravator, found in
RCW 9.94A.535(3)(t), added to each count.
The parties agreed to bifurcated trials that separated the underlying offenses of
unlawful possession of a firearm from their aggravators. Andrew Stawicki stipulated to
his release from the Kittitas County Corrections Center on January 19, 2023. The jury
found Stawicki guilty of both counts of unlawful possession of a firearm in the second
degree.
Later, the jury considered whether Andrew Stawicki committed the aggravating
2 No. 40107-3-III State v. Stawicki
circumstance of committing the offenses shortly after being released from incarceration.
The State argued to the jury:
So, he’s released from jail, and 109 days later he has acquired and has in his possession the firearms that you found him guilty of. The State’s asking you to answer the question whether that’s shortly after being released from incarceration as yes.
RP at 460-61.
Andrew Stawicki argued to the jury that 109 days did not constitute a short period
of time.
I mean, short or long depends on what we’re talking about. I mean, short for — I — I would just ask that you give my client the benefit of the doubt that 109 days is not shortly. It’s not like he got out of jail and ran out and bought a gun. Okay? I would say that’s a — significant amount of time rather than shortly after he was released.
RP 4 at 61. The State offered a brief rebuttal:
I mean, I guess the question is interpreting what the law is for you, whether it’s shortly. Do you want somebody who gets out of jail 109 days later to have two guns? Is that too soon? That’s the question you’re being asked, and the answer is yes. Thank you.
RP at 462.
The jury found that Andrew Stawicki committed the offenses shortly after his
release from incarceration. The superior court sentenced him to concurrent terms of 18
months of confinement for each count of unlawful possession of a firearm in the second
degree. Stawicki appeals.
3 No. 40107-3-III State v. Stawicki
LAW AND ANALYSIS
Rapid Recidivism Aggravator
Andrew Stawicki contends that obtaining firearms and accidentally shooting
himself in the leg 109 days after his release from confinement does not make him a rapid
recidivist. Thus, he challenges the sufficiency of evidence to convict him of the
aggravator.
In a criminal case, the State must prove each element of the charged offense
beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 316 (1979). This rule
extends to a sentencing aggravator. We test the sufficiency of the evidence by asking
whether viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, any rational trier of
fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
State v. Gordon, 172 Wn.2d 671, 680, 260 P.3d 884 (2011).
The “rapid recidivism” aggravating circumstance permits a sentencing court to
impose an exceptional sentence when the jury finds that “[t]he defendant committed the
current offense shortly after being released from incarceration.” RCW 9.94A.535(3)(t).
The aggravator expresses a core concern over the defendant’s “disdain for the law,”
which increases the culpability for the present offense. State v. Combs, 156 Wn. App.
502, 506, 232 P.3d 1179 (2010). In determining rapidity, the factfinder must consider, in
addition to the days since release, any similar offenses and the heightened harm or
4 No. 40107-3-III State v. Stawicki
culpability that pattern indicates. State v. Saltz, 137 Wn. App. 576, 584, 154 P.3d 282
(2007). An offender’s violation, on release, of the same crime or harm to the same victim
shows a disregard for the law. State v. Hughes, 154 Wn.2d 118, 141, 110 P.3d 192
(2005); State v. Saltz, 137 Wn. App. 576, 585 (2007); State v. Butler, 75 Wn. App. 47
(1994). Whether a defendant’s conduct qualifies as rapid recidivism depends on the facts
of each case. State v. Combs, 156 Wn. App. 502, 506 (2010).
The legislature could have written the aggravator to include a set time, such as two
months after release, as the cutoff point for the aggravator instead of the language:
“shortly after being released from incarceration.” Thus, the legislature must have
intended the courts to consider more than the duration of time since release from
imprisonment.
In State v. Butler, 75 Wn. App. 47 (1994), Donald Butler, in separate events,
committed second degree robbery and an attempted second degree rape 12 hours after his
release from prison after serving a sentence for first degree robbery. The court upheld the
exceptional sentence. Butler’s immediate reoffense, within hours of his release, reflected
a disdain for the law so flagrant as to render him particularly culpable in the commission
of the current offense.
In State v. Saltz, 137 Wn. App. 576 (2007), the court imposed the aggravator
because Gardner Saltz committed his crime one month after release from incarceration.
5 No. 40107-3-III State v. Stawicki
The State initially incarcerated him on a felony violation of a no-contact order. After his
release he contacted the same woman and thereby committed the same crime.
In State v. Combs, 156 Wn. App. 502 (2010), this court ruled that six months after
release from prison did not constitute a short period of time. The court, in part, relied on
the nature of the current crime being attempting to elude a police officer, which the court
considered an impulsive crime that entailed no planning or premeditation.
Andrew Stawicki committed his crime 109 days after release, a duration in
between the one month in State v. Saltz and the six months in State v. Combs, although
closer to the time in Saltz. Stawicki’s crime was not impulsive but entailed purposely
possessing firearms. One of his previous convictions, fourth degree assault, involved
violence, which could be exacerbated by firearms. The State previously convicted
Stawicki with unlawful possession of a firearm, the crime he committed in the pending
appeal. For these reasons, we conclude a reasonable jury could conclude that Stawicki
committed his crimes of unlawful possession of a firearm shortly after release from
incarceration.
Statement of Additional Grounds
In his additional grounds for review, Andrew Stawicki asserts that law
enforcement unlawfully searched his home. We need not address this contention because
the superior court suppressed the evidence obtained as a result of the unlawful search.
6 No. 40107-3-III State v. Stawicki
CONCLUSION
We affirm the superior court’s imposition of the rapid recidivism aggravator.
A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the
Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to
RCW 2.06.040.
____________________________________ Fearing, J.
WE CONCUR:
______________________________ Cooney, J.
______________________________ Lawrence-Berrey, C.J.