IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION ONE
THE STATE OF WASHINGTON, No. 87297-4-I Respondent,
v. PUBLISHED OPINION ALEX KEVIN BARANYI, Appellant.
BOWMAN, A.C.J. — In 1997, 17-year-old Alex Kevin Baranyi murdered all four members of the Wilson family. A jury convicted him of four counts of first degree aggravated murder, and the court imposed four consecutive sentences of life without the possibility of parole (LWOP). In October 2024, the trial court resentenced Baranyi under the Miller1-fix statutes, RCW 10.95.030 and .035, and imposed four concurrent indeterminate sentences of 46 years to life. Baranyi appeals, arguing he is entitled to another resentencing because the court misapplied the Miller factors and imposed an unconstitutional de facto LWOP sentence. In a statement of additional grounds for review (SAG), Baranyi also claims the court improperly considered retribution over rehabilitation. Finding no error, we affirm.
1 Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 183 L. Ed. 2d 407 (2012).
FACTS
In January 1997, Baranyi and David Anderson were 17 years old. Over the course of at least a year, the two had been discussing a plan to kill someone. They decided to commit the crime before their 18th birthdays because juveniles could not receive the death penalty. Ultimately, the two decided to kill 20-year- old Kimberly “Kim” Wilson2 because Anderson did not like her and owed her money.3 They planned to lure Kim to a local park in Bellevue and strangle her because that method of murder would be quieter and draw the least attention. They would then go to Kim’s house, kill the rest of her family, and rob them.
On the evening of January 3, 1997, Anderson drove Baranyi to the Woodridge Water Tower Park, which was about eight blocks from Kim’s home. Baranyi hid in the bushes while Anderson drove to pick up Kim. When Anderson arrived with Kim, Baranyi snuck up behind her and put a rope around her neck. He then put his knee in her back, pinned her face-down on the ground, and strangled her for about four minutes. At one point, Kim managed to get to her knees, so Anderson kicked her in the ribs until she collapsed, and Baranyi kept strangling her until he thought she was dead. To be sure, Baranyi tied the rope around Kim’s neck into a knot. He then dragged her into the bushes to hide her body.
2 We refer to the Wilson family members by their first names for clarity and mean
no disrespect by doing so.
3 Anderson had dated Kim in middle school, and they remained friends after that.
He was mad at Kim because he thought she had “tricked” him into signing an I-owe-you note while he was drunk.
3
After strangling Kim, Anderson and Baranyi returned to Anderson’s truck and smoked a cigarette. Anderson said they needed to “finish it all off,” and Baranyi agreed.4 So, they drove to Kim’s house. They entered the home through an unlocked door with knives and a baseball bat, wore disguises, and covered their hands. They first disabled the landline phone by lifting the headset off the cradle and putting a pillow over it to conceal the dial tone. They then headed for the master bedroom, where Kim’s parents, William “Bill” Wilson and Rosalie “Rose” Wilson, slept. They had to hide in a bathroom when the family dog started barking.
When Baranyi and Anderson eventually entered the bedroom, they approached opposite sides of the bed. Anderson severely beat Rose’s head with the baseball bat, crushing her skull. Baranyi attacked Bill with a knife, repeatedly stabbing him in the head, neck, and face, fracturing Bill’s skull into several pieces and breaking off the tip of the knife in his skull. Anderson eventually joined Baranyi and started beating Bill with the baseball bat, shattering his skull.
Baranyi then went looking for Kim’s sister, 17-year-old Julia Wilson. He confronted Julia in the hallway and stabbed her repeatedly. Anderson arrived with his baseball bat and said he would “ ‘finish this up,’ ” and Baranyi went back into the master bedroom. Baranyi heard Rose making “gurgling noises,” so he stabbed her. He then checked upstairs to make sure no one else was in the home. Before leaving the house, Baranyi and Anderson stole the Wilsons’
4 After his arrest, Baranyi told detectives that he and Anderson decided to kill
Kim’s family because they were worried that her family might know who Kim met with that night.
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telephone, videocassette recorder, and compact disc player. They then drove to Baranyi’s house. They discussed needing to get rid of the evidence and wrapped the bat, knives, and bloody clothes in Baranyi’s coat and threw it in a trash can at a gas station near Baranyi’s house.
On January 5, 1997, two young boys found Kim’s body in the park. When the police went to the Wilsons’ home to inform them of Kim’s death, they discovered the bodies of Rose, Bill, and Julia. Their investigation eventually led them to Anderson and Baranyi.
On January 9, 1997, the police arrested Baranyi, and he confessed to killing the Wilson family. He at first claimed that he acted alone but eventually admitted to working with someone else. He told the police that he killed the family because “[d]eath in itself has always really fascinated” him, and he was “getting into a life-style that was too stagnant and needed to change.” He said that he did not have a personal motive to kill Kim specifically. But he admitted that he had been thinking about taking someone’s life for “years” and wanted to kill because it was an “opportunity to experience something truly phenomenal.”
The State charged Baranyi with four counts of first degree aggravated murder.5 A jury convicted him of all four counts. In January 1999, the trial court sentenced Baranyi to four consecutive LWOP sentences, which was mandatory at the time.6 We affirmed Baranyi’s convictions on appeal. State v. Baranyi, noted at 101 Wn. App. 1054, 2001 WL 1022831, at *1.
5 Baranyi and Anderson were charged as codefendants, but the court severed
their cases for trial.
6 See former RCW 10.95.030(1) (1993).
5
Thirteen years later, the United States Supreme Court decided Miller and held that a mandatory LWOP sentence for juveniles violates the United States Constitution’s Eighth Amendment prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment. 567 U.S. at 470. The Court explained that before sentencing a juvenile to LWOP, a court must “take into account how children are different, and how those differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime in prison.” Id. at 480. In response to Miller, our state legislature enacted what are often called the “Miller-fix” statutes, requiring courts to resentence juveniles previously sentenced to mandatory LWOP for aggravated first degree murder. See RCW 10.95.030(2)(a)(ii), (b),7 .035; State v. Haag, 198 Wn.2d 309, 319, 495 P.3d 241 (2021).
In October 2023, Baranyi moved for resentencing under Miller and the Miller-fix statutes. He argued his crimes stemmed from “transient youthful immaturity, impetuosity, and significant childhood adversity that left [him] particularly susceptible to negative peer influence—and with a corresponding impaired ability to appreciate risks and consequences.” Baranyi asked the court to resentence him to concurrent indeterminate sentences of 25 years to life.8 The State agreed that Baranyi must be resentenced but asked the court to
7 When the legislature added the new language to RCW 10.95.030, it was
subsection 3(b). LAWS OF 2014, ch. 130, § 9. Because only the subsection but not the relevant language has changed over subsequent amendments, we cite the current statute.
8 Under RCW 10.95.030(2)(a)(ii), a court must sentence any person convicted of
aggravated first degree murder for an offense committed when the person is at least 16 years old but less than 18 years old to at least 25 years’ imprisonment.
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impose concurrent sentences of 80 years to life, arguing that Baranyi’s culpability was not mitigated by his youth.
In September 2024, the trial court held a resentencing hearing. Physician, psychiatrist, and child psychiatrist Dr. Terry Lee testified on behalf of Baranyi. Dr. Lee reviewed Baranyi’s school, court, police, health, and mental health records and evaluated Baranyi in 2015 and 2023 for the purpose of resentencing. Dr. Lee testified about Baranyi’s childhood. He said Baranyi “did not receive optimal parenting,” which negatively affected his capacity to plan and inhibited his impulses. He opined that because of this, Baranyi would have been “less capable . . . of decision making, emotional regulation, and behavioral regulation compared to a typical teenager.” Dr. Lee testified there were “many aspects about the crime that showed immature brain functioning,” including the crime was impulsive, it “evolved over time,” and “there wasn’t a lot of planning that went into it.” And he explained that Baranyi “fell under [the] peer influence” of Anderson, his “only friend,” which is a “hallmark of adolescent brain functioning.”9 Dr. Brian Judd testified for the State. Dr. Judd is a psychologist who interviewed Baranyi in July 2023. He agreed with Dr. Lee that adverse childhood experiences have a dampening effect on brain development and that this may have been a factor that influenced Baranyi’s decision making and actions. But, in Dr. Judd’s opinion, Dr. Lee’s analysis was an “over-reach.” Dr. Judd explained that he, too, generally looks at the “degree of” preplanning, impulsivity, and impetuosity to see if brain development is linked to a person’s crime. And in Dr.
9 See Miller, 567 U.S. at 477 (“hallmark features” of youth include “immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences”).
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Judd’s opinion, the evidence did not show that Baranyi’s crimes bore the hallmark characteristics of youth. Instead, the evidence “clearly” showed signs of a conduct disorder.10 Dr. Judd also performed a comprehensive risk assessment and found that Baranyi presented a low-to-moderate risk of violently reoffending.
Several other witnesses testified at the hearing. One of the Wilsons’
extended family members testified about the heartbreak and sadness she and her relatives experienced since losing them. Two of Baranyi’s fellow inmates testified about the work Baranyi had done to make life better for them and the other inmates at Clallam Bay Corrections Center. They talked specifically about Baranyi’s work in creating the TEACH11 program that helped long-term inmates get enrolled in college. And Department of Corrections Officer Michael Woodhouse testified about Baranyi becoming “an integral part” of the “Release Readiness Program”12 while he was incarcerated. He said that Baranyi “essentially wrote the curriculum” and “spent countless . . . hours, days and weeks, months probably, developing a workbook both for the students, and a workbook for the instructors.”
Forty-five-year-old Baranyi also testified on his own behalf. He told the court that “I am here to accept responsibility for what I did. I’m not here to justify my actions.” And he apologized that “it’s taken so long.” He also described his
10 Dr. Judd explained that conduct disorder is a prerequisite to a diagnosis of
antisocial personality disorder, but he could not make that diagnosis until after a person turns 18 years old.
11 Taking education and creating history.
12 Officer Woodhouse described the Release Readiness Program as “an eight week class that inmates could take to prepare for release.”
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journey toward change. He said he started taking classes and reading books and “got into Buddhism.” He explained that he
spent thousands of hours of classes, thousands of hours of homework, thousands of hours of self-reflective meditation because the me at 17 is unacceptable to me. What I did is unacceptable to me. I’m not going to let that happen again. I’m not going to let him exist.
Baranyi told the court that “I need help. I don’t think I can do it in prison.” He said, “I should have helped Kim. I should have helped her sister. I should have helped their parents. I didn’t. I was scared and I didn’t — I didn’t know how.”
The trial court determined the record did not show “that the hallmark characteristics of youth were substantial factors in Mr. Baranyi’s crimes.” First, it concluded that Baranyi did not act on impulse. It reasoned that Baranyi and Anderson spent at least a year planning the murders and chose to act before they turned 18 so they would receive less severe punishment if caught. Then, the court determined that Baranyi appreciated the risks and consequences of his actions. It explained that after strangling Kim, the pair went to the Wilson home and murdered her remaining family members because they might have known where Kim was on the night she was murdered. And Baranyi tried to conceal his identity and get rid of evidence to avoid being caught. So, the court concluded that “the record does not support the finding or conclusion that [Baranyi’s] actions were significantly influenced by his age, immaturity or impetuosity.”
The court then considered the mitigating factors of Baranyi’s childhood and rehabilitation. It recognized that Baranyi “encountered adverse childhood experiences” and that Anderson exerted influence over him. It also noted that
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Baranyi has engaged in “significant amounts of training and programming since his incarceration, some of which predated the . . . Miller decision.” The court commented:
Despite the facts surrounding the commission of his crimes, not substantially displaying the hallmark features of youth, mitigating factors are present in this case. And upon consideration of Mr. Baranyi’s family circumstances and his environment growing up. Further, Mr. Baranyi’s service to others while incarcerated, his education aimed at personal growth and development and remorse towards the Wilson family, that suggests that Mr. Baranyi has demonstrated a heightened capacity for change, which supports the finding that he may be capable of rehabilitation.
The court stated that Baranyi’s progress since his incarceration showed that he does not fall into the “category of a rare juvenile [d]efendant that is irreparab[ly] depraved, incorrigible or irreparably corrupt.” So, it concluded that it could not impose a de facto LWOP sentence. Still, the court found this was a “rare case” in which a “longer sentence is appropriate.” It resentenced Baranyi to four concurrent indeterminate sentences of 46 years to life.
Baranyi appeals.
ANALYSIS
Baranyi argues he must again be resentenced because the court misapplied the Miller factors and imposed an unconstitutional de facto LWOP sentence. In a SAG, Baranyi also claims the court improperly considered retribution over rehabilitation. We disagree.
“We will reverse a sentencing court’s decision only if we find ‘a clear abuse of discretion or misapplication of the law.’ ” State v. Delbosque, 195
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Wn.2d 106, 116, 456 P.3d 806 (2020)13 (quoting State v. Blair, 191 Wn.2d 155, 159, 421 P.3d 937 (2018)). A trial court abuses its discretion when its decision is manifestly unreasonable or based on untenable grounds. Id.
The Eighth Amendment and article I, section 14 of the Washington Constitution prohibit cruel punishment. Punishment is “cruel” when it is “entirely disproportionate to the seriousness of [the] crimes” committed. State v. Fain, 94 Wn.2d 387, 402, 397, 617 P.2d 720 (1980) (adopting four-factor disproportionality analysis); see also State v. Moretti, 193 Wn.2d 809, 830, 446 P.3d 609 (2019) (a sentence may also be cruel under article I, section 14 if it is “grossly disproportionate to the offense”).
Children are constitutionally different from adults for the purpose of sentencing. Miller, 567 U.S. at 471; In re Pers. Restraint of Ali, 196 Wn.2d 220, 225, 474 P.3d 507 (2020). So, to avoid disproportionate punishment when imposing adult sentences on juveniles, “our criminal justice system [must] address this difference.” Ali, 196 Wn.2d at 225-26; State v. Houston-Sconiers, 188 Wn.2d 1, 18-19, 391 P.3d 409 (2017). Still, although most juvenile offenders are less culpable than adult offenders, “youth” itself is not a per se mitigating factor that always justifies a lower sentence. State v. Anderson, 200 Wn.2d 266, 285, 516 P.3d 1213 (2022). Instead, a juvenile offender must show that their immaturity, impetuosity, or failure to appreciate risks and consequences— characteristics of youth that suggest a juvenile offender may be less culpable than an adult offender—contributed to the commission of their crime. Id.
13 Internal quotation marks omitted.
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Juvenile offenders can show that the hallmark characteristics of youth are reflected in their crime by presenting “ ‘relevant mitigation evidence bearing on the circumstances of the offense and the culpability of the offender, including both expert and lay testimony as appropriate.’ ” Haag, 198 Wn.2d at 320-2114 (quoting Delbosque, 195 Wn.2d at 121). And an offender can show they are not irreparably corrupt by offering evidence of their capacity to change. Delbosque, 195 Wn.2d at 122. 1. Application of the Miller Factors Baranyi argues the resentencing court misapplied the Miller factors because it concluded that his crimes did not reflect the hallmark characteristics of youth before considering his capacity to change. Baranyi suggests that his capacity to change is a factor the court should have considered when determining whether the characteristics of youth were reflected in his crime. We disagree.
In 2012, the United States Supreme Court first recognized in Miller the unconstitutional disparity of sentencing juveniles to mandatory LWOP. In that case, the Court held that mandatory LWOP sentences for juvenile offenders violate the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. Miller, 567 U.S. at 470. The Court explained that a mandatory LWOP sentence for a juvenile “precludes consideration of his chronological age and its hallmark features—among them, immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences.” Id. at 477. Those distinctive attributes of youth “diminish
14 Internal quotation marks omitted.
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the penological justifications for imposing the harshest sentences on juvenile offenders, even with they commit terrible crimes.” Id. at 472.
The Court also explained that a mandatory LWOP sentence does not serve the goal of rehabilitation. Miller, 567 U.S. at 472-73. Instead, it reflects an irrevocable judgment about an offender’s value and place in society, which is at odds with a child’s capacity to change. Id. at 473. Such a sentence should be reserved for the “ ‘rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption.’ ” Id. at 479-80 (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 573, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 161 L. Ed. 2d 1 (2005)).
The Miller Court recognized that juveniles may be “ ‘less deserving of the most severe punishments’ ” because they have both “diminished culpability and greater prospects for reform.” 567 U.S. at 471 (quoting Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 176 L. Ed. 2d 825 (2010)). As to diminished culpability, the sentencing court must determine whether immaturity, impetuosity, or failure to appreciate risks and consequences contributed to the commission of the crime. Anderson, 200 Wn.2d at 285. And determining the prospect for reform involves a “forward-looking” assessment of an offender’s capacity for change. Delbosque, 195 Wn.2d at 122.
In response to Miller, our state legislature passed RCW 10.95.035 and amended RCW 10.95.030, commonly referred to as the Miller-fix statutes. LAWS OF 2014, ch. 130, §§ 11, 9. RCW 10.95.035(1) requires resentencing for any person sentenced to mandatory LWOP for an offense committed before their 18th birthday. And RCW 10.95.030(2)(b) requires a sentencing court to consider
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the “diminished culpability of youth” in setting a minimum term for the sentence, “including, but not limited to,” the “age of the individual, the youth’s childhood and life experience, the degree of responsibility the youth was capable of exercising, and the youth’s chances of becoming rehabilitated.” The latter Miller-fix statute is intended to account for the diminished culpability of youth “as provided in Miller.” Id. So, it does not require an analysis different from that described in Miller.
The record here shows that the resentencing court properly applied both the Miller factors and the Miller-fix statutes. The court thoughtfully and carefully considered Baranyi’s mitigating evidence, both as it related to the crime itself and to his capacity for rehabilitation. It first assessed whether Baranyi’s crimes reflected the hallmark characteristics of youth. In doing so, the court appropriately considered evidence relevant to youthful characteristics that may have contributed to the commission of the crimes—the facts and circumstances of the murders, information about Baranyi’s cognitive development leading up to and at the time of the murders, and corresponding expert opinions.
After concluding that Baranyi’s crimes did not reflect the hallmark characteristics of youth, the court then looked to whether Baranyi’s sentence should be mitigated nonetheless based on his capacity for reform. It determined that Baranyi’s evidence of rehabilitation showed a greater prospect for reform than a similarly situated adult, warranting a sentence less than the most severe punishment.
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Because the characteristics of youth reflected in a crime relate to diminished culpability, and evidence of rehabilitation relates separately to the capacity for reform, the trial court did not err in its application of the Miller factors. 2. Unconstitutional De Facto LWOP Sentence Baranyi argues that his 46-year sentence amounts to an unconstitutional de facto LWOP sentence. Citing Haag, Baranyi contends that the court issued a sentence that will “ ‘deprive him of a meaningful life,’ ” despite concluding that he was not irreparably corrupt. See 198 Wn.2d at 328-29. Again, we disagree.
In 1995, Timothy Haag was convicted of aggravated first degree murder for killing his 7-year-old neighbor when he was 17 years old. Haag, 198 Wn.2d at 313. The court sentenced him to LWOP. Id. at 312. In 2018, the court resentenced Haag. Id. at 314. At his resentencing hearing, Haag offered unrebutted expert testimony that he would have been a low risk of reoffending at the time he committed the crime. Id. at 314-15. An expert also testified that Haag had no serious mental health issues and continued to be a low risk of reoffending. Id. at 314. And Haag presented evidence that he had matured in prison and testified about the remorse he felt for the crime. Id. at 314-15. Despite the unrebutted testimony, the court resentenced Haag to 46 years to life, focusing on the age of Haag’s young victim and the disturbing facts of the crime instead of how his youth may have diminished his culpability or increased his capacity for change. Id. at 315-16.
Our Supreme Court reversed the sentence. Haag, 198 Wn.2d at 330. It concluded Haag’s sentence amounted to an unconstitutional de facto LWOP
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sentence under both the Eighth Amendment and article I, section 14 of our constitution. Id. at 329-30. It reasoned that the sentence was procedurally unsound because the resentencing court misapplied the law by focusing more on retribution than rehabilitation. Id. at 323-24. The court also held that Haag’s 46- year sentence was a “de facto life sentence” because it resulted in him losing “meaningful opportunities to reenter society and to have a meaningful life.” Id. at 327. It reasoned that a juvenile sentenced to be released at 63 years old “has lost incalculably more than an adult in the same circumstances.” Id. at 329.
The court explained that “in the face of the substantial and uncontroverted mitigating evidence presented by Haag, the resentencing court favored retributive factors over an abundance of mitigation factors.” Haag, 198 Wn.2d at 325. And it held that in a “Miller-fix hearing,” “retributive factors must count for less than mitigating factors,” and that the resentencing court’s “inversion of this balance” amounted to reversible error. Id. Still, the court pointed out that its holding “does not prevent future trial courts from exercising discretion.” Id. at 326. Sentencing courts “retain the discretion to determine whether and to what extent a juvenile offender has been rehabilitated, whether youthfulness contributed to the crime, and whether he or she is likely to reoffend.” Id.
Justice Debra Stephens concurred in part and dissented in part from the majority ruling. Haag, 198 Wn.2d at 331. She agreed that the trial court erred by emphasizing retributive factors over the mitigating qualities of youth. Id. at 332. But she disagreed with the majority’s conclusion that “Haag’s 46-year minimum term constitutes an unconstitutional de facto LWOP sentence.” Id. Justice
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Stephens explained that Miller rendered LWOP an unconstitutional penalty for only those juvenile offenders “ ‘whose crimes reflect the transient immaturity of youth.’ ” Id. at 333 (quoting Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190, 208, 136 S. Ct. 718, 193 L. Ed. 2d 599 (2016)).
Justice Stephens pointed to subsequent United States Supreme Court opinions that show “the Eighth Amendment does not categorically bar LWOP sentences for juvenile homicide offenders who demonstrate their capacity for rehabilitation.” Haag, 198 Wn.2d at 334. Instead, a state’s “ ‘discretionary sentencing system is both constitutionally necessary and constitutionally sufficient’ to permit the imposition of LWOP sentences on juvenile homicide offenders under the Eighth Amendment.” Id. at 334-35 (quoting Jones v. Mississippi, 593 U.S. 98, 105, 141 S. Ct. 1307, 209 L. Ed. 2d 390 (2021)). So, “the Eighth Amendment did not prohibit the resentencing court from exercising discretion to impose an LWOP sentence, much less the 46-year minimum term that gives Haag the opportunity for parole.” Id. at 337. Justice Stephens also noted that the majority did not explain why Washington’s constitution would bar such a sentence. Id. at 339-40.
One year later, Justice Stephens wrote for the majority in Anderson. In that case, 17-year-old Tonelli Anderson and his friend planned to steal drugs from James Bateman and then “kill him and any witnesses.” Anderson, 200 Wn.2d at 270. After his friend killed Bateman, Anderson shot two women in a nearby bedroom, killing one of them. Id.15 In 2000, Anderson was convicted of
15 The two-year-old son of one of the women was also in the room, and Anderson “kicked the toddler away” when he grabbed Anderson’s leg. Id.
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two counts of first degree murder and sentenced to “the longest sentence available within the standard range,” 61 years. Id. at 272. Then, in 2018, he was resentenced under the Miller-fix statutes. Id. at 272-73.
At his resentencing hearing, Anderson argued that the facts of his case showed he acted with impulsivity and immaturity, and he submitted articles describing scientific studies on juvenile brain development. Anderson, 200 Wn.2d at 273. Anderson also submitted several “supportive letters,” exclaiming that he “ ‘was a reliable and dependable worker’ ” in prison. Id. The letters explained that he had been “ ‘instrumental and consistent with preparing for not only his release but also assisting in the preparation of reentry for fellow prisoners by tutoring,’ ” and they congratulated Anderson for being named to the “ ‘President’s List’ ” at Walla Walla Community College. Id. Anderson also provided “two dozen certificates of participation, proficiency, completion, recognition, and achievement” for various programs he joined while serving his sentence. Id.
The resentencing court “conducted a thorough hearing based on a clear understanding of Miller and the role the mitigating qualities of youth must play in sentencing a juvenile offender as an adult.” Anderson, 200 Wn.2d at 275. The court found that Anderson’s crimes did not reflect immaturity, impetuosity, or a failure to understand the consequences of his actions. Id. at 277. It pointed to the preplanned nature of the robbery and murders, Anderson’s attempt to kill both women to hinder law enforcement’s investigation of who killed Bateman, and the fact that Anderson had “never taken responsibility for this crime” yet
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discussed the details of his crimes in letters to girlfriends. Id. at 277-78, 271. The court reviewed the certificates and many accomplishments that Anderson achieved in prison, “praised” Anderson for his efforts, and “urged him to ‘continue[ ] to be a leader.’ ” Id. at 277.16 But after weighing Anderson’s evidence of rehabilitation with the circumstances of his crimes, the court resentenced Anderson to his original sentence of 61 years’ imprisonment. Id. at 278.
On appeal, Anderson argued that Haag announced a new “categorical bar” under article I, section 14, prohibiting “any” sentence 46 years or longer for “any” juvenile offender. Anderson, 200 Wn.2d at 280. But our Supreme Court rejected that characterization of Haag. Id. Instead, it explained that Haag recognized a categorical bar prohibiting de facto LWOP sentences “for juvenile offenders who have shown that their crimes reflect youthful immaturity, impetuosity, or failure to appreciate risks and consequences.” Id. And in Haag, unlike in Anderson, “the resentencing court imposed a de facto LWOP sentence even though Haag’s crime reflected youthful immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences.” Id. at 281 (citing Haag, 198 Wn.2d at 327).
As part of its reasoning, our Supreme Court acknowledged that its decision in Bassett announced that article I, section 14 categorically bars LWOP sentences for juvenile offenders. Anderson, 200 Wn.2d at 282 (citing State v. Bassett, 192 Wn.2d 67, 90, 428 P.3d 343 (2018)). But it explained that central to
16 Alteration in original.
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Bassett’s reasoning is that “an LWOP sentence—unlike any other sentence—is inherently harsher for juvenile offenders than for adult offenders, while the ability to identify those rare juvenile offenders who merit such punishment is imperfect at best.” Id. at 282-83. And, in any event, Bassett’s reasoning “does not readily translate to term-of-years sentences.” Id. at 283. So, Haag “cannot be read to draw a bright line prohibiting term-of-years sentences of 46 years or more for all juvenile offenders.” Id. at 283-84.
Instead, courts must read Haag in line with Bassett’s “recognition that judicial discretion generally provides the necessary protection against” cruel and unusual punishment when imposing adult sentences on juvenile offenders. Anderson, 200 Wn.2d at 284. And, while courts must recognize that “in the unique context of LWOP sentences, the risk of erroneous judgment is too high,” there is still “no reasoning in either Haag or Bassett that suggests a 46-year sentence would be impermissible for the rare juvenile offender who is just as culpable as an adult offender.” Id. As a result, article I, section 14 categorically bars de facto LWOP sentences for only those juvenile offenders “whose crimes reflect youthful immaturity, impetuosity, or failure to appreciate risks or consequences.” Id.
Like the resentencing court in Anderson, the resentencing court here conducted a thorough hearing based on a clear understanding of Miller and the role the mitigating qualities of youth must play in sentencing a juvenile offender as an adult. The court acknowledged that Baranyi was 17 years old when he murdered the Wilsons. It recognized that there is a difference between youth
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and adults, that “[a]dolescent brains are still developing,” and that teenagers are “generally more likely than adults to engage in risky and impulsive behavior.” And it acknowledged that juveniles are “more emotionally reactive and susceptible to peer influences,” have “less developed problem solving skills,” and have less capacity to weigh the consequences of their actions.
And, like the resentencing court in Anderson, the resentencing court here concluded that Baranyi failed to show that his crimes reflected immaturity, impetuosity, or a failure to appreciate the risks and consequences of his actions.17 So, Baranyi failed to show that his culpability was diminished by his youth, and the court was not categorically barred from imposing a de facto LWOP sentence.
But, unlike in Anderson, the court here was convinced that Baranyi’s evidence of rehabilitation showed he had the capacity to change. The resentencing court recognized that Baranyi engaged in significant amounts of training and programming since incarceration, some of which predated Miller, and recognized that those efforts supported his growth and capacity for rehabilitation. The court noted that Baranyi confessed to his participation in the murders and expressed remorse, and it acknowledged that Baranyi has a relatively low risk of recidivism. And the court took those mitigating factors into consideration. It explained that “[w]hile I do not find the hallmark features of youth were substantial factors in Mr. Baranyi’s actions at the time of his crimes,”
17 Baranyi does not challenge this conclusion on appeal.
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there are “also significant mitigating circumstances that must be considered in this case,” warranting a reduction of Baranyi’s original sentence.
The resentencing court said:
[I]t is through the legal requirement that this case be viewed with a greater focus on rehabilitation than retribution; that the totality of the record supports the finding and conclusion that Mr. Baranyi’s efforts and demonstrated capacity for rehabilitation reveal his . . . greater capacity for change.
Still, “this is a rare case in which a longer sentence is appropriate.” So, under the “unique facts of this case and the circumstances of this case,” the court resentenced Baranyi to four concurrent sentences of 46 years to life. Indeed, a sentence 15 years less than Tonelli Anderson’s.
Like the court in Anderson, the resentencing court here properly considered the Miller factors and concluded Baranyi failed to meet his burden to prove that his crimes reflected youthful immaturity, impetuosity, or the failure to appreciate the risks and consequences of his actions. And, after meaningful consideration of Baranyi’s capacity for reform, weighed against the aggravating circumstances of his crimes,18 the court properly exercised its discretion in imposing four concurrent 46-year sentences.19 Because the resentencing court did not misapply the Miller factors, and neither the Eighth Amendment nor article I, section 14 forbids Baranyi’s four
18 While sentencing courts must focus on the mitigating qualities of youth, “they
must also consider the facts of the particular case, including those that counsel in favor of punishment.” Anderson, 200 Wn.2d at 286.
19 In his SAG, Baranyi argues that the resentencing court improperly focused
more on retribution than rehabilitation when issuing his sentence. But the record shows that its consideration was forward looking and did not improperly place more emphasis on retribution than on mitigation.
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concurrent indeterminate sentences of 46 years to life, we affirm his resentencing.
WE CONCUR: