FILED
AUGUST 18, 2015
In the Office of the Clerk of Court
W A State Court of Appeals, Division III
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION THREE
STATE OF WASHINGTON, ) ) Respondent, ) No. 32730-2-II1 ) v. ) ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION A.L.-A. 1, (D.O.B. 6/11199), ) ) Appellant. )
KORSMO, J. - A.L.-A. appeals her juvenile court adjudication of guilt for first
degree assault. She contends the evidence was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that she intended to inflict great bodily hann or that the knife she used constituted a
deadly weapon. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we are
satisfied that the evidence was sufficient to prove the assault. We affirm.
FACTS
During the early afternoon of April 1, 2014, then 14-year-old A.L.-A. began to
argue with her older sister, Y.A.2 Report of Proceedings (RP) at 16,21. When Y.A.
IUnder RAP 3.4, we change the title of the case to the juvenile'S initials to protect the juvenile's interest in privacy. 2 This court uses initials when referring to appellant's relatives to protect her privacy. No. 32730-2-111 State v. Ayala
retreated to the bathroom to take a shower, A.L.-A. began banging on the door and
demanding that Y.A. open the door. A.L-A. repeatedly demanded that her sister open the
door and threatened to destroy her sister's possessions if she did not do so. Y.A.
eventually opened the door and A.L.-A. went in and out of the bathroom.
Y.A. telephoned their mother, C.A., and told her she needed to come home and
control A.L-A. When C.A. returned home, Y.A. informed her that A.L.-A. had been
hitting her younger brother for no reason and had been leaving condoms on Y.A.'s bed.
According to Y.A., this last comment incensed A.L.-A. and she started hitting Y.A. with
her fist in the face and stomach. In retaliation, Y.A. told A.L.-A. that she was going to
break A.L.-A.'s Xbox. This infuriated A.L.-A., who then threw a laptop and television
that belonged to Y.A. In response, Y.A. grabbed A.L.-A.'s Xbox and threw it outside.
A.L.-A. then went into the kitchen with her mother, picked up a sharp steak knife
and started swinging it back and forth with the blade pointed upward while yelling that
she wanted to kill herself and Y.A. A.L.-A.'s mother called the police and Y.A. pushed
A.L.-A. into the kitchen counter, fearing that she was going to hurt their mother. In
response, A.L.-A. took a step toward Y.A. and swung at her with the knife, cutting Y.A.'s
left arm in the process. A.L.-A. ran outside with the knife.
No. 32730-2-III State v. Ayala
The State charged A.L.-A. with first degree assault, felony harassment, third
degree malicious mischief, and second degree assault. At trial, Y.A. testified that the
kitchen knife was "pretty sharp" and estimated that the total length was about seven
inches. RP at 40. She also testified that she did not notice the cut on her arm until about
ten to fifteen minutes after the incident and that she did not believe that A.L.-A. actually
intended to kill her. A police officer testified that the cut on Y.A.'s arm was shallow and
about two to three inches long. RP at 75; see also State's Exhibit 2.
When A.L.-A. testified, she stated that she had been angry because Y.A. had
recently moved home with her boyfriend and taken A.L.-A.'s bedroom. She admitted that
she and her sister had been arguing and that she pushed her sister. She also admitted that
she cut Y.A., but claimed that she only used her fingernails. She also admitted that she
put a knife to her throat and threatened to kill herself, but denied cutting Y.A. with the
knife.
The juvenile court found A.L.-A. guilty of first degree assault and third degree
malicious mischief. The court entered the following relevant findings of fact:
1.12) The Respondent was holding the knife in her right hand, blade forward and pointed upward, swinging the knife back and forth in a forward motion and at the same time yelling that she was going to kill [Y.A.]. When the Respondent was holding the knife, and threatening to kill [Y.A.], the two were close, only one to two feet apart. The Respondent was capable of carrying out the threat.
1.13) While the record did not establish the length of the blade itself on the seven inch kitchen knife, the facts established that the physical attributes of the kitchen knife in combination with the way it was held, waived [sic] around, threatened to be used (both verbally and physically) and actually swung at ... [was] capable of significant lacerations of the flesh of the victim, [Y.A.] which could have easily resulted in permanent scaring [sic] and disfigurement (for instance, had the knife slashed her face), i.e., great bodily harm. Thus, the knife was a deadly weapon under RCW 9A.04.110(6).
1.16) The Respondent, close to [Y.A.], lifted the knife over her head and swung the knife at [Y.A.] inflicting a wound on [Y.A.]'s left arm approximately two to three inches long between her shoulder and her elbow, drawing blood. Responding Police Officer Matt Lee described the length of the cut as significant. Given the escalating tensions, the immediately preceding physical assault on [Y.A.], the Respondent's verbal threats to kill [Y.A.] in the kitchen coupled with her wielding the knife and contemporaneous actions evidencing a present willingness to use the knife to carry out the threat, the Court is persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that Respondent did in fact intend to cause great bodily harm. (It is not essential that "great bodily harm" actually occur.)
1.17) The Respondent's actions were an intentional cutting of [Y.A.] with the knife and were in fact harmful to [Y.A.]. Thus, Respondent's actions constituted an intentional assault.
Clerks Papers (CP) at 54-56.
ANALYSIS
A.L.-A. argues that insufficient evidence supports her adjudication for first degree
assault because the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that she intended to
inflict great bodily harm or that the knife constituted a deadly weapon. We disagree.
No. 32730-2-II1 State v. Ayala
When we review a sufficiency challenge to a conviction, we detennine whether
"after viewing the evidence most favorable to the [State], any rational trier of fact could
have found the essential elements" of the crime "beyond a reasonable doubt." State v.
Green, 94 Wn.2d 216, 221-22, 616 P.2d 628 (1980) (emphasis omitted). "A sufficiency
challenge admits the truth of the State's evidence and accepts the reasonable inferences to
be made from it." State v. O'Neil, 159 Wn.2d 500,505, 150 P.3d 1121 (2007).
A.L.-A. first argues that the State failed to present evidence that she intended to
inflict great bodily injury. She points out that she did not lunge at Y.A. or hold the knife
in a manner that suggested she intended to hurt Y.A., rather she swung the knife in front
of her in an outward motion from her own body and when the altercation ended, she ran
out the back door.
As relevant here, under RCW 9A.36.011, first degree assault occurs when a
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FILED
AUGUST 18, 2015
In the Office of the Clerk of Court
W A State Court of Appeals, Division III
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION THREE
STATE OF WASHINGTON, ) ) Respondent, ) No. 32730-2-II1 ) v. ) ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION A.L.-A. 1, (D.O.B. 6/11199), ) ) Appellant. )
KORSMO, J. - A.L.-A. appeals her juvenile court adjudication of guilt for first
degree assault. She contends the evidence was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that she intended to inflict great bodily hann or that the knife she used constituted a
deadly weapon. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we are
satisfied that the evidence was sufficient to prove the assault. We affirm.
FACTS
During the early afternoon of April 1, 2014, then 14-year-old A.L.-A. began to
argue with her older sister, Y.A.2 Report of Proceedings (RP) at 16,21. When Y.A.
IUnder RAP 3.4, we change the title of the case to the juvenile'S initials to protect the juvenile's interest in privacy. 2 This court uses initials when referring to appellant's relatives to protect her privacy. No. 32730-2-111 State v. Ayala
retreated to the bathroom to take a shower, A.L.-A. began banging on the door and
demanding that Y.A. open the door. A.L-A. repeatedly demanded that her sister open the
door and threatened to destroy her sister's possessions if she did not do so. Y.A.
eventually opened the door and A.L.-A. went in and out of the bathroom.
Y.A. telephoned their mother, C.A., and told her she needed to come home and
control A.L-A. When C.A. returned home, Y.A. informed her that A.L.-A. had been
hitting her younger brother for no reason and had been leaving condoms on Y.A.'s bed.
According to Y.A., this last comment incensed A.L.-A. and she started hitting Y.A. with
her fist in the face and stomach. In retaliation, Y.A. told A.L.-A. that she was going to
break A.L.-A.'s Xbox. This infuriated A.L.-A., who then threw a laptop and television
that belonged to Y.A. In response, Y.A. grabbed A.L.-A.'s Xbox and threw it outside.
A.L.-A. then went into the kitchen with her mother, picked up a sharp steak knife
and started swinging it back and forth with the blade pointed upward while yelling that
she wanted to kill herself and Y.A. A.L.-A.'s mother called the police and Y.A. pushed
A.L.-A. into the kitchen counter, fearing that she was going to hurt their mother. In
response, A.L.-A. took a step toward Y.A. and swung at her with the knife, cutting Y.A.'s
left arm in the process. A.L.-A. ran outside with the knife.
No. 32730-2-III State v. Ayala
The State charged A.L.-A. with first degree assault, felony harassment, third
degree malicious mischief, and second degree assault. At trial, Y.A. testified that the
kitchen knife was "pretty sharp" and estimated that the total length was about seven
inches. RP at 40. She also testified that she did not notice the cut on her arm until about
ten to fifteen minutes after the incident and that she did not believe that A.L.-A. actually
intended to kill her. A police officer testified that the cut on Y.A.'s arm was shallow and
about two to three inches long. RP at 75; see also State's Exhibit 2.
When A.L.-A. testified, she stated that she had been angry because Y.A. had
recently moved home with her boyfriend and taken A.L.-A.'s bedroom. She admitted that
she and her sister had been arguing and that she pushed her sister. She also admitted that
she cut Y.A., but claimed that she only used her fingernails. She also admitted that she
put a knife to her throat and threatened to kill herself, but denied cutting Y.A. with the
knife.
The juvenile court found A.L.-A. guilty of first degree assault and third degree
malicious mischief. The court entered the following relevant findings of fact:
1.12) The Respondent was holding the knife in her right hand, blade forward and pointed upward, swinging the knife back and forth in a forward motion and at the same time yelling that she was going to kill [Y.A.]. When the Respondent was holding the knife, and threatening to kill [Y.A.], the two were close, only one to two feet apart. The Respondent was capable of carrying out the threat.
1.13) While the record did not establish the length of the blade itself on the seven inch kitchen knife, the facts established that the physical attributes of the kitchen knife in combination with the way it was held, waived [sic] around, threatened to be used (both verbally and physically) and actually swung at ... [was] capable of significant lacerations of the flesh of the victim, [Y.A.] which could have easily resulted in permanent scaring [sic] and disfigurement (for instance, had the knife slashed her face), i.e., great bodily harm. Thus, the knife was a deadly weapon under RCW 9A.04.110(6).
1.16) The Respondent, close to [Y.A.], lifted the knife over her head and swung the knife at [Y.A.] inflicting a wound on [Y.A.]'s left arm approximately two to three inches long between her shoulder and her elbow, drawing blood. Responding Police Officer Matt Lee described the length of the cut as significant. Given the escalating tensions, the immediately preceding physical assault on [Y.A.], the Respondent's verbal threats to kill [Y.A.] in the kitchen coupled with her wielding the knife and contemporaneous actions evidencing a present willingness to use the knife to carry out the threat, the Court is persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that Respondent did in fact intend to cause great bodily harm. (It is not essential that "great bodily harm" actually occur.)
1.17) The Respondent's actions were an intentional cutting of [Y.A.] with the knife and were in fact harmful to [Y.A.]. Thus, Respondent's actions constituted an intentional assault.
Clerks Papers (CP) at 54-56.
ANALYSIS
A.L.-A. argues that insufficient evidence supports her adjudication for first degree
assault because the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that she intended to
inflict great bodily harm or that the knife constituted a deadly weapon. We disagree.
No. 32730-2-II1 State v. Ayala
When we review a sufficiency challenge to a conviction, we detennine whether
"after viewing the evidence most favorable to the [State], any rational trier of fact could
have found the essential elements" of the crime "beyond a reasonable doubt." State v.
Green, 94 Wn.2d 216, 221-22, 616 P.2d 628 (1980) (emphasis omitted). "A sufficiency
challenge admits the truth of the State's evidence and accepts the reasonable inferences to
be made from it." State v. O'Neil, 159 Wn.2d 500,505, 150 P.3d 1121 (2007).
A.L.-A. first argues that the State failed to present evidence that she intended to
inflict great bodily injury. She points out that she did not lunge at Y.A. or hold the knife
in a manner that suggested she intended to hurt Y.A., rather she swung the knife in front
of her in an outward motion from her own body and when the altercation ended, she ran
out the back door.
As relevant here, under RCW 9A.36.011, first degree assault occurs when a
person, "with intent to inflict great bodily hann ... assaults another with a fireann or any
deadly weapon or by any force or means likely to produce great bodily harm or death."
RCW 9A.36.011(1)(a). "Great bodily hann" is defined as "bodily injury which creates a
probability of death or which causes a significant pennanent disfigurement, or which
causes a significant pennanent loss or impairment of the function of any bodily part or
organ." RCW 9A.04.110(4)(c). Intent is present when a person "acts with the objective
or purpose to accomplish a result which constitutes a crime." RCW 9A.08.010.
"Evidence of intent ... is to be gathered from all the circumstances of the case." State v. I Ferreira, 69 Wn. App. 465, 468, 850 P.2d 541 (1993) (quoting State v. Woo Won Choi, I [ I' 55 Wn. App. 895, 906, 781 P.2d 505 (1989». i Here, the evidence shows that A.L.-A. was angry and out of control before she
wielded the knife. As tensions between her and her sister escalated, A.L.-A. destroyed
some ofY.A.'s personal property and hit her in the face and stomach with her fists. She
then grabbed a knife from the kitchen and swung it back and forth while threatening to
kill Y.A. After Y.A. pushed her, A.L.-A. thrust the knife forward, cutting Y.A.'s left
arm. Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the State, the State presented
sufficient evidence to support the court's finding that A.L.-A. intended to inflict great
bodily harm on Y.A.
A.L-A. also argues that the State did not meet its burden of showing she was
armed with a deadly weapon. Again, we disagree. Objects other than firearms and
explosives qualifY as deadly weapons if the State proves, under the circumstances of the
case, that the object was "readily capable of causing death or substantial bodily harm."
RCW 9A.04.l10(6). In tum, "substantial bodily harm" means "bodily injury which
involves a temporary but substantial disfigurement, or which causes a temporary but
substantial loss or impairment of the function of any bodily part or organ, or which causes
a fracture of any body part." RCW 9A.04.110(4)(b).
A.L.-A. argues that the State failed to show that the knife actually caused
substantial bodily harm because the minor cut at issue in the case does not quality as 1 substantial disfigurement. She points out that the cut was two- to three-inches long and
that Y.A. did not even notice when it was inflicted. This argument misses the mark. II !! The nature of the actual injury inflicted is only one factor in determining whether f l: f the knife was capable ofinflicting substantial bodily harm. State v. Holmes, 106 Wn. !t , I App. 775, 781-82, 24 P.3d 1118 (2001). Other factors include the intent and ability of the Ir
user, the degree of force, and the part of the body to which it was applied. Holmes, 106 I Wn. App. at 782. Thus, the issue here is whether the knife, under the circumstances in I ! which it was used, or threatened to be used, was readily capable of causing temporary but ! i ! substantial disfigurement. State v. Shilling, 77 Wn. App. 269, 273, 492 P.2d 233 (1972)
("[r]eady capability is determined in relation to surrounding circumstances, with reference I f
to potential substantial bodily harm."). In State v. Barragan, 102 Wn. App. 754, 761,9
P.3d 942 (2000), for example, a pencil was deemed a deadly weapon where the evidence
showed that the defendant forcefully swung the pencil's pointed end at the victim's eye
and threatened to kill the victim. "[T]here must be some manifestation of willingness to
7 No. 32730-2-II1 State v. Ayala
use the knife before it can be found to be a deadly weapon under RCW 9A.04.110(6)."
State v. Gotcher, 52 Wn. App. 350,354, 759 P.2d 1216 (1988).
A.L.-A. manifested a ready willingness to use the knife to cause severe injury. She
swung the knife in an upward motion in close proximity to her sister and cut her arm.
While the reSUlting cut was not deep, the potential for impairment, as RCW 9A.04.110(6)
requires, was great. Viewed in a light most favorable to the State, the State presented
sufficient evidence that the knife was possessed in such circumstances that it was readily
capable of causing substantial bodily harm and thus a deadly weapon. We therefore
conclude that sufficient evidence supports the adjudication of guilt for first degree
assault.
Affirmed.
A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will notbe printed in the
Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW
2.06.040.
WE CONCUR:
dzdLow~. C)} Brown, J. Siddoway, C . l ' ()