IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
STATE OF WASHINGTON, No. 88676-2-I Respondent, DIVISION ONE v. UNPUBLISHED OPINION A.G.,
Appellant.
COBURN, J. — Fourteen-year-old A.G. pled guilty to assault in the third degree.
The court entered a one-year deferred disposition and imposed community supervision
conditions including the statutory requirement that A.G. refrain from committing new
offenses and comply with mandatory school attendance. At issue in this appeal is the
court’s requirement of random urinalysis (UA) to monitor A.G.’s use of controlled
substances and alcohol. Finding no error, we affirm.
FACTS
When A.G. was 13 years old, he and his brother were accused of stealing blow
torches from Home Depot. The resulting police chase and arrest resulted in A.G. being
charged with assault in the third degree, obstruction, and theft in the third degree. This
was the first time A.G. was in the court system. The parties entered an agreed
disposition where A.G. pled guilty to assault in the third degree in exchange for
dismissal of the other counts. 88676-2-I/2
A.G., the State, and the probation officer agreed that a deferral was appropriate.
The probation officer submitted a disposition probation report that included school
discipline records. The probation officer summarized that A.G. struggles with school
attendance, including being suspended for cannabis use. The probation officer and the
State recommended that the court require A.G. submit to random UA testing while on
community supervision. A.G. objected, arguing that such a condition had to be crime-
related and A.G.’s adjudication had no relationship to alcohol or drugs.
The court imposed a one-year deferred disposition. As part of this order, the
court imposed general community supervision conditions, including, as relevant to this
appeal, that
(A) The respondent is ordered to refrain from committing new offenses. This provision includes no possession/use of alcohol and non-prescribed controlled substances; no possession/use of drug paraphernalia; and no possession/use of firearms, ammunition, or dangerous weapons as dictated by RCW 9.41. “Dangerous weapons” includes clubs, knives, metal knuckles, guns, tasers, or other weapons capable of producing bodily injury. (B) The respondent is ordered to comply with the mandatory school attendance provisions of RCW 28A.225 and have no unexcused absences or suspensions. If the respondent has an unexcused absence or suspension, the respondent shall immediately notify the probation counselor.
The court also imposed specific community supervision conditions, including: “The
Respondent shall be monitored for the use of controlled substances and/or alcohol
through random urinalysis or other testing as directed by the probation counselor, and
the Respondent shall fully cooperate.” A.G. appeals.
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DISCUSSION
Crime-Relatedness
A.G. argues that the trial court exceeded its statutory authority when it ordered
A.G. to submit to random UA as a community supervision condition because the
condition was not crime-related and the condition does not further his rehabilitation. The
State argues that the condition is appropriate because it allows the court to monitor
A.G.’s compliance with a required condition under RCW 13.40.020(5). We agree with
the State.
The Juvenile Justice Act (JJA) intends “that youth … be held accountable for
their offenses and that communities, families, and the juvenile courts carry out their
functions consistent with this intent.” RCW 13.40.010(2). To accomplish this intent, the
statute lists “equally important purposes,” including to “[p]rotect the citizenry from
criminal behavior” and “[p]rovide for the rehabilitation and reintegration of juvenile
offenders,” among others. RCW 13.40.010(2)(a), (f) (emphasis added). “[T]he JJA
permits juvenile courts to impose any conditions of supervision it deems necessary to
meet the needs of the juvenile and to effectuate the rehabilitative and accountability
goals of the JJA.” State v. S.D.H., 17 Wn. App. 2d 123, 131-32, 484 P.3d 538 (2021)
(citing State v. H.E.J., 102 Wn. App. 84, 87, 9 P.3d 835 (2000)). Juvenile courts have
wide latitude when imposing those conditions. State v. K.H.-H., 185 Wn.2d 745, 755,
374 P.3d 1141 (2016). Accordingly, “[w]e review conditions for abuse of discretion and
will reverse if a condition is manifestly unreasonable.” State v. J.H.-M., 28 Wn. App. 2d
757, 761, 538 P.3d 644 (2023).
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A.G. quotes the following holding from K.H.-H. to support his argument that
conditions imposed must be crime-related, arguing that the court’s authority is confined
to “‘reasonable conditions that are related to the crime of which the offender was
convicted and that further the reformation and rehabilitation of the juvenile.’” (quoting
K.H.-H., 185 Wn.2d at 755). A.G. quotes this passage out of context and fails to
recognize that K.H.-H.’s holding relates to a condition that has nothing to do with
monitoring statutorily mandated conditions. K.H.-H., 185 Wn.2d at 755. The full quote
reads, “‘a juvenile court can impose and require reasonable conditions that are related
to the crime of which the offender was convicted and that further the reformation and
rehabilitation of the juvenile.’” Id. (emphasis added).
In K.H-H., the juvenile court sentenced the defendant to three months of
community supervision and ordered him to write an apology letter to the victim. Id. at
748. The defendant alleged that this condition violated his First Amendment rights and
article I, section 5 of the Washington Constitution. Id. The court disagreed, explaining
that:
Juvenile courts are permitted wide latitude and discretion in imposing conditions in a disposition order. This makes sense given that juveniles are, by their very nature, still developing. The JJA recognizes the differences between adults and juveniles and embraces rehabilitation as a primary goal rather than a focus primarily on punishment. Because of this, we hold that a juvenile court can impose and require reasonable conditions that are related to the crime of which the offender was convicted and that further the reformation and rehabilitation of the juvenile.
Id. at 755-56. The court held that under the “wide latitude and discretion” given to
juvenile courts, it was proper for the juvenile court to order K.H.–H. to write a letter of
apology to the victim. Id. at 755. Notably, in the adult context, community supervision
conditions must be crime related. RCW 9.94A.505(9); State v. Nguyen, 191 Wn.2d 671,
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683, 425 P.3d 847 (2018). However, the Washington Supreme Court recently answered
“the question of whether a condition that authorizes [(breath analysis)] BA and UA
testing to monitor compliance with statutorily authorized conditions prohibiting alcohol
and drug use is constitutionally permitted, even if it is not crime related.” State v.
Nelson, 4 Wn.3d 482, 485, 565 P.3d 906 (2025). The court answered the question in
the affirmative, holding that if prohibitions of alcohol and drug use are statutorily
authorized, they do not have to be crime-related to be imposed; thus, it follows that
monitoring compliance with statutorily-authorized prohibitions via random BA and UA
testing need not be crime-related. 1 Id. at 503-04.
Turning back to the JJA, the juvenile court, in imposing community supervision,
“shall order the juvenile to refrain from committing new offenses” and “shall order the
juvenile to comply with the mandatory school attendance provisions of chapter 28A.225
RCW.” RCW 13.40.020(5). Under the JJA, “[c]ommunity supervision is an individualized
program that can include monitoring and reporting requirements.” State v. S.J., No.
59322-0-ll, slip op. at 21 (Wash. Ct. App. July 29, 2025) (unpublished) (citing RCW
13.40.020(5)(c)), https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/D2%2059322-0-
II%20Unpublished%20Opinion.pdf, review denied, 584 P.3d 402 (2026). 2 The State
understandably relies on S.J. as persuasive authority, as it directly addresses the same
issue raised in this appeal.
1 The Nelson court noted that its holding does not preclude an inquiry on another day in another case where the method of enforcement is challenged as unreasonable. Nelson, 4 Wn.3d at 509. Similarly, in the instant case, A.G. raises concerns about how random UAs may negatively impact A.G.’s schooling by forcing him to miss class. Such concerns relate to future enforcement that is not ripe for review in the instant case. 2 We may cite or discuss unpublished opinions in our opinions if “necessary for a reasoned decision.” GR 14.1(c). 5 88676-2-I/6
In S.J., the juvenile argued
that the juvenile court abused its discretion when it imposed the condition that S.J. refrain from using drugs and alcohol because her underlying offenses had nothing to do with drug or alcohol use, nor does the record show that she struggles with substance abuse. Additionally, S.J. argues that the condition of random urinalyses (UAs) violates her right to privacy.
No. 59322-0-ll, slip op. at 23. Similar to the record in the instant case, nothing in the
record in S.J. suggested that alcohol or drugs were related to S.J.’s offenses. S.J., No.
59322-0-ll, slip op. at 23. Additionally, like A.G., S.J. was still a minor when the juvenile
court imposed her community supervision conditions, meaning she could not legally
drink alcohol. S.J., No. 59322-0-ll, slip op. at 24 (citing RCW 66.44.270(3)(a)). Just as
the S.J. court recognized that S.J. using drugs or alcohol, based on her age, would
constitute a new offense in violation of the mandatory condition of refraining from
committing new offenses, so is the case for A.G. S.J., No. 59322-0-ll, slip op. at 24. The
S.J. court held that the juvenile court did not err when it imposed random UA to monitor
the prohibition on S.J.’s drug and alcohol use. S.J., No. 59322-0-ll, slip op. at 24.
Moreover, in the instant case, the record supports that A.G.’s cannabis use impacted
his struggles with school attendance. Even A.G.’s counsel argued that “the focus on
Probation should be to make sure that A.G. is caught up with school.”
The condition that A.G. refrain from using drugs or alcohol is consistent with the
accountability and rehabilitative purposes of the JJA. See RCW 13.40.010, .020(5). The
juvenile court did not err in ordering random UA to monitor A.G.’s compliance with
statutorily authorized conditions.
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Article I, Section 7
A.G. also claims that the random UA testing is an unconstitutional intrusion on
his privacy under article I, section 7 of our state constitution. A.G. objected to this
condition below but did not argue it was a violation of his privacy. He argues that he can
raise this argument for the first time on appeal because the condition “implicates” a
constitutional interest. Under RAP 2.5(a), we may refuse to review a claim or error not
raised in the trial court. An exception to this rule is when the claimed error is a “manifest
error affecting a constitutional right.” RAP 2.5(a)(3). The State does not argue that A.G.
waived this issue.
Before reviewing the merits of an unpreserved error under RAP 2.5(a)(3), we
must ask two questions: (1) has the party claiming the error shown the error is truly of
constitutional magnitude and, if so, (2) has the party demonstrated that the error is
manifest? State v. Kalebaugh, 183 Wn.2d 578, 583, 355 P.3d 253 (2013).
We do not assume a party’s assigned error is of constitutional magnitude. State
v. O’Hara, 167 Wn.2d 91, 98, 217 P.3d 756 (2009). Instead, “[w]e look to the asserted
claim and assess whether, if correct, it implicates a constitutional interest as compared
to another form of trial error.” Id. To determine whether the RAP 2.5(a)(3) exception is
applicable, “[i]t is proper to ‘preview’ the merits of the constitutional argument to
determine whether it is likely to succeed.” State v. Kirwin, 165 Wn.2d 818, 823, 203
P.3d 1044 (2009) (quoting State v. Walsh, 143 Wn.2d 1, 8, 17 P.3d 591 (2001)). Here,
we are asked to consider whether it is an unlawful disturbance of private affairs to
subject a juvenile to random UA. Because this question reaches a constitutional
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interest, we consider the merits of A.G.’s argument to determine if there is error and if it
is manifest.
Article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution provides that “[n]o person shall
be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of law.” A
search occurs under article I, section 7 if “the government disturbs ‘those privacy
interests which citizens have held, and should be entitled to hold, safe from
governmental trespass absent a warrant.’” State v. Hinton, 179 Wn.2d 862, 868, 319
P.3d 9 (2014) (emphasis omitted) (quoting State v. Myrick, 102 Wn.2d 506, 511, 688,
P.2d 151 (1984)). “Article I, section 7 ‘is grounded in a broad right to privacy.’” Id.
(quoting State v. Chacon Arreola, 176 Wn.2d 284, 291, 290 P.3d 983 (2012)).
An analysis under article I, section 7 requires a two-party inquiry. State v.
Bowman, 198 Wn.2d 609, 618, 498 P.3d 478 (2021) (citing State v. Miles, 160 Wn.2d
236, 243, 156 P.3d 864 (2007)). First, courts must determine if the challenged action
disturbs an individual’s private affairs. State v. McKinney, 148 Wn.2d 20, 27, 60 P.3d 46
(2002)). The State concedes that random UA disturbs an individual’s private affairs,
satisfying the first prong under article I, section 7, even while recognizing that
probationers have a reduced expectation of privacy. Nelson, 4 Wn.3d at 501-02.
If an individual’s private affairs have been disturbed, the second prong under
article I, section 7 requires the court to determine whether the disturbance is justified by
the “authority of law.” Miles, 160 Wn.2d at 244. In State v. Olsen, 189 Wn.2d 118, 127-
28, 399 P.3d 1141 (2017), our state Supreme Court explained that, in the context of a
person on probation, to determine whether a disturbance has “authority of law” the court
should engage in a balancing test. This balancing test includes “examin[ing] whether a
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compelling interest, achieved through narrowly tailored means, supports the intrusion
into a … probationer’s reduced privacy interests.” Id. at 128. Probationers have a duty
to engage in their rehabilitation in exchange for the privilege of being relieved from jail
time and “should expect close scrutiny.” Id. at 127. The fact that the defendant in Olsen
was an adult and A.G. is a juvenile is a distinction without a material difference in
determining that this balancing test should equally apply to the instant case.
Here, A.G. was granted a deferred disposition, which means that he was found
guilty on stipulated facts and the disposition is deferred pending satisfaction of
conditions of supervision that the court specifies. State v. D.P.G., 169 Wn. App. 396,
399, 280 P.3d 1139 (2012). “If the juvenile completes all supervision conditions, the
conviction will be vacated and the case dismissed with prejudice.” Id. Therefore, A.G.
has a duty to engage in his rehabilitation, through complying with his supervision
conditions, for the privilege of his conviction being vacated and his case dismissed with
prejudice. For A.G.’s random UA supervision condition to have authority of law, there
must be a compelling interest achieved through narrowly tailored means.
As to whether A.G.’s condition has authority of law, the State relies on Nelson. In
Nelson, the defendant pled guilty to three counts of rape of a child in the third degree,
communication with a minor for immoral purposes, and child molestation in the second
degree. 4 Wn.3d at 487. The court imposed a special sex offender sentencing
alternative and placed the defendant on community custody. Id. at 487-88. One of the
defendant’s community custody conditions prohibited him from using controlled
substances without a prescription, consuming alcohol, and using cannabis without
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medical authorization. Id. at 488. To monitor his compliance, the court required the
defendant to submit to breathalyzer and UA testing. Id.
The defendant argued that this condition violated his right to privacy under article
I, section 7. Id. at 492. As in the instant case, the parties agreed that the first prong
under article I, section 7 is met. Id. at 501-502. However, A.G. argues that Nelson
cannot apply here under the second prong of his article I, section 7 challenge because
Nelson applies to an adult and he is a juvenile. We disagree.
First, A.G. states that Nelson cannot apply because the JJA prioritizes
rehabilitation over punishment. As discussed above, the JJA provides for the
rehabilitation and reintegration of juvenile offenders, and juvenile courts have wide
latitude when imposing conditions of supervision it deems necessary to meet the needs
of the juvenile and to effectuate the JJA’s rehabilitative and accountability goals. S.D.H.,
17 Wn. App. 2d at 131-32 (citing H.E.J., 102 Wn. App. at 87). Juvenile courts are not
only authorized to impose conditions of community supervision, but they also are
required to impose certain community supervision conditions, such as requiring the
juvenile to refrain from committing new crimes and requiring juveniles to comply with
mandatory school attendance. RCW 13.40.020(5). A.G. cites no authority to support
that monitoring compliance through random UA equates to punishment.
In Nelson, the court held that the State has a compelling interest in “promot[ing]
and assess[ing] the rehabilitation of a probationer,” “effective prison and probation
management” and “protect[ing] the public.” 4 Wn.3d at 504 (alterations in original) (citing
Matter of Juveniles A, B, C, D, E, 121 Wn.2d 80, 92, 94, 847 P.2d 455 (1993); Olsen,
189 Wn.2d at 129). Similarly, here, the JJA specifically states that rehabilitation and
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protecting the public are equally important purposes of the Act. RCW 13.40.010(2)(a),
(f). The juvenile court has a compelling interest in disturbing A.G.’s privacy interest in
protecting the public and promoting his rehabilitation through effective community
supervision management.
Next, A.G. argues that his random UA community supervision condition is not
narrowly tailored because he is expected to attend school every day but will be forced to
leave school and present a urine sample when requested. Nothing in the record
supports this assertion. Instead, A.G. provides in his brief a link to a website listing
times that the UA testing center in Snohomish County is open. Even if we were to
consider this information, the working hours of 5 a.m. to 3:59 p.m. do not establish that
the random UA would necessarily interfere with A.G.’s school attendance. A.G.
conflates concerns related to reasonableness of future enforcement as opposed to
whether the condition is narrowly tailored.
In Olsen, our state Supreme Court held that a random UA condition was narrowly
tailored because it was a crucial monitoring tool that was limited in scope and imposed
only to assess compliance with a valid prohibition on drug and alcohol use. 189 Wn.2d
at 130. The defendant in Olsen pled guilty to one count of driving under the influence
(DUI) and, as a condition of her suspended sentence, she could not consume alcohol,
marijuana, or nonprescribed drugs. Id. at 121. The court also required the defendant
submit to random UA to ensure compliance with conditions regarding alcohol and
controlled substances. Id.
The court reasoned that the defendant’s random UA condition was narrowly
tailored because UA is “an important monitoring tool utilized by courts during the
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rehabilitative process of probation.” Id. at 130. Additionally, the defendant’s judgment
and sentence explicitly authorized random UA only to “ensure compliance with
conditions regarding the consumption of alcohol and controlled substances.” Id. at 132-
33. Therefore, the court held that the defendant’s random UA requirement was narrowly
tailored. Id. at 134. 3 Recently, the Washington Supreme Court reaffirmed its support of
its holding in Olsen and held that when BA and UA testing is narrowly tailored to
achieve the State’s compelling interest in monitoring compliance to validly imposed
community custody conditions, such testing is “not as a fishing expedition.” Nelson, 4
Wn.3d at 509.
Although Olsen involved an adult, not a juvenile in juvenile court, its reasoning as
to the constitutional question still applies. Notably, Olsen’s holding that the defendant’s
random UA was narrowly tailored focused on the rehabilitative process of probation; the
JJA also has a rehabilitative focus. RCW 13.40.010(2)(f). 4 Also, like the condition in
Olsen, A.G.’s community supervision condition explicitly authorized random UA only to
“monitor[] for the use of controlled substances and/or alcohol.” We hold that A.G.’s
community supervision requirement to submit to random UA is narrowly tailored and
does not violate his article I, section 7 right to privacy. Accordingly, A.G. fails to
establish that the court requiring him to submit to random UA as part of his community
supervision constitutes a manifest constitutional error.
3 The court was careful to note that random UA can “lack ‘authority of law’ absent a sufficient connection to a validly imposed probation condition or if the testing is conducted in an unreasonable manner.” Olsen, 189 Wn.2d at 134. 4 Later, in Nelson, our state Supreme Court further clarified that “Olsen never expressly stated that random UA testing for alcohol consumption is constitutional only in a case involving a DUI conviction or only when the condition is crime related.” 4 Wn.3d at 506. 12 88676-2-I/13
CONCLUSION
We affirm.
WE CONCUR: