STATE GF WASHING! C."
2013JUH 10 AHIhi*b
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
STATE OF WASHINGTON, No. 68148-6-1 Respondent, DIVISION ONE v.
LONNIE CURTIS LAMAR, JR., UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appellant. FILED: June 10. 2013
Spearman, A.C.J. — Lonnie Lamar, Jr. was convicted of child molestation
in the first degree. On appeal, he claims the trial court violated his constitutional
right to an impartial jury and committed reversible error by failing to instruct the
reconstituted jury, after deliberations had begun and an alternate juror had
replaced an original juror, to disregard previous deliberations and begin
deliberations anew. We agree with Lamar. We reverse his conviction and remand
for retrial.
FACTS
The State charged Lamar with rape of a child in the first degree and child
molestation in the first degree. The State alleged that on or about January 13,
1998 through July 1, 2000 Lamar had sexual contact and sexual intercourse with
his daughter, a minor during that period. No. 68148-6-1/2
The case went to trial and closing arguments were heard on Friday,
October 14, 2011. Before the jury retired, the court excused the alternate juror,
Juror 3, directing him to remain available and not talk about the case. The jury
deliberated for 45 minutes to one hour that day. On Monday morning, Juror 4
called in sick. The trial court held a hearing with all parties present. The parties
agreed to replace Juror 4 with Juror 3. The court told the parties it would "tell the
other members of the jury that they should provide [the replacement juror] with a
recap of what their deliberations had been on Friday." Report of Proceedings
(RP) (10/17/11) at 429. The parties did not object. The jury was brought into the
courtroom and the court told the jury:
Well, ladies and gentlemen, as you can see, Juror No. 4 has not been able to join us this morning. He called in early, I think about 6:00 o'clock, and then called a second time about 7:00 o'clock, indicated that he was ill and that he would not be able to come in. And as I explained to you Friday, that's the whole reason I didn't excuse Juror No. 3.
And so now Juror No. 3 is going to take Juror No. 4's spot so that all 12-we have 12 jurors again.
What I will advise you to do is this: When you go back to the jury room and begin your deliberations, you should spend some time reviewing, recapping with Juror No. 3 any discussion that you may have already had Friday in terms of the case so that he's first brought up to speed in terms of whatever the deliberative process was.
Then once that's been done, resume your deliberations without any other hitches or anything else.
RP (10/17/11) at 430. No objection was made and the jury was excused to begin
deliberations. No. 68148-6-1/3
The jury deliberated for approximately four hours that day. The jury
delivered its verdict that afternoon, acquitting Lamar of rape of a child and
convicting him of child molestation. The court informed the jury that it was "going
to ask you is this how you voted on both of these counts." Each juror, including
Juror 3, answered "yes." RP at 432-33.
Lamar appeals.
DISCUSSION
Lamar claims the trial court violated his constitutional right to an impartial
jury through its instruction to the reconstituted jury.1 He contends the courtfailed to instruct the reconstituted jury to disregard all previous deliberations and begin
deliberations anew as required by CrR 6.5.
A defendant's right to an impartial jury is guaranteed by article I, section
22 of the Washington State Constitution and the Sixth Amendment to the United
States Constitution. State v. Latham. 100 Wn.2d 59, 62-63, 667 P.2d 56 (1983).
Claims of constitutional error are reviewed de novo. State v. Stanley, 120 Wn.
App. 312, 314, 85 P.3d 395 (2004).
CrR 6.5, governing the use of alternate jurors, relates to a defendant's
constitutional rights to a fair trial before an impartial jury and to a unanimous
verdict. State v. Ashcraft, 71 Wn. App. 444, 463, 859 P.2d 60 (1993). The rule
provides, "Ifthe jury has commenced deliberations prior to replacement of an
1The State contends this claim is not a "manifesterror affecting a constitutional right" under RAP 2.5(a)(3) that can be raised for the first time on appeal. Its waiver argument is not well taken. We have held that a trial court's failure to instruct a reconstituted jury on the record to disregard previous deliberations and begin deliberations anew is a manifest constitutional error that can be raised for the first time on appeal. State v. Ashcraft. 71 Wn. App. 444, 463 n.7, 859 P.2d60(1993). No. 68148-6-1/4
initial juror with an alternate juror, the jury shall be instructed to disregard all
previous deliberations and begin deliberations anew." CrR 6.5. The purpose of
such an instruction "is to assure jury unanimity—to assure the parties, the public
and any reviewing court that the verdict rendered has been based upon the
consensus of the 12 jurors who rendered the final verdict, based upon the
common experience of all of them." Ashcraft. 71 Wn. App. at 466 (quoting State
v. Fisch. 22 Wn. App. 381, 381, 588 P.2d 1389 (1979). It is "reversible error of
constitutional magnitude to fail to instruct the reconstituted jury on the record that
it must disregard all prior deliberations and begin deliberations anew." |d. at 464.
Ashcraft and Stanley are instructive. In Ashcraft. the jury had begun
deliberations when the trial court replaced one juror with an alternate juror
without consulting the defense or instructing the reconstituted jury to begin
deliberations anew. jd. at 450. The jury returned a verdict of guilty for two counts
of second degree assault and guilty of one count of the lesser included offense of
simple assault. ]d_. at 448, 450. We reversed and remanded for retrial on the
basis of the trial courts' failure to instruct the reconstituted jury on the record to
disregard all previous deliberations and begin deliberations anew. Id. at 467.
Similarly, in Stanley, after the original jury had deliberated for approximately one
hour, the trial court replaced a juror with an alternate juror, and the record did not
show what instruction, if any, was given to the reconstituted jury. Stanley. 120
Wn. App. at 313. Furthermore, the record did not show whether Stanley or his
counsel was present when the alternate juror was seated. ]d. at 313. The State
conceded error under the circumstances, but argued it was harmless, id. at 316. No. 68148-6-1/5
We disagreed and reversed the defendant's conviction for felony harassment,
noting that as in Ashcraft "[i]t is not beyond the realm of reasonable possibility
that the reconstituted jury could have concluded that it need not begin
deliberations anew as to any issues already considered by the original 12
jurors."2 ]a\ at 317. Here, we find nothing in the trial court's statements to the reconstituted
jury that instructed it to disregard all previous deliberations and begin anew. In
fact, the court told the reconstituted jury that the members of the original jury
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STATE GF WASHING! C."
2013JUH 10 AHIhi*b
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
STATE OF WASHINGTON, No. 68148-6-1 Respondent, DIVISION ONE v.
LONNIE CURTIS LAMAR, JR., UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appellant. FILED: June 10. 2013
Spearman, A.C.J. — Lonnie Lamar, Jr. was convicted of child molestation
in the first degree. On appeal, he claims the trial court violated his constitutional
right to an impartial jury and committed reversible error by failing to instruct the
reconstituted jury, after deliberations had begun and an alternate juror had
replaced an original juror, to disregard previous deliberations and begin
deliberations anew. We agree with Lamar. We reverse his conviction and remand
for retrial.
FACTS
The State charged Lamar with rape of a child in the first degree and child
molestation in the first degree. The State alleged that on or about January 13,
1998 through July 1, 2000 Lamar had sexual contact and sexual intercourse with
his daughter, a minor during that period. No. 68148-6-1/2
The case went to trial and closing arguments were heard on Friday,
October 14, 2011. Before the jury retired, the court excused the alternate juror,
Juror 3, directing him to remain available and not talk about the case. The jury
deliberated for 45 minutes to one hour that day. On Monday morning, Juror 4
called in sick. The trial court held a hearing with all parties present. The parties
agreed to replace Juror 4 with Juror 3. The court told the parties it would "tell the
other members of the jury that they should provide [the replacement juror] with a
recap of what their deliberations had been on Friday." Report of Proceedings
(RP) (10/17/11) at 429. The parties did not object. The jury was brought into the
courtroom and the court told the jury:
Well, ladies and gentlemen, as you can see, Juror No. 4 has not been able to join us this morning. He called in early, I think about 6:00 o'clock, and then called a second time about 7:00 o'clock, indicated that he was ill and that he would not be able to come in. And as I explained to you Friday, that's the whole reason I didn't excuse Juror No. 3.
And so now Juror No. 3 is going to take Juror No. 4's spot so that all 12-we have 12 jurors again.
What I will advise you to do is this: When you go back to the jury room and begin your deliberations, you should spend some time reviewing, recapping with Juror No. 3 any discussion that you may have already had Friday in terms of the case so that he's first brought up to speed in terms of whatever the deliberative process was.
Then once that's been done, resume your deliberations without any other hitches or anything else.
RP (10/17/11) at 430. No objection was made and the jury was excused to begin
deliberations. No. 68148-6-1/3
The jury deliberated for approximately four hours that day. The jury
delivered its verdict that afternoon, acquitting Lamar of rape of a child and
convicting him of child molestation. The court informed the jury that it was "going
to ask you is this how you voted on both of these counts." Each juror, including
Juror 3, answered "yes." RP at 432-33.
Lamar appeals.
DISCUSSION
Lamar claims the trial court violated his constitutional right to an impartial
jury through its instruction to the reconstituted jury.1 He contends the courtfailed to instruct the reconstituted jury to disregard all previous deliberations and begin
deliberations anew as required by CrR 6.5.
A defendant's right to an impartial jury is guaranteed by article I, section
22 of the Washington State Constitution and the Sixth Amendment to the United
States Constitution. State v. Latham. 100 Wn.2d 59, 62-63, 667 P.2d 56 (1983).
Claims of constitutional error are reviewed de novo. State v. Stanley, 120 Wn.
App. 312, 314, 85 P.3d 395 (2004).
CrR 6.5, governing the use of alternate jurors, relates to a defendant's
constitutional rights to a fair trial before an impartial jury and to a unanimous
verdict. State v. Ashcraft, 71 Wn. App. 444, 463, 859 P.2d 60 (1993). The rule
provides, "Ifthe jury has commenced deliberations prior to replacement of an
1The State contends this claim is not a "manifesterror affecting a constitutional right" under RAP 2.5(a)(3) that can be raised for the first time on appeal. Its waiver argument is not well taken. We have held that a trial court's failure to instruct a reconstituted jury on the record to disregard previous deliberations and begin deliberations anew is a manifest constitutional error that can be raised for the first time on appeal. State v. Ashcraft. 71 Wn. App. 444, 463 n.7, 859 P.2d60(1993). No. 68148-6-1/4
initial juror with an alternate juror, the jury shall be instructed to disregard all
previous deliberations and begin deliberations anew." CrR 6.5. The purpose of
such an instruction "is to assure jury unanimity—to assure the parties, the public
and any reviewing court that the verdict rendered has been based upon the
consensus of the 12 jurors who rendered the final verdict, based upon the
common experience of all of them." Ashcraft. 71 Wn. App. at 466 (quoting State
v. Fisch. 22 Wn. App. 381, 381, 588 P.2d 1389 (1979). It is "reversible error of
constitutional magnitude to fail to instruct the reconstituted jury on the record that
it must disregard all prior deliberations and begin deliberations anew." |d. at 464.
Ashcraft and Stanley are instructive. In Ashcraft. the jury had begun
deliberations when the trial court replaced one juror with an alternate juror
without consulting the defense or instructing the reconstituted jury to begin
deliberations anew. jd. at 450. The jury returned a verdict of guilty for two counts
of second degree assault and guilty of one count of the lesser included offense of
simple assault. ]d_. at 448, 450. We reversed and remanded for retrial on the
basis of the trial courts' failure to instruct the reconstituted jury on the record to
disregard all previous deliberations and begin deliberations anew. Id. at 467.
Similarly, in Stanley, after the original jury had deliberated for approximately one
hour, the trial court replaced a juror with an alternate juror, and the record did not
show what instruction, if any, was given to the reconstituted jury. Stanley. 120
Wn. App. at 313. Furthermore, the record did not show whether Stanley or his
counsel was present when the alternate juror was seated. ]d. at 313. The State
conceded error under the circumstances, but argued it was harmless, id. at 316. No. 68148-6-1/5
We disagreed and reversed the defendant's conviction for felony harassment,
noting that as in Ashcraft "[i]t is not beyond the realm of reasonable possibility
that the reconstituted jury could have concluded that it need not begin
deliberations anew as to any issues already considered by the original 12
jurors."2 ]a\ at 317. Here, we find nothing in the trial court's statements to the reconstituted
jury that instructed it to disregard all previous deliberations and begin anew. In
fact, the court told the reconstituted jury that the members of the original jury
should review their previous deliberations with the replacement juror and bring
that juror "up to speed" as to what the original jurors had discussed. The court's
remarks suggested that the reconstituted jury should pick up where the previous
jury had left off instead of beginning deliberations anew. The instruction was
error.
Because the failure to reinstruct the jury raises an error of constitutional
magnitude, it is initially presumed prejudicial and the State bears the burden of
proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the error is harmless. Ashcraft. 71 Wn.
App. at 465-66.
The presumption may be overcome if and only if the reviewing court is able to express an abiding conviction, based on its independent review of the record, that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, that is, that it cannot possibly have
2The State seeks to distinguish Ashcraftand Stanley by pointing out that in those cases neither the defendant nor defense counsel were present when the jury was re-impaneled, so there was no opportunity to object. Its argument appears to be that a trial court's failure to properly instruct a reconstituted jury is not alone a sufficient basis for reversal. But in Ashcraft. whilewe held the trial court's failure to provide defense counsel the opportunity to object was error, we did not decide whether itwas reversible error. We reversed solely on the basis ofthe trial court's failure to reinstruct the jury. Ashcraft, 71 Wn. App. at 464. No. 68148-6-1/6
influenced the jury adversely to the defendant and did not contribute to the verdict obtained.
Id at 465.
The State contends any error was harmless, first arguing that the record
reflects jury unanimity because each juror was polled. This argument was
rejected in Stanley, where the jury was polled and deemed unanimous. Stanley.
120 Wn. App. at 316-18. We stated that "[p]olling the jury cannot substitute for
the procedural omissions in this record." jd. at 318. The State also attempts to
distinguish the form of polling in this case by pointing out that the jury in Stanley
was asked whether "the verdict was both his or her individual verdict as well as
the verdict of the jury as a whole," id. at 317, whereas the jurors here were asked
if "this is how you voted on both of these counts, .. ." RP 432-33. We see no
meaningful distinction, and the State does not explain why the form of
questioning in this case more clearly illustrates the unanimity of the jury than in
Stanley. The State also notes that the original jury deliberated for only 45
minutes to one hour before the alternate juror replaced the juror who was sick.
But the reconstituted jury's entire deliberations took place over a period of only
about four or fewer hours.3 The time the original jury spent deliberating was not insignificant in comparison to the time the reconstituted jury spent deliberating.
We are not persuaded that the original jury did not reach agreement on any
issues determinative to the two charged counts during the 45 minutes to one
3The reconstituted jury was excused from the courtroom to begin deliberations at 9:24 a.m. and was back in the courtroom to announce its verdict by 1:34 p.m. The record does not indicate whether the jurydeliberated for four hours and ten minutes or for a lesser period (if ittook one or more breaks for lunch or another purpose). No. 68148-6-1/7
hour in which it deliberated. Nor are we persuaded that the reconstituted jury
concluded it needed to begin deliberations anew as to any such issues.
We are unable to express an abiding conviction, based on the record, that
the error in the trial court's instruction was harmless. Accordingly, we reverse
Lamar's conviction and remand for retrial.
Reversed.
^bx.o.