IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION ONE
STATE OF WASHINGTON, ) No. 80948-2-I ) Respondent, ) ) v. ) ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION NAVA, JOSE ANTONIO, ) DOB: 12/23/1987, ) ) Appellant. )
BOWMAN, J. — Jose Antonio Nava appeals his jury conviction for one count of
first degree murder with a firearm enhancement. Nava alleges the State improperly
minimized its burden during jury selection, the trial court erred in denying his motions for
a mistrial after witnesses twice violated a pretrial order, the prosecutor committed
misconduct by vouching for two witnesses, the trial court erred in admitting certain
evidence, and the cumulative effect of these errors deprived him of a fair trial. He also
asserts the trial court inadvertently imposed a DNA1 collection fee. We affirm Nava’s
conviction but remand for the trial court to strike the DNA fee from his judgment and
sentence.
FACTS
On February 19, 2018, Tye Burley won around $2,000 at a casino. He used
some of the money to rent a hotel room in Marysville that he shared with his friend and
1 Deoxyribonucleic acid.
Citations and pin cites are based on the Westlaw online version of the cited material. No. 80948-2-I/2
drug supplier Jeremy Dailey. Dailey saw Burley win the “jackpot” of money that night
and began scheming ways to get his hands on it. He thought about taking Burley’s
wallet while he slept but did not want to be the obvious suspect.
On February 20, Burley left the hotel with his girlfriend Kristin Schram. Dailey
knew Burley planned to buy Schram a tattoo that day. Dailey met with two friends,
Jared Evans and Jorge Nava Martinez Jr.2 Nava Martinez Jr. is Nava’s older brother.
Dailey told Evans and Nava Martinez Jr. about Burley’s casino winnings.3 Evans did
not know Burley very well but he “didn’t like him.” He was angry that Burley did not pay
back some money he believed Burley owed him. Later, Nava joined them. Neither
Nava Martinez Jr. nor Nava knew Burley.
According to Dailey, the men drove around in a white Dodge Durango owned by
Nava’s girlfriend Tiffany Beston while they formulated a plan to rob Burley at the tattoo
shop. They planned to mace Burley as he left the shop and steal his wallet. Nava
Martinez Jr. said that if Burley “ ‘does anything dumb, I’ll shoot him.’ ” Nava Martinez Jr.
told the group he planned to get a “cuete.”4
The four men aborted their original plan after seeing a police car drive by the
tattoo shop. They decided to confront Burley back at his hotel instead. They drove to
the hotel, sat in the Durango smoking methamphetamine, and waited for Burley to
arrive. Dailey and Evans testified that Nava Martinez Jr. was driving and Nava was in
the front passenger seat.
2 Dailey also regularly sold drugs to Evans. He said that he never sold drugs to Nava Martinez Jr.
but they did drugs together. 3 Dailey thought Bailey had as much as $7,000 in cash winnings. 4 “Cuete” can be slang for “gun” in Spanish.
2 No. 80948-2-I/3
Burley and Schram arrived at the hotel at around 7:00 p.m. and began walking to
Burley’s room. Nava and Nava Martinez Jr. got out of the Durango and confronted
them. They wore face coverings and hooded sweatshirts. One of the two pointed a gun
at Schram. She remembered “seeing the hole of the gun” and that it was silver, and
she had the impression that it was a handgun with “a pretty long barrel.” Schram
screamed and ran away. Nava Martinez Jr. and Nava then beat Burley to the ground
and robbed him. At some point, Nava Martinez Jr. shot Burley once in the back of the
head. Burley died from the wound two days later.
The brothers ran back to the Durango. Nava Martinez Jr. got in the driver’s seat
first, holding a silver handgun and yelling, “ ‘I shot him in the head.’ ” Nava got in the
front passenger side a few moments later, crying Nava Martinez Jr.’s name and holding
Burley’s wallet. They fled the scene and abandoned the Durango. The four spilt the
money from Burley’s wallet between them.
Marysville police arrived and interviewed Schram. She told them that she
suspected Dailey was involved in the attack. Detectives found Schram’s wallet and a
can of bear mace at the scene. The next day, police interviewed Dailey and Evans.
Everett police officers also found the abandoned Durango about a week later. Police
never found Burley’s wallet or the gun used to shoot him.
A Washington State Patrol Crime Laboratory (WSPCL) forensic scientist found
Nava’s DNA on the gearshift of the Durango and “excluded” Dailey, Evans, and Nava
Martinez Jr. “as the source” of the DNA. A WSPCL forensic scientist also traced Nava
Martinez Jr.’s DNA to the steering wheel and the handle pulls and controls of the
driver’s side interior door of the Durango and excluded Dailey, Evans, and Nava as the
3 No. 80948-2-I/4
source of the DNA. Surgeons recovered part of a bullet from Burley’s head. Testing by
a WSPCL ballistics expert showed the bullet was fired from a .38 caliber handgun.5
Nava and Nava Martinez Jr. fled to California. On February 28, 2018, members
of the Escondido Police Department arrested them and managed to identify Nava
Martinez Jr. using facial recognition software. They discovered an active warrant from
Washington. Marysville police detectives interviewed Nava in California. In his
statement to police, Nava admitted that on February 20, 2018, he “wanted to . . . get
high” and drove around Marysville in Beston’s Durango with Dailey and Evans to get
drugs. “[B]ut they were short of money” so the three planned to wait outside a tattoo
shop to rob someone. Nava also told detectives that he was not the driver and that they
ended up at the hotel where Burley was shot because the robbery did not “ ‘work out.’ ”
According to Nava, they sat in the car and smoked heroin, Dailey and Evans put on a
“sweater or something,” and exited the Durango. Then he heard a “bang or something.”
Nava never said Nava Martinez Jr. was with them.
The State charged Dailey, Evans, Nava Martinez Jr., and Nava with first degree
murder with firearm enhancements. Dailey and Evans later agreed to plead guilty to
reduced charges in exchange for “truthful” testimony against Nava and Nava Martinez
Jr. At their joint trial, Nava Martinez Jr. testified but Nava did not.
The jury convicted Nava of first degree murder and found that he was armed with
a firearm when he committed the crime. The court imposed a standard-range sentence
of 331 months. The court also ordered Nava to pay a $100 DNA collection fee. It
5 Detectives later learned that Nava’s girlfriend Beston owned a black and silver .38 caliber
Beretta and kept it in a lockbox at her home. When detectives asked to see her gun, she discovered it was “missing.” Beston testified that she and Nava lived together and the last time she saw the gun was about a week before the murder.
4 No. 80948-2-I/5
otherwise found Nava indigent and waived all discretionary legal financial obligations.
Nava appeals.
ANALYSIS
Nava alleges the State improperly minimized its burden during jury selection, the
trial court erred in denying his motions for a mistrial after witnesses twice violated a
pretrial order, the prosecutor committed misconduct by vouching for two witnesses, and
the trial court erred in admitting certain evidence. He argues that the cumulative effect
of these errors denied him a fair trial. He also argues the court improperly imposed the
DNA fee. We address each argument in turn.
Jury Selection
Nava contends the State improperly minimized its burden during jury selection by
“repeatedly press[ing] jurors about finding a person guilty based on accomplice liability
and ask[ing] them to declare the circumstances under which they would convict a
person as an accomplice.” We disagree.
“The limits and extent of voir dire examination are within the discretion of the trial
court, and it has considerable latitude.” State v. Robinson, 75 Wn.2d 230, 231, 450
P.2d 180 (1969). “[A]bsent an abuse of discretion and a showing that the rights of an
accused have been substantially prejudiced, a trial court’s ruling on the scope and
content of voir dire will not be disturbed on appeal.” State v. Davis, 141 Wn.2d 798,
826, 10 P.3d 977 (2000).
Jury selection is meant to “enable the parties to learn the state of mind of the
prospective jurors, so that they can know whether or not any of them may be subject to
a challenge for cause, and determine the advisability of interposing their peremptory
challenges.” State v. Tharp, 42 Wn.2d 494, 499-500, 256 P.2d 482 (1953). But a party
5 No. 80948-2-I/6
should not use jury selection to educate the jury panel to the particular facts of the case,
to compel the jurors to commit themselves to vote a particular way, to prejudice the jury
for or against a particular party, to argue the case, to indoctrinate the jury, or to instruct
the jury in matters of law. State v. Frederiksen, 40 Wn. App. 749, 752, 700 P.2d 369
(1985). Asking general hypothetical questions without implicating the unique facts of
the case does not commit potential jurors to a verdict. See Green v. Johnson, 160 F.3d
1029, 1036-37 (5th Cir. 1998).
Here, the State introduced the concept of accomplice liability by posing a
hypothetical question about driving a friend to the bank. The hypothetical involved the
jurors assuming the role of the driver and increasingly suspicious behavior by the
“friend,” including putting on a ski mask, pulling out a gun before entering the bank, and
returning from the bank “holding a sack of something.” At each stage, the prosecutor
asked jurors whether they believed they had “done anything wrong” by failing to
intervene. The prosecutor asked one juror, “Does it matter to you when you knew what
was going on.” The prosecutor did not instruct the jurors on the legal definition of
accomplice liability or use particular facts of Nava’s case, and he did not use the
hypothetical to argue the State’s case. Rather, the prosecutor explored the concept of
accomplice liability in general to learn the jurors’ state of mind. The prosecutor’s
hypothetical did not minimize the State’s burden or otherwise exceed the proper scope
of jury selection.
Motions for Mistrial
Nava argues the trial court should have granted his motions for a mistrial
because the State twice violated a pretrial order prohibiting it from offering evidence that
Nava Martinez Jr. “had been in prison before.” We disagree.
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Because the trial court is in the best position to determine whether a trial
irregularity caused prejudice, we review a trial court’s decision to deny a motion for
mistrial for an abuse of discretion. State v. Stenson, 132 Wn.2d 668, 719, 940 P.2d
1239 (1997); State v. Jackson, 150 Wn.2d 251, 276, 76 P.3d 217 (2003). A trial court
abuses its discretion if its decision is manifestly unreasonable or based on untenable
grounds. State v. Allen, 159 Wn.2d 1, 10, 147 P.3d 581 (2006). The court should grant
a mistrial “only when the defendant has been so prejudiced that nothing short of a new
trial can insure that the defendant will be tried fairly.” State v. Mak, 105 Wn.2d 692,
701, 718 P.2d 407 (1986).
In determining whether a trial irregularity is so prejudicial as to require a mistrial,
we look to (1) the seriousness of the irregularity, (2) whether the irregularity was
cumulative of other admissible evidence, and (3) whether the court could cure the
irregularity by an instruction to disregard the remark. State v. Weber, 99 Wn.2d 158,
165-66, 659 P.2d 1102 (1983). Ultimately, we will reverse the trial court only if there is
a substantial likelihood the irregularity affected the jury’s verdict. State v. Rodriguez,
146 Wn.2d 260, 269-70, 45 P.3d 541 (2002).
In his interview with the police, Dailey said that “he first met Mr. [Nava] Martinez
[Jr.] in prison.” Before trial, the prosecutor agreed that “[w]e will not seek to admit that
fact. We will simply talk about their connections outside of jail.” At trial, the prosecutor
and Dailey had the following exchange:
Q. Do you know Jorge [Nava] Martinez [Jr.]? A. Yes. Q. Do you know when it was that you met him? A. In prison last time. 2014.
The defense objected to the answer and the court instructed the jurors to disregard the
7 No. 80948-2-I/8
testimony. The defense then moved for a mistrial, which the court denied.
Later, Officer Sean Davidson testified about arresting Nava Martinez Jr. and
Nava in Escondido, California. Officer Davidson explained that he was able to identify
Nava Martinez Jr. through facial recognition software on his cell phone that can identify
people “as long as the person has been in jail in San Diego County.” The defense did
not object to this testimony but later renewed its motion for a mistrial, which the court
again denied.
Citing State v. Escalona, 49 Wn. App. 251, 742 P.2d 190 (1987), Nava argues
that “[i]mproper references” to Nava Martinez Jr.’s “prior prison sentence and jail term
suggested he—and Nava by association—were criminal types, likely to commit the
robbery that resulted in Burley’s death.” In that case, the State charged Escalona with
second degree assault for threatening the victim with a knife. Escalona, 49 Wn. App. at
252. At trial, the victim testified that Escalona “ ‘already has a record and had stabbed
someone.’ ” Escalona, 49 Wn. App. at 253. We held this testimony was prejudicial
propensity evidence because a jury could conclude that Escalona “acted on this
occasion in conformity with the assaultive character he demonstrated in the past.”
Escalona, 49 Wn. App. at 255-56.
Unlike Escalona, no witness here testified that Nava Martinez Jr. was in custody
for a similar crime. As for Dailey’s comment about meeting Nava Martinez Jr. some
years earlier in prison, the trial court properly instructed the jury to disregard the
testimony. We presume jurors follow a trial court’s instructions. State v. Johnson, 124
Wn.2d 57, 77, 873 P.2d 514 (1994). And as to Officer Davidson’s explanation of the
8 No. 80948-2-I/9
facial recognition software, the testimony was fleeting and indirect. Nava fails to show
that the testimony was so prejudicial as to require a mistrial.6
Prosecutorial Misconduct
Nava argues that the prosecutor “impermissibly vouched for its two key
witnesses by eliciting evidence in its case-in-chief of their formal agreements to ‘testify
truthfully.’ ” The State claims Dailey and Evans’ testimony was proper to “rehabilitate”
them. We agree with the State.
We review allegations of prosecutorial misconduct for an abuse of discretion.
Stenson, 132 Wn.2d at 718. The defendant bears the burden of proving that the
prosecutor’s conduct was both improper and prejudicial in the context of the entire
record and circumstances at trial. State v. Thorgerson, 172 Wn.2d 438, 442, 258 P.3d
43 (2011). We determine whether the defendant was prejudiced under one of two
standards of review. State v. Emery, 174 Wn.2d 741, 760, 278 P.3d 653 (2012). If the
defendant objected at trial, the defendant must show that the prosecutor’s misconduct
led to prejudice that had a substantial likelihood of affecting the jury’s verdict. State v.
Anderson, 153 Wn. App. 417, 427, 220 P.3d 1273 (2009) (citing State v. Reed, 102
Wn.2d 140, 145, 684 P.2d 699 (1984)). If the defendant did not object at trial, we deem
the defendant to have waived any error unless the prosecutor’s misconduct was so
flagrant and ill intentioned that an instruction could not have cured the resulting
prejudice. Stenson, 132 Wn.2d at 726-27.
Whether a witness has testified truthfully “is entirely for the jury to determine.”
State v. Ish, 170 Wn.2d 189, 196, 241 P.3d 389 (2010) (citing United States v. Brooks,
6 Because we conclude that the testimony was not worthy of a mistrial, we do not address Nava’s
argument that any prejudice to Nava Martinez Jr. also prejudiced him “by association.”
9 No. 80948-2-I/10
508 F.3d 1205, 1210 (9th Cir. 2007)). Improper vouching generally occurs if the
prosecutor (1) expresses his or her personal belief as to the veracity of the witness or
(2) suggests that evidence not presented at trial supports the witness’ testimony. Ish,
170 Wn.2d at 196.
“[E]vidence that a witness has agreed to testify truthfully generally has little
probative value and should not be admitted as part of the State’s case in chief.” Ish,
170 Wn.2d at 198. But where the defense attacks the witness’ credibility, the State is
within its rights to “rehabilitate” its witness by introducing the details of a plea agreement
that requires truthful testimony. See State v. Petrich, 101 Wn.2d 566, 574, 683 P.2d
173 (1984), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Kitchen, 110 Wn.2d 403, 756 P.2d
105 (1988). And it is reasonable for the State to “anticipate the attack and ‘pull the
sting’ of the defense’s cross-examination.” State v. Bourgeois, 133 Wn.2d 389, 402,
945 P.2d 1120 (1997) (quoting United States v. LeFevour, 798 F.2d 977, 983 (7th Cir.
1986)).
Here, both Nava Martinez Jr. and Nava attacked Dailey and Evans’ credibility in
opening remarks. And before Dailey testified, Nava Martinez Jr. made clear that he
intended to examine Dailey about “why he entered this agreement, what his motives
were, and how they’re explained by his prior conduct in being a liar and a cheat and a
schemer. Because that goes to his credibility, and it goes to his state of mind.” Nava
agreed that “Dailey has been given a very good deal in order to — in exchange for his
testimony here, and it’s important that we get to explore all of those issues and let the
jury decide what’s important and what’s not.” As a result, it was reasonable for the
prosecutor to elicit testimony about the witnesses’ agreements to testify truthfully during
questioning on direct to “pull the sting” out of the defense attack on their credibility
10 No. 80948-2-I/11
during cross-examination. LeFevour, 798 F.2d at 983. The prosecutor did not commit
misconduct.
Evidentiary Errors
Nava claims the trial court erred by admitting testimony (1) that Nava had
“access to a gun, without adequate evidence of its connection to the crime,” and (2) that
“unknown people” coerced Dailey to make statements exonerating Nava Martinez Jr.
and Nava. We disagree.
Standard of Review
We review a trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence for an abuse of
discretion. State v. Ashley, 186 Wn.2d 32, 38-39, 375 P.3d 673 (2016). An abuse of
discretion occurs when the trial court bases its decision on untenable grounds or
reasons. State v. Darden, 145 Wn.2d 612, 619, 41 P.3d 1189 (2002).
Admissible evidence must be relevant. ER 402; State v. Scherf, 192 Wn.2d 350,
386-87, 429 P.3d 776 (2018). Evidence is relevant if it has a logical nexus to the fact to
be established. State v. Burkins, 94 Wn. App. 677, 692, 973 P.2d 15 (1999); see ER
401. “The threshold to admit relevant evidence is very low. Even minimally relevant
evidence is admissible.” State v. Darden, 145 Wn.2d 612, 621, 41 P.3d 1189 (2002).
But even relevant evidence is not admissible if the danger of unfair prejudice
substantially outweighs its probative value. ER 403; State v. Briejer, 172 Wn. App. 209,
226, 289 P.3d 698 (2012). Evidence is unfairly prejudicial if it is likely to elicit an
emotional response from the jury rather than a rational decision. State v. Powell, 126
Wn.2d 244, 264, 893 P.2d 615 (1995). Unfair prejudice is caused by evidence of
“ ‘scant or cumulative probative force, dragged in by the heels for the sake of its
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prejudicial effect.’ ” Carson v. Fine, 123 Wn.2d 206, 223, 867 P.2d 610 (1994)7 (quoting
United States v. Roark, 753 F.2d 991, 994 (11th Cir. 1985)).
Firearm Evidence
Nava contends testimony that he had access to Beston’s firearm was unduly
prejudicial because there was not “adequate evidence of its connection to the crime.”
He is incorrect.8
We have routinely excluded as unfairly prejudicial evidence of weapons having
“no relation to” or “ ‘nothing to do with the crime charged.’ ” State v. Freeburg, 105 Wn.
App. 492, 501 n.22, 501, 20 P.3d 984 (2001) (citing Moody v. United States, 376 F.2d
525, 532 (9th Cir. 1967)) (quoting United States v. Warledo, 557 F.2d 721, 725 (10th
Cir. 1977)). When the State tries to sway the jury into believing a defendant is a “bad
man” or inherently dangerous because he owns or possesses weapons, the trial court
should exercise its discretion to exclude such evidence. See Moody, 376 F.2d at 532;
State v. Rupe, 101 Wn.2d 664, 705, 683 P.2d 571 (1984).
Nava cites Freeburg to support his position that admitting evidence of access to
Beston’s firearm unfairly prejudiced him. In that case, officers arrested Freeburg more
than two years after he committed murder. Freeburg, 105 Wn. App. at 495-96. At trial,
the State introduced evidence that Freeburg was carrying a handgun when officers
arrested him. Freeburg, 105 Wn. App. at 496. The State agreed that Freeburg did not
use the weapon in the underlying crime and instead argued that possession of the gun
7 Internal quotation marks omitted. 8 We disagree with the State that Nava waived his challenge to the firearm evidence for failing to object below. At trial, the testimony of the State’s ballistics expert cast doubt on whether the shooter used a .38 caliber Beretta to kill Burley. Nava Martinez Jr. then moved to strike Beston’s testimony that Nava had access to her gun. Nava joined the motion. The motion to strike preserved the issue for appeal. See ER 103(a)(1).
12 No. 80948-2-I/13
evidenced flight and consciousness of guilt. Freeburg, 105 Wn. App. at 500, 497. We
concluded the trial court erred by admitting the evidence because it was unrelated to the
murder:
[T]he gun was not the gun used in the shooting of Rodriguez, the arrest occurred more than two years after the shooting, and the presence of the gun does not by itself indicate a consciousness of the serious offense [Freeburg] faced.
Freeburg, 105 Wn. App. at 500.
In contrast, the State elicited testimony that Beston’s gun could have been the
firearm used to kill Burley. Beston testified that she owned a small, .38 caliber, black
and silver Beretta handgun during the time that she and Nava lived together. She
discovered the gun was missing after the murder. The WSPCL determined a .38 caliber
bullet killed Burley. Schram testified that the gun used during the robbery was a silver
handgun with a long barrel. And Dailey testified that Nava Martinez Jr. was holding a
small “silver or chrome” handgun when he returned to the Durango after Burley was
shot. The jury could conclude from this evidence that the shooter used Beston’s gun to
kill Burley. As a result, Nava’s access to the gun was probative as to who killed Burley.
Nava argues this evidence was unduly prejudicial because there was also
testimony tending to show that the gun had no connection to Burley’s murder. For
example, Schram testified that the gun pointed at her during the robbery had a long
barrel, while the barrel of Beston’s Beretta was short. And the WSPCL ballistics expert
said that in her opinion, “it’s not probable” that Beston’s gun matched the fired bullet
jacket recovered from Burley. But the expert also testified that she could not
“conclusively eliminate” the Beretta. That there was competing evidence on whether
the shooter used Beston’s gun to kill Burley does not render the testimony inadmissible.
13 No. 80948-2-I/14
It is the province of the trier of fact to weigh evidence and judge the credibility of
witnesses. See State v. Carver, 113 Wn.2d 591, 604, 781 P.2d 1308, 789 P.2d 306
(1989). The jury was free to weigh the competing evidence and consider inferences in
reaching its verdict. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting evidence
that Nava had access to Beston’s gun.
Threats to Dailey
Nava asserts the trial court erred in admitting evidence that “some unnamed
person told Dailey to contact Nava’s and [Nava] Martinez [Jr.]’s mother and tell her they
were not involved in the shooting.” According to Nava, the evidence was improper
because there “was no evidence connecting the threat to Nava or [Nava] Martinez
[Jr.].”9
Before trial, Nava and Nava Martinez Jr. notified the State that they intended to
introduce a recording of a telephone call Dailey made from jail to Nava Martinez Jr. and
Nava’s mother. In the call to their mom, Dailey explained that Nava and Nava Martinez
Jr. did not kill Burley. As a result, the State introduced the recording in its case-in-chief.
Nava and Nava Martinez Jr. did not object. The State then elicited testimony from
Dailey that he was “getting beat up” in jail and that someone claiming to be Nava
Martinez Jr.’s friend told Dailey that if he made the call to Nava Martinez Jr. and Nava’s
mother, “they’d stop sending people to beat me up.” After he made the call, the
beatings stopped.
9 The State argues that Nava waived this issue on appeal. But it provides no legal argument in
support of its theory. We need not consider arguments that are not developed in the briefs and for which a party has not cited authority. State v. Dennison, 115 Wn.2d 609, 629, 801 P.2d 193 (1990).
14 No. 80948-2-I/15
Citing Bourgeois, Nava argues the “prosecution may not use allegations that
someone other than the accused may have threatened a witness to bolster its case
when there is no proven connection between the accused and the threat.” But
Bourgeois, which involved two owners of a market getting shot, addressed testimony
from the surviving victim and bystanders who generally were “reluctant to appear in
court” or “afraid to testify.” Bourgeois, 133 Wn.2d at 393.10 Our Supreme Court
concluded that the testimony about the witnesses’ state of mind was not relevant
because “no connection was established between Bourgeois and the reluctance of any
witness to testify.” Bourgeois, 133 Wn.2d at 400.
Here, the evidence that Nava Martinez Jr.’s friends coerced Dailey was relevant
to rebut the inference that Dailey willingly exonerated Nava Martinez Jr. and Nava when
he called their mother. Because the defense chose to use Dailey’s telephone call as
evidence that Nava and Nava Martinez Jr. did not shoot Burley, the State could
introduce the rebuttal evidence. Unlike Bourgeois, the relevance of the evidence does
not turn on whether the threats came from Nava and Nava Martinez Jr. Evidence that
someone coerced Dailey to make the call was relevant to Dailey’s state of mind, no
matter who threatened him. The trial court did not err in admitting the evidence.
Cumulative Error
Nava asserts that cumulative error entitles him to a new trial. Cumulative error
“is limited to instances where there have been several trial errors that standing alone
may not be sufficient to justify reversal but when combined may deny a defendant a fair
10 One woman who did not witness the crime testified that she was afraid to testify because the
defendant offered her money to lie about his whereabouts during the incident and a friend of the defendant threatened her. Bourgeois, 133 Wn.2d at 395.
15 No. 80948-2-I/16
trial.” State v. Greiff, 141 Wn.2d 910, 929, 10 P.3d 390 (2000); State v. Hodges, 118
Wn. App. 668, 673-74, 77 P.3d 375 (2003). As discussed above, Nava establishes no
trial error. The cumulative error doctrine does not apply.
DNA Fee
Nava argues the trial court erred by imposing a $100 DNA fee because the state
previously collected his DNA as part of his sentence for an unrelated felony conviction.
The State concedes the error. We accept the State’s concession and remand for the
trial court to strike the DNA collection fee.
Because Nava fails to show prejudicial error, we affirm his conviction and
sentence, but remand to the trial court to strike the DNA fee.
WE CONCUR: