State Of Washington, Et Ano., V. Danielle Sterling And Darren Sterling

CourtCourt of Appeals of Washington
DecidedApril 15, 2024
Docket85448-8
StatusUnpublished

This text of State Of Washington, Et Ano., V. Danielle Sterling And Darren Sterling (State Of Washington, Et Ano., V. Danielle Sterling And Darren Sterling) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Washington primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State Of Washington, Et Ano., V. Danielle Sterling And Darren Sterling, (Wash. Ct. App. 2024).

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

DANIELLE STERLING and DARREN No. 85448-8-I STERLING, wife and husband, DIVISION ONE Appellants,

v.

STATE OF WASHINGTON, by and UNPUBLISHED OPINION through THE UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON, d/b/a “UW Medicine,” “UW Physicians,” and “Harborview Medical Center,”

Respondents.

BOWMAN, J. — Danielle Sterling and her husband appeal the trial court’s

order dismissing her medical negligence lawsuit against the state of Washington,

University of Washington (UW), UW Medicine, UW Physicians, and Harborview

Medical Center. Sterling argues the trial court erred by dismissing her lawsuit for

failure to file a claim with the Department of Enterprise Services (DES) Office of

Risk Management (ORM) under chapter 4.92 RCW. We affirm.

FACTS

On December 26, 2019, EvergreenHealth hospital admitted Sterling with

pancreatitis. EvergreenHealth put Sterling into a medically induced coma

because of complications in her treatment. Her condition worsened, and on

January 9, 2020, EvergreenHealth transferred Sterling to Harborview. On

January 23, 2020, Sterling’s providers discovered that she had developed a No. 85448-8-I/2

“sacral pressure ulcer” on the base of her spine. On February 22, 2020, Sterling

regained consciousness and learned about the injury. The ulcer had become

infected and necrotic, requiring debridement, surgery, and rehabilitative therapy.

On December 30, 2022, Sterling filed a “UW Claim Form” with UW Claim

Services, seeking $2.5 million in damages.1 On January 5, 2023, Harborview

acknowledged receipt of Sterling’s claim form. On January 19, 2023, UW Claim

Services also acknowledged receipt of Sterling’s claim form, stating that it “will

investigate the claim and provide a written response,” which “may take from 60 to

90 days to complete.”

On February 3, 2023, 15 days later, Sterling sent a demand letter to UW

Claim Services, again seeking $2.5 million to settle her claims. She informed

UW Claim Services that she intended to “immediately proceed to litigation” if it

did not accept the demand within 15 days. On March 1, 2023, Sterling and her

husband sued the state of Washington, UW, UW Medicine, UW Physicians, and

Harborview (collectively State), alleging medical negligence. Then, on April 3,

2023, Sterling sent the UW Claim Form to ORM.

On April 28, 2023, the State moved for summary judgment, arguing that

Sterling failed to comply with the claim procedures outlined in chapter 4.92 RCW.

The trial court granted the motion and dismissed Sterling’s lawsuit.

Sterling appeals.

1 UW Medical manages Harborview.

2 No. 85448-8-I/3

ANALYSIS

Sterling argues that the trial court erred by dismissing her medical

negligence lawsuit for failure to file a claim with ORM under chapter 4.92 RCW.

We disagree.

We review orders on summary judgment de novo, engaging in the same

inquiry as the trial court. Kim v. Lakeside Adult Fam. Home, 185 Wn.2d 532,

547, 374 P.3d 121 (2016). “Summary judgment is appropriate only if there is no

genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment

as a matter of law.” Rublee v. Carrier Corp., 192 Wn.2d 190, 198, 428 P.3d 1207

(2018); CR 56(c). We consider facts and inferences in a light most favorable to

the nonmoving party. Id. at 199.

The legislature enacted chapter 4.92 RCW to abrogate sovereign

immunity and establish procedures for suing the state. Hyde v. Univ. of Wash.

Med. Ctr., 186 Wn. App. 926, 929, 347 P.3d 918 (2015). The statutory filing

procedures preclude tort actions against the state unless the plaintiff first files a

claim with ORM:

All claims against the state, or against the state’s officers, employees, or volunteers, acting in such capacity, for damages arising out of tortious conduct, must be presented to [ORM].[2]

RCW 4.92.100(1). And the claimant must file the claim with ORM at least 60

days before commencing an action:

No action subject to the claim filing requirements of RCW 4.92.100 shall be commenced against the state, or against any state officer,

2 RCW 4.92.006(3) defines ORM as “the office within [DES] that carries out the powers and duties under this chapter relating to claim filing, claims administration, and claims payment.”

3 No. 85448-8-I/4

employee, or volunteer, acting in such capacity, for damages arising out of tortious conduct until [60] calendar days have elapsed after the claim is presented to [ORM].

RCW 4.92.110.

Under RCW 4.92.100(1), a claimant properly files a claim form when they

deliver it “in person or by regular mail, registered mail, or certified mail, with

return receipt requested, or as an attachment to email or by fax, to [ORM].” A

claimant must use the standard claim form maintained by ORM and posted on

the DES website. Id. The remedy for failure to comply with the claim filing

requirements is dismissal. Hyde, 186 Wn. App. at 929. But courts must “liberally

construe[ ]” these procedural and content requirements “so that substantial

compliance will be deemed satisfactory.” RCW 4.92.100(3).

Sterling argues that she “substantially complied” with the procedural

requirements under RCW 4.92.100(1) by filing the UW Claim Form with UW

Claim Services—“the entity . . . responsible for investigating the claim.” She is

incorrect.

“Substantial compliance . . . means that the ‘statute has been followed

sufficiently so as to carry out the intent for which the statute was adopted.’ ” Lee

v. Metro Parks Tacoma, 183 Wn. App. 961, 968, 335 P.3d 1014 (2014) (quoting

Banner Realty, Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 48 Wn. App. 274, 278, 738 P.2d 279

(1987)).3 The purpose of RCW 4.92.100(1) and .110 is to provide notice of

claims to the state so that ORM can maintain a centralized claim tracking system

3 Lee addressed tort claim filing preconditions for lawsuits against municipalities under RCW 4.96.020. 183 Wn. App. at 965-68. But the “substantial compliance” standard under RCW 4.96.020

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Related

Banner Realty, Inc. v. Department of Revenue
738 P.2d 279 (Court of Appeals of Washington, 1987)
Hontz v. State
714 P.2d 1176 (Washington Supreme Court, 1986)
Hall v. Niemer
649 P.2d 98 (Washington Supreme Court, 2009)
Estate of Connelly v. SNOHOMISH CTY. PUBLIC UTILITY DIST.
187 P.3d 842 (Court of Appeals of Washington, 2008)
Rublee v. Carrier Corp.
428 P.3d 1207 (Washington Supreme Court, 2018)
Kim v. Lakeside Adult Family Home
374 P.3d 121 (Washington Supreme Court, 2016)
Estate of Connelly v. Snohomish County Public Utility District No. 1
145 Wash. App. 941 (Court of Appeals of Washington, 2008)
Lee v. Metro Parks Tacoma
335 P.3d 1014 (Court of Appeals of Washington, 2014)
Hyde v. University of Washington Medical Center
347 P.3d 918 (Court of Appeals of Washington, 2015)

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