State of Vermont v. Boston and Maine Corporation

269 F. Supp. 80, 1967 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9238, 1967 WL 163410
CourtDistrict Court, D. Vermont
DecidedMay 11, 1967
DocketCiv. 4799
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 269 F. Supp. 80 (State of Vermont v. Boston and Maine Corporation) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Vermont primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State of Vermont v. Boston and Maine Corporation, 269 F. Supp. 80, 1967 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9238, 1967 WL 163410 (D. Vt. 1967).

Opinion

J. JOSEPH SMITH, Circuit Judge.

The State of Vermont brought this action appealing from and seeking to enjoin and set aside, or to remand for further consideration, a Report and Order of the Interstate Commerce Commission entered January 25, 1967 in Finance Docket No. 24000, Boston and Maine Corp. Discontinuance of Trains, 328 I.C. C. 594, permitting discontinuance of four passenger trains, between Springfield, Massachusetts and White River Junction, Vermont, the Boston and Maine operated segment of a through Montreal-New York City run, and the sole remaining rail passenger service between Springfield and White River.

The proceedings in this case commenced with a notice and supporting statement of a proposal to discontinue these trains effective March 7, 1966, filed on February 1, 1966, pursuant to Section 13a(l) 1 of the Interstate Com *82 merce Act. By order of February 21, 1966, the Commission instituted an investigation of the proposed discontinuance, ordering the trains continued meanwhile. The proceeding was heard on a consolidated record with Finance Docket Nos. 23959, 23960' and 23961, which involved discontinuance of Boston and Maine trains between Boston, Massachusetts and various points in Massachusetts and New Hampshire. Hearings were held and briefs were filed with Division 3, which on July 6, 1966 found that continuance was not required by present and future convenience and necessity and that continued operation would unduly burden interstate or foreign commerce. Findings and report were filed July 22, 1966, 328 I.C.C. 224. Action was brought by the Public Service Board of the State of Vermont, Civil Action 4611, District of Vermont, seeking to set aside and enjoin enforcement of the order. A temporary restraining order was issued by Judge Gibson on July 8, 1966. A three-judge district court was convened, and after hearing, dissolved the restraining order and denied injunctive relief on the ground that there had been insufficient showing of irreparable injury, Circuit Judge Waterman dissenting. The trains were discontinued September 4, 1966.

Vermont and others petitioned the Commission for further hearing and reconsideration. The Commission recalled the matter from Division 3 and reconsidered it. On reconsideration by the full Commission the findings in the report of July 22, 1966 were affirmed, Chairman Tucker dissenting. £28 I.C.C. 594, January 25, 1967. This action, Civil 4799, District of Vermont, followed and a second three-judge district court was convened.

The Interstate Commerce Commission, the City of New York, the City of Montreal, The Canadian Corporation for the *83 1967 World Exhibition, The Vermont Public Service Board, and The Brotherhood of Railroad Clerks, The Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, The Brotherhood of Firemen and Engineers, and other unions and employees, by C. N. Monaghan, were permitted to intervene in the action.

The Boston and Maine Corporation moved to dismiss the action for lack of jurisdiction.

The Court finds that it has jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter of the action, denies the motion to dismiss, and affirms the order of the Interstate Commerce Commission. The application for injunctive relief requiring resumption of operation of the trains is denied.

It has been held that there is no court review authorized of determinations under 13a (1) not to enter into investigations of a proposed discontinuance of service, or of determinations after investigation and hearing refusing to order continuance. State of New Jersey v. United States, D.C., 168 F.Supp. 324, aff’d p. c. Bergen County v. United States, 359 U.S. 27, 79 S.Ct. 603, 3 L. Ed.2d 625 (1959); State of New Hampshire v. Boston and Maine Corporation, 251 F.Supp. 421 (D.N.H.1965). The Commission takes the position that a state may obtain review of an order entered after a hearing, which allows the discontinuance to take effect, but has requested an amendment of the Act to remove any doubt on the point, as well as to lengthen the time for the Commission to act, and broaden its powers. 2

We agree with our brethren in the New Hampshire case, 251 F.Supp. 421 *84 at 424, that the thrust of the 1958 statute amending the Interstate Commerce Act, which became section 13a, was relief of hard pressed roads from heavy-losses from passenger service operations, abandonment of which state commissions were unduly reluctant to sanction, by giving the roads the option of having the Interstate Commerce Commission rather than the state bodies, pass upon discontinuance of interstate operations. See, as to 13a (2) intrastate discontinuances, Southern RR Co. v. North Carolina, 376 U.S. 93, 104, 84 S.Ct. 564, 11 L.Ed.2d 541 (1964). But we fail to find convincing evidence that the Congress intended the unusual and concededly unfair result of granting judicial review of the Commission’s determination solely to the roads, and not to opposing parties. The statutory scheme gives the Commission power to control discontinuances, and sets limits on the Commission’s powers, allowing discontinuances to become effective unless the Commission acts within four months and empowering it to require continuance of service only for a period of one year after the date of the order, after which period the carrier could again move for relief under the statute.

If an order is wrongfully granted, the road can obtain review and reversal. If an order is wrongfully refused, ordinary principles of review of administrative determinations, as well as elemental fairness call for review at the instance of opposing parties. Congress having set standards for the Commission in the Act, its decision to refuse to order continuance as well as its decision to order it, should be reviewable and we have jurisdiction to do so here. Compare the Administrative Procedure Act, 60 Stat. 237 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1009. Cf. Bard, The Challenge of Rail Passenger Service, Regulation, and Subsidy, 34 Univ. of Chi.L.R. 301, 311 n. 28 (1967); United States v. Maher, 307 U.S. 148, 59 S.Ct. 768, 83 L.Ed. 1162 (1939); Rochester Telephone Co. v. United States, 307 U.S. 125, 59 S.Ct. 754, 83 L.Ed. 1147 (1939).

We must determine whether substantial evidence supports the findings, and whether proper standards were applied. Bard points out, op. cit. supra, p. 322, that the Commission in 13a (1) cases in which it has declined to interfere with discontinuances has so far found both undue burden and that the service was not required by public convenience and necessity. 3 Although the difference in *85

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Bluebook (online)
269 F. Supp. 80, 1967 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9238, 1967 WL 163410, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-of-vermont-v-boston-and-maine-corporation-vtd-1967.