State of Texas v. Dorris

165 F. Supp. 738, 1958 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3744
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. Texas
DecidedSeptember 20, 1958
StatusPublished
Cited by9 cases

This text of 165 F. Supp. 738 (State of Texas v. Dorris) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State of Texas v. Dorris, 165 F. Supp. 738, 1958 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3744 (S.D. Tex. 1958).

Opinion

ALLRED, District Judge.

Counsel for the named defendants have asked the clerk of this court to file a removal petition under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1446 so as to transfer the trial of two misdemeanor criminal cases originating in the Justice Court and appealed to the County Court of Brooks County. Counsel claims that these criminal cases can be removed under Section 1443 of Title 28, which authorizes removal of civil or criminal actions against any person who is denied, or cannot enforce, in the state courts a right under any law providing for equal civil rights.

Defendants were convicted in the justice court on a charge of hunting deer at night, 1 in violation of Article 887 of the Vernon’s Ann.Penal Code of Texas. The minimum punishment for which is a fine of not less than $25 nor more than $100. They appealed to the County Court and allege here that the complaints were filed by an employee and representative of an organization of ranchers in the county who are aiding and abetting the prosecution; that defendants cannot secure a fair and impartial trial because these ranchers own about 34% of the land in the county, have many employees, and control the county judge and county attorney; that- these ranchers have conspired to bring about the conviction of the defendants; that the county judge *740 will appoint jury commissioners who have selected and will continue to select prospective jurors who will probably convict defendants; that the jurors available to try the case at the present term are employees of, or closely associated with members of the association.

Defendants assert that, since Texas law does not provide for a change of venue in a misdemeanor case 2 and no appeal is allowed from the County Court to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals in a case of this type 3 they are denied and cannot enforce their right under the Fourteenth Amendment to be not deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law and not to be denied the equal protection of the laws.

When counsel for defendants tendered the so-called petition for removal for filing, the Clerk searched the rules and statutes and, being understandably puzzled, asked the Court for instructions. The Court directed that the actions not be docketed for the following reasons:

This is not the first time that counsel for defendants has attempted to remove misdemeanor cases to this court. In 1950 a number of alleged election law violation cases were pending in Starr County, Texas, against M. A. Guerra, Antonio Ramos, Jr. and Lauro Salinas. There it was contended that there was a conspiracy on the part of members of a new political party to persecute members of the old party and deprive them of their life, liberty and property without due process of law and deny them protection, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The first proposition put forward here, that the State law does not authorize a change of venue in a misdemeanor case, was also pressed in that case. This court remanded the Guerra cases 4 to the Starr County court, pointing out that change of venue in a misdemeanor case is not a constitutional right. 5

In the Brownsville cases this court quoted from 2d Cyc.Fed.Proc. 398, pp. 283, 288 (now 2d Cyc.Fed.Proc. 3.82), reading in part as follows;

“§ 3.82 — Denial by acts of Judges or officers.
“Denials of equal rights resulting from the constitution or laws of a state must be distinguished from those caused by the acts of judicial or administrative officers. The wrong in the one case is the direct and necessary result of the state law, of its necessary operation proprio vigore, while in the other it results from the administration of the law. In the former case, the action is removable, and in the latter it is not * * *
“Since the denial of equal rights which will justify a removal must be the result of the constitution or laws of the state, there is no right of removal where the alleged discrimination against defendant, in respect of his equal rights, is due to illegal or corrupt acts of administrative officers, unauthorized by the state constitution or laws. It is incumbent upon the state court to see to it that the accused has a fair trial, and its failure so to do is remediable in the state courts or ultimately in the highest court of the nation. The removal provision under consideration does not contemplate a removal *741 where neither the constitution nor laws of the state deny the litigant his civil rights, but where there is a criminal misuse or violation of the state law by some subordinate officer which results in depriving the litigant of the rights which the state law accords to him. Alleged existence of race prejudice, interfering with a fair trial, is not ground for removal, where the prejudice cannot be attributed to the state constitution or laws. It is not cause for removal that jury commissioners or other subordinate officers have, without authority derived from the constitution or laws of the state, excluded colored citizens from juries because of their race, or excluded from the jury every person, however competent, who belonged to the same political party as the accused. * * ” (Emphasis supplied.)

Com. of Kentucky v. Powers, 201 U.S. 1, 26 S.Ct. 387, 50 L.Ed. 633, is cited in a footnote as authority for most of the preceding quotation. It is the leading case on the right to remove civil rights cases. In that case the alleged willful and corrupt action was a hundredfold worse than the facts alleged here. There is no right of removal in such cases, the remedy being by certiorari to the United States Supreme Court as has been done in many cases where convictions were set aside because of the systematic exclusion of colored citizens from grand or petit jurors.

There remains then the single additional contention here that defendants, in the event they are convicted, will have no right of appeal to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. There is nothing unconstitutional about this. Due process does not mean that a state must provide for a trial by jury or right of appeal. 16A C.J.S. Constitutional Law, § 569(4), p. 579, citing, among other cases, Dohany v. Rogers, 281 U.S. 362, 50 S.Ct. 299, 74 L.Ed. 904. As stated by the Supreme Court in Reetz v. Michigan, 188 U.S. 505, 23 S.Ct. 390, 392, 47 L.Ed. 563, many years ago:

“* * * Neither is the right of appeal essential to due process of law.

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Bluebook (online)
165 F. Supp. 738, 1958 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3744, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-of-texas-v-dorris-txsd-1958.