State of Tennessee v. Ray Saulsberry

CourtCourt of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee
DecidedJanuary 30, 2004
DocketW2002-01484-CCA-R3-CD
StatusPublished

This text of State of Tennessee v. Ray Saulsberry (State of Tennessee v. Ray Saulsberry) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State of Tennessee v. Ray Saulsberry, (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004).

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT JACKSON Assigned on Briefs November 4, 2003

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. RAY SAULSBERRY

Direct Appeal from the Criminal Court for Shelby County No. 01-03100-01 Joseph B. Dailey, Judge

No. W2002-01484-CCA-R3-CD - Filed January 30, 2004

The defendant was convicted of robbery and driving while a habitual motor vehicle offender. The defendant contends on appeal that the trial court erred in 1) denying his constitutional right to the assistance of counsel, and 2) conducting the trial in absentia while the defendant was not represented by counsel. We conclude that once elbow counsel has been appointed, and the defendant is absent voluntarily or through removal because of behavior, the trial court should require elbow counsel to represent the absent defendant. Under the facts of this case, the trial court erred in not requiring elbow counsel to proceed to represent the defendant when he was removed from the courtroom. Accordingly, the judgments of conviction are reversed and remanded for a new trial.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgments of the Criminal Court Reversed and Remanded

JOHN EVERETT WILLIAMS, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which DAVID H. WELLES and JOE G. RILEY , JJ., joined.

Robert Wilson Jones, District Public Defender; and Tony N. Brayton, Michael Johnson, and Gregg Carman, Assistant Public Defenders, for the appellant, Ray Saulsberry.

Paul G. Summers, Attorney General and Reporter; Renee W. Turner, Assistant Attorney General; William L. Gibbons, District Attorney General; and Amy Weirich, Assistant District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

The defendant, Ray Saulsberry, was convicted of robbery, a Class C felony, and driving while a habitual motor vehicle offender, a Class E felony. The trial court sentenced him as a Range III, persistent offender, to fifteen years on the robbery conviction and six years on the driving while a habitual motor offender conviction, to be served consecutively for an effective sentence of twenty- one years. This appeal timely followed. The defendant contends on appeal that the trial court erred in 1) denying his constitutional right to the assistance of counsel, and 2) conducting the trial in absentia while the defendant was not represented by counsel. The judgments of conviction are reversed and remanded for a new trial.

Facts

On December 1, 2000, the victim, Arthur Lee Thornton, was returning to his car after shopping at a local Kroger supermarket. As the victim was placing bags of groceries into his vehicle, he heard cursing and noticed the defendant coming toward him. The defendant struck the victim on the left side of his head knocking the victim to the ground. The defendant got into the victim’s vehicle and drove away, leaving the seventy-two-year-old victim lying on the ground bleeding from his ear. Police soon arrived on the scene and drove the victim to his residence. Approximately forty- five minutes later, a police officer returned to the victim’s residence and informed him that his vehicle had been located at an apartment complex. The officer asked the victim to come with him to identify the vehicle, and the victim complied.

The police officers had located the victim’s vehicle at an apartment complex approximately one-half of a mile from the Kroger store where it had been stolen. The defendant was found in the driver’s seat of the car with the lights on and the keys in the ignition. After the victim arrived at the apartment complex, the police removed the defendant from the back of a patrol car, and the victim positively identified the defendant as the person who hit him and took his car. The defendant was tried and convicted by a jury of robbery and driving while a habitual motor vehicle offender.

Pre-Trial Hearing - Friday, February 1, 2002

On the day before trial was scheduled to begin, the defendant requested the appointment of new counsel. After the trial court denied his request, the defendant requested that he be allowed to represent himself. The trial court granted the defendant’s request to represent himself. The following colloquy occurred between the trial court and the defendant during the pre-trial hearing concerning the defendant’s right to represent himself during his trial. [DEFENDANT]: Well, I’ll have to get me another public defender - I’ll have to talk to my family or something because I’m not gonna go to no trial with him. THE COURT: There won’t be a lawyer that will take your case and be ready on Monday. [DEFENDANT]: Well, I wish not to choose him as my public defender. THE COURT: Well, you don’t have that choice. Your choice is, you go to trial on Monday either representing yourself or - [DEFENDANT]: Well, I’ll have to represent myself. THE COURT: You’re going to represent yourself? [DEFENDANT]: I’ll do that. THE COURT: Have you ever - how far did you go in school? [DEFENDANT]: I went to the eleventh grade. THE COURT: Have you ever tried a case before?

-2- [DEFENDANT]: Have I ever tried a case before? THE COURT: Um-hum. [DEFENDANT]: No, sir. THE COURT: Have you ever read the rules of procedure - rules of evidence? [DEFENDANT]: No, but I think I could - I mean I think I could, you know, go through the procedures of it. THE COURT: All right. Before we get to that question, you listen to what Mr. Johnson is saying just to make sure you understand. I don’t care whether you plead guilty or go to trial - it doesn’t make any difference to me. But the fact is, you’re charged with driving while an habitual motor vehicle offender, which carries six years at sixty percent if you’re convicted. Okay? [DEFENDANT]: Yeah. THE COURT: You can plead not guilty. I’m not trying to get you to plead guilty. I’m just telling you what it is. [DEFENDANT]: Yeah, I’m - THE COURT: This is a fact of life - it carries six years at sixty percent if you’re convicted based on your record. If the state can prove that this record is yours, then that’s what you’ll be sentenced to. [DEFENDANT]: Okay. THE COURT: Okay. All right. Go ahead, Mr. Johnson, with your explanation regarding the robbery case as well. And we’re not trying to get you to plead guilty today. I just want - I want to make sure that the record is clear that this has all been explained to you, and after it’s explained to you, and you know what you’re facing, that you want to go to trial, which is fine. I go to trial every week. If it’s not you, it’s somebody else. [DEFENDANT]: Yeah. I still want to go. I’ll represent myself. THE COURT: That’s fine, but what I’m going to make sure of today is that this record that’s being made of this is clear that you’ve had it explained to you what you’re facing and it’s your desire to reject that and go to trial. All right. So we’ve established driving while habitual motor vehicle, six years, sixty percent. Now, go ahead, Mr. Johnson. Q: (Mr. Johnson) Do you understand you’re also charged with robbery, and if you are convicted on that offense, you would be looking at a sentence of fifteen years at sixty percent. Do you understand that? A: Yeah. Q: Okay. Do you understand there’s also a possibility that the state would file a motion requesting consecutive sentencing,

-3- and if that were granted, then you would be looking at a sentence of twenty-one years at sixty percent. Do you understand that? A: (Moved head up and down.) Q: Do you understand the state has made you an offer in this matter of eleven years at forty-five percent. Do you understand that? A: Yeah. Q: Okay. And you indicated to me that you had a witness that you wished to call, but you have refused to give me the phone number or address of this person. Is that correct? A: Yeah, because I don’t want you - I don’t want you as my lawyer - my PD. ... THE COURT: All right. So it’s your desire to represent yourself.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Von Moltke v. Gillies
332 U.S. 708 (Supreme Court, 1948)
Illinois v. Allen
397 U.S. 337 (Supreme Court, 1970)
Faretta v. California
422 U.S. 806 (Supreme Court, 1975)
United States v. William Stewart McDowell
814 F.2d 245 (Sixth Circuit, 1987)
State v. Carruthers
35 S.W.3d 516 (Tennessee Supreme Court, 2000)
State v. Small
988 S.W.2d 671 (Tennessee Supreme Court, 1999)
State v. Northington
667 S.W.2d 57 (Tennessee Supreme Court, 1984)
State v. Herrod
754 S.W.2d 627 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee, 1988)
Saunders v. State
721 S.W.2d 359 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1986)
State v. Muse
967 S.W.2d 764 (Tennessee Supreme Court, 1998)
State v. Goodwin
909 S.W.2d 35 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee, 1995)
State v. Ballard
21 S.W.3d 258 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee, 2000)
People v. Anderson
133 A.D.2d 120 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 1987)
Guevara-Torres v. United States
533 U.S. 953 (Supreme Court, 2001)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
State of Tennessee v. Ray Saulsberry, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-of-tennessee-v-ray-saulsberry-tenncrimapp-2004.