State of Tennessee v. Michael Rimmer - Concurring

• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court
• Decided: April 16, 2021
• Docket: W2017-00504-SC-DDT-DD
• Status: Published

Opinion

04/16/2021 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE November 4, 2020 Session

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. MICHAEL RIMMER

Automatic Appeal from the Court of Criminal Appeals Criminal Court for Shelby County Nos. 98-01033, 98-01034 Chris Craft, Judge ___________________________________

No. W2017-00504-SC-DDT-DD ___________________________________

SHARON G. LEE, J., concurring.

I concur in the Court’s opinion except for the analysis of the proportionality review. In 1997, this Court narrowed the scope of the proportionality review required by Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-206(c)(1)(D) (2018 & Supp. 2020) by limiting consideration to only those cases in which the State sought the death penalty. State v. Bland, 958 S.W.2d 651, 666 (Tenn. 1997). A majority of this Court reaffirmed this truncated approach in State v. Pruitt, 415 S.W.3d 180, 217 (Tenn. 2013).

In Pruitt, I joined Justice William C. Koch, Jr. in dissenting from the Court’s decision to continue following the Bland approach, as it improperly narrowed the proportionality review required by Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-206(c)(1)(D). Pruitt, 415 S.W.3d at 230 (Koch and Lee, JJ., concurring and dissenting). We determined that the Court should return to its pre-Bland proportionality analysis by considering “all first-degree murder cases in which life imprisonment or a sentence of death has been imposed” and focusing on whether the case under review is more like cases in which the State sought the death penalty than those in which the death penalty was not sought. Id. at 226, 230–31.1 By considering only cases in which the State sought a death sentence, the Bland approach “hides the full picture” from view. Id. at 230.

1 See also State v. Jones, 568 S.W.3d 101, 146–47 (Tenn. 2019) (Lee, J., concurring) (applying this broader comparative approach); State v. Clayton, 535 S.W.3d 829, 863–64 (Tenn. 2017) (Lee, J., concurring) (same); State v. Hawkins, 519 S.W.3d 1, 54–55 (Tenn. 2017) (Lee, J., concurring) (same); State v. Willis, 496 S.W.3d 653, 762 (Tenn. 2016) (Lee, J., concurring) (same); State v. Hall, 461 S.W.3d 469, 504–05 (Tenn. 2015) (Lee, J., concurring) (same); State v. Dotson, 450 S.W.3d 1, 84–85 (Tenn. 2014) (Koch and Lee, JJ., concurring) (same); State v. Freeland, 451 S.W.3d 791, 826–27 (Tenn. 2014) (Koch and Lee, JJ., concurring) (same). Thus, after reviewing similar first-degree murder cases, including those in which the State did not seek the death penalty, I conclude that Mr. Rimmer’s personal background and the nature of the crimes he committed are more like the personal backgrounds and the crimes committed by other persons who have received a death sentence than those who have not. Based on Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-206(c)(1)(D) and the evidence, I find that Mr. Rimmer’s death sentence is neither excessive nor disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases.

_________________________________ SHARON G. LEE, JUSTICE