State of Tennessee v. Kevin R. Newman

Opinion

FILED 05/13/2025

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE Clerk of the Appellate Courts

AT KNOXVILLE February 26, 2025 Session

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. KEVIN R. NEWMAN

Appeal from the Criminal Court for Knox County No. 122960 G. Scott Green, Judge

No. E2024-00600-CCA-R3-CD

Defendant, Kevin R. Newman, appeals his Knox County Criminal Court jury convictions of aggravated burglary and vandalism of property valued at more than $1,000 but less than $2,500, arguing that the trial court erred by admitting certain testimony, by refusing to declare a mistrial, and by providing a jury instruction on flight. He also challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. Upon review, we find no error and, accordingly, affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgments of the Criminal Court Affirmed

MATTHEW J. WILSON, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which TIMOTHY L. EASTER, J., and W. MARK WARD, SP. J., joined.

Gregory P. Isaacs and Michael R. Fitzgerald (at trial and on appeal); and Ashlee B. Mathis (at trial), Knoxville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Kevin R. Newman.

Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter; Katherine C. Redding, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and TaKisha Fitzgerald and Robert Debusk, Assistant District Attorneys General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

The Knox County Grand Jury charged Defendant with the aggravated burglary of Amanda Lane's residence and the damage or destruction of more than $1,000 worth of property belonging to Blaine Stewart, the owner of the residence, on April 11, 2020.

On April 11, 2020, Aaron Armes was outside his home on Birchfield in the Solway area of Knox County when he "heard a big loud crash" and "a racket" coming from the house that Ms. Lane rented from Blaine Stewart. The sound caught his attention because there were no cars in the driveway of Ms. Lane's residence and because he knew that Ms.

Mr.

Lane had decamped to her mother's house at the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic.

a gray jacke t, a black

Armes went to investigate and observed a man wearing red pants, a box. Mr.

hat, and black shoes exit Ms. Lane's residence through the screen door cariying to pull his

Armes saw the man, whom he later identified as Defendant, put the box down the house away

pants up. When Defendant saw Mr. Armes, he walked around the corner of from Mr. Armes.

ued watching

Concerned, Mr. Armes asked his wife to call Ms. Lane while he contin s got into a white

the residence. When he could no longer see Defendant, Mr. Arme 's backyard. Mr.

Hummer and drove to the main road so that he could see into Ms. Lane Ridge Highway and

Armes did not see anyone, so he continued to drive down Oak wearing, speaking to

eventually saw Defendant, whom he identified by the clothes he was Armes did not see the

the driver of "a Chevy black pickup" at the Raceway Market. Mr.

Armes drove behind

box that Defendant had carried away from Ms. Lane's residence. Mr.

the pickup drove away.

the truck, and Defendant cursed and threatened him; the driver of

Raceway Market.

Mr. Armes called 911 to report that Defendant was at the thereafter, "a red Kia with Defendant used a cell phone to make a phone call and, shortly the car, which was driven chrome wheels" pulled into the parking lot. Defendant got into car as it exited the Raceway by a woman dressed in blue scrubs. Mr. Armes followed the until the car crossed into the Market and remained on the phone with Knox County 911 City of Oak Ridge 9-1-1, and City of Oak Ridge. Mr. Armes's call was transferred to the Department (ORPD) told

he continued to follow until officers from the Oak Ridge Police him to "back off."

ORPD officer called

Mr. Armes drove toward his house, but before he arrived, an man he had seen exiting Ms.

to ask that he come to a particular address to identify the address, Mr. Armes saw the Lane's residence with a box in his hands. Upon arriving at the wearing the same clothes he red Kia, the woman in blue scrubs, and Defendant, who was n, recalled that a tattoo of wore when Mr. Armes had seen him earlier. Mr. Armes, a vetera ular attention.

the American flag on Defendant's neck had drawn his partic

's residence, where

After identifying Defendant, Mr. Armes drove to Ms. Lane of the officers questioned officers stood outside with Ms. Lane and her boyfriend. One s examined the area around Mr. Armes. After answering the officer's questions, Mr. Arme grass, and, eventually, some the house, where he observed footprints in the mud, trampled of Ms. Lane's belongings strewn on the ground.

3

nce a few

Mr. Armes said that he had observed a black truck at Ms. Lane's reside ng property

days before the incident involving Defendant, but he did not see anyone carryi ng on the road

out of the residence at that time. Mr. Armes had also seen Defendant walki near Ms. Lane's residence twice before April 11, 2020.

in a house

Ms. Lane' testified that on April 11, 2020, she and her two children lived day, Mr. Armes's

on Birchfield that she rented from Blaine and Shelley Stewart. On that Ms. Lane, who was

wife, Brandy Freeny, called and asked Ms. Lane if she was moving.

se she thought

staying in Loudon at the time, "freaked out" and called the Stewarts becau nce, and when she

"someone was breaking into the house." She then drove to the reside over the place. The TV

went inside, she found that her belongings were "destroyed and all n, as were the French

down and broken. . . . it was a disaster." The back door was broke doors inside the house; she found a tire iron on her son's bed.

and clothing were

Ms. Lane said that most of her jewelry and her designer handbags also missing. Mr. Armes

missing. Some of the clothing belonging to her children was the house in between the

later found one of her handbags in a "wooded area right beside whom she did not know,

gas station and the house." Ms. Lane did not give Defendant, permission to enter her home or take her possessions.

house after Ms. Lane

Blaine Stewart, who owned the house, said that he went to the ed over, and things on the called and found "a ransacked house. Drawers and things knock rt estimated damages of $1,500 floor, and drawers emptied. It was just like TV." Mr. Stewa n glass in the house. He said based upon the cost to replace the doors, television, and broke ssion to enter the house or to that he did not give Defendant, whom he did not know, permi damage the property.

6:30 p.m. on April 11,

ORPD Officer John Thomas2 testified that at approximately "a citizen was following an 2020, he received a "be on the lookout" (BOLO) dispatch that "a shiny red new Kia boxy alleged burglary suspect from Solway into Oak Ridge" in that allowed for observation of vehicle." Shortly after parking his cruiser in a parking lot turned to follow the car, which the roadway, he saw a vehicle matching the BOLO, so he

Hayward. We use the surname listed By the time of the trial, Ms. Lane had taken the last name in the indictment to avoid confusion.

2 At the time of trial, Mr. Thomas had become Chief of Police for the town of Rocky Top, Tennessee.

4

was headed east toward Clinton. Officer Thomas activated his emergency equipment and effectuated a traffic stop.

's

Upon approaching the vehicle, he observed a female wearing scrubs in the driver dant to exit

seat and Defendant seated in the passenger seat. Officer Thomas asked Defen officers

the vehicle and then placed him into the cruiser of another ORPD officer. Other Among the

searched the red Kia and placed the contents on the hood of the vehicle.

saw "bits of

contents, Officer Thomas saw "a gray jacket with a black liner." He also of the left

glass" on the jacket, on the hood of the vehicle, and "on the pavement in front that Mr. Armes

front wheel."3 Body worn camera footage captured Defendant admitting the Raceway

saw him walking through Ms. Lane's yard and through the adjacent field to Market. He claimed to be looking for his cell phone in the area.

elected

The State rested its case, and following a full Momon colloquy, Defendant not to testify but chose to present proof.

to the

Kevin Lindsay testified that he drove his black Chevrolet pickup truck ched him,

Raceway Market on April 11, 2020. An individual with several tattoos approa y said that the

and Mr. Lindsay let the man use his cell phone to make a call. Mr. Lindsa ual returned his

man did not put any items in his truck. Mr. Lindsay left after the individ station.

phone. Mr. Lindsay did not see a white Hummer pull into the gas

Defendant to the

Defendant's ex-wife, Christina Perdue, testified that she drove "was pinging in that

Solway area on April 11, 2020, to look for his lost cell phone, which slowly around the area

area." She initially drove to a church parking lot, and they drove they split up so

with the windows down, hoping to hear the phone pinging. Eventually, searched the other.

that she could search one side of Oak Ridge Highway while Defendant received a call from an

Shortly after she dropped Defendant off to begin his search, she up at the Raceway

unknown number. When she answered, Defendant asked her to pick him said that Defendant did

Market because "there was some guy following him." Ms. Perdue not have any items with him when he got into her car.

parking lot.

Defendant pointed out Mr. Armes' white Hummer before they left the ed. Ms. Perdue said that

When they pulled out of the parking lot, the white Hummer follow she took an indirect

the vehicle followed at a close distance, which made her nervous, so light, Ms. Perdue

route to her house. After the white Hummer got caught at a traffic

3 We have omitted the testimony of other witnesses not necessary to the outcome of this appeal.

5

over by

decided to drive straight home. Before they arrived at her house, they were pulled into a police

the ORPD. After Defendant was taken from Ms. Perdue's car and placed dant.

cruiser, the white Hummer arrived, and the driver of the Hummer pointed at Defen

a

Based upon this evidence, the jury convicted Defendant as charged. Following years for the

sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed concurrent sentences of fifteen at 60 percent

conviction of aggravated burglary and six years for vandalism to be served a timely but

based on Defendant's status as a Career Offender. Defendant filed unsuccessful motion for new trial followed by a timely notice of appeal.

Analysis

as's testimony

In this appeal, Defendant challenges the admission of Officer Thom Perdue's car, the trial

about the glass found in the gray jacket that was removed from Ms.

ction on flight, and

court's refusal to grant a mistrial, the court's provision of a jury instru in turn.

the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. We consider each claim

I. Officer Thomas's Testimony

r Thomas to testify

Defendant contends that the trial court erred by permitting Office from the red Kia, on the

that he observed broken glass on the gray jacket that was pulled the car, claiming that the hood of the vehicle, and on the pavement following the search of was relevant to connect

testimony was irrelevant. The State asserts that the evidence evidence that glass was

Defendant to the burglary of Ms. Lane's residence, noting other broken inside the house.

the existence of any

Relevant evidence is evidence "having any tendency to make probable or less probable fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more "Evidence which is not

than it would be without the evidence." Tenn. R. Evid. 401.

ions concerning evidentiary relevant is not admissible." Tenn. R. Evid. 402. Quest we will not interfere with relevance rest within the sound discretion of the trial court, and appearing on the face of the the exercise of this discretion in the absence of clear abuse ; State v. Van Tran, 864

record. See State v. DuBose, 953 S.W.2d 649, 652 (Tenn. 1997)

73 (Tenn. 1992). "A trial S.W.2d 465, 477 (Tenn. 1993); State v. Harris, 839 S.W.2d 54, standard, reaches an illogical court abuses its discretion when it applies an incorrect legal ment of the evidence, or

conclusion, bases its decision on a clearly erroneous assess

6

employs reasoning that causes an injustice to the complaining party." State v. Clark, 452 S.W.3d 268, 287 (Tenn. 2014) (citing State v. Banks, 271 S.W.3d 90, 116 (Tenn. 2008)).

Here, the presence of glass inside and outside the red Kia, and particularly on and

Defendant's gray jacket, tended to make it more likely that Defendant vandalized burglarized Ms. Lane's home. The glass was discovered only a short time after Mr. Armes

r

observed Defendant exiting Ms. Lane's residence wearing a gray jacket. That Office Thomas

Thomas did not conduct the search does not alter our conclusion because Officer car, and the

testified that he personally observed glass on the jacket, the hood of the an exact

pavement outside the car. Similarly, the absence of forensic evidence establishing make

match between the glass found in the car and the glass in Ms. Lane's home does not the discovery of broken glass any less relevant. This issue is without merit.

II. Failure to Declare a Mistrial

Defendant next contends that the trial court should have declared a mistrial when ant waived

the jury indicated that they were deadlocked. The State argues that Defend for and is not

plenary review of this issue. The State asserts that Defendant has not asked brief and, thus,

entitled to plain error review of this issue. Defendant did not file a reply issue.

has not addressed the State's assertion that he waived our review of this

parties that

Sometime after the jury retired to deliberate, the trial court informed the e working into the

it intended to bring the jury in to ask whether they wanted to continu discussion, the

evening or preferred to retire and return the following day. During this are hopelessly

court asked defense counsel, "[I]n the scenario where they do say that they ant's consent?"

deadlocked, if I were to declare a mistrial, would it be with the defend not to go beyond the

Defense counsel responded, "It would. And we would urge the Court you accept that

jury's admonition that they're deadlocked. We would ask that and I won't

representation." The court stated that it would "explain the options to them, tell them to take the other side of the argument and argue about that."

whether they

The trial court then brought the jury into the courtroom and asked in the morning. The

wanted to continue working or retire for the evening and start fresh hopelessly deadlocked,

court added, "Or if you believe at this point in time that you are options. When the jury

you may so report." The foreperson asked for time to discuss the best interest for the

returned, the foreperson stated, "You Honor, I believe it would be the allow us to reengage

State and the defendant if we were to adjourn for tonight and tomorrow with a fresh mind."

7

The jury reported for deliberations at 9:00 a.m. the following morning. At some point in the morning, the jury sent a note to the trial court that read:

Jury has not reach[ed] a consensus on the lst count of [a]ggravated burglary. Request further guidance per jury instructions to prevent a hung jury.

as given."

The court sent a written response that read, "You must rely upon the instructions the parties

According to Defendant's brief, "the court addressed the note in chambers with record." That

and indicated that it would address the deadlock with the jury on the discussion was not transcribed.

them that

At some point in the afternoon, the trial court brought the parties in to tell temperature." The

the court intended to bring the jury into the courtroom to "take[] their we're going to have

court said it intended to tell the jury, "It's okay if you can't agree, but Both parties stated

to shut this down at 3:00 because of the parade that's coming through."

to the courtroom, the

that they did not object to this procedure. When the jury returned t." The court then

foreperson stated, "I do believe further deliberations may yield benefi at 3:00 p.m. but that

advised the jury that the city would begin closing roads for a parade would "await your

they would be permitted to deliberate until that time and that the court announcement about what step forward we need to take."

s. The trial

The jury later returned a unanirnous verdict of guilty on both charge verdict. After the jury

court polled the jurors, who each indicated their agreement with the court to grant a mistrial rendered its verdicts and was discharged, Defendant moved the note "saying that they

"under your authority as a 13 th juror" and to conclude that the jury's court denied the motion

were deadlocked on Count I asking guidance was a mistrial." The ghly convinced that

and affirmed the jury' s verdict as thirteenth juror, saying, "I'm thorou the jury got it right."

First, Defendant

In our view, Defendant has waived appellate review of this issue.

trial court. See State v.

failed to object, at any point, to the procedure employed by the ("The failure to make a

Gilley, 297 S.W.3d 739, 762 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2008)

on appeal."). Second,

contemporaneous objection constitutes a waiver of the issue ed its verdict and was

Defendant failed to request a mistrial before the juiy render be construed as

discharged. See Tenn. R. App. P. 36(a) ("Nothing in [Rule 36] shall failed to take whatever

requiring relief be granted to a party responsible for an en•or or who ul effect of an error.").

action was reasonably available to prevent or nullify the harmf

8

dant

Finally, Defendant failed to prepare an adequate record for review. In his brief, Defen "to avoid a

states that a critical discussion of the jury's note asking for further guidance was not

hung jury" took place in the trial judge's chambers. A transcript of that discussion paring

included in the record on appeal. As the appellant, Defendant bears the burden ofpre transp ired with respect a record that conveys "a fair, accurate and complete account of what . the record

to those issues that are the bases of appeal." Tenn. R. App. P. 24(b). "Where . .

nt to an issue

is incomplete, and does not contain a transcript of the proceedings releva this Court is

presented for review, or portions of the record upon which a party relies, (Tenn. Crim.

precluded from considering the issue." State v. Roberts, 755 S.W.2d 833, 836 1981); State v. Jones,

App. 1998) (citing State v. Groseclose, 615 S.W.2d 142, 147 (Tenn.

the absence of an

623 S.W.2d 129, 131 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1981)). Importantly, "[i]n was supported by

adequate record on appeal, we must presume that the trial court's ruling 1991) (citing Smith

the evidence." State v. Bibbs, 806 S.W.2d 786, 790 (Tenn. Crim. App.

v. State, 584 S.W.2d

v. State, 584 S.W.2d 811, 812 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1979); Vermilye 226, 230 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1979)).

for plain error.

Whether properly assigned or not, this court may review an issue , an appellate court

See Tenn. R. App. P. 36(b) ("When necessary to do substantial justice party at any time, even

may consider an error that has affected the substantial rights of a or assigned as error on

though the error was not raised in the motion for a new trial exercise our discretion to appeal."). However, Defendant did not ask this court to d to the waiver by the

undertake plain error review of this issue, even after he was alerte establishing entitlement to State's brief. As the appellant, Defendant bears the burden of (Tenn. 2021) (citation

plain error review. See, e.g., State v. Reynolds, 635 S.W.3d 893, 931 is to ask for it. See State v.

omitted). The first and best way to obtain plain error review at *5 (Tenn. Crim. App.

Thompson, No. W2022-01535-CCA-R3-CD, 2023 WL 4552193, persuasion to show that he July 14, 2023) ("Because the ' [d]efendant bears the burden of st this relief weighs against is entitled to plain error relief,' a defendant's failure to reque , No. M2021-01326-CCAany

such consideration on our own." (first quoting State v. Dixon ; and then citing State

R3-CD, 2022 WL 5239289, at *21 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 6, 2022)

49, at *18 (Tenn. Crim. App.

v. Cornwell, No. E2011-00248-CCA-R3-CD, 2012 WL 53041 Defendant should have

Oct. 25, 2012)) (alteration in Thompson). At the very least, 4552193, at *5 ("Where

responded to the State's assertion of waiver. Thompson, 2023 WL particularly compelling or a defendant fails to respond to a waiver argument, only e consideration of plain error egregious circumstances could typically justify our sua spont 2013 WL 12185202, at *8

relief." (citing State v. Powell, No. W2011-02685-CCAR3-CD, not demonstrate the existence (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 26, 2013)). Because the record does ious," we decline to consider of circumstances that are "particularly compelling or egreg this issue any further.

9

III. Jury Instruction on Flight

dant

The State asked the trial court to provide an instruction on flight, and Defen proof that

objected, arguing that the instruction was inapplicable because there was no did not

Defendant fled from law enforcement officers. The State conceded that Defendant based on

flee from officers but nevertheless argued that the instruction was applicable ction was

Defendant's flight from Mr. Armes. The trial court concluded that the instru Ms. Lane's

proper because Defendant fled after being spotted by Mr. Armes leaving residence.

The trial court instructed the jury as follows:

,

The flight of a person accused of a crime is a circumstance which nce of

when considered with all the facts of the case, may justify an infere se of evadin g

guilt. Flight is the voluntary withdrawal of oneself for the purpo ted

arrest or prosecution for the crime charged. Whether the evidence presen on for

proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant fled is a questi your determination.

of

The law makes no precise distinction as to the manner or method [sic], or

flight; it may be open, or it may be hurried or concealed department takes both a

it may be a concealment with[in] the jurisdiction. However, it evasion, or

leaving the scene of the difficulty and a subsequent hiding out, for parts

concealment in the community, or a leaving of the community unknown to constitute flight.

find

If flight is proved, the fact of flight alone does not allow you to since flight by a

that the defendant is guilty of the crime alleged. However, consider the

defendant may be caused by a consciousness of guilt, you may evidence

fact of flight, if flight is so proven, together with all of the other the other

when you decide the guilt o[r] innocence of the defendant. On may be

hand, an entirely innocent person may take flight and such flight of the case.

explained by proof offered, or by the facts and circumstances

the

Whether there was flight by the defendant, the reasons for it, and weight to be given to it, are questions for you to determine.

10

The constitutional right to trial by jury, see U.S. Const. amend VI; Tenn. Const. art.

I, § 6, imposes upon the trial court a duty "to give a complete charge of the law applicable to the facts of a case," State v. Harbison, 704 S.W.2d 314, 319 (Tenn. 1986); see also Tenn. R. Crim. P. 30. We review the legal accuracy of the trial court's instructions de novo with no presumption of correctness, see Troup v. Fischer Steel Corp., 236 S.W.3d 143, 149 of

(Tenn. 2007), and the propriety of a given instruction de novo with a presumption correctness, see Carpenter v. State, 126 S.W.3d 879, 892 (Tenn. 2004).

The trial court may instruct the jury on flight as an inference of guilt when the record contains evidence of "both a leaving the scene of the difficulty and a subsequent hiding 498

out, evasion, or concealment in the community." State v. Payton, 782 S.W.2d 490, Crim. App.

(Tenn. Crim. App. 1989) (quoting Rogers v. State, 455 S.W.2d 182, 187 (Tenn.

flight instruc tion is not 1970)); see State v. Berry, 141 S.W.3d 549, 588 (Tenn. 2004). "A specific intent

prohibited when there are multiple motives for flight," and "[a] defendant's for fleeing a scene is a jury question." Berry, 141 S.W.3d at 589.

law,

The flight instruction provided by the trial court was a correct statement of the spotted by Mr.

see id. at 588, and the evidence supported the trial court's giving it. When through the

Armes in Ms. Lane's yard, Defendant walked behind the house and continued ay Market,

woods to avoid Mr. Armes. When he spotted Mr. Armes at the Racew Officer Thomas

Defendant left with Ms. Perdue. Although Ms. Perdue stopped when ted the giving of

activated his emergency equipment, Defendant's previous conduct suppor instruct the jury

the instruction. Contrary to Defendant's argument, the trial court did not the applicable

that it must infer Defendant's guilt from his flight. Instead, in keeping with ant, the reasons

law, the court instructed the jury, "Whether there was flight by the defend ine." Defendant is

for it, and the weight to be given to it, are questions for you to determ not entitled to relief on this issue.

IV. Sufficiency of the Evidence

cient to

Finally, Defendant contends that the evidence adduced at trial was insuffi simply unbelievable"

support his convictions, arguing that Mr. Armes's "testimony was the damage to the

and that the State failed to establish his identity as the perpetrator of house. The State asserts that the evidence was sufficient.

to determine

We review a challenge to the sufficiency of the convicting evidence the prosecution" and

whether, "after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to evidence as well as all

providing the State with "the strongest legitimate view of the

11

al trier

reasonable and legitimate inferences which may be drawn therefrom," "any ration able doubt ."

of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reason , 354

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979) (citations omitted); State v. Davis review "is

S.W.3d 718, 729 (Tenn. 2011) (citations omitted); Tenn. R. App. P. 13. Our stantia l eviden ce, or a identical whether the conviction is predicated on direct or circum (citing State

combination of both." State v. Williams, 558 S.W.3d 633, 638 (Tenn. 2018)

t removes

v. Dorantes, 331 S.W.3d 370, 379 (Tenn. 2011)). Importantly, a guilty verdic g the to the

the presumption of innocence and replaces it with one of guilt on appeal, shiftin the conviction.

defendant to demonstrate why the evidence is legally insufficient to support ).

Davis, 354 S.W.3d at 729 (citing State v. Sisk, 343 S.W.3d 60, 65 (Tenn. 2011)

of the

The jury, as the trier of fact, resolves all questions involving the credibility disputes raised by

witnesses, the weight and value to be given to evidence, and the factual bell, 245 S.W.3d

such evidence. See Dorantes, 331 S.W.3d at 379 (citing State v. Cwnp gh nor reconsider the

331, 335 (Tenn. 2008)). Accordingly, this court will neither re-wei v. Stephens, 521

evidence when evaluating the sufficiency of the convicting proof. State S.W.3d 718, 724 (Tenn. 2017).

a habitation as

As charged in the indictment, "[a]ggravated burglary is burglary of -403 (2020).4 A

defined in §§ 39-14-401 and 39-14-402." Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-14 e homes, trailers, and

habitation is "any structure, including buildings, module units, mobil ion of persons." Id. §

tents, which is designed or adapted for the overnight accommodat effective consent of the

39-14-401(1)(A). "A person commits burglary who, without the any portion thereof) not

property owner . . . [e]nters a building other than a habitation (or -402(a)(1). "A person

open to the public, with intent to commit . . . theft . . . ." Id. § 39-14 e to or the destruction

commits the offense of vandalism who knowingly . . . [c]auses damag does not have the

of any real or personal property of another . . . knowing that the person owner's effective consent." Id. § 39-14-408(b)(1).

rized or that Mr.

Defendant does not argue that Ms. Lane's residence was not burgla Stewart's valuation of the Stewart's property was not damaged and does not contest Mr.

of Mr. Armes's testimony

damage. Instead, he invites this court to revisit the credibility vandalism. We must decline establishing his identity as the perpetrator of the burglary and jury is the final arbiter of this invitation. See Dorantes, 331 S.W.3d at 379 (stating that the appellate court does not

witness credibility); Stephens, 521 S.W.3d at 724 (stating that the the State, Mr. Armes saw

reweigh or reconsider evidence). In the light most favorable to

codified at Tennessee Code Annotated 4 The crimes of burglary and aggravated burglary are now 545, § 3 (effective July 1, 2021).

sections 39-13-1002 and -1003. See 2021 Tenn. Pub. Acts

12

h the

Defendant exit Ms. Lane's house carrying a box. Defendant fled the scene throug woods, and, when spotted by Mr. Armes at the Raceway Market, he fled with Ms. Perdue it, and

into Oak Ridge. Ms. Lane testified that someone broke into her home, ransacked along the

took possessions belonging to her and her children, some of which were found the same

path that Defendant took from the property. When arrested, Defendant wore inside Ms.

clothes as he did when initially spotted by Mr. Armes, and a gray jacket found saw him walking

Perdue's car bore bits of glass. Defendant admitted that Mr. Armes Market. Mr.

through Ms. Lane's yard and through the adjacent field to the Raceway repairing the

Stewart, who owned the house, testified that he spent more than $1,500 of Defendant's

damage inside the house. This evidence was sufficient to support both convictions, and he is not entitled to relief.

Conclusion

court.

Based upon the foregoing analysis, we affirm the judgments of the trial

s/ Matthew J. Wilson

MATTHEW J. WILSON, JUDGE