State of Tennessee v. Gustavo Chavez - Dissenting

• Court: Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee
• Decided: March 17, 2005
• Docket: W2004-01154-CCA-R3-CD
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT JACKSON

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. GUSTAVO CHAVEZ

Direct Appeal from the Circuit Court for Decatur County No. 03-CR-140 C. Creed McGinley, Judge

No. W2004-01154-CCA-R3-CD - Filed March 17, 2005

DAVID G. HAYES, Judge, dissenting.

The majority concludes that modification of the defendant’s sentence is required in light of Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. __, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004). I must respectfully dissent.

Any sentencing challenge available to the defendant under Blakely is now waived because the defendant did not object at trial to what he now contends is a constitutionally invalid sentencing scheme. See Tenn. R. App. P. 36(a). Our rules of appellate procedure provide that an issue may not be raised for the first time on appeal. Tenn. R. App. P. 36(a). I see no valid reason to carve out an Apprendi/Blakely exception to this established rule. In United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 631- 34, 122 S. Ct. 1781, 1785-87 (2002), the Supreme Court held, after its decision in Apprendi, that the defendant’s claim of right to a trial and finding by a jury on a fact used to enhance the defendant’s sentence was forfeited because it was not raised at trial. Similarly, I find the Supreme Court’s ruling in Cotton applicable to the review of Blakely claims raised on appeal in this State.

Review and modification of the defendant’s sentence for the first time on appeal not only has the effect of removing the trial court as the primary sentencing court, it also denies the State the opportunity to be heard in the sentencing decision. Because the issue is waived, it is reviewable on appeal only under the discretionary authority of plain error. See Tenn. R. Crim. P. 52(b).

An appellate court is permitted to correct plain error, or in this case Blakely error, only when the error is “of such a great magnitude that it probably changed the outcome of the trial.” State v. Adkisson, 899 S.W.2d 626, 642 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994). Clearly, this was the import of the Supreme Court’s recent holding in U. S. v. Booker, 543 U. S. _____, 125 S. Ct. 738, 769 (2005), wherein it opined that not “every [Blakely/Booker] appeal will lead to a new sentencing hearing. That is because we expect reviewing courts to apply ordinary prudential doctrines, determining, for example, whether the issue was raised below and whether it fails the ‘plain-error’ test.” The Supreme Court’s expectations in Booker are ignored by the majority as the “plain-error test” is not employed.

The record supports application of enhancing factor (16), that the defendant abused a position of trust. The majority rejects factor (16), not because it does not exist, but because it violates Blakely. Indeed, on appeal, the defendant does not contest the fact that the mother of the victim, the victim, and the defendant shared the same home, and the defendant served as a “parental figure” to the five-year-old victim. I find, however, under plain-error review, that had a jury heard the proof with regard to factor (16), its verdict would have been the same. Accordingly, the defendant has failed to establish prejudice in order to satisfy the “affecting substantial rights” requirement of Rule 52(b). See Cotton, 535 U.S. at 1786, 122 S. Ct. at 633 (affirming enhancement of the defendant’s sentence following plain error analysis notwithstanding presence of Apprendi error). The distinction between harmless error analysis and error assigned on appeal cannot be overlooked. See U. S. v. Monroe, 353 F.3d 1346 (11th Cir. 2003). It is the defendant, not the State, who has the burden of establishing how the Blakely error changed the outcome of the sentencing decision. See id. Clearly, the defendant has not met this burden. For these reasons, I would affirm the trial court’s imposition of the ten-year sentence.

_____________________________ David G. Hayes, Judge

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