State of Tennessee v. Charles L. Williams - Concurring and Dissenting

Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee

State of Tennessee v. Charles L. Williams - Concurring and Dissenting

CourtCourt of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee

DecidedNovember 29, 2006

DocketM2005-00836-CCA-R3-CD

StatusPublished

This text of State of Tennessee v. Charles L. Williams - Concurring and Dissenting (State of Tennessee v. Charles L. Williams - Concurring and Dissenting) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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State of Tennessee v. Charles L. Williams - Concurring and Dissenting, (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006).

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Opinion

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT NASHVILLE April 18, 2006 Session

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. CHARLES L. WILLIAMS

Appeal from the Criminal Court for Davidson County No. 2003-D-3000 Monte Watkins, Judge

No. M2005-00836-CCA-R3-CD - Filed November 29, 2006

JOSEPH M. TIPTON , J., concurring and dissenting.

I concur in the results and most of the reasoning in the majority opinion. In this regard, I view the prosecutor’s improper statements to be a matter of serious concern. I disagree, however, with the opinion’s conclusion that the trial court erred by instructing the jury as to a reckless mental state regarding rape of a child.

As the opinion notes, this court has held that sexual penetration relates to both nature of the conduct and result of the conduct mental state element. See State v. Chester Wayne Walters, No. M2003-03019-CCA-R3-CD, White County, slip op. at 14 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 30, 2004), perm. app.denied (Tenn. Mar. 21, 2005). In fact, the majority opinion provides the statutory definition of reckless, which includes application to the result of conduct, and then states that unlawful sexual penetration, “a nature of conduct and result of conduct element, may be satisfied only by the culpable mental states of ‘intentional’ or ‘knowing’ -- and not by a mens rea of ‘reckless.’” I think this conclusion actually contradicts the statutory definition of reckless. In any event, I would hold that the trial court did not err in instructing the jury regarding all three mental states applying to rape of a child. I am authorized to say that Judge Williams joins in this opinion.

____________________________________ JOSEPH M. TIPTON, JUDGE

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IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT NASHVILLE April 18, 2006 Session

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. CHARLES L. WILLIAMS

Appeal from the Criminal Court for Davidson County No. 2003-D-3000 Monte Watkins, Judge

No. M2005-00836-CCA-R3-CD - Filed November 29, 2006

JOSEPH M. TIPTON , J., concurring and dissenting.

I concur in the results and most of the reasoning in the majority opinion. In this regard, I view the prosecutor’s improper statements to be a matter of serious concern. I disagree, however, with the opinion’s conclusion that the trial court erred by instructing the jury as to a reckless mental state regarding rape of a child.

As the opinion notes, this court has held that sexual penetration relates to both nature of the conduct and result of the conduct mental state element. See State v. Chester Wayne Walters, No. M2003-03019-CCA-R3-CD, White County, slip op. at 14 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 30, 2004), perm. app.denied (Tenn. Mar. 21, 2005). In fact, the majority opinion provides the statutory definition of reckless, which includes application to the result of conduct, and then states that unlawful sexual penetration, “a nature of conduct and result of conduct element, may be satisfied only by the culpable mental states of ‘intentional’ or ‘knowing’ -- and not by a mens rea of ‘reckless.’” I think this conclusion actually contradicts the statutory definition of reckless. In any event, I would hold that the trial court did not err in instructing the jury regarding all three mental states applying to rape of a child. I am authorized to say that Judge Williams joins in this opinion.

____________________________________ JOSEPH M. TIPTON, JUDGE

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State of Tennessee v. Charles L. Williams - Concurring and Dissenting, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-of-tennessee-v-charles-l-williams-concurring-tenncrimapp-2006.