State of Tennessee, Department of Children's Services v. CBH, in re: SB

CourtCourt of Appeals of Tennessee
DecidedJuly 29, 2004
DocketE2003-03000-COA-R3-PT
StatusPublished

This text of State of Tennessee, Department of Children's Services v. CBH, in re: SB (State of Tennessee, Department of Children's Services v. CBH, in re: SB) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Tennessee primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State of Tennessee, Department of Children's Services v. CBH, in re: SB, (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004).

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT KNOXVILLE June 7, 2004 Session

STATE OF TENNESSEE, DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN’S SERVICES v. CBH, IN RE: SB, a Child Under 18 Years of Age

Direct Appeal from the Circuit Court for Bradley County No. V-02-1034 Hon. John B. Hagler, Jr., Circuit Judge

No. E2003-03000-COA-R3-PT - FILED JULY 29, 2004

The Trial Court terminated the mother’s parental rights after finding statutory grounds to terminate and clear and convincing evidence that it was in the child’s best interest that the parent’s rights be terminated. On appeal, we affirm.

Tenn. R. App. P.3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed.

HERSCHEL PICKENS FRANKS, P.J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which CHARLES D. SUSANO , JR., J., and D. MICHAEL SWINEY , J., joined.

Charles G. Wright, Jr., Chattanooga, Tennessee, for Appellant.

Paul G. Summers, Attorney General and Reporter, and Elizabeth C. Driver, Assistant Attorney General, Nashville, Tennessee, for Appellee.

OPINION

The Department of Children’s Services (DCS) filed a Petition to Terminate Parental Rights of the mother, CBH, to the minor child, SB, on December 9, 2002, alleging that mother had abandoned the child, has not complied with her permanency plan, and the child had been removed for more than six months.

The Petition further alleged that SB was removed from the mother (and not for the first time) on July 27, 2001, and that mother had not sought visitation with the child since that time, had not engaged in a permanency plan, and had shown no intent to reunify with the child. Following an evidentiary hearing in which numerous witnesses, as well as the mother, testified, the Trial Court found the mother had been given many opportunities, especially in the last two years to properly care for the child, but the Department had found it necessary to take the child into custody again. The Court said there was clear and convincing evidence that the mother endangered the children when she was arrested for driving recklessly and without a license, and that she had no success in dealing with her alcohol and drug problems, although services had been available to assist her.

The Court held the mother had not complied with the permanency plans, and this was a “classic case” of persistence of conditions. The Court observed that the child had been in state custody for most of the 15 years of her life.

The Court found that the mother’s failure to support the child was not willful, as the evidence did not establish her ability to pay. The Court held, however, that the mother’s failure to visit, was willful, and was grounds for termination. The Court noted that he gave no credit to much of the mother’s testimony in conflict with the witnesses from the Department.

The Court entered an Order terminating the mother’s rights on the grounds of abandonment for failure to visit, persistence of conditions, and incompetence to care for the child due to the mother’s long-standing problems with alcohol and drugs, further that termination was in the child’s best interest.

The mother has appealed, and these issues are presented for consideration on appeal:

1. Whether the trial court erred in considering evidence prior to the latest removal on July 27, 2001?

2. Whether the trial court had a legal basis to terminate based on Tenn. Code Ann. §36-1-113(g)(8)?

3. Whether the trial court had a legal basis to terminate based on Tenn. Code Ann. §36-1-113(g)(3)?

4. Whether the trial court had clear and convincing evidence of abandonment pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. §36-1-102(1)(A)(I)?

5. Whether the trial court had a legal basis for termination pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. §36-1-102(1)(A)(ii)?

A parent has a fundamental right to the care, custody, and control of her child. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 92 S. Ct. 1208 (1972). This right is not absolute, however, and may be terminated if there is clear and convincing evidence justifying termination under the

-2- applicable statute. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 102 S. Ct. 1388 (1982); In re Drinnon, 776 S.W.2d 96 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988). The court must also find that termination of parental rights is in the child’s best interest. Tennessee Dept. of Human Services v. Riley, 689 S.W.2d 164 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1984); Tenn. Code Ann. §36-1-113(c).

The mother argues that the Department should not have been allowed to present evidence of the conditions prior to the last removal, and that the findings of the Juvenile Court in the earlier termination proceeding were res judicata, i.e. the mother had been drug free for four years. The only finding the Trial Court made as to drugs in this case was that drug and alcohol problems had plagued the mother off and on for years, and that she had never completed a treatment program. The mother, in her testimony, admitted that she had “slipped” and smoked pot in 2001, and failed a drug test, which lead to the latest removal.

The Trial Court relied upon numerous factors in terminating the mother’s rights, and made clear that it was not reconsidering matters that the Juvenile Court had previously ruled on, but on facts which had occurred after the latest removal. The Court found the mother had failed to comply with her latest plan of care, and was incompetent to care for the child due to her alcohol/drug problems and instability. The Court ruled the mother had abandoned the child by failing to visit, and that the conditions which led to removal persisted. Moreover, the history of past behavior is relevant to the issue of future behavior. We find no error on this issue.1

The mother argues that the Court did not have a proper basis for finding that she was mentally incompetent (see Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(8)) to care for the child, because the Juvenile Court had previously found in 2000 that she had been drug-free for four years. The mother admitted at trial that she had taken drugs in the past two years, that she was under indictment for DUI and child endangerment, and that she had no proper home for the children. She offered no proof that she had ever completed alcohol or drug treatment, or that she had completed counseling as required by her plan of care. The Trial Court based his ruling on this ground in part on mother’s behavior at the trial, stating that from observing mother testify, he was convinced that the mother did not have the proper mental or emotional state to meet the child’s needs. The mother’s argument that the Trial Court improperly based its finding on prior facts, is without merit.

The Trial Court found that this was a “classic case” of persistence of conditions. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(3)(A).

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Related

Stanley v. Illinois
405 U.S. 645 (Supreme Court, 1972)
Santosky v. Kramer
455 U.S. 745 (Supreme Court, 1982)
Tennessee Department of Human Services v. Riley
689 S.W.2d 164 (Court of Appeals of Tennessee, 1984)
In Re Drinnon
776 S.W.2d 96 (Court of Appeals of Tennessee, 1988)

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State of Tennessee, Department of Children's Services v. CBH, in re: SB, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-of-tennessee-department-of-childrens-services-v-cbh-in-re-sb-tennctapp-2004.