LATOURETTE, C. J.
Appeal by Dr. George H. Buck, a duly licensed physician and surgeon of the state of Oregon, from a judgment of conviction and sentence predicated on the alleged violation of § 23-408, OCLA, known as the Criminal Abortion Act, which is as follows:
“If any person shall administer to any woman pregnant with a child any medicine, drug, or substance whatever, or shall use or employ any instrument or other means, with intent thereby to destroy such child, unless the same shall be necessary to preserve the life of such mother, such person shall, in case the death of such child or mother be thereby produced, be deemed guilty of manslaughter. ’ ’
The indictment, inter alia, charges that on December 11, 1950, Dr. Buck, by employing certain instruments, destroyed the unborn child of a certain woman, it not being necessary to preserve the life of the woman.
The medical code, in effect at the time in question, after providing for a board of medical examiners, the licensing of physicians and surgeons, and other pro[91]*91visions not necessary for this opinion, provided by §54-931, OCLA, inter alia, as follows:
“The board may refuse to grant a license to any applicant who desires to practice medicine and surgery in this state or may suspend or revoke such licenses for any of the following reasons:
“(a) Unprofessional or dishonorable conduct;
“(b) The procuring or aiding or abetting in procuring an abortion unless such is done for the relief of a woman whose health appears in peril because of her pregnant condition after due consultation with another duly licensed medical physician and surgeon;
<<#####
“(i) Conviction of any offense for which the punishment may be incarceration in a state penitentiary or in a federal prison; a copy of the record of conviction, certified to by the clerk of the court entering the conviction, shah be conclusive evidence;
i i # # * * # ? >
Among the definitions found in § 54-901, OCLA, are the following:
(( # * & * #
‘ ‘ ‘Unprofessional or dishonorable conduct’ shall mean such conduct as would not be indulged in by an ethical physician and surgeon, under all the circumstances, taking into consideration the good of the patient, and the public, the time and place.
“ ‘Abortion’ shall mean the expulsion of the foetus at a period of uterogestation so early that it has not acquired the power of sustaining an independent life; provided it shall be conclusively presumed for the purpose of this statute that the foetus has not acquired such power earlier than one hundred fifty (150) days after gestation, and a disputable presumption of lack of such power shall arise if the expulsion take place earlier than two hundred forty (240) days after gestation.”
[92]*92The main question involved in this appeal is what effect, if any, the Medical Practice Act contained in chapter 9, title 54 (§54-901 — 54-945, OCLA, as amended) has on the Criminal Abortion Act. And in this connection it may be noted that the outcome of this case not only affects Dr. Buck, whose license to practice medicine has heretofore been revoked on a matter wholly unrelated to the facts in this case, In re Buck, 200 Or 488, 258 P2d 124, but also the entire medical profession.
It is a familiar rule that a court, in construing a statute, must ascertain the intent and purpose of the legislation from the language used. The rule is well stated in Swift & Co. and Armour & Co. v. Peterson, 192 Or 97, 108, 233 P2d 216, as follows:
“The cardinal rule for the construction of a statute is to ascertain from the language thereof the intent of the lawmakers as to what purpose was to be served, or what object was designed to be attained. Leonard v. Ekwall, 124 Or. 351, 359, 264 P. 463; Fox v. Galloway, 174 Or. 339, 346, 148 P. 2d 922. We accomplish this with such aid as may be found in the rules of interpretations and legitimate extrinsic sources, always keeping in mind that the legislative intent to enact a valid and constitutional law will be assumed. Fullerton v. Lamm, supra, at page 670. When the legislative intent has been ascertained, it should be given effect, even though, in doing so, the literal meaning of the words used is not followed. Allen v. Multnomah County, 179 Or. 548, 554, 173 P. 2d 475; Wood v. State, 133 Tex. 110, 126 S. W. 2d 4, 121 A. L. R. 931, 935. In arriving at the legislative intention, it is proper for the court to take into consideration the policy and purposes of the Act, and to consider in that connection whether or not such a policy and purposes will be attained by a literal interpretation of the language used. Ban-[93]*93field v. Schulderman, 137 Or. 167, 178, 296 P. 1066, 298 P. 905, 89 A.L.R. 504; Allen v. Multnomah County, supra, at 554. It is the express intent of the legislature which we seek, and to do this we must look to the entire statute. * * V’
It is well recognized that when the language of an act is unambiguous the intent of the legislature must be gained from the language used.
Giving consideration to the Medical Practice Act alone it is obvious that the same clearly and pointedly authorizes a doctor to perform an abortion as therein defined, if the same is done for the relief of a woman whose health appears in peril because of her pregnant condition after due consultation with another duly licensed medical physician and surgeon.
Since the Criminal Abortion Act and the Medical Practice Act conflict, it is our province to determine the relationship between the two, and, in so doing, we must construe the same together. It is true that the Medical Practice Act makes no express reference to the Criminal Abortion Act, but that is unimportant if there are necessary implications relating to it.
We recognize that repeals, amendments or modifications of previous statutes by implication are not favored, nor are they frowned upon in a proper case. If the legislature clearly intended by the enactment of the Medical Practice Act to alter or change the Criminal Abortion Act under given circumstances, such intention must be given full force and effect.
It is generally conceded that statutes in pari materia are to be construed together. There is another rule of equal importance, and that is, although statutes are not strictly in pari materia, yet, if they relate to the same matter, persons or things, or the same class [94]*94of persons or things, or are closely allied to the same subject or object, they may be construed together.
In 50 Am Jur 347, Statutes, § 350, we read:
“Although there may be statutory provisions which, in a sense, relate to the same matter and yet are not in pari materia, the general rule is that statutes or statutory provisions which relate to the same person or thing, or to the same class of persons or things, or to the same or a closely allied subject or object, may be regarded as in pari materia. * * * ”
In Black, Interpretation of Laws, 2d ed, p 340, § 104, we find the following:
“It is also held that legislation which is of a similar nature to the statute under consideration, although not precisely in pari materia, is within the reason of the rule, and may be referred to for the same purpose * *
In Crawford, Statutory Construction, we read:
“Just as the different words, phrases and provisions of a statute should not be isolated and given an abstract meaning, so the statute itself in its entirety should not be interpreted solely by reference to its own terms, but rather by reference to the other laws of the state, and particularly to those pertaining to the same subject. Every statute should be regarded as a part of the whole body or system of law. Consequently, in construing a statute, the constitution, the common law, and other statutes, particularly those in pari materi and those expressly referred to, should be examined, in the effort to ascertain the intention of the legislature. * * * p 420, § 227.
“When it is necessary to resort to the process of construction, the court may properly refer to certain other statutes in its effort to determine the meaning of the language used by the legislature, epecially where such statutes are pre-existing or contemporaneous. While this rule is particularly [95]*95applicable to statutes in pari materia, the court is not limited to statutes of that character. Certain statutes which are not strictly in pari materia may also be given consideration, such as statutes on cognate subjects, since they are within the reason of the rule which allows reference to statutes in pari materia. * * *” p 428, §229.
In construing statutes to determine the intent of the legislature, it makes no difference whether the court is construing a civil statute in relation to a criminal statute, or vice versa; the ultimate object is to ascertain the intention of the legislature in enacting such legislation. In 82 CJS 815, Statutes, § 366, we read:
“ * * * Other related legislation may be considered in construing statutes dealing with * * * crimes, * * * ; and in this respect, similar expressions in civil and criminal statutes dealing with the same general subject should be given a uniform construction, and resort to the civil statutes as well as to the penal code will be had to give meaning to language appearing in the criminal statutes.”
In State v. Ebbs, 89 Mo App 95, 98, the court said:
“ * * * Though section 3867 is found in chapter 47 of the statute relating to crimes and punishments, while section 7537 is embraced in chapter 138 in relation to the assessment and collection of the revenue, they both touch the same subject, and therefore should be treated and considered in accordance with the rule just referred to.”
In United States v. Hutcheson, 312 US 219, 85 L ed 788, 61 Sup Ct 463, the Supreme Court, in construing the Sherman Act (criminal) and the Clayton and Norris-La Guardia Acts (civil) said:
“In order to determine whether an indictment charges an offense against the United States, [96]*96designation by the pleader of the statute under which he purported to lay the charge is immaterial. He may have conceived the charge under one statute which would not sustain the indictment, but it may nevertheless come within the terms of another statute. See Williams v. United States, 168 U. S. 382, 42 L. ed. 509, 18 S. Ct. 92. On the other hand, an indictment may validly satisfy the statute under which the pleader proceeded, but other statutes not referred to by him may draw the sting of criminality from the allegations. Here we must consider not merely the Sherman Law but the related enactments which entered into the decision of the district court.”
A consideration of the opinion of this court, written by Mr. Justice Bossman, in Multnomah County Fair Association v. Langley, 140 Or 172, 13 P2d 354, in connection with the Racing Commission Act adopted in 1933, §§ 91-901 to 91-913, OCLA, will disclose a situation on all fours with that in the case at bar.
In the Langley case, one of the questions involved was whether pari mutuel betting upon horse races constituted a nuisance in violation of § 14-722, Oregon Code 1930, now § 23-927, OCLA. In passing, we note that this nuisance statute was first adopted in 1864, and has since been a criminal law of this state. The court, in the Langley case, held that such pari mutuel betting constituted a violation of § 14-722, Oregon Code 1930. Following the decision in that case, the legislature, in 1933, adopted the Bacing. Commission Act, providing for the licensing of pari mutuel betting upon animal races, and since that time licensees have been permitted to lawfully carry on pari mutuel betting that prior to the adoption of the act would have been unlawful. It is noted that in the racing act no mention whatever is made of the nuisance [97]*97statute. Here, clearly, the licensing act had a direct effect upon the nuisance statute and modified it to the extent provided in the later Racing Commission Act, just as the Medical Practice Act, also a licensing act -which permits duly licensed physicians and surgeons to perform certain abortions that prior to its adoption would have constituted manslaughter, modifies the Criminal Abortion Act. See also Reser v. Umatilla County, 48 Or 326, 329, 86 P 595; Portland v. Portland Ry. Light & Power Co., 80 Or 271, 306, 156 P 1058.
In City of Portland v. Duntley, 185 Or 365, 390, 203 P2d 640, we said:
“It is our holding, based upon an analysis of the Oregon Racing Act, the applicable principles of statutory construction, and the pertinent decisions, that the only effect of that Act, so far as the present question is concerned, was to except regulated pari mutuel wagering at a licensed race track from the operation of the Oregon Nuisance Statute, leaving that statute otherwise in full force and effect. * *
Before leaving the pari mutuel statute we call attention to § 91-911, OCLA, where it is provided that all nonprofit fair associations, such as the State Pair, County Pairs, and Pendleton Round-up, are not required to have licenses to conduct such races but that they shall be entitled to withhold 10 per cent of the gross receipts of mutuel wagering. We do not believe that anyone would deign to argue that such associations would be amenable to the Nuisance Act.
To determine the intent of the legislature in enacting the Medical Practice Act, we shall trace the same from its inception. Subsequent to the passage of the Criminal Abortion Act, the legislature, by the [98]*98Laws of 1889, page 144, adopted an act entitled: “An Act to Begulate the Practice of Medicine and Surgery-in the State of Oregon.” This statute created a “board of examiners for the State of Oregon,” and provided for issuance by it to applicants, entitled under the law thereto, of licenses to practice medicine and surgery within the state. Provision was made for revocation of licenses, after hearing, for “unprofessional [sic] or dishonorable conduct,” but the act contained no detailed statement of what might be deemed such conduct.
The legislature, by the Laws of Oregon, 1895, p 61, enacted a new and complete law embodying the Medical Practice Act. The act provided for the appointment of a Board of Medical Examiners, for the issuance of licenses to practice medicine and surgery, and invested the board with the following power: “and such board may refuse or revoke a license for unprofessional or dishonorable conduct, subject, however, to the right of such applicant to appeal,” as in the act provided. Section 4 of the act defined “unprofessional” or “dishonorable conduct” as follows:
“The words ‘unprofessional’ or ‘dishonorable conduct,’ as used in section three (3) of this act, are hereby declared to mean: First, the procuring or aiding or abetting in procuring a criminal abortion; * * *”
Inasmuch as the only statute of the state that defined and prohibited “a criminal abortion” was what is now § 23-408, OCLA, it manifestly was the intent of the legislature by such reference to abortion, to refer to and incorporate into the 1895 Act, so far as applicable, the provisions of the Criminal Abortion [99]*99Act. Board of Medical Examiners v. Eisen, 61 Or 492, 123 P 52.
The legislatures of 1913, 1915, 1927 and 1935 amended in some respects the Medical Practice Act but retained the provision authorizing the board to revoke licenses for unprofessional or dishonorable conduct in “the procuring or aiding or abetting in procuring a criminal abortion. ’ ’
It is obvious from the foregoing enactments that the legislature intended, by the use of the term “criminal abortion” in the Medical Practice Act, to hold physicians and surgeons responsible under the Criminal Abortion Act, as well as to subject them to a revocation of license for a violation of that statute. Under then existing law, physicians and surgeons, as well as all other persons, were prohibited from performing any abortion whatsoever, unless such abortion was necessary “to preserve the life” of the mother.
By chapter 277, Oregon Laws 1937, the legislature amended the Medical Practice Act in a very material respect by defining the words “unprofessional” and “dishonorable conduct” as
“ * * * the procuring or aiding or abetting in procuring an abortion unless such is done for the relief of a woman whose health appears in peril after due consultation with another licensed medical physician and surgeon.”
It will be noticed that in the amending act the word “criminal”, which had been employed in the Medical Practice Act for a period of over 40 years, was removed from the language previously used and the amendment above noted added; however, “abortion” was not defined. To remedy this situation and to make certain what kind of abortion a medical doctor [100]*100could perform, the next legislature, by chapter 153, § 3, amended the Medical Practice Act in the respect that “abortion” was defined to mean:
“ * * * the expulsion of the foetus at a period of uterogestation so early that it has not acquired the power of sustaining an independent life; provided it shall be conclusively presumed for the purpose of this statute that the foetus has not acquired such power earlier than one hundred fifty (150) days after gestation, and a disputable presumption of lack of such power shall arise if the expulsion take place earlier than two hundred forty (240) days after gestation.”
We glean from the foregoing that at the time the alleged crime was committed, the medical board had the authority to revoke the license of a doctor if he procured, or aided or abetted in the procuring of an abortion, being one where the foetus was expelled so early, as defined by the act, that it had not acquired the power of sustaining an independent life, unless it was done for the relief of a woman whose health appeared to be in peril, after collaboration with another licensed medical physician and surgeon. Conversely, the board would have no authority to revoke the doctor’s license if he performed the abortion mentioned where it appeared to him that the woman’s health was imperiled after due consultation with another physician.
It necessarily follows, as night the day, that if the board had no right to revoke the doctor’s license if' he performed the abortion under the circumstances mentioned, the doing and performing of such an abortion would be legal, and not unlawful. In other words, if one is told that he will, be chastised for doing a certain thing unless he does it in a certain way, it is [101]*101equivalent to telling him that if he does it in the prescribed way he will not be punished.
It would be parodoxical, indeed, if the state were permitted to prosecute a doctor for a violation of the Criminal Abortion Act when, under the Medical Practice Act, he was permitted to do the very thing he was prosecuted for. And, further, it would be absurd and an anomaly if the board were authorized to cancel a doctor’s license upon conviction under the Criminal Abortion Act when it would not be permitted to so do where an abortion was legally conducted under the Medical Practice Act.
That it was the intention of the legislature to place medical physicians and surgeons in a class by themselves, as far as abortions, as defined by the Medical Practice Act, are concerned, is further illustrated in the legislation affecting naturopaths, chapter 451, Laws of 1927, § 54-531, OCLA, wherein their licenses could be revoked for performing criminal abortions. It is interesting to note in this connection that although chiropractors, by § 54-331, OCLA, could have their licenses revoked for the conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, no mention was made of abortions until the legislature of 1953 enacted chapter 556, where it was written that a chiropractor could have his license revoked for
6 i ¿fe sK' ¿fe
“(g) The procuring or aiding or abetting in procuring an abortion, and for the purpose of this Act an abortion shall be deemed to mean the removal from the womb of a woman the product of conception at any time prior to delivery of the child; provided, however, nothing in this Act shall be construed to authorize any licentiate under title 54, chapter 3, OCLA, to perform an abortion;
C( ¿fe ¿fe ¿fe # # ? J
[102]*102It is patent that under the above legislation chiropractors or naturopaths stand on the same footing as ordinary persons, so far as the Criminal Abortion Act is concerned and are amenable thereto.
That the legislature intended to legalize abortions as defined in the Medical Practice Act is further exemplified by chapter 265, Oregon Laws 1951. By that act the law affecting the practice of abortions by medical doctors was tightened and strengthened. By that act, when a doctor performs an abortion he must consult with another duly licensed medical physician and surgeon “who is not an associate or relative of the physician or surgeon and who agrees that an abortion is necessary.” The law further provides:
“ * * * The record of this consultation shall be in writing and shall be maintained in the hospital where the consultation occurred or in the offices of all physicians and surgeons involved for a period of at least three years after the date of such abortion.”
As the law now stands, if criminal jurisdiction were permitted to attach, not only would the doctor performing the abortion, but also his medical collaborator, be criminally liable. In such a case the hospital record made by the doctor under accusation could be used against him in furtherance of the criminal prosecution.
In passing, we call attention to the legislative enactments, ch 128, Laws of Oregon 1945, and ch 183, Laws of Oregon 1953, applying to osteopathic physicians which parallel the laws pertaining to abortions in the Medical Practice Act. Thus, osteopathic and medical doctors, so far as abortions are concerned, are placed in a category distinct from that of chiropractors and naturopaths.
[103]*103Since we have held that a medical doctor has the legal right to perform an abortion, as defined in the Medical Practice Act, provided he acts for the relief of a woman whose health appears in peril because of her pregnant condition, after consultation with another medical doctor, the question is posed whether or not such relief of a woman whose health appears in peril because of her pregnant condition is an integral part of the crime charged against him or a matter of defense. It is conceded by the state, and the law in Oregon is well established, that if such provision is a material part of the description of the offense and a necessary ingredient thereof, the same must be negatived in the indictment, but, if not, it is a mere matter of excuse or defense and need not be negatived in the indictment. State v. Tamler & Polly, 19 Or 528, 25 P 71; State v. Schriber, 185 Or 615, 629, 205 P2d 149.
It is likewise conceded, and it is the law, that in an indictment under the Criminal Abortion Act, the necessity to preserve the life of the mother must be negatived and proved. State v. Glass, 5 Or 73; State v. Clements, 15 Or 237, 14 P 410; State v. Ausplund, 86 Or 121, 167 P 1019; Annotation, 153 ALR 1266.
In the case at bar, it is admitted that the defendant is a duly licensed physician and surgeon and that the abortion in question was performed within 150 days after gestation. Since the indictment did not negative that the abortion was performed for the relief of the woman in question, whose health appeared imperiled because of her pregnant condition, would this be fatal to the state’s case?
It is axiomatic that if accused can admit the truth of every allegation in the indictment against him [104]*104and yet be innocent of any crime, the indictment is insufficient as to bim and will not support a conviction. In the instant case, if the defendant performed the abortion upon the woman in question, whose health appeared imperiled because of her pregnant condition, after due consultation with another duly licensed physician and surgeon, he was guilty of no crime.
It seems logical that if it is necessary to charge in an indictment in an ordinary criminal abortion case that the abortion performed was not necessary to preserve the life of the mother, that being an integral part of the crime, by analogy, in a prosecution against a duly licensed physician and surgeon for an abortion, as defined by the Medical Practice Act, it would likewise be necessary to charge that the abortion was not performed for the relief of a woman whose health appeared in peril because of her pregnant condition, since that too would be an integral part of the crime as against such a licensed physician and surgeon.
Bearing in mind that related statutes must be construed together as if they were one law, we must construe the Criminal Abortion Act and the Medical Practice Act together as if they were one act where a licensed physician and surgeon is charged with committing an unlawful abortion as defined under the Medical Practice Act. Erickson v. Erickson, 167 Or 1, 15, 115 P2d 172. When the matter is approached from this angle, it can readily be seen that the relief of a woman whose health appears in peril because of her pregnant condition attains the same importance as the necessity “to preserve the life of such mother.” We do not apprehend that the district attorney would argue against the necessity of negativing in the indictment that the abortion was performed for “the relief of a woman whose health appears in peril be[105]*105cause of her pregnant condition” if the Criminal Abortion Act itself contains such language.
A medical doctor who, in performing an abortion as defined by the Medical Practice Act, having complied with all of its terms and conditions, is absolved of criminal liability; on the other hand, if he fails to meet all the requirements specified in the abortion sections of the Medical Practice Act, he would be liable under the Criminal Abortion Act and subjected to its penalties. The construction we have placed on this legislation protects ethical medical practictioners in the pursuit of their profession and in no wise places a protective cloak over the unethical medical practitioner.
Reversed.