State of Ohio v. Bey

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. Ohio
DecidedNovember 22, 2022
Docket1:22-cv-00660
StatusUnknown

This text of State of Ohio v. Bey (State of Ohio v. Bey) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. Ohio primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State of Ohio v. Bey, (S.D. Ohio 2022).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO WESTERN DIVISION

STATE OF OHIO, Case No. 1:22-cv-660

Plaintiff, Cole, J. v. Bowman, M.J.

RODERICK JABURI BEY,

Defendant.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

The above captioned case was removed to this Court by the pro se Defendant, who has simultaneously moved for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. The undersigned now recommends the sua sponte dismissal and summary remand of this action based upon improper removal and lack of subject matter jurisdiction. I. Background On November 14, 2022, a person who identifies himself as “Roderick Jaburi Bey”1 filed a document that has been docketed as a “Notice of Removal” in this federal Court. Although the cover sheet for this case identifies it as a civil case removed under “federal question” jurisdiction, (see Docs. 1-3 and 1-4), the documents of record make clear that it is nothing of the sort. Instead, it is apparent that Defendant is attempting to “remove” to this Court as a new civil case an existing criminal case filed against Defendant in the Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas. See Hamilton County Criminal Case No. B2202206. According to the publicly available electronic records of the state court, the

1The undersigned infers, based upon scattered references throughout the record, that the same individual referenced criminal case charges Defendant with eight counts: three charges of trafficking in drugs including fentanyl-related compounds; two charges of having weapons while under a disability; an aggravated possession charge; and two charges of possession of a fentanyl-related compound. As a basis for removal, Defendant’s 12-page single-spaced “Notice of Removal”

contains numerous nonsensical allegations that closely resemble many similar filings made by “sovereign citizens.” For example, Defendant identifies himself in relevant part as follows: COMES NOW, Roderick Jabari Bey, In Propria Persona, Sui Juris (not to be confused with Pro se). Aboriginal Indigenous Moorish-American; possessing Free-hold by Inheritance status; standing squarely affirmed and bound to the Zodiac Constitution, with all due respect and honors given to the Constitution for the United States Republic. North America. Being a descendant of Moroccans and born in America, with the blood of the Ancient Moabites from the land of Moab, who received permission from the Pharaohs of Egypt to settle and inhabit North-West Africa / North Gate. The Moors arc the founders and are the true possessors of the present Moroccan Empire; with our Canaanite, Hittite and Amorite brethren, who sojourned from the land of Canaan, seeking new homes.

(Doc. 1-1 at 2, PageID 7). The “Notice of Removal” goes on to allege that the criminal proceedings against Defendant in state court are unconstitutional and unlawful, based in part upon Defendant’s belief that the State of Ohio is “an unconstitutional, private corporation.” (Doc. 1-1 at 3, PageID 8; see also id., “notifying all parties of the Petitioner's Moorish American (Identification / Status) and that the Petitioner was not, is not, and does not, waive any Inalienable Rights to due process….”). Towards the end of the Notice of Removal is a demand for monetary damages sought by Defendant in this federal court against a long 2 list of governmental entities and individuals loosely associated with the ongoing state criminal court proceedings. (Doc. 1-1 at 12). In addition to his Notice of Removal, Defendant has filed 23 pages of what have been identified in the docket sheet as “State Court Documents.” (Doc. 1-2). Whether all of the documents previously have been filed in the related state court criminal record

is not entirely clear. What is clear is that the referenced documents all reflect the same nonsensical beliefs concerning the alleged illegitimacy of the court system and the state criminal proceedings. (See, e.g., Doc. 1-2 at 1, “Letter Rogatory for Relief,” alleging in part that the Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas “is not really a court…but rather a military tribunal under Admiralty jurisdiction….operated as a private, for profit corporation listed on Dun and Bradstreet,” that “[a]ll cases are civil, though often fraudulently called criminal,” and that “[a]fter finding the alleged Defendant guilty, the court clerks sell the judgments to the Federal Courts,” and that international bankers “have concocted a reverse trust scheme….”; see also Doc. 1-2 at 6-8 and 15-17, “Notice of Appearance,

Mandatory Judicial Notice, Motion to Dismiss, Notice of Subrogation”; Doc. 1-2 at 18-19, “Affidavit of Title (Statement of Beneficial Ownership”; Doc. 1-2 at 20-23, “Transmittal Letter” demanding Defendant’s “right to subrogation.”). II. Analysis Upon sua sponte review, the undersigned has determined that the attempted removal of the state court criminal action is improper. For the reasons that follow, this case should be summarily dismissed and remanded to state court. As noted, the documents filed in this removal action incorporate verbiage commonly used in “sovereign

3 citizen” cases. The Sixth Circuit has affirmed the summary dismissal of such cases and defenses in many contexts, as have other courts around the country. See e,g., United States v. Coleman, 871 F.3d 470, 476 (6th Cir. 2017) (collecting cases and noting that Defendant’s “legal arguments directly correspond to meritless rhetoric frequently espoused by tax protesters, sovereign citizens, and self-proclaimed Moorish-

Americans.”); El Bey v. Doe, 2017 WL 3923753 (W.D.N.Y., 2017) (dismissing federal habeas corpus case based upon “Moorish claims.”). A more fundamental problem, however, is the lack of any federal subject matter jurisdiction for the removal of this case. Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, and may examine jurisdictional issues sua sponte. A challenge to subject matter jurisdiction over a removed case may be raised at any time before final judgment. See Page v. City of Southfield, 45 F.3d 128, 133 (6th Cir.1995) (“[L]ack of subject matter jurisdiction ... requires the court to remand at any time prior to final judgment.”); accord Rule 12(h)(3), Fed. R. Civ. P. “A federal court may remand a

case sua sponte where the allegations of the complaint which gave rise to the federal jurisdictional basis are insufficient to confer subject matter jurisdiction on the court.” Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government Civil Service Comm'n v. Overstreet, 115 Fed. Appx. 813, 816-17 (6th Cir. 2004) The limits of subject matter jurisdiction cannot be expanded through the improper removal of an action from state court. In order for removal jurisdiction to exist for Defendant to remove a civil case from state to federal court, there must have been a “civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have

4 original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). Here, Defendant is not attempting to remove a civil case, but instead is attempting to remove a criminal case, in which he is being prosecuted by the State of Ohio. Defendant cannot magically transform a state case in which he is a criminal defendant into a civil lawsuit that he is prosecuting against the State of Ohio.

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Related

Thomas v. Arn
474 U.S. 140 (Supreme Court, 1986)
Lexington-Fayette Urban County v. Overstreet
115 F. App'x 813 (Sixth Circuit, 2004)
United States v. Airiz Coleman
871 F.3d 470 (Sixth Circuit, 2017)
Page v. City of Southfield
45 F.3d 128 (Sixth Circuit, 1995)

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State of Ohio v. Bey, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-of-ohio-v-bey-ohsd-2022.