State of Ohio Ex Rel. Chrysler L.L.C. v. Indus. Comm., 07ap-823 (6-3-2008)

2008 Ohio 2649
CourtOhio Court of Appeals
DecidedJune 3, 2008
DocketNo. 07AP-823.
StatusPublished

This text of 2008 Ohio 2649 (State of Ohio Ex Rel. Chrysler L.L.C. v. Indus. Comm., 07ap-823 (6-3-2008)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Ohio Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State of Ohio Ex Rel. Chrysler L.L.C. v. Indus. Comm., 07ap-823 (6-3-2008), 2008 Ohio 2649 (Ohio Ct. App. 2008).

Opinion

DECISION
{¶ 1} Chrysler LLC ("Chrysler") filed this action in mandamus, seeking a writ to overturn the order of the Industrial Commission ("commission") which granted permanent total disability ("PTD") compensation to Patricia A. Moulton. *Page 2

{¶ 2} In accord with Loc. R. 12, the case was referred to a magistrate to conduct appropriate proceedings. The parties stipulated the pertinent evidence and filed briefs. The magistrate then issued a magistrate's decision which contains detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law. (Attached as Appendix A.) The magistrate's decision includes a recommendation that we deny the request for a writ.

{¶ 3} Chrysler has filed objections to the magistrate's decision. Counsel for Patricia Moulton and counsel for the commission have each filed a memorandum in response. The case is now before the court for review.

{¶ 4} Patricia Moulton worked on a Chrysler assembly line for 20 years. Her recognized conditions include lumbosacral strain, herniated disc at L5-S1 and pain in her hands, wrists, elbows, shoulders, neck and upper back. She is physically incapable of resuming assembly line work, but is capable of sedentary work. Her entitlement to PTD compensation turns upon an analysis of a variety of vocational factors.

{¶ 5} Patricia Moulton filed her first application for PTD compensation in 2003. It was denied based upon an analysis of the pertinent vocational factors, especially including her failure to seek any additional vocational training. As a result, she sought help in acquiring additional skills through a rehabilitation provider sponsored by Chrysler.

{¶ 6} The provider found Patricia Moulton could not feasibly be rehabilitated. She had not done anything but assembly line work for 20 years and her two relatively brief stints as a receptionist occurred at a time when receptionists did not have to have extensive computer skills and skills managing complex telephone systems.

{¶ 7} Counsel for Patricia Moulton filed a second application for PTD compensation. Based upon the changed circumstances, a staff hearing officer ("SHO") *Page 3 granted the compensation. Reconsideration was denied, following which Chrysler filed this action in mandamus.

{¶ 8} Our magistrate made the finding that the commission acted within its discretion in granting PTD compensation. Counsel for Chrysler objects to this finding based upon two particulars:

I. The Magistrate erred in finding that Moulton was not required to seek employment or enhance her re-employment potential after her initial permanent total disability application was denied.

II. The Magistrate erred in finding that the May 5, 2005 Vocational Closure Report is "some evidence" to support the award of permanent total disability compensation where the report does not support the Magistrate's conclusion that Moulton is permanently and totally disabled from a vocational standpoint.

{¶ 9} Addressing the first objection, Patricia Moulton clearly did attempt to enhance her re-employment potential. Her challenges were deemed insurmountable due to a variety of reasons. She is now 64 years of age and was 63 when the SHO granted her second application. She has had two back surgeries, but still suffers from a variety of painful conditions. She has to keep changing physical positions to alleviate her pain. She has no transferable skills from her line working with Chrysler. Her brief stints as a receptionist are now almost 30 years in the past, resulting in few, if any, transferable skills. She has consistently maintained that she would work if she could. Her attempt to be rehabilitated by working with Chrysler's chosen rehabilitation source is a vocational positive which offsets her earlier failure to attempt rehabilitation. *Page 4

{¶ 10} The SHO and the magistrate were well within their discretion to find that a failure to seek further rehabilitation and to conduct a job search did not bar Patricia Moulton from receiving PTD compensation.

{¶ 11} The first objection is overruled.

{¶ 12} The second objection misconstrues what occurred, both before the SHO and the magistrate. Analysis of vocational factors is strictly the province of the commission. They can utilize one vocational report or a dozen of them, but are bound by no one else's view of the vocational factors. The SHO analyzed the factors and awarded PTD compensation. The magistrate acknowledged that a different weighing was possible, but found the commission/SHO was within its discretion to weigh things the way they were weighed. The magistrate was correct.

{¶ 13} The second objection is overruled.

{¶ 14} We adopt the findings of fact and conclusions of law contained in the magistrate's decision. We, therefore, deny the requested writ of mandamus.

Objections overruled; writ of mandamus denied. BROWN and SADLER, JJ., concur. *Page 5

APPENDIX A
MAGISTRATE`S DECISION
IN MANDAMUS
{¶ 15} Relator, Chrysler LLC, has filed this original action requesting that this court issue a writ of mandamus ordering respondent Industrial Commission of Ohio ("commission") to vacate its order which granted permanent total disability ("PTD") *Page 6 compensation to respondent Patricia A. Moulton ("claimant"), and ordering the commission to find that claimant is not entitled to that compensation.

Findings of Fact:

{¶ 16} 1. Claimant has sustained two work-related injuries and her claims have been allowed for the following:

98-625855: LUMBOSACRAL STRAIN (Emp. FROI-1 Cert. 4/21/99); HERNIATED DISC L5-S1 (DHO 6/23/00).

L217823-22: PAIN IN HANDS AND BOTH WRISTS; PAIN IN BOTH ELBOWS; PAIN IN BOTH SHOULDERS; PAIN IN NECK/UPPER BACK (Emp. Cert. C-50 10/12/92).

{¶ 17} 2. Claimant last worked in June 1999, approximately six months after the 1998 injury to her back.

{¶ 18} 3. Claimant filed her first application for PTD compensation on March 16, 2003. At that time, claimant was 59 years old. On her application, claimant indicated that she had graduated from high school, was able to read, write, and perform basic math, and that she had never participated in rehabilitation because she felt she was too old. Claimant's previous work consisted of 20 years on the assembly line for relator and approximately one and one-half years as a receptionist.

{¶ 19} 4. Claimant's application was heard before a staff hearing officer ("SHO") on March 15, 2004, and was denied. The SHO concluded that relator was capable of performing at a sedentary work level. Thereafter, the SHO analyzed the nonmedical disability factors and found that relator's age was not a barrier to reemployment, that her high school degree was a positive factor, and that she had a long history working in both unskilled and semi-skilled work. Further, the SHO cited the reports of two vocational *Page 7 experts who had specifically identified several jobs which claimant was capable of performing.

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Related

State ex rel. Pressley v. Industrial Commission
228 N.E.2d 631 (Ohio Supreme Court, 1967)
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497 N.E.2d 70 (Ohio Supreme Court, 1986)
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State ex rel. Noll v. Industrial Commission
567 N.E.2d 245 (Ohio Supreme Court, 1991)
State ex rel. Gay v. Mihm
626 N.E.2d 666 (Ohio Supreme Court, 1994)
State ex rel. Domjancic v. Industrial Commission
635 N.E.2d 372 (Ohio Supreme Court, 1994)

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Bluebook (online)
2008 Ohio 2649, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-of-ohio-ex-rel-chrysler-llc-v-indus-comm-07ap-823-6-3-2008-ohioctapp-2008.