NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-4915-16T2
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
ZARIK ROSE,
Defendant-Appellant. _____________________________
Submitted October 24, 2018 – Decided April 24, 2019
Before Judges Koblitz, Ostrer and Currier.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Gloucester County, Indictment No. 06-04- 0377.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (David A. Gies, Designated Counsel, on the briefs).
Charles A. Fiore, Gloucester County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Staci L. Scheetz, Assistant Prosecutor, on the brief).
Appellant filed pro se supplemental briefs. The opinion of the court was delivered by
OSTRER, J.A.D.
In this post-conviction relief (PCR) appeal, one novel issue merits in-
depth discussion: may a defendant waive a previously asserted right to represent
himself by acquiescing in his representation by counsel. Federal courts have
addressed the issue, but our state courts have not. We conclude that a defendant,
by his or her conduct, may waive the right of self-representation. But, whether
a defendant has done so is a fact question. To conclude that a defendant has
waived an asserted right of self-representation, the evidence must clearly
demonstrate that the defendant intentionally relinquished the known right of
self-representation. We remand for an evidentiary hearing so the court can
determine whether defendant waived his right.
The trial court also rejected multiple claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel, concluding they failed to meet the two-pronged Strickland test of non-
professional assistance and prejudice. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668, 687, 694 (1984). We address those below, following our discussion of the
self-representation issue, and conclude that one of those claims also warrants
exploration at an evidentiary hearing. In all other respects, we affirm the trial
court's denial of PCR.
A-4915-16T2 2 I.
A.
After a 2007 trial, a jury found defendant guilty, as an accomplice, of
purposeful murder of Charles Mosley. The State's case rested largely on the
testimony of two criminal offenders. Larry Graves confessed to killing Mosley,
but testified that he did so at defendant's request, made when they were both in
jail together. Graves said he killed Mosley to prevent him from testifying
against defendant in an upcoming trial for attempted murder of Mosley. The
other witness was Salvatore Puglia, a drug dealer, who elicited statements from
defendant about the homicide in a covertly recorded conversation. We assume
the reader's familiarity with these and other underlying facts, which the Supreme
Court reviewed in detail in affirming defendant's conviction on direct appeal.
State v. Rose, 206 N.J. 141, 146-52 (2011). We focus here on defendant's
assertion of the right to represent himself.
Defendant declared he wanted to "go pro se" after he unsuccessfully
sought to replace his assigned counsel. In a June 14, 2006 letter to Judge Walter
L. Marshall, Jr., defendant asked that his attorney "be removed from [his] case"
because the attorney had not met with him or requested information about
witnesses. Eight days later, having "not heard anything" from the court or
A-4915-16T2 3 counsel, defendant wrote again, asking the court "to appoint another attorney to
represent" him.
At a bail review hearing on July 24, 2006 before a different judge,
defendant renewed his complaint about counsel. The judge informed defendant
that he did not have a right to choose his appointed attorney. Defendant then
asserted his right to represent himself. The court deferred a response, insisting
that defendant present his request in writing.
The colloquy between the court and defendant was as follows:
Mr. Rose: For the record – so it's on the record, I don't want [my defense counsel] on my case.
The Court: Sir, –
Mr. Rose: He hasn't interviewed a witness. I haven't had one witness interviewed. I haven't had an interviewer come to see me. He could have had people that could have cleared my name already, –
The Court: Okay. Sir – Sir
Mr. Rose: – and we still haven't done that. I don't want him on my case.
The Court: Sir
Mr. Rose: That's all I'm asking, your honor, that you remove him from my case. I'll go pro se. I'll put in a motion to go pro se. I'm not going to court with him purposely trying to sell me out.
A-4915-16T2 4 ....
The Court: Okay. Let me suggest to you, sir, that you –
Mr. Rose: I understand.
The Court: Notwithstanding the application which you've made verbally. You've not made it in writing yet, which will be considered by the Court if you want to do that, to proceed pro se, the Court would, in any event, appoint an attorney to be your advisor.
Mr. Rose: Yes, sir. Okay.
Two days later, defendant presented his request in a letter to the judge.
The State does not dispute that defendant sent the following letter:
Your Honor please except this letter in Lieu of a formal Motion, to dismiss . . . my Defense Counsel, and to proceed to Trial Pro-se.
Your Honor on July 24, 2006, I made a Verbal Application before you to dismiss . . . my Defense Counsel, and to Proceed to Trial Pro-Se. [Defense counsel] said, I must make my request in writing. So im [sic] making my Application to the court, with a copy being sent to [defense counsel], to remove him as my Defense Counsel, and to Proceed to trial Pro-se. Defense Counsel has continued to ignore my request for Discovery, to interview witnesses, or come to my County Jail to meet with me, to discuss the status of my up coming trial.
So please allow this letter to act as a formal motion to dismiss . . . my Defense Counsel and to proceed to trial pro-se.
A-4915-16T2 5 There is no record that the judge responded, or forwarded the letter to
Judge Marshall, who later presided over the trial. Defendant did not thereafter
renew his request to represent himself. In a certification supporting his PCR
petition, defendant asserted, "The Court and trial counsel failed to address my
Motion and it was my understanding that it was denied." He contended he was
entitled to a new trial because the court deprived him of his right to represent
himself.
The PCR court denied defendant's petition without an evidentiary hearing
stating, "Petitioner chose to move forward with trial while being represented by
trial counsel, and Petitioner was convicted by the jury. Petitioner cannot now
argue that his right to self-representation was violated because he was not
pleased with the outcome of the trial."
In his appeal, defendant contends, "The PCR Court erred where it did not
determine whether the trial court erroneously required defendant's waiver of
counsel request to be made in writing." In a pro se reply brief, defendant argues:
Defendant Zarik Rose, clearly and unequivocally notified the trial court and trial counsel that he desired to proceed pro se, however the court refused to hold a Faretta hearing and refused to allow him to proceed pro se, thereby violating his constitutional right to counsel and his rights to due process of law and a fair trial; if the court finds this issue should have been raised on direct appeal, then direct appeal and PCR
A-4915-16T2 6 counsels rendered ineffective assistance of counsel was ineffective [sic].
The State argues that defendant's argument "is not cognizable via post-
conviction relief," noting that PCR is "neither a substitute for direct appeal, R.
3:22-3, nor an opportunity to relitigate cases already decided on the merits, R.
3:22-5." (quoting State v. Preciose, 129 N.J. 451, 459 (1992)). The State also
contends defendant never clearly and unequivocally asserted the right to
represent himself. Thus, as we understand the argument, we have no cause to
reach the issue of the right's waiver.
We review de novo the PCR court's factual findings without an evidentiary
hearing. State v. Harris, 181 N.J. 391, 421 (2004). We also owe no deference
to the trial court's conclusions of law. Ibid. "A defendant shall be entitled to an
evidentiary hearing" before a PCR court if he or she establishes a "prima facie
case in support of post-conviction relief," there are "material issues of disputed
fact that cannot be resolved by reference to the existing record," and a "hearing
is necessary to resolve the claims for relief." R. 3:22-10.
B.
As a threshold matter, we reject the State's contention that defendant's
claim that he was denied his self-representation right is procedurally barred. A
defendant may seek PCR upon a showing of a "[s]ubstantial denial in the
A-4915-16T2 7 conviction proceedings of defendant's rights under the Constitution of the
United States or the Constitution or laws of the State of New Jersey." R. 3:22-
2(a). As a corollary to the right to counsel, the right to represent oneself enjoys
constitutional protection. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 813-14, 821
(1975); State v. King, 210 N.J. 2, 16 (2012).
As a procedural matter, defendant's claim that his right was denied stands
on similar footing with a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. "Our courts
have expressed a general policy against entertaining ineffective-assistance-of-
counsel claims on direct appeal because such claims involve allegations and
evidence that lie outside the trial record." Preciose, 129 N.J. at 460. Likewise,
the issue whether defendant waived by conduct his right to represent himself
requires, in this case, a review of evidence outside the trial record. That may
include evidence of discussions between defendant and his appointed counsel.
Those discussions may reflect how defendant perceived the court's non-response
to his self-representation request, and whether defendant intentionally
relinquished it thereafter. Consequently, defendant's claim is appropriate for
PCR review because it could not have been fully considered on direct appeal.
In any event, the court shall not bar a defendant's claim in a first PCR
proceeding if it "would result in fundamental injustice." R. 3:22-4(a)(2). In
A-4915-16T2 8 State v. Coon, 314 N.J. Super. 426 (App. Div. 1998), the defendant contended
in a petition for PCR that he waived his right to appellate counsel without the
required searching inquiry to confirm whether he did so knowingly and
voluntarily. Id. at 431-33. Even if defendant could have raised the claim earlier,
we declined to bar it because doing so "would result in a fundamental injustice."
Id. at 437 (quoting R. 3:22-4(b)). On the same basis, we decline to bar
defendant's claim that the trial court denied him his right of self-representation. 1
C.
Our substantive analysis involves consideration of two questions: (1) did
defendant effectively assert his right to represent himself; and (2) if so, did he
subsequently waive that right by conduct or acquiescence. To address the first
question, we review well-settled principles regarding self-representation.
The United States Supreme Court held in Faretta that a defendant has a
Sixth Amendment right to represent oneself at trial, so long as the defendant has
"voluntarily and intelligently" waived the right to counsel. 422 U.S. at 807; see
1 Given our view of the procedural bar, we need not address defendant's alternative claim that his appellate attorney was ineffective by failing to raise on direct appeal the deprivation of his right to self-represent. But see Orazio v. Dugger, 876 F.2d 1508, 1513 (11th Cir. 1989) (holding that the failure to raise a Faretta claim on direct appeal constituted ineffective assistance of counsel). A-4915-16T2 9 also Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 400 (1993) (stating the waiver must be
"knowing and voluntary"); State v. Crisafi, 128 N.J. 499, 509 (1992) (stating the
waiver must be made "knowingly and intelligently"); State v. Thomas, 362 N.J.
Super. 229, 243 (App. Div. 2003) (stating the waiver must be "voluntary,
knowing and intelligent"); Wayne R. LaFave et al., 3 Criminal Procedure §
11.3(a), at 775 and n.7 (4th ed. 2015) (stating that the waiver must be "knowing,
intelligent, and voluntary" and that various similar formulations do not mean to
suggest "a difference in content"); cf. State v. Wessells, 209 N.J. 395, 402 (2012)
(stating that the waiver of right to counsel by a suspect in custody must be
"knowing, voluntary and intelligent").
Mindful that defendants are usually better off with counsel than without,
the Court has required that a defendant "be made aware of the dangers and
disadvantages of self-representation, so that the record will establish that he
knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open." Faretta, 422
U.S. at 434 (citation omitted); see also State v. Reddish, 181 N.J. 553, 592
(2004). The court "should 'indulge [in] every reasonable presumption against
waiver.'" King, 210 N.J. at 19 (quoting State v. Gallagher, 274 N.J. Super. 285,
295 (App. Div. 1994)); see also Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
A-4915-16T2 10 A two-step process has emerged. First, a defendant must assert the right
of self-representation "in a timely fashion" so as not to "disrupt the criminal
calendar, or a trial in progress." State v. Buhl, 269 N.J. Super. 344, 362 (App.
Div. 1994). The request must be made "clearly and unequivocally." See
Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835 (upholding waiver of counsel where defendant "clearly
and unequivocally declared . . . that he wanted to represent himself" and did so
voluntarily and intelligently); State v. Figueroa, 186 N.J. 589, 593 and n.1
(2006); State v. Harris, 384 N.J. Super. 29, 57 (App. Div. 2006). In making the
request, a defendant need not "recite some talismanic formula." Dorman v.
Wainwright, 798 F.2d 1358, 1366 (11th Cir. 1986). Whether "orally or in
writing," a defendant need only make the request "unambiguously . . . so that no
reasonable person can say that the request was not made." Ibid.
Second, once a defendant asserts the self-representation right, the trial
court must ascertain, in a so-called "Faretta hearing," whether the waiver is
indeed knowing, voluntary, and intelligent after a searching inquiry that
involves advising the defendant of the risks and pitfalls of self-representation.
State v. DuBois, 189 N.J. 454, 468-69 (2007); Figueroa, 186 N.J. at 593;
A-4915-16T2 11 Reddish, 181 N.J. at 593-95 (describing the inquiry); Crisafi, 128 N.J. at 510-
12 (describing the inquiry). 2
Following the hearing, the court generally must permit the defendant to
proceed pro se if it finds on the record that the defendant has knowingly,
voluntarily, and intelligently waived the right to counsel and decided instead to
2 The Court described the required inquiry as follows:
Taken together, then, the Crisafi/Reddish inquiry now requires the trial court to inform a defendant asserting a right to self-representation of (1) the nature of the charges, statutory defenses, and possible range of punishment; (2) the technical problems associated with self-representation and the risks if the defense is unsuccessful; (3) the necessity that defendant comply with the rules of criminal procedure and the rules of evidence; (4) the fact that the lack of knowledge of the law may impair defendant's ability to defend himself or herself; (5) the impact that the dual role of counsel and defendant may have; (6) the reality that it would be unwise not to accept the assistance of counsel; (7) the need for an open-ended discussion so that the defendant may express an understanding in his or her own words; (8) the fact that, if defendant proceeds pro se, he or she will be unable to assert an ineffective assistance of counsel claim; and (9) the ramifications that self-representation will have on the right to remain silent and the privilege against self- incrimination.
[DuBois, 189 N.J. at 468-69.]
A-4915-16T2 12 proceed pro se. Figueroa, 186 N.J. at 593. "[T]he ultimate focus must be on the
defendant's actual understanding of the waiver of counsel." Crisafi, 128 N.J. at
512. In rare cases, a court's failure to engage in the necessary colloquy may be
excused. Id. at 512-513 (finding waiver of counsel knowing and intelligent
despite inadequacy of colloquy).
However, the right of self-representation is not "absolute." Reddish, 181
N.J. at 587. In exceptional cases, the court may deny self-representation if it
would obstruct the progress of a case, or, it would interfere with "the integrity
of the State's interest in fair trials" and the courts' ability "to ensure that their
judgments meet the high level of reliability demanded by the Constitution."
Reddish, 181 N.J. at 587;3 see also State v. McNeil, 405 N.J. Super. 39, 52 (App.
Div. 2009) (affirming finding that a mentally ill defendant lacked competence
to represent himself though he was competent to stand trial) (citing Indiana v.
Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 176-78 (2008)); LaFave et al., § 11.5(d), at 865-82
(discussing grounds for denying self-representation, including misconduct and
lack of competence to self-represent).
3 Although Reddish applied this standard to a capital case, the Court has invoked this standard in other cases. See, e.g., King, 210 N.J. at 18 (robbery case). A-4915-16T2 13 Defendant's oral and written requests to discharge his appointed counsel
and to represent himself were timely – as he made them well in advance of trial.
They were also clear and unequivocal. The record belies the State's contention
that defendant's request was "vague." Once the court summarily denied
defendant's request for substitute counsel, defendant said, without qualification,
that he wanted to represent himself and he refused to go to court with someone
he believed would "sell [him] out." Rather than hold a Faretta hearing, the trial
court deflected defendant's oral request by inappropriately requiring defendant
to submit his request in writing. See Buhl v. Cooksey, 233 F.3d 783, 792 (3d
Cir. 2000) (stating that the law "does not require that [the] request be written or
in the form of a formal motion"). Defendant responded with an unambiguous
request to represent himself, but the court ignored the letter. 4
In response to defendant's request, the court was obliged to conduct a
Faretta hearing. A defendant is entitled to a new trial when a court denies a
4 While the court may have viewed defendant's oral request as conditioned on his inability to get replacement counsel, his written request was unconditional. It criticized his appointed counsel, but did not request a substitute. In any event, "[a] request to proceed pro se is not equivocal because it is an alternative position, advanced as a fall-back to a primary request for different counsel." Johnstone v. Kelly, 808 F.2d 214, 216 n.2 (2d Cir. 1986); see also United States v. Hernandez, 203 F.3d 614, 621-22 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding request so conditioned unequivocal). A-4915-16T2 14 defendant the right to self-representation without determining whether a timely
and unequivocal request was knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently made.
[I]f the court fails to fulfill its obligation to inform the defendant [of the nature of the charges, the possible penalties and the dangers of self-representation] and then denies his request to represent himself, it violates the defendant's Sixth Amendment right of self- representation. . . . Were the rule otherwise, the Sixth Amendment right to self-representation would be severely weakened. . . . If the judge failed to perform his duties properly – if he failed, for example, to explain adequately the dangers of self-representation and the consequences the defendant faced – the defendant would be penalized: his right to self- representation would be forfeited by virtue of the court's error.
[United States v. Hernandez, 203 F.3d 614, 625 (9th Cir. 2000) (reversing conviction based on wrongful denial of right of self-representation).]
See also Buhl, 233 F.3d at 800, 806-07 (reversing conviction where court denied
a timely and unequivocal request on the ground that the defendant was motivated
by his dissatisfaction with counsel); Figueroa, 186 N.J. at 596.
The failure to rule on a defendant's request has been treated the same as
an explicit denial. In Moore v. Haviland, 531 F.3d 393, 401-04 (6th Cir. 2008),
the trial court declined to rule on the defendant's self-representation request and
directed defense counsel to call his next witness. The Court of Appeals grant ed
habeas corpus relief, stating that "[b]y failing to rule on [the defendant's]
A-4915-16T2 15 unequivocal requests to proceed pro se, the trial court deprived him of his Sixth
Amendment right to self-representation." Id. at 404.
Violation of the right is not "amenable to 'harmless error' analysis. The
right is either respected or denied; its deprivation cannot be harmless."
McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 177 n.8 (1984); see also King, 210 N.J. at
22 (reversing conviction where trial court erred in denying defendant's motion
to represent himself).
Although the record does not clearly demonstrate that defendant's
assertion of the right to represent himself was knowingly, voluntarily, and
intelligently made, that lack of clarity results from the trial court's failu re to
engage in the searching inquiry our case law requires. The trial court did not
explicitly deny defendant's request. Nonetheless, as in Hernandez, defendant
should not be "penalized" for the court's error in failing to address defendant's
request in a Faretta hearing. Unless defendant's failure to persist in his request
constitutes a waiver of his self-representation right, the court's failure to act is
tantamount to a denial, inasmuch as defendant could only proceed pro se with
the court's affirmative approval. See Haviland, 531 F.3d at 404. Therefore, we
turn next to the issue of waiver.
A-4915-16T2 16 D.
Waiver of a constitutional right, as with waiver generally, requires proof
of the "intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or
privilege." Zerbst, 304 U.S. at 464. Whether a defendant has waived the right
to counsel "must depend, in each case, upon the particular facts and
circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and
conduct of the accused." Ibid. We conclude this standard also applies to the
waiver of the right to self-representation, once asserted. Furthermore, "'waiver
of constitutional rights in any context must, at the very least, be clear.'"
Mazdabrook Commons Homeowners' Ass'n v. Khan, 210 N.J. 482, 505-06
(2012) (quoting Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 95 (1972)).
We recognize that, although the right of self-representation is a
"corollary" to the right to counsel, the rights are treated differently. "While the
right to counsel is in force until waived, the right of self-representation does not
attach until asserted." Brown v. Wainwright, 665 F.2d 607, 610 (5th Cir. 1982)
(en banc). A defendant is routinely advised of the right to counsel at the outset
of criminal proceedings. See R. 3:4-2(c)(3) (requiring a judge, at the first
appearance of a defendant charged with an indictable offense, to inform the
defendant of the right to retain counsel, and the right to appointed counsel if
A-4915-16T2 17 indigent). As we have discussed above, before a court may properly accept a
defendant's waiver of the right to counsel, the court must engage in a searching
inquiry after informing the defendant of the nature of the right and the
consequences of waiver.
By contrast, our rules do not require the court to inform a defendant of his
or her right to proceed without counsel, and we are unaware of any New Jersey
case that recognizes such an obligation. Nor must a court engage in a colloquy
with a defendant about the risks and pitfalls of eschewing the right of self -
representation before a defendant may proceed with counsel after asserting the
right to proceed pro se. A defendant may also forego the right of self -
representation without knowing it exists. In such cases, it would appear
inappropriate to say that such a defendant waived that right, that is, intentionally
relinquished a known right. 5
5 Some rights can be waived by simple inaction. For example, following "the majority view," our Court held that "a defendant who does not affirmatively request the right to participate in voir dire sidebars should be considered to have waived the right," although the Court did not predicate such waiver on proof of knowledge of the right to be present. State v. W.A., 184 N.J. 45, 63 (2005). In other contexts, however, the court has been "unwilling to equate [a] defendant's silence with a knowing waiver of a constitutional right." State v. Suazo, 133 N.J. 315, 323 (1993) (involving refusal to object to search). A-4915-16T2 18 Other courts have held that a trial court is not obliged to inform a
defendant of the right of self-representation. See LaFave et al., § 11.5(b), at
847-48 and n.31 (citing cases). One court has explained that the two rights are
treated differently because the right to counsel is essential to the right to a fair
trial, while the right to self-representation "is grounded more in considerations
of free choice than in fair trial concerns." United States v. Martin, 25 F.3d 293,
295 (6th Cir. 1994). The Martin court cites Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412
U.S. 218, 237 (1973) for the proposition that, "[a]lmost without exception, the
requirement of a knowing and intelligent waiver has been applied only to those
rights which the Constitution guarantees to a criminal defendant in order to
preserve a fair trial." Schneckloth identifies the right to counsel, confrontation,
a jury trial, a speedy trial, and freedom from double-jeopardy. Id. at 237-38.
Some federal courts have held that even the right to counsel may be
"waive[d] by conduct." United States v. Bauer, 956 F.2d 693, 695 (7th Cir.
1992). The Seventh Circuit in Bauer held that a defendant waived his right to
counsel when he insisted upon appointed counsel but refused to provide
financial information to demonstrate that he qualified, and refused to retain
private counsel. However, the Third Circuit has stated, "'A waiver by conduct'
requires that a defendant be warned about the consequences of his conduct,
A-4915-16T2 19 including the risks of proceeding pro se." United States v. Goldberg, 67 F.3d
1092, 1101 (3d Cir. 1995). The Goldberg court reasoned that when a defendant
neither asks nor intends to proceed pro se, but is compelled to do so because of
his obstructive or uncooperative behavior, it is more accurate to say that the
defendant has forfeited rather than waived the right. Ibid.
We are unaware of any New Jersey case in which a defendant was found
to have waived by conduct the right of self-representation after assertion. 6 Yet,
federal courts have found such waivers by conduct where the defendant did not
press the issue in the face of judicial inaction or indecisiveness.
The federal courts do not require a defendant to persist in asserting the
right to proceed pro se after a clear denial. See Orazio v. Dugger, 876 F.2d
1508, 1512-13 (11th Cir. 1989) (rejecting finding of waiver); Brown, 665 F.2d
at 612 (stating that, to avoid a waiver, a defendant need not "continually rene w
his request to represent himself even after it is conclusively denied by the trial
court"). However, absent a clear denial, some federal courts have deemed a
defendant's inaction to be a waiver under the circumstances. "Once asserted . . .
the right to self-representation may be waived through conduct indicating that
6 A defendant may waive the issue of the denial of the right on appeal, by entering a non-conditional guilty plea. State v. Szemple, 332 N.J. Super. 322, 328-29 (App. Div. 2000). A-4915-16T2 20 one is vacillating on the issue or has abandoned one's request altogether."
Wilson v. Walker, 204 F.3d 33, 37 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting Williams v. Bartlett,
44 F.2d 95, 100 (2d Cir. 1994)).
The Second Circuit held that a defendant waived his self-representation
right when his request was met with judicial equivocation, and he did not renew
his request. Id. at 38. The court noted that defendant was motivated to make
his request by his dissatisfaction with appointed counsel. There were two
subsequent changes in attorneys and defendant expressed no dissatisfaction with
new counsel and did not "reassert his desire to proceed pro se." Id. at 38-39.
The court observed that the defendant's silence starkly contrasted with his
willingness to assert other rights and to challenge the court. Ibid.
Other federal courts have reached similar conclusions. In Brown, the
court affirmed the district court's denial, after an evidentiary hearing, of hab eas
corpus relief based on the denial of the right of self-representation. 665 F.2d at
612. The trial judge had deferred ruling on the defendant's motion to proceed
pro se. Id. at 609. Defense counsel later informed the court that he and his
client had resolved the difficulties that apparently prompted the defendant's
request. Ibid. Defendant conceded that he told his attorney to "'stay on' as his
A-4915-16T2 21 lawyer," but he argued he did so only after he considered his self-representation
request denied. Id. at 610.
The Fifth Circuit applied a relaxed standard to waiver of the self-
representation right. "The right of self-representation . . . is waived if not
asserted, while the right to counsel is not." Id. at 611. From that premise, the
court concluded, "Since the right of self-representation is waived more easily
than the right to counsel at the outset, before assertion, it is reasonable to
conclude it is more easily waived at a later point, after assertion." Ibid. "A
waiver may be found if it reasonably appears to the court that [the] defendant
has abandoned his initial request to represent himself." Ibid. The court
acknowledged that "in some cases a personal dialogue between the court and
defendant may be advisable." Id. at 612. But, it was unnecessary when "all
circumstances indicate[d] [the] defendant ha[d] abandoned his request to
conduct his own defense." Ibid.
In Cain v. Peters, 972 F.2d 748 (7th Cir. 1992), the Seventh Circuit
rejected a habeas corpus challenge to a state court finding that the defendant
waived by conduct, or, in the Circuit's view, forfeited self-representation. The
defendant had expressed dissatisfaction with his attorney, stating "he had
nothing to lose [in representing himself] because he was not 'getting adequate
A-4915-16T2 22 representation'" from his appointed counsel. Id. at 749. The trial judge told the
defendant that he was entitled to represent himself, but ordered a psychiatric
examination. Ibid. That led the judge to appoint a new attorney for the
defendant, who did not raise the issue of self-representation again.
The Circuit held that the defendant "had only to speak up." Id. at 750.
The court assumed he did not because he got what he wanted, a different lawyer.
Ibid.; see also United States v. Johnson, 223 F.3d 665, 669 (7th Cir. 2000)
(concluding that "[t]he only plausible inference from the defendant's conduct is
that he acquiesced in the denial by judicial inaction of his motion and thereb y
deliberately relinquished his right of self-representation"); Walker v. Phelps,
910 F.Supp.2d 734, 742-43 (D. Del. 2012) (finding that defendant abandoned
his asserted self-representation right by acquiescing to counsel's representation).
Although our State Supreme Court has not addressed the issue, we are
convinced the Court would find that a defendant may waive by conduct an
asserted right of self-representation. In other contexts, a trial court may infer
the waiver of a constitutional right by conduct. For example, a court may infer
the "knowing waiver of the right to attend trial" by the defendant's absence, so
long as the court has provided defendant "adequate notice of the date, time and
place of trial and of the right to be present," and informed defendant of the
A-4915-16T2 23 "consequences of the failure to appear." State v. Hudson, 119 N.J. 165, 179-80,
182 (1990); R. 3:16(b) (stating a defendant may waive the right to be present by
"the defendant's conduct evidencing a knowing, voluntary and unjustified
absence after (1) the defendant has received actual notice in court or has signed
a written acknowledgment of the trial date, or (2) trial has commenced in
defendant's presence").
Although the right to self-representation may be waived by conduct, the
conduct must clearly establish that the defendant intentionally relinquished a
known right. See Mazdabrook, 210 N.J. at 505-06 (stating a waiver of a
constitutional right must at least be clear). Even assuming differences between
the right to counsel and the right of self-representation, once a defendant has
clearly and unequivocally requested permission to proceed pro se, the right of
self-representation should be treated more like the right to counsel. That is
because once a defendant exercises the right of self-representation, it "must be
scrupulously respected through all critical stages of his criminal prosecution and
cannot be revoked without affirmative action by the defendant to rescind his
waiver [of counsel] and reinstate his right to counsel." State v. Ayer, 834 A.2d
277, 289 (N.H. 2003).
A-4915-16T2 24 Faretta requires the court to respect the defendant's invocation of the right.
Even if a defendant is unaware of a right to self-representation, once a defendant
requests to proceed pro se, and the court takes the issue under advisement, a
defendant may be presumed to know at least that there was a possibility he could
represent oneself. Waiver should require proof that he or she intentionally
relinquished that known right. It may arise from the defendant's acceptance of
the court's inaction in refusing to address such a request. However, mere
acquiescence through silence in representation by counsel is not proof enough.
We acknowledge that in none of the federal waiver-by-conduct cases cited
did the court expressly address whether the defendant's conduct evidenced an
intentional relinquishment of a known right. However, we are persuaded that
our State Supreme Court would apply the test, consistent with Johnson v. Zerbst,
as well as the general principle that we must "'indulge every reasonable
presumption against waiver' of fundamental constitutional rights and . . . 'do not
presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights.'" State v. Buonadonna,
122 N.J. 22, 35 (1991) (quoting Zerbst, 304 U.S. at 464). In Schneckloth, the
Supreme Court held that proof of knowledge of the right to refuse consent was
not essential to prove voluntary consent to a search. 412 U.S. at 248-49. In
contrast to the Sixth Circuit's approach in Martin, our State Supreme Court has
A-4915-16T2 25 declined to apply Schneckloth's reasoning to the New Jersey Constitution. Our
State Supreme Court held that under Art. I. par. 7, voluntary consent to a search
requires a knowing and intelligent waiver, which includes "knowledge of the
right to refuse consent." State v. Johnson, 68 N.J. 348, 353-54 (1975).
We find persuasive the reasoning of the several dissenters in Brown, who
would have applied the Johnson v. Zerbst principle requiring proof of an
intentional relinquishment of a known right. Brown, 665 F.2d at 613 (Hill, J.,
dissenting). The dissenters noted that "[s]elf-representation, as a constitutional
right, is valuable per se and should not be held lightly waived once it attaches."
Ibid.7
Also persuasive is the Ninth Circuit's rejection of the government's
argument that a defendant waived his motion for substitute counsel because he
did not reassert it after the court inadvertently failed to rule on it. Schell v.
Witek, 218 F.3d 1017 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). The defendant stated that h is
attorney told him that the request must have been denied "because she was still
his attorney." Id. at 1021. The Court of Appeals held that the defendant "did
7 The dissenters went on to contend that once the self-representation right attaches, "the defendant ought not be found to have waived it until and unless there is a dialogue between the judge and the defendant showing a knowing and intelligent voluntary waiver." Ibid. As we accept the possibility of waiver by conduct, we conclude that a dialogue, although preferred, is not essential. A-4915-16T2 26 not voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently waive [his] motion that he
reasonably believed was denied." Id. at 1024. The same test should apply to a
case where a defendant does not reassert a request to proceed pro se after the
trial court inadvertently failed to rule, especially if the defendant understood
that the request was denied.
The critical question here is whether defendant clearly intended to
relinquish a known right. The court must consider the "facts and circumstances
surrounding th[e] case, including the background, experience, and conduct of
the accused." Zerbst, 304 U.S. at 464. As in Brown, 665 F.2d at 616, we
conclude that an evidentiary hearing is necessary to explore communications
between counsel and defendant, and other circumstances that would reflect
defendant's knowledge and intent.
Defendant may have resolved his differences with his attorney, and
decided to abandon his request to proceed pro se. In Brown, the defense
attorney's testimony that he had patched things up with the defendant was
probative of the defendant's intent to abandon his request. However, unlike in
Cain and Walker, defendant here did not receive a new appointed attorney,
which might have obviated defendant's motivation to proceed pro se.
A-4915-16T2 27 Alternatively, defendant may have reasonably understood the court's
inaction to be tantamount to a denial. Indeed, his attorney may have advised
him to consider it as such, as in Schell. If defendant did not intend to relinquish
his request, it may well have been prudent for him to inquire whether the court
intended to respond to his letter. However, we are not prepared to hold that his
failure to inquire is conclusive proof of waiver. It takes some measure of
temerity even for practicing attorneys to nudge a judge who has reserved
decision on a motion. Here, the court insisted that defendant submit his reque st
to proceed pro se in writing. If defendant reasonably believed his request was
denied, he was not obliged to continually renew it. Cf. Orazio, 876 F.2d at 1512.
Defendant's reasonable interpretation of the court's inaction is a fact
question. We therefore remand for an evidentiary hearing and a determination
whether defendant waived his right to proceed pro se. Unless the court finds
that defendant waived his right, the court's failure to address defendant's request
is a structural error that entitles defendant to a new trial.
We conclude by observing that trial courts must timely address a
defendant's expressed desire to proceed pro se. While we have no reason to
believe the court in this case deliberately ignored defendant's request in the hope
that he would drop the matter, the court failed to promptly address defendant's
A-4915-16T2 28 request. It serves both the interests of justice and judicial economy to address
Faretta issues promptly when they arise.
II.
Defendant presents multiple other claims of ineffective assistance of trial
counsel. In his counseled brief, he contends:
POINT ONE
DEFENDANT'S TRIAL ATTORNEY WAS CONSTITUTIONALLY INEFFECTIVE WHERE HE FAILED TO FORMULATE A DEFENSE STRATEGY INVOLVING THIRD PARTY GUILT AND WHERE THE RECORD REVEALED THAT HE WAS NOT FULLY FAMILIAR WITH THE MATERIAL FACTS OF THE CASE.
POINT TWO
THE PCR COURT ERRED WHERE IT FOUND THAT THE DEFENDANT DID NOT ESTABLISH A PRIMA FACIE CASE WHICH WARRANTED AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING.
POINT THREE
THE PCR COURT ERRED WHERE IT DID NOT DETERMINE WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY REQUIRED DEFENDANT'S WAIVER OF COUNSEL REQUEST TO BE MADE IN WRITING.
A-4915-16T2 29 POINT FOUR
THE PCR COURT ERRED WHERE IT DID NOT DECIDE DEFENDANTS REQUEST FOR RELIEF BASED ON THE TRIAL COURT'S ADMISSION OF THE GUILTY PLEA OF THE STATE'S CHIEF WITNESS, A PERSON IT ALLEGED DEFENDANT COAXED INTO MURDERING THE VICTIM.
POINT FIVE
THE PCR COURT'S REJECTION OF THE DEFENDANT'S PRO SE POST-TRIAL MOTION REGARDING JURY MISCONDUCT FOR LACK OF GOOD CAUSE UNDER R. 1:16-1, WHICH THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ADDRESS, WAS HARMFUL TO THE INTEGRITY OF THE JURY PROCESS.
Rose added the following arguments in his pro se supplemental brief:
THE PCR COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S PETITION BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT SUA SPONTE INSTRUCTING THE JURY ON AGGRAVATED MANSLAUGHTER, MANSLAUGHTER AND PASSION-PROVOCATION AS A LESSER- INCLUDED OFFENSE TO MURDER THEREBY DEPRIVING DEFENDANT OF THE RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL.
THE PCR COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S PETITION BECAUSE TRIAL COUNSEL PROVIDED INEFFECTIVE
A-4915-16T2 30 ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL THEREBY PREJUDICING DEFENDANT. IN THE ALTERNATIVE, BECAUSE DEFENDANT PRESENTED AT LEAST PRIMA FACIE PROOF THAT HE HAD BEEN DEPRIVED OF THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF TRIAL COUNSEL, THE PCR COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO HOLD A FULL EVIDENTIARY HEARING.
TRIAL COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE WHEN HE FAILED TO PROPERLY CROSS-EXAMINE STATE'S WITNESS SALVATORE PUGLIA.
POINT FOUR
CUMULATIVE ERRORS BY COUNSEL AMOUNTED TO INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AND THE DENIAL OF A FAIR TRIAL.
THE PCR COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO CONDUCT A FULL EVIDENTIARY HEARING ON DEFENDANT'S CLAIMS.
With respect to these points, we affirm the PCR court's denial of relief
substantially for the reasons set forth in its extensive written opinion, with one
exception. We remand for an evidentiary hearing on defendant's claim that his
trial counsel was ineffective because he failed to call several witnesses, about
whom he was aware before trial, to undermine Graves's credibility and the
reason he confronted Mosley.
A-4915-16T2 31 These witnesses contended, in certifications, that Graves knew Mosley
before the homicide; Graves discussed robbing Mosley; and Graves exonerated
defendant. One witness contended in a March 2006 letter to defendant before
trial that Graves told him that defendant was not involved in the homicide.
Rather, Graves admitted that he used to get high with Mosley; Mosley caught
him during an attempted burglary; they fought; Graves killed Mosley; and then
stole $3000 to $4000 from Mosley.
Another potential witness, a former employee of Mosley, stated in a
certification written in 2007, after defendant's trial, that he tried to inform trial
counsel that he saw Graves at Mosley's property many times, but counsel refused
to speak to him. The witness said Graves once worked part-time for Mosley;
and the last time he saw the two men, they got into a dispute in which Graves
claimed that Mosley owed him money; and he conveyed this information to
prosecutor's office detectives.
Defendant's sister certified in 2013 that she advised trial counsel in court
that Graves was lying about not knowing Mosley; she lived near Mosley and
saw Graves and him together numerous times. The sister's partner also certified
in 2013 that he too saw Mosley and Graves together and dispatched defendant's
sister to tell trial counsel he was prepared to testify. A fifth witness told a public
A-4915-16T2 32 defender's office investigator two years before trial that he went to Mosley's
home with Graves on three or four occasions where they would obtain "drugs,
alcohol and women for Mosley." This witness said that Graves would bring up
the idea of robbing Mosley because he kept large amounts of cash in his home. 8
These witnesses would have provided an independent motive for Graves
to enter Mosley's home and to commit the homicide. It would also undermine
Graves's credibility, which was already subject to challenge based on his
inconsistent statements to police and his criminal record. Graves said he did not
know Mosley before the incident.
The PCR court held that trial counsel was not deficient in failing to present
these witnesses because the testimony would have been at odds with the defense
strategy. The court noted that the trial strategy, as argued on appeal, was to
persuade the jury that defendant "merely asked Graves to try to persuade Mosley
to drop the [attempted murder] charges against him; that Graves had intended to
do nothing more, but had killed Mosley in self-defense when Mosley had
attacked him . . . ." Rose, 206 N.J. at 152. This strategy involved asking the
8 It is unclear whether defendant's trial counsel represented defendant in 2005 or that he reviewed the investigator's memorandum about the interview before trial. A-4915-16T2 33 jury to credit Graves's first statement to law enforcement, and not his second
statement or his trial testimony.
To demonstrate that he was deprived of his constitutional right to effective
assistance of counsel, defendant must satisfy the two-part Strickland test by
demonstrating that (1) his trial counsel was deficient and (2) the deficient
performance prejudiced the defense. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. To satisfy the
second prong, a defendant must demonstrate "a reasonable probability that, but
for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have be en
different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine
confidence in the outcome." Id. at 694.
As for the first prong, there is a "strong presumption that counsel's conduct
falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance." Id. at 689.
"[D]efendant must overcome the presumption that . . . the challenged action
'might be considered sound trial strategy.'" Ibid. (quoting Michel v. Louisiana,
350 U.S. 91, 101 (1955)).
We recognize that "[d]etermining which witnesses to call to the stand is
one of the most difficult strategic decisions that any trial attorney must confront"
based on a variety of factors, including the witnesses' likely testimony, their
credibility, and their impact on other witnesses' testimony. State v. Arthur, 184
A-4915-16T2 34 N.J. 307, 320-21 (2005). However, strategy must not be confused with
inattention. LaFave et al., § 11.10(c). "[S]trategic choice made after thorough
investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually
unchallengeable," but "strategic choices made after less than complete
investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable professional
judgments support the limitations on investigation." Strickland, 466 U.S. at
690-91.
"An ineffective assistance of counsel claim may occur when counsel fails
to conduct an adequate pre-trial investigation." State v. Porter, 216 N.J. 343,
352, 357 (2013) (remanding for an evidentiary hearing where the defendant
alleged his trial counsel failed to investigate an alibi defense); see also Wiggins
v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 534-36 (2003) (noting that where counsel failed to
discover and present mitigating evidence regarding defendant's history, counsel
was "not in a position to make a reasonable strategic choice" during sentencing);
Rolan v. Vaughn, 445 F.3d 671, 682 (3d Cir. 2006) (holding that trial strategy
that was "uninformed" by pretrial investigation was not entitled to a presumption
of deference).
The record does not reflect that trial counsel ever interviewed the
witnesses, or investigated their susceptibility to challenge. If those witnesses
A-4915-16T2 35 could credibly testify that Graves knew Mosley and Graves acted on his own, it
is unclear why defense counsel would choose not to call them, and instead only
ask the jury to credit Graves's initial statement, which still implicated defendant
in a scheme with Graves – albeit not as serious as the actual one Graves
described at trial. Further challenging Graves's credibility would move the jury
to question any and all of the versions of events presented by Graves.
We shall not defer to a strategy that was uninformed by a reasonable
investigation. If trial counsel's strategy was based on inattention or an
inadequate investigation, then counsel performed deficiently. "Whether a
counsel's action or inaction was based on a strategic choice is a factual
question." LaFave et al., § 11.10(c), at 1133. The issue should be explored at
an evidentiary hearing.
Defendant has also presented a prima facie case of prejudice that warrants
a hearing. "In addressing an ineffective assistance claim based on a counsel's
failure to call an absent witness [or witnesses], a PCR court must unavoidably
consider whether the absent witness's testimony would address a significant fact
in the case, and assess the absent witness's credibility." State v. L.A., 433 N.J.
Super. 1, 15 (App. Div. 2013). However, the absent witnesses' credibility is not
the sole criterion in assessing the prejudice prong. Rather, "it is a factor in the
A-4915-16T2 36 court's determination whether there is a reasonable probability that, but for the
attorney's failure to call the witness, the result would have been different – that
is, there would have been reasonable doubt about the defendant's guilt." Id. at
15-16. The court should consider "the credibility of all witnesses, including the
likely impeachment of the uncalled defense witnesses" and "the strength of the
evidence actually presented by the prosecution." Id. at 16-17 (quoting
McCauley-Bey v. Delo, 97 F.3d 1104, 1106 (8th Cir. 1996)).
The PCR court must assess whether the uncalled witnesses may have
raised reasonable doubt about the truthfulness of Graves's testimony that he
killed Mosley at defendant's behest. The testimony would not be cumulative,
nor would it pertain to insignificant issues. The testimony would provide a
reason for Graves's presence in Mosley's home other than to do defendant's
bidding. We do not minimize the weight of Puglia's testimony. Yet, if the jury
had a reasonable doubt about the truth of Graves's testimony, that might have
tainted Puglia's testimony as well. Defendant's recorded statement may well
have been just talk, reflecting his satisfaction that Mosley met his demise.
Analysis of the prejudice prong should await an evidentiary hearing, at
which the strength of the proposed testimony of the absent witnesses could be
weighed.
A-4915-16T2 37 III.
In sum, we affirm in part and reverse in part. We remand for a hearing on
the issue of trial counsel's failure to call the five witnesses; and remand for a
hearing on whether defendant waived by conduct his assertion of the right to
represent himself. We do not retain jurisdiction.
A-4915-16T2 38