NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-3843-18
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
TURI REDDICK, a/k/a LEESHONE REDDICK,
Defendant-Appellant. ________________________
Argued March 8, 2021 – Decided April 20, 2021
Before Judges Hoffman and Smith.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Union County, Indictment No. 02-05-0632.
Steven E. Braun argued the cause for appellant.
Milton S. Leibowitz, Special Deputy Attorney General/Acting Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for respondent (Lyndsay V. Ruotolo, Acting Union County Prosecutor, attorney; Milton S. Leibowitz, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM Defendant Turi Reddick appeals from a March 26, 2019 Law Division
order denying his post-conviction motion for a new trial based on an alleged
Brady 1 violation. We affirm.
I.
Having outlined the facts underlying defendant's conviction in our prior
opinion affirming the conviction on direct appeal, State v. Reddick (Reddick I),
No. A-4073-03 (App. Div. Nov. 2, 2006) (slip op.), we need only summarize the
facts relevant to this appeal.
On February 9, 2002, defendant and his two co-defendants, Shane Burns
and Shakore "Chubbs" Collins, broke into a home in Roselle, intending to rob a
drug dealer who lived there. During the break-in, one of the robbers shot Mary
Lou Nolan, who lived in the home, with a shotgun from an approximate distance
of one foot. She later died from the gunshot wound.
Roselle police arrested defendant on February 13, 2002. After receiving
Miranda 2 warnings, defendant provided a statement to police whereby he
admitted that he and his co-defendants plotted to rob the home, but did not intend
to hurt anyone. Defendant provided his "role was 'to hold the shotgun and scare
1 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 2 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
2 A-3843-18 them[,]'" while "Burns was '[t]o get the money' and Collins was to 'keep anyone
from getting to the phone."' Reddick I, slip op. at 6 (second alteration in
original). Defendant described Collins ringing the doorbell, and when Nolan
cracked the door open, defendant stuck the shotgun "inside the door to prevent
her from closing it." Ibid. According to defendant, a struggle ensued between
him and Nolan, during which Nolan grabbed the barrel of the shotgun.
"Defendant's finger was on the trigger and a shot was fired. Then the men ran
to the car." Id. at 7.
Subsequently, in May 2002, a Union County grand jury returned an
indictment charging defendant, Burns, and Collins with first-degree aggravated
manslaughter, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4(a) (count one); first-degree robbery, N.J.S.A.
2C:15-1 (count two); 3 first-degree felony murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(3) (count
three); second-degree possession of a shotgun for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A.
2C:39-4(a) (count four); third-degree unlawful possession of a shotgun, N.J.S.A.
2C:39-5(c)(1) (count five); and third-degree unlawful possession of a loaded
3 Evidently, count two was reduced from first-degree to second-degree robbery at some point before the trial of each co-defendant, as all three were convicted of second-degree robbery, without indication that this was a lesser-included offense. See Reddick I, slip op. at 1; State v. Burns (Burns I), No. A-4696-03 (App. Div. Nov. 2, 2006) (slip op. at 1); State v. Collins (Collins I), No. A-4677- 03 (App. Div. Nov. 2, 2006) (slip op. at 1).
3 A-3843-18 shotgun, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(c)(2) (count six). The three co-defendants were tried
separately.
In January 2003, before defendant's trial, the court held a Miranda hearing
concerning defendant's statement to police following his arrest. See Reddick v.
Warren, No. 12-7875, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 321, at *7-11 (D.N.J. Jan. 4,
2016). Following the hearing, the court denied defendant's motion to suppress
the statement and found defendant intelligently, knowingly, and voluntarily
waived his Miranda rights after receiving proper warning from police. At
defendant's trial, which took place in June 2003, one of the officers who elicited
defendant's statement read the statement to the jury.
Witness Typhic Phipps, Burns' girlfriend, also testified at defendant's
trial. She recounted that defendant and Burns showed up at her house after the
shooting, where Burns "said to defendant, 'it wasn't supposed to go down like
that.'" Reddick I, slip op. at 7. Defendant responded by stating, the "'gun was
too big for me to hold'" and "demonstrated, as if holding an object pointing it
toward the ground." Ibid. Defendant "also said, 'Chubbs froze up.'" Ibid.
On June 13, 2003, the jury found defendant guilty of counts two, three,
four, and five, and of the lesser included offense of second-degree reckless
manslaughter, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4(b), as to count one. They found defendant not
4 A-3843-18 guilty of count six. The sentencing judge merged counts one, two, and four into
count three for sentencing purposes, and then imposed a thirty-five-year term of
imprisonment with a thirty-year parole ineligibility period and five years of
parole supervision under the No Early Release Act (NERA). On count five, the
court imposed a five-year sentence to run consecutive to count three.
We affirmed defendant's conviction, 4 Id. at 28, and our Supreme Court
denied defendant's petition for certification, State v. Reddick, 191 N.J. 317
(2007). In June 2008, defendant filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which
the trial court denied. We affirmed, Reddick II, slip op. at 8, and the Supreme
Court denied defendant's petition for certification. State v. Reddick, 212 N.J.
288 (2012). In December 2012, defendant filed a habeas corpus petition in
federal court, which the District Court of New Jersey denied in January 2016.
Reddick v. Warren, No. 12-7875, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 321, at *67 (D.N.J.
Jan. 4, 2016).
While discussing his case in the prison library in August 2017, defendant
claims he learned from another inmate, Khalif James, that defendant's co-
4 While affirming defendant's conviction, we vacated the sentence imposed on count five and remanded for resentencing. Reddick I, slip op. at 28. On remand, the trial court again imposed a consecutive five-year term. Reddick II, slip op. at 2.
5 A-3843-18 defendant, Shane Burns, had worked with Linden 5 police as an informant in
1997. Defendant obtained transcripts from James' Miranda hearing and trial,
which revealed Burns had worked with a Linden police detective voluntarily in
1997, providing information about criminals in exchange for leniency. While
defendant did not include these transcripts in the record on appeal, our decision
on James' direct appeal explicitly identified Burns as a police informant. See
State v. James, 346 N.J. Super. 441, 450 (App. Div. 2002). Specifically, our
opinion stated:
On January 28, 1997, Shane Burns, a police informant who was also a friend of [James], convinced [James] to turn himself in to the police. At the station, in the presence of Burns, [James] invoked his right to counsel. Burns spoke to Linden Detective Salvator Bivona who told him to go back and speak to [James] and convince him to give a statement. Ultimately, Burns prevailed upon [James] to give a statement without his lawyer, maintaining that the police would go easy on [James] if he gave a statement. In addition, Burns vouched for Bivona's trustworthiness based on the help the detective had given him in the past. [James] then told Burns that he had given his gun to Jackson. Ultimately, the police were able to retrieve the gun.
[Ibid.]
5 The city of Linden is in Union County.
6 A-3843-18 In May 2018, defendant filed a Rule 3:22-10(b) motion for a new trial
based on his discovery that Burns had once been a police informant. In his
certification accompanying this motion, defendant asserted, "Had I known that
Shane Burns was an informant when I was arrested and questioned, I would have
told the truth. I would have told the arresting detectives that Shane Burns was
the one who killed Ms. Nolan."
However, defendant also certified that he "considered telling them I did
the crime to stop Shane Burns from getting the death penalty," but became
scared and instead "told them I did not know what they were talking about."
According to defendant, he ultimately provided his statement after detectives
showed him the incriminating statements from his co-defendants and Phipps and
after the detectives threatened to jail the mother of defendant's son and have
child services take away his son. "At that point," defendant "had no choice but
to lie and say [he] did it."
The motion judge held a hearing on defendant's motion on March 26,
2019. During oral argument, the motion judge acknowledged that the defense
argued its motion for a new trial was based on a "Brady violation," while the
"State couche[d] it as a newly discovered evidence" motion. The motion judge
explained her understanding of the motion:
7 A-3843-18 [B]asically . . . defendant argues that he lied or took responsibility when he confessed to the police back in 2002[,] admitting he was the shooter in this matter[,] because his codefendant, Mr. Burns[,] asked or coerced him to take the blame because Mr. Burns faced . . . the death penalty . . . . And [defendant] now claims that it was Burns and not himself that was the shooter.
During the hearing, defendant's attorney argued had the State turned over
information detailing Burns' informant activity, defendant could have used it to
bolster his argument that his confession was not voluntary. Further, in addition
to showing defendant made his statement in response to the detectives' threats
to defendant's family, defendant's attorney contended defendant could also have
highlighted how defendant's mistaken concern for Burns inspired defendant's
statement and how Burns' influence shaped law enforcement's view of the case.
Defendant's attorney asserted this would have been crucial because defendant's
statement "provided the bulk of the evidence against him" and because
defendant may have received a more lenient sentence by raising further doubt
as to the veracity of his confession.
The motion judge denied defendant's motion, first analyzing it under the
newly discovered evidence standard. The judge found that defendant learning
that Burns was an informant in James' case was not new evidence based on a
line in defendant's certification that provided, before James told defendant about
8 A-3843-18 his case, defendant said to James: "I told [James] I lied; I didn't do it and his
police informant friend Shane [Burns] set me up." The judge determined this
indicated defendant already knew Burns was a police informant years before
ever talking to James about his case.
Additionally, since defendant previously challenged the voluntariness of
his statement at trial and in his prior PCR, the motion judge found defendant
could have argued he made the confession to protect Burns, even without
knowing Burns was an informant. The judge also concluded this information
was not material because Burns being an informant was not the reason defendant
gave his confession, prior judges already assessed and confirmed the
voluntariness of defendant's confession earlier in this litigation, and defendant
possessing this information would not have changed the jury's verdict in this
case, given the other evidence against him.
At the end of her oral decision, the motion judge noted a new trial was
likewise not warranted under the Brady framework. The judge indicated the
second and third Brady elements were not met because
there's no reasonable probability that had defendant known that Mr. Burns had assisted police in the past, would have changed anything because it's not why he confessed. And it was irrelevant to this case. There is . . . nothing in the record that shows that Mr. Burns was acting as an informant in this case. Maybe he did assist
9 A-3843-18 five years earlier at some point in Khalif James' matter. But it is irrelevant. It is not favorable because it had nothing to do with the confession in this case.
On the day of the hearing, the motion judge entered an accompanying
written order denying defendant's motion. This appeal followed, with defendant
presenting the following points of argument:
POINT I
DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO A NEW TRIAL ON THE BASIS OF NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE BECAUSE OF THE MISCONDUCT OF THE PROSECUTOR IN FAILING TO APPRISE THE DEFENSE THAT WHEN DEFENDANT PROVIDED HIS CONFESSION, CO-DEFENDANT BURNS WAS A POLICE AGENT
....
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT ADJUDICATED THE MERITS OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL BY USING THE WRONG LEGAL STANDARD. THAT IS, IT USED THE STANDARD FOR A GENERAL MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL ON THE BASIS OF NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE INSTEAD OF THE CORRECT STANDARD WHEN A BRADY VIOLATION IS ALLEGED
10 A-3843-18 POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY TREATED THE MOTION AS IF IT WERE AN ATTEMPT TO RE- LITIGATE THE MIRANDA AND PRIOR POST- CONVICTION RELIEF HEARINGS[.]
II.
The State has a "constitutional obligation to provide criminal defendants
with exculpatory evidence in the State's possession[.]" State v. Marshall, 148
N.J. 89, 154 (1997). "[T]he suppression by the prosecution of evidence
favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is
material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad
faith of the prosecution." State v. Knight, 145 N.J. 233, 245 (1996) (quoting
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963)). In order to make a Brady claim, a
defendant must show three criteria: "(1) the prosecution suppressed evidence;
(2) the evidence is favorable to the defense; and (3) the evidence is material."
State v. Martini, 160 N.J. 248, 268-69 (1999) (citing Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S.
786, 794-95 (1972)).
As to the first factor, the "disclosure rule applies to information of which
the prosecution is actually or constructively aware." State v. Nelson, 330 N.J.
Super. 206, 213 (App. Div. 1998) (citing Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437-
38 (1995)). The lack of actual awareness does not relieve the State of its Brady
11 A-3843-18 obligations because the prosecutor has a duty to learn of any favorable evidence
known to others acting on the government's behalf. Kyles, 514 U.S. at 437-38.
See also State v. Nelson, 155 N.J. 487, 499 (1998).
The second Brady factor is often presumed and few courts have
considered exactly what must be shown in order to establish that withheld
evidence is favorable to the defendant. Evidence found to be favorable has
generally involved information that impeaches the testimony of a government
witness. See State v. Henries, 306 N.J. Super. 512, 533 (App. Div. 1997).
Favorability is not limited to impeachment, however, and it has been recognized
in cases where evidence simply bolsters a defendant's claims. See Nelson, 155
N.J. at 497.
The third Brady factor involves the materiality of the evidence that was
withheld. "[E]vidence is material for Brady purposes 'if there is a reasonable
probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the
proceeding would have been different.'" Marshall, 148 N.J. at 156 (quoting
United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985)). "A 'reasonable probability'
is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Nelson,
155 N.J. at 500 (quoting Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682). As our Supreme Court has
stated:
12 A-3843-18 "[A] showing of materiality does not require demonstration by a preponderance that disclosure of the suppressed evidence would have resulted ultimately in the defendant's acquittal." Rather, the question is whether in the absence of the undisclosed evidence the defendant received a fair trial, "understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence."
[Ibid. (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Kyles, 514 U.S. at 434).]
In applying the materiality test "where a conviction has followed a full trial, we
assess the strength of the State's case, and determine whether introduction of the
suppressed evidence would probably have changed the jury's verdict." State v.
Parsons, 341 N.J. Super. 448, 455 (App. Div. 2001) (citation omitted).
Whether non-disclosure of evidence violates Brady is a mixed question of
law and fact, where the lower court's decision concerning the materiality of the
evidence merits deference. State v. Marshall, 148 N.J. 89, 185-86 (1997). We
do not defer, however, where the trial court did not analyze the claim under the
correct legal standard. Id. at 185.
Defendant argues the motion judge applied the wrong legal standard when
evaluating his new trial motion. He contends the judge incorrectly employed
the more rigorous standard for a new trial motion premised on newly discovered
evidence, rather than one premised on a Brady violation. In turn, he argues that
13 A-3843-18 he satisfied the three elements necessary to establish a Brady claim, and
therefore, the motion judge erred in denying his motion for a new trial.
"[A] new trial analysis premised upon a Brady violation and a new trial
analysis premised upon newly discovered evidence, are different[.]'" Henries,
306 N.J. Super. at 534 (quoting State v. Carter, 85 N.J. 300, 314 (1981)). The
latter requires the defendant establish the evidence "was 'not discoverable by
reasonable diligence'" before trial. State v. Ways, 180 N.J. 171, 187 (2004)
(quoting Carter, 85 N.J. at 314). See also Henries, 306 N.J. Super. at 534.
Defendant correctly points out that that it is more difficult for a defendant
to obtain a new trial based on a newly discovered evidence than it is based on a
Brady violation. However, the distinction between the two standards is
irrelevant here because the motion judge considered defendant's motion under
both standards, albeit providing a more detailed analysis under the newly
discovered evidence standard. In our review of the motion judge's decision, we
are mindful of the obligation to assess defendant's Brady claim under the correct
legal standard. We nevertheless conclude that defendant failed to establish a
Brady violation because the evidence concerning Burns' 1997 informant
activities was not material to defendant's conviction or sentence.
14 A-3843-18 We disagree with the motion judge's determination that defendant failed
to meet the second Brady element, i.e., that this evidence is not favorable to
defendant. The evidence showing Burns was a police informant in Union
County five years before defendant and Burns were arrested and prosecuted,
even if of minor value, is favorable to defendant because it raises questions as
to the degree of defendant's and Burns' culpability and role in the robbery-
murder and the police's potential bias in favor of Burns. We also note that the
first Brady element is satisfied because the Union County prosecutor's office
had constructive knowledge of this evidence, having earlier prosecuted James'
case where Burns police informant status was revealed.
In any event, we reject defendant's assertions that the evidence of Burns'
informant activities was material to defendant's conviction and sentence.
Defendant insists his possession of this evidence concerning Burns would have
enabled him to challenge the voluntariness and veracity of his statement
admitting he shot Nolan because it supports defendant's theory that the police
were biased in favor of Burns and sought to pin defendant as the shooter.
Essentially, defendant contends there is a reasonable probability that the result
of his trial would have been different because he would have used the evidence
15 A-3843-18 to cast doubt on his admission to being the shooter while suggesting Burns
actually pulled the trigger.
At the outset, we find that defendant would not have been able to rebut
the evidence showing he shot Nolan if the evidence in question had been
disclosed before trial. Defendant's statement and Phipps' testimony amount to
much stronger evidence than the evidence showing Burns worked with a
different Union County police department five years before the charged robbery-
murder. And nothing in the record suggests the Roselle police afforded Burns
any favorable treatment or even knew of his informant activities with the Linden
police department, especially given that Burns was prosecuted on the same
charges as defendant. Thus, even if defendant attempted to impeach the police
who testified against him or call Burns as a hostile witness using the Burns
informant evidence, defendant would not have successfully persuaded the jury
that he did not shoot Nolan.
Additionally, accomplice liability reveals a major flaw in defendant's
argument. Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:2-6(c), "an accomplice to a crime is legally
responsible for 'the conduct' of the person who actually commits the crime" if
the accomplice acts "'[w]ith the purpose of promoting or facilitating the
commission of the offense'" and "'[a]ids or agrees or attempts to aid such other
16 A-3843-18 person in planning or committing it[.]"' State v. Whitaker, 200 N.J. 444, 457
(2009) (third alteration in original) (quoting N.J.S.A. 2C:2-6(c)). "An
accomplice is . . . guilty of the same crime committed by the principal if he
shares the same criminal state of mind as the principal" and "'at least indirectly
participate[s] in the commission of the criminal act.'" Id. at 458-59 (quoting
State v. Bielkiewicz, 267 N.J. Super. 520, 528 (App. Div. 1993)).
Defendant here does not deny planning and participating in the robbery
which resulted in Nolan's killing. Thus, even if defendant successfully cast
doubt on his identity as the shooter and showed Burns was the principal who
shot Nolan, defendant would still be liable as an accomplice to Burns. The same
would be true even if police biasedly sought to pin defendant, rather than Burns,
as the shooter. Tellingly, under the theory that defendant was the shooter and
17 A-3843-18 they were accomplices, both Burns 6 and Collins 7 were convicted on the
essentially same charges as defendant. We perceive no reasonable probability
that defendant's participation in the robbery-murder, even if not the shooter,
would not give rise to accomplice liability. In short, defendant's conviction did
not depend on him being the literal shooter; he would have been convicted all
the same even if he unequivocally showed Burns shot Nolan.
We also find that the suppressed evidence here would not have helped
defendant challenge the voluntariness of his statement to police. "[C]oercive
police activity is a necessary predicate to [a] finding that a confession is not
'voluntary' within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment." State v. Smith, 307 N.J. Super. 1, 10 (App. Div. 1997) (alteration
in original) (quoting Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167 (1986)). The
6 See Burns I, slip op. at 1. Burns was initially convicted on all six charges contained in the indictment. Ibid. However, on appeal, we reversed Burns' convictions on counts one, two, and three due to an improper accomplice liability jury charge. Id. at 3. We affirmed Burns' conviction on counts four through six. Id. at 19. On remand, pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, Burns pled guilty to first-degree aggravated manslaughter (count one) while counts two and three were dismissed. See State v. Burns (Burns II), No. A- 0917-14 (App. Div. September 1, 2016) (slip op. at 3). 7 See Collins I, slip op. at 1. Collins was convicted of counts two, four, five, and, like defendant, of first-degree reckless manslaughter as a lesser included offense as to count one. Ibid. He was acquitted of counts three and six. Ibid.
18 A-3843-18 voluntariness inquiry "is not concerned 'with moral and psychological pressures
to confess emanating from sources other than official coercion.'" Id. at 10-11
(quoting Connelly, 479 U.S. at 170). The evidence in question does not show
Burns was a police informant in defendant's case or that Burns acted on behalf
of the police in convincing defendant to confess to being the shooter. Even if
Burns did convince defendant to claim responsibility for shooting Nolan, it
cannot be said that police conduct coerced the statement from defendant. The
evidence of Burns' prior informant activities is wholly irrelevant to inquiry into
the voluntariness of defendant's confession.
Lastly, we reject defendant's argument that there is a reasonable
probability he would have received a lighter sentence had the evidence in
question been properly turned over before trial. We reiterate that, due to the
weight of the evidence against him, we do not think defendant would have
convinced the jury or trial court that someone else shot Nolan. This evidence
therefore would have no bearing on defendant's sentence.
We also note defendant likely would have received a similar sentence even
if he proved he were only an accomplice. Indeed Burns, as an accomplice,
initially received a sixty-year sentence after being convicted on all six counts in
19 A-3843-18 the indictment. 8 After his convictions on counts one through three were
reversed, his case was remanded, and he pled guilty to count one, Burns was
sentenced to an aggregate twenty-nine-year term. State v. Burns (Burns II), No.
A-0917-14 (App. Div. September 1, 2016) (slip op. at 4). Collins received a
seventeen year sentence count two, count five, and the lesser included to count
one. 9
Even if Burns were the shooter and defendant an accomplice, defendant's
sentence would have more closely resembled Burns' than Collins because
defendant admitted to planning the robbery with Burns, whereas Collins'
confession to police and trial testimony indicated that he did not plan the robbery
and only went along with them after they called for a ride. State v. Collins
(Collins I), No. A-4677-03 (App. Div. Nov. 2, 2006) (slip op. at 7-11).
Defendant also did not plead guilty, so him receiving a greater sentence than
Burns' remanded sentence is not uncommon.
8 Burns II, slip op. at 3. The sentencing court "merged counts one, two, four, five, and six into count three" and then imposed the sixty-year term. Burns I, slip op. at 1. 9 State v. Collins (Collins II), No. A-0895-10 (App. Div. April 30, 2012) (slip op. at 2). While Collins was also convicted on count four, the trial court dismissed this charge before sentencing Collins.
20 A-3843-18 The evidence of Burns' 1997 informant activities does not undermine our
confidence in the outcome of defendant's case, and we are convinced there is no
reasonable probability that the disclosure of this information would have
impacted defendant's conviction or sentence.
Affirmed.
21 A-3843-18