STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. NATASHA MALAVE(13-11-3357, CAMDEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)

• Court: New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division
• Decided: June 22, 2017
• Docket: A-2408-15T2
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-4208-15T1

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

CHARLES H. HOENS, III,

Defendant-Appellant. ________________________________

Argued April 24, 2017 – Decided May 4, 2017

Before Judges Sabatino, Currier and Geiger.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Middlesex County, Indictment No. 14-07-0836.

Edward C. Bertucio argued the cause for appellant (Hobbie, Corrigan & Bertucio, P.C., attorneys; Mr. Bertucio, of counsel and on the briefs; Elyse S. Schindel, on the briefs).

Brian D. Gillet, Deputy First Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for respondent (Andrew C. Carey, Middlesex County Prosecutor, attorney; David M. Liston, Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Defendant Charles Hoens, III, appeals the trial court's June

1, 2016 order denying his post-sentencing motion to withdraw his guilty plea to second-degree theft, N.J.S.A. 2C:20-3, and second-

degree official misconduct, N.J.S.A. 2C:30-2. The thrust of

defendant's motion is that he should now be permitted to withdraw

his plea because the two attorneys who successively represented

him before and during the plea entry and at sentencing were

ineffective and failed to adequately safeguard his interests in

the criminal process.

For the reasons that follow, we remand for an evidentiary

hearing. We do so in light of the discrete allegations presented,

and the trial court's key assumption, which may have been legally

mistaken, that defendant could tenably assert in a post-conviction

relief ("PCR") petition claims of constitutional ineffectiveness

against his first attorney concerning his representation before

he was charged or indicted.

I.

Since we are remanding this matter for further factual

development and legal analysis, we need not present the underlying

chronology in a comprehensive or conclusive manner. The following

will suffice for purposes of this opinion.

Defendant was employed by the Fire Commission of South

Brunswick Township ("the Commission"). In that capacity, he had

access to the bank account of Fire District Number 3 ("the Fire

District"). During the relevant timeframe, defendant was

2 A-4208-15T1 personally experiencing financial difficulties with his private

business. Due to those difficulties, defendant began periodically

diverting sums of money from the Fire District's bank account to

his personal bank account. Defendant alleges that he intended to

repay the diverted amounts once his financial situation

stabilized.

Recognizing that the Commission is a public entity subject

to audit, and that an upcoming audit would inevitably reveal his

diversion of funds, defendant retained the services of a private

criminal defense attorney ("the first attorney"). According to

the affidavit defendant submitted in support of his plea withdrawal

motion, defendant admitted to his first attorney that he had

diverted what he estimated to be approximately $90,000 from the

Fire District's bank account. Allegedly hoping to make

restitution, defendant provided the first attorney with $90,000

out of funds that defendant had recently inherited. The first

attorney deposited the $90,000 into an escrow account.

According to defendant's affidavit, his first attorney

advised him that he "should go to the Middlesex County Prosecutor's

Office and made a statement[,]" even though, as defendant contends,

the Prosecutor's Office "had no information about this matter and

had not begun an investigation against [him]." Defendant further

attested that his first attorney "also indicated that he would

3 A-4208-15T1 negotiate a plea deal with the State that would involve no jail

time and would include payment of $90,000 as full restitution in

this matter[.]"

The first attorney arranged a meeting with the Prosecutor's

office, to which he accompanied defendant. The meeting occurred

on December 19, 2012. At that session, defendant was given

Miranda1 warnings, waived his right to remain silent, and was then

questioned by an investigator during a video-recorded interview.

During that interview, which was later transcribed and made part

of the present record, defendant admitted that he had diverted

funds from the Fire District's bank accounts at various times in

2011 and 2012. He also agreed to make restitution and resign as

a fire commissioner.

According to defendant's affidavit, his first attorney "did

no prior investigation and did not obtain a formal written

negotiation as to the State's intention with regard to

[defendant's] statement." The attorney also allegedly "never did

any subsequent follow up investigation after [defendant's]

statement was given."

More specifically, defendant contends:

The only information I received [from his first attorney] was a reassurance that there

1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966).

4 A-4208-15T1 was a "gentlemen's agreement" and that the deal between the State and myself would be to plead guilty to third degree theft in exchange for a sentence of straight, non-custodial probation without jail time and to pay $90,000 in restitution and move on with my life . . . . With that understanding in mind, and because that information had been represented to me, I made [my] statement to the Middlesex County Prosecutor's Office.

The State denies, however, the existence of any such unwritten

"gentlemen's agreement." In this regard, the State points out

that at the conclusion of defendant's recorded interview, the

investigator warned him that there would be consequences for the

actions to which defendant had confessed and that the investigator

would be forwarding the information to his superiors. The

investigator added "I can't promise you anything. I don't know

where they're going to go with this." The transcript reflects

that defendant and his first attorney were both given the

opportunity to put "anything else on the record" before the

recording ended, and they did not do so. On December 19, 2013,

the Prosecutor's Office issued a criminal complaint against

defendant, charging him with second-degree theft in a cumulative

sum of $695,795.46.

Before defendant was indicted by a grand jury, the first

attorney moved to be relieved as counsel for reasons of non-payment

of fees. In his supporting certification, the first attorney

5 A-4208-15T1 stated that the retainer defendant had paid to the attorney's law

firm "was set to address only representation during the [matter's]

investigative phase, and did not contemplate representation once

adversarial proceedings commenced." The certification further

added that defendant's written retainer agreement was "limited to

the Investigation[,]" and that the retainer had been exhausted

since the time the criminal charges were filed. Counsel also

referred to the $90,000 in the firm's escrow account, and the

court's oral direction to not dispense those funds without leave

of court. The trial court granted the first attorney's motion to

be relieved.

Meanwhile, on May 29, 2014, a grand jury issued a five-count

indictment against defendant, charging him with one count of

second-degree theft, N.J.S.A. 2C:20-3 (Count 1); two counts of

first-degree financial facilitation of criminal activity, N.J.S.A.

2C:21-25 (Counts 2 and 3); one count of second-degree official

misconduct, N.J.S.A. 2C:30-2 (Count 4); and one count of third-

degree pattern of official misconduct, N.J.S.A. 2C:30-7 (Count 5).

Defendant then requested representation from the Office of the

Public Defender. A trial attorney ("the second attorney") was

assigned to represent him.

Plea negotiations ensued, resulting in a written agreement

between defendant and the State dated November 10, 2014. The

6 A-4208-15T1 agreement provided that defendant would plead guilty to counts one

(second-degree theft) and four (second-degree official

misconduct), and the other three counts of the indictment would

be dismissed. The State agreed to recommend at sentencing that

defendant receive a ten-year custodial term, with a five-year

period of parole ineligibility, with defendant having the right

to argue for a shorter term of five years. Defendant also agreed

to execute a consent judgment at sentencing to be liable for

restitution in the recalculated sum of $736,847.75.

Defendant appeared before the trial court on November 10,

2014, at which time his guilty plea was placed on the record.

During extensive questioning at that plea hearing, defendant, who

is a businessman with advanced degrees, repeatedly acknowledged

that he understood the terms of the plea agreement and was entering

into it voluntarily.

About six months later, defendant appeared before a different

judge for sentencing. As permitted by the plea agreement, the

court sentenced defendant to five years in prison (less than the

ten years advocated by the State) with a five-year parole

ineligibility period. In addition, defendant was ordered to make

restitution in the sum of $736,847.75, reflected on the consent

judgment. Defendant was also ordered to pay customary fines and

7 A-4208-15T1 penalties, and was permanently disqualified from holding any

public office in this State in the future.

Defendant did not appeal his sentence. Instead, he retained

new private counsel and filed the instant motion to withdraw his

guilty plea pursuant to Rules 3:9-2 and 3:9-3 and the withdrawal

factors of State v. Slater, 198 N.J. 145 (2009). As a critical

part of his arguments, defendant asserted that his first attorney

and his second attorney were each, for different reasons,

ineffective and violated his federal and state constitutional

rights under the precepts of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.

668, 694, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2068, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 697 (1984) and

State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42 (1987).

As to his first attorney, defendant argued that the attorney

was deficient in allowing him to make incriminating statements in

a recorded interview with the Prosecutor's Office without a written

agreement specifying how that statement could be used, and by

instead advising defendant that he was protected by an unwritten

alleged "gentlemen's agreement." As to the second attorney,

defendant contends that the attorney coerced him into accepting

the terms of the plea negotiation, and also failed to argue at

sentencing that defendant should receive a sentence one degree

lower, as permitted in appropriate situations by State v. Rice,

425 N.J. Super. 375 (App. Div. 2012).

8 A-4208-15T1 After considering these arguments and the State's opposition,

the motion judge (who had also been the sentencing judge in this

case2) denied defendant's motion without an evidentiary hearing.

The judge concluded that defendant had not shown a basis for relief

under the four criteria of Slater, supra. In addition, the judge

noted in his May 19, 2016 oral ruling that defendant could pursue

relief in a future PCR proceeding in which matters outside the

existing record could be developed. The judge further noted that,

to the extent defendant argued that the amount of court-ordered

restitution was excessive, defendant was free to file a motion to

seek to have the sum recalculated and an ability-to-pay hearing.

The court memorialized that right in its written corresponding

order, allowing defendant to submit his calculations as to the

proper amount of restitution to the prosecutor's office and that

if the prosecutor disagreed with these figures, defendant could

request a hearing on the issue.

II.

This appeal ensued. Defendant presents the following

arguments for our consideration:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS GUILTY PLEA PURSUANT TO STATE V. SLATER AND STRICKLAND V. WASHINGTON. APPELLANT ENTERED A GUILTY PLEA

2 Both the plea judge and the sentencing/motion judge are now retired.

9 A-4208-15T1 INVOLUNTARILY AND AS THE RESULT OF THE INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL OF HIS TWO PRIOR ATTORNEYS.

A. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION TO WITHDRAW THE GUILTY PLEA PURSUANT TO STATE V. SLATER.

B. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION TO WITHDRAW THE GUILTY PLEA PURSUANT STRICKLAND V. WASHINGTON.

The parties agree that defendant's motion to withdraw must

be evaluated under the four factors set forth by the Supreme Court

in Slater, supra. Those factors are:

(1) whether the defendant has asserted a colorable claim of innocence; (2) the nature and strength of defendant’s reasons for withdrawal; (3) the existence of a plea bargain; and (4) whether withdrawal would result in unfair prejudice to the State or unfair advantage to the accused.

[Id. at 157-58].

None of these factors, including a colorable claim of innocence,

is required or dispositive. Id. at 162; see also State v. Munroe,

210 N.J. 429, 442-43 (2012). As defendant acknowledges, the burden

of justifying a requested withdrawal is heavier where, as here,

the motion to withdraw is made after, rather than before,

sentencing. Slater, supra, 198 N.J. at 160; see also Munroe,

supra, 210 N.J. at 442-43. Generally, the decision on whether to

grant or deny a motion to withdraw a plea rests in the "sound

10 A-4208-15T1 discretion" of the trial court. Munroe, supra, 210 N.J. at 442;

see also Slater, supra, 198 N.J. at 156.

We agree with the trial court that the first Slater factor

of "colorable claim of innocence" tips against defendant here.

Defendant concedes that he repeatedly diverted funds from the fire

district. The only caveat he alleges is that his state of mind

in doing so was not sufficiently venal to satisfy the theft and

official misconduct statutes beyond a reasonable doubt. He also

contests the quantification of the amount diverted, although he

has not yet offered a competing calculation.

The third and fourth factors do not manifestly weigh in

defendant's favor. As to the third factor, defendant's guilty

plea was entered pursuant to a negotiated agreement, although that

is the factor that "receives the least weight in the overall

analysis[.]" Munroe, supra, 210 N.J. at 443. As to the fourth

factor, the State surely will sustain some prejudice if the plea

were withdrawn post-sentencing, although we presume that the

documentation of the financial accounts still exists and that

defendant's incriminatory recorded statement remains preserved in

audio form.

The critical questions posed here arise under the second

Slater factor, i.e., "the nature and strength of defendant's

reasons for withdrawal." Slater, supra, 198 N.J. at 159. In his

11 A-4208-15T1 motion affidavit, defendant has detailed several reasons why his

first attorney was allegedly deficient in arranging the taped

interview with the Prosecutor's Office without any formal written

agreement to address the future uses of that recording. His

assertion that his first attorney advised him of a so-called

"gentlemen's agreement" limiting his criminal exposure is

presently unrefuted, at least as to the alleged advice itself. We

simply do not know what the first attorney would have to say on

the subject and what, if any, documentation exists in the first

attorney's files that might refute defendant's sworn assertion

about what he was told.

Analysis of the second factor becomes more problematic

because the trial court may have been under a possibly mistaken

assumption that defendant could have, at least as a matter of law,

pursued claims of ineffectiveness against his first attorney for

allegedly deficient representation occurring before he was ever

charged. As the State points out in its brief, the constitutional

right to representation generally is not triggered until a criminal

defendant is formally charged. See Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S.

682, 688-89, 92 S. Ct. 1877, 1881-82, 32 L. Ed. 2d 411, 417 (1972);

State v. Sanchez, 129 N.J. 261, 265 (1992). In a case we found

and provided to counsel before oral argument, the Second Circuit

Court of Appeals in Claudio v. Scully, 982 F.2d 798, 802 (2d Cir.

12 A-4208-15T1 1992), held that there is no constitutional right under the Sixth

Amendment to a defendant for allegedly deficient representation

by a criminal defense attorney who took his client to police for

questioning before charges were ever filed against that defendant.

Our New Jersey courts have yet to address the specific issue

posed in Claudio. At a minimum, without deciding that legal issue

on appeal at this time, there appears to be substantial doubt that

claims of ineffectiveness are viable for missteps by defense

counsel before charges are ever filed. The motion judge thus may

have incorrectly presumed that PCR is a viable option for

defendant, at least with respect to the first attorney. Although

the motion judge's remarks on the record about PCR may have solely

concerned the second attorney, whose representation was post-

indictment, we cannot be confident that the motion judge implicitly

assumed that PCR was available to raise ineffectiveness claims

concerning both attorneys. See State v. Brito, 345 N.J. Super.

228, 230 (App. Div. 2001) (remanding a case where the trial court

"operat[ed] under a misapprehension as to the nature of the

proceedings before it").

Under these discrete circumstances, we deem it preferable for

this matter to be remanded for the trial court to conduct an

evidentiary hearing to explore the pertinent factual issues in

more depth, including taking testimony from defendant and, if

13 A-4208-15T1 feasible, his two prior counsel, and considering any relevant

documents from their prior representation addressing the

assertions made in defendant's affidavit. The trial court shall

then reevaluate the Slater factors, particularly under the second

prong. Although the focus of our concerns relates mainly with the

first attorney, we decline to address the second attorney's conduct

at this time and instead defer that to the overall mix of

considerations on remand. The trial court shall also consider,

in the first instance, the constitutional issues posed, to the

extent the court finds it necessary to reach them in its analysis.

Remanded for further proceedings consistent with this

opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.

14 A-4208-15T1