NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-3963-15T3
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
LAZAROS TSITSOULAS,
Defendant-Appellant. _____________________________
Argued February 5, 2018 – Decided June 29, 2018
Before Judges O'Connor and DeAlmeida.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Morris County, Municipal Appeal No. 15-040.
Lon C. Taylor argued the cause for appellant (Lon C. Taylor, attorney; Carmine D. Campanile, on the brief).
Paula C. Jordao, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for respondent (Fredric M. Knapp, Morris County Prosecutor, attorney; Paula C. Jordao, on the brief).
PER CURIAM Defendant Lazaros Tsitsoulas appeals from a January 5, 2016
Law Division order finding him guilty of driving while on the
suspended list, N.J.S.A. 39:3-40. We affirm.
I
We glean the following from the record. On May 1, 2007, a
Family Part judge entered an order directing defendant to pay
$100 per week in child support to his ex-wife, the primary
caretaker of her and defendant's two sons. The order provided
that if defendant missed two payments, an arrest warrant may
issue.
On June 28, 2013, an order was entered that emancipated the
older of the two children, found defendant did not owe any child
support arrears, and granted him a $100 per week credit for the
ensuing fifty-three weeks toward the child support he was
obligated to pay for the younger son. The record does not
reveal the weekly child support amount defendant was obligated
to pay at that time for the remaining unemancipated son.
On June 10, 2014, a bench warrant was issued for
defendant's arrest because, according to the warrant, he failed
to pay court ordered child support. The warrant stated
defendant was to be brought before the court for an enforcement
hearing on an expedited basis, but noted he could be released
upon the payment of $953. 2 A-3963-15T3 On June 24, 2014, a Denville Township police officer was
driving behind a car and inserted the license plate number of
such car into the Info Cops System, to which he had access in
his patrol vehicle. The system reported the driver's license of
the registered owner of the car was suspended because a child
support warrant had been issued. The officer then activated his
overhead lights and the driver of the car, subsequently
identified as defendant, was pulled over. Defendant was issued
a summons for driving while on the suspended list, N.J.S.A.
39:3-40.
The matter was not heard by the Municipal Court until
September 2015. In the interim, in May 2015, defendant filed a
motion in the Family Part to vacate the suspension of his
driver's license triggered by the issuance of the June 10, 2014
arrest warrant. In his certification in support of the motion1,
defendant acknowledged the Probation Department's position he
was in arrears on child support, but disputed he was in fact in
arrears, claiming the Probation Division had made clerical and
mathematical errors over the years.
Defendant further asserted the Probation Division did not
send him a notice warning his driver's license was going to be
1 No other documents submitted with or in opposition to the motion were included in the record. 3 A-3963-15T3 suspended if he failed to bring his arrears current, and that he
was not aware his license had been suspended until he was pulled
over on June 24, 2014. For the reasons provided in his
certification, defendant contended the "court ordered suspension
dated June 10, 2014" had to be vacated.
On June 23, 2015, the Family Part judge denied the motion.
In his written decision, the judge found defendant missed two
child support payments, which resulted in the issuance of the
June 10, 2014 arrest warrant. The judge noted the issuance of a
child support related arrest warrant automatically suspends an
obligor's driver's license. See N.J.S.A. 2A:17-56.41a.
The judge also determined defendant was aware of but
refused to comply with his child support obligation. The judge
found that, on May 16, 2014, a probation caseworker spoke to
defendant about his failure to pay child support. Defendant
told the caseworker he was ill and could not work, but
thereafter failed to provide medical documentation to
substantiate his claim he was too sick to work.
The caseworker advised defendant to file a motion to reduce
child support or to emancipate his remaining child; otherwise,
an arrest warrant would issue. Finding he was notified of the
license suspension, the judge entered an order denying
defendant's motion. Defendant did not appeal from that order. 4 A-3963-15T3 Thereafter, the State and defendant appeared for trial in
Municipal Court on the summons issued to defendant for driving
while on the suspended list. In addition to testifying about
the circumstances surrounding his decision to pull defendant
over on June 24, 2014, the police officer commented defendant
appeared surprised to learn his license had been suspended and
that defendant stated he had not received any notice of
suspension. Defendant also told the officer he was not paying
child support at that time because his children were
emancipated.
Among other things, defendant testified he was "shocked"
when he learned from the police officer his license had been
suspended. He also stated he did not receive notice from the
Probation Division that his license had been suspended. He also
claimed he did not have any child support arrears at the time he
was pulled over and thus had no reason to believe his license
might be suspended.
In his summation, defendant argued that before a party can
be found guilty of N.J.S.A. 39:3-40, the State must prove such
party had been provided notice he or she was on the suspended
list. The State argued N.J.S.A. 39:3-40 does not require that,
in order to be found guilty of violating this statute, a party
must knowingly drive while on the suspended list. 5 A-3963-15T3 The Municipal Court judge found that "if it's a violation
of a court order, there's no need for notice[,]" convicted
defendant of driving while suspended, and fined him $506
dollars, plus $33 in court costs. The judge did not order a
suspension of his driver's license.
Defendant appealed his conviction to the Law Division.
After conducting a trial de novo, the judge determined that,
among other things, because N.J.S.A. 39:3-40 makes no reference
to intent or knowledge, the State did not have to prove
defendant had prior knowledge of his license suspension before
he could be found guilty of violating N.J.S.A. 39:3-40. Because
the State proved defendant's driver's license was suspended at
the time he was operating a motor vehicle, the judge convicted
him of driving while suspended and fined him $506, as well as
$33 in court costs.
II
On appeal, defendant asserts the following for our
consideration:
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-3963-15T3
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
LAZAROS TSITSOULAS,
Defendant-Appellant. _____________________________
Argued February 5, 2018 – Decided June 29, 2018
Before Judges O'Connor and DeAlmeida.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Morris County, Municipal Appeal No. 15-040.
Lon C. Taylor argued the cause for appellant (Lon C. Taylor, attorney; Carmine D. Campanile, on the brief).
Paula C. Jordao, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for respondent (Fredric M. Knapp, Morris County Prosecutor, attorney; Paula C. Jordao, on the brief).
PER CURIAM Defendant Lazaros Tsitsoulas appeals from a January 5, 2016
Law Division order finding him guilty of driving while on the
suspended list, N.J.S.A. 39:3-40. We affirm.
I
We glean the following from the record. On May 1, 2007, a
Family Part judge entered an order directing defendant to pay
$100 per week in child support to his ex-wife, the primary
caretaker of her and defendant's two sons. The order provided
that if defendant missed two payments, an arrest warrant may
issue.
On June 28, 2013, an order was entered that emancipated the
older of the two children, found defendant did not owe any child
support arrears, and granted him a $100 per week credit for the
ensuing fifty-three weeks toward the child support he was
obligated to pay for the younger son. The record does not
reveal the weekly child support amount defendant was obligated
to pay at that time for the remaining unemancipated son.
On June 10, 2014, a bench warrant was issued for
defendant's arrest because, according to the warrant, he failed
to pay court ordered child support. The warrant stated
defendant was to be brought before the court for an enforcement
hearing on an expedited basis, but noted he could be released
upon the payment of $953. 2 A-3963-15T3 On June 24, 2014, a Denville Township police officer was
driving behind a car and inserted the license plate number of
such car into the Info Cops System, to which he had access in
his patrol vehicle. The system reported the driver's license of
the registered owner of the car was suspended because a child
support warrant had been issued. The officer then activated his
overhead lights and the driver of the car, subsequently
identified as defendant, was pulled over. Defendant was issued
a summons for driving while on the suspended list, N.J.S.A.
39:3-40.
The matter was not heard by the Municipal Court until
September 2015. In the interim, in May 2015, defendant filed a
motion in the Family Part to vacate the suspension of his
driver's license triggered by the issuance of the June 10, 2014
arrest warrant. In his certification in support of the motion1,
defendant acknowledged the Probation Department's position he
was in arrears on child support, but disputed he was in fact in
arrears, claiming the Probation Division had made clerical and
mathematical errors over the years.
Defendant further asserted the Probation Division did not
send him a notice warning his driver's license was going to be
1 No other documents submitted with or in opposition to the motion were included in the record. 3 A-3963-15T3 suspended if he failed to bring his arrears current, and that he
was not aware his license had been suspended until he was pulled
over on June 24, 2014. For the reasons provided in his
certification, defendant contended the "court ordered suspension
dated June 10, 2014" had to be vacated.
On June 23, 2015, the Family Part judge denied the motion.
In his written decision, the judge found defendant missed two
child support payments, which resulted in the issuance of the
June 10, 2014 arrest warrant. The judge noted the issuance of a
child support related arrest warrant automatically suspends an
obligor's driver's license. See N.J.S.A. 2A:17-56.41a.
The judge also determined defendant was aware of but
refused to comply with his child support obligation. The judge
found that, on May 16, 2014, a probation caseworker spoke to
defendant about his failure to pay child support. Defendant
told the caseworker he was ill and could not work, but
thereafter failed to provide medical documentation to
substantiate his claim he was too sick to work.
The caseworker advised defendant to file a motion to reduce
child support or to emancipate his remaining child; otherwise,
an arrest warrant would issue. Finding he was notified of the
license suspension, the judge entered an order denying
defendant's motion. Defendant did not appeal from that order. 4 A-3963-15T3 Thereafter, the State and defendant appeared for trial in
Municipal Court on the summons issued to defendant for driving
while on the suspended list. In addition to testifying about
the circumstances surrounding his decision to pull defendant
over on June 24, 2014, the police officer commented defendant
appeared surprised to learn his license had been suspended and
that defendant stated he had not received any notice of
suspension. Defendant also told the officer he was not paying
child support at that time because his children were
emancipated.
Among other things, defendant testified he was "shocked"
when he learned from the police officer his license had been
suspended. He also stated he did not receive notice from the
Probation Division that his license had been suspended. He also
claimed he did not have any child support arrears at the time he
was pulled over and thus had no reason to believe his license
might be suspended.
In his summation, defendant argued that before a party can
be found guilty of N.J.S.A. 39:3-40, the State must prove such
party had been provided notice he or she was on the suspended
list. The State argued N.J.S.A. 39:3-40 does not require that,
in order to be found guilty of violating this statute, a party
must knowingly drive while on the suspended list. 5 A-3963-15T3 The Municipal Court judge found that "if it's a violation
of a court order, there's no need for notice[,]" convicted
defendant of driving while suspended, and fined him $506
dollars, plus $33 in court costs. The judge did not order a
suspension of his driver's license.
Defendant appealed his conviction to the Law Division.
After conducting a trial de novo, the judge determined that,
among other things, because N.J.S.A. 39:3-40 makes no reference
to intent or knowledge, the State did not have to prove
defendant had prior knowledge of his license suspension before
he could be found guilty of violating N.J.S.A. 39:3-40. Because
the State proved defendant's driver's license was suspended at
the time he was operating a motor vehicle, the judge convicted
him of driving while suspended and fined him $506, as well as
$33 in court costs.
II
On appeal, defendant asserts the following for our
consideration:
POINT I: NOTICE IS A REQUIRED ELEMENT TO BE PROVEN BY THE STATE IN CASES INVOLVING A VIOLATION OF N.J.S.A. 39:3-40.
POINT II: SINCE THE NOTICE REQUIREMENTS SET FORTH IN N.J.S.A. 2A:17-56.41 AND R. 5:7-5 WERE NOT FOLLOWED, DEFENDANT'S LICENSE PRIVILEGES WERE IMPROPERLY SUSPENDING [SIC],
6 A-3963-15T3 WARRANTING REVERSAL OF HIS CONVICTION UNDER N.J.S.A. 39:3-40.
When the Law Division conducts a trial de novo on the
record developed in the municipal court, our appellate review is
limited. State v. Clarksburg Inn, 375 N.J. Super. 624, 639
(App. Div. 2005). "Our review is limited to determining whether
there is sufficient credible evidence present in the record to
support the findings of the Law Division judge, not the
municipal court." Ibid. (citing State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146,
161-62 (1964)).
At the time he was pulled over on June 24, 2014,
defendant's driver's license had been suspended since June 10,
2014 as the result of the issuance of a child support related
arrest warrant. See N.J.S.A. 2A:17-56.41(a). It is statutorily
mandated that the driver's license of a party who is in arrears
for child support "be suspended by operation of law upon the
issuance of a child support-related warrant." Ibid. Thus,
defendant's driver's license had been automatically suspended on
June 10, 2014 because he was in arrears on his child support
obligation.
The operation of a motor vehicle during a period of driving
privilege suspension is prohibited by law and subjects the
violator to punishment, including further suspension of driving
7 A-3963-15T3 privileges. See N.J.S.A. 39:3-40. This statute states in
pertinent part:
No person . . . whose driver's license . . . has been suspended . . . shall personally operate a motor vehicle during the period of . . . suspension . . . .
[Ibid.]
Although defendant's first argument point indicates he is
arguing that one of the elements the State must prove when
prosecuting charge of violating N.J.S.A. 39:3-40 is the
defendant knew his driver's license had been suspended, in his
brief he contends the mere fact he had not been noticed of his
license suspension when pulled over on June 24, 2014 warrants
the reversal of his conviction as a matter of law.
In State v. Ferrier, 294 N.J. Super. 198, 200 (App. Div.
1996), the defendant was convicted of violating N.J.S.A. 39:3-40
in both municipal court and after a trial de novo in the Law
Division. She appealed to us arguing, among other things, that
she was deprived of due process because the Director of the
Division of Motor Vehicles2 suspended her driver's license
without notifying her. She contended that because she was
2 Effective July 1, 2003, the Motor Vehicle Commission was created and the Division of Motor Vehicles abolished. See N.J.S.A. 39:2A-4.
8 A-3963-15T3 unaware her license had been suspended at the time she allegedly
violated N.J.S.A. 39:3-40, her conviction had to be reversed.
We rejected her argument, noting the defendant should have
"challenged any deficiencies in the suspension of her driver's
license by appealing from that decision, rather than attacking
it collaterally as a defense to a charge of violating N.J.S.A.
39:3-40." Ferrier, 294 N.J. Super. at 200 (emphasis added). In
addition, "all that is required to support a conviction for a
violation of N.J.S.A. 39:3-40 is proof of operation, coupled
with proof that the operation occurred during a period of
suspension or revocation." 17A N.J. Practice, Municipal Court
Practice § 37:15, at 373 (Robert Ramsey) (rev. 3d ed. 2006).
Defendant claims a reversal of his conviction is warranted
because he did not receive notice of his license suspension
pursuant to N.J.S.A. 39:5-30(a). N.J.S.A. 39:5-30(a) states in
relevant part:
Every . . . license certificate, every privilege to drive motor vehicles, . . . may be suspended or revoked, and any person may be prohibited from obtaining a driver’s license . . . by the director [of the Motor Vehicle Commission] for a violation of any of the provisions of this Title . . . , after due notice in writing of such proposed suspension, revocation, disqualification or prohibition and the ground thereof. . . .
9 A-3963-15T3 This statute does not govern these circumstances and does
not support defendant's argument. N.J.S.A. 39:5-30(a) provides
that if a person violates a provision in Title 39, among other
things such person's driver's license may be suspended by the
Director of the Motor Vehicle Commission (Director) after the
alleged violator has received notice in writing of the proposed
suspension and the ground for such suspension.
Here, however, defendant is not contending he failed to
receive notice of a proposed suspension based on a violation of
the motor vehicle code. He is claiming he did not receive
notice his license had been suspended as a result of the
issuance of the arrest warrant on June 10, 2014. Further, the
notice requirements in N.J.S.A. 39:5-30(a) apply where a
suspension of driving privileges results from action taken by
the Director, not by a court. N.J.S.A. 39:5-30(a) is simply not
applicable.
Defendant next contends the Probation Division failed to
adhere to the provisions of N.J.S.A. 2A:17-56.41(a) and Rule
5:7-5, warranting the reversal of his conviction. N.J.S.A.
2A:17-56.41(a) provides in relevant part:
If . . . a child support-related warrant exists, and the obligor is found to possess a license in the State and all appropriate enforcement methods to collect the child support arrearage have been exhausted, the 10 A-3963-15T3 Probation Division shall send a written notice to the obligor, by certified and regular mail, return receipt requested, at the obligor's last-known address or place of business or employment, advising the obligor that the obligor's license may be revoked or suspended unless, within 30 days of the postmark date of the notice, the obligor pays the full amount of the child support arrearage, . . . or makes a written request for a court hearing to the Probation Division. The obligor's driver's license shall be suspended by operation of law upon the issuance of a child support-related warrant.
In 2014, Rule 5:7-5(e)(1) stated essentially the same as
N.J.S.A. 2A:17-56.41a.
If the Family Part court erred by issuing the subject
arrest warrant, defendant’s remedy was to challenge that error
by filing an appeal, not attack the error collaterally as a
defense to a charge of violating N.J.S.A. 39:3-40. See Ferrier,
294 N.J. Super at 200. Although defendant did contest the
suspension of his driver's license by filing a motion in the
Family Part seeking to vacate that suspension, he did not appeal
from the order that rejected his challenge. His claim he
received no notice of the suspension of his license as a result
of the issuance of the arrest warrant is not properly before us.
Accordingly, because defendant's license was suspended at
the time the police officer observed him operating a vehicle on
11 A-3963-15T3 June 24, 2014, the Law Division judge properly convicted
defendant of violating N.J.S.A. 39:3-40.
Affirmed.
12 A-3963-15T3