NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-4924-17T3
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
KAWON ROBINSON and MAURICE J. MILES,
Defendants-Respondents,
and
TONY J. MARTINEZ, KATTRELL TRENT, and DARRION K. TRENT,
Defendants. ________________________________________
Submitted September 13, 2018 – Decided October 9, 2018
Before Judges Alvarez and Reisner.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Hudson County, Indictment No. 17-11-0775
Esther Suarez, Hudson County Prosecutor, attorney for appellant (David S. Feldman, Assistant Prosecutor, Charles C. Cho, Assistant Prosecutor, and Erin M. Campbell, Assistant Prosecutor, on the brief). Grigaite & Abdelsayed, LLC, attorneys for respondent Kawon Robinson (Shokry G. Abdelsayed, on the letter brief).
Michael R. Shulman, attorney for respondent Maurice J. Miles.
PER CURIAM
By leave granted, the State appeals from a May 7, 2018 order dismissing
the indictments against defendants Kawon Robinson and Maurice J. Miles. With
respect to Kawon Robinson, we reverse and vacate the order dismissing the
indictment. The trial court, perhaps inadvertently, failed to issue a statement of
reasons for its decision with respect to Maurice Miles. Accordingly, we remand
the Miles case to the trial court for reconsideration of the merits in light of the
guidance provided in this opinion, and for a statement of the trial court's reasons
for whatever disposition it reaches on the remand.
We begin by defining the scope of this appeal. By way of background,
defendants were accused of participating in an incident arising from a
confrontation between two groups of young men. During the confrontation, a
victim named Corbin was shot and wounded, and he was then otherwise
physically assaulted. A second victim named Gordon was brutally beaten and
stomped, and was then shot to death as he lay on the ground. The indictment
charged both defendants with aggravated assault. The indictment charged two
A-4924-17T3 2 other co-defendants, respectively, with the murder of Gordon and the attempted
murder of Corbin. During the Grand Jury presentation, the prosecutor
repeatedly told the Grand Jurors that the two other co-defendants – not Robinson
or Miles – were responsible for the shootings, and the Grand Jury heard
testimony consistent with the State's theory. The Grand Jury returned an
indictment against defendants for aggravated assault.
Both defendants moved to dismiss the indictment for aggravated assault.
During the oral argument of the motion, the State confirmed to the trial court
that neither Robinson nor Miles was indicted in connection with the shooting
and that the indictment was limited to the fistfight and beating of the two
victims. The State defended the indictment on that basis, and the trial judge
reviewed the Grand Jury record based on the State’s representation. The judge
concluded there was insufficient evidence that Robinson assaulted either victim.
The judge dismissed the indictment against Miles without a statement of
reasons.
When we granted leave to appeal, it was limited to a review of the trial
court's order, which in turn was based on the State's representations about the
scope of the indictment. As a result, our decision here will permit the State to
try Robinson for aggravated assault, limited to the allegations of physical
A-4924-17T3 3 beating of either or both victims, but not with respect to the shootings. Likewise,
the remand of Miles’ motion is limited to the aggravated assault charges related
to the fistfight and beatings. Absent a superseding indictment, the State has
waived the right to try either of these two defendants for the shootings.
Having defined what is properly before us, we turn to the merits of
Robinson's appeal. Our review is governed by well-established legal principles.
In deciding whether to indict, "the grand jury must determine whether the State
has established a prima facie case that a crime has been committed and that the
accused has committed it." State v. Hogan, 144 N.J. 216, 227 (1996).
A grand jury may base an indictment on the evidence the State has produced, as well as any reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that evidence. In a grand jury proceeding, hearsay is admissible. In considering a motion to dismiss an indictment, the court should consider whether “there is some evidence establishing each element of the crime[,]” and should view that evidence in the light most favorable to the State.
[State v. Tringali, 451 N.J. Super. 18, 26 (App. Div. 2017) (citations omitted).]
See also State v. Morrison, 188 N.J. 2, 12-13 (2006). "[A]n indictment should
be disturbed only on the clearest and plainest ground." Hogan, 144 N.J. at 228
A-4924-17T3 4 (citations omitted). We review the trial court's decision to dismiss an indictment
for abuse of discretion. Id. at 229.
The pertinent elements of the crime of aggravated assault require evidence
that the defendant: "[a]ttempt[ed] to cause serious bodily injury to another, or
cause[d] such injury purposely or knowingly or under circumstances
manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life recklessly cause[d]
such injury." N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(1). The State may establish a defendant's
culpability by proving the defendant personally committed the aggravated
assault as a principal, or that the defendant was liable as an accomplice to the
crime. N.J.S.A. 2C:2-6(b)(3). Accomplice liability can be proven by evidence
that the defendant, with the purpose of promoting or facilitating commission of
the crime, aided or attempted to aid someone else in committing the crime.
N.J.S.A. 2C:2-6(c)(1)(b).
The State may prove its case by direct or circumstantial evidence. See
State v. Reyes, 50 N.J. 454, 458-59 (1967). It is not necessary that the State
present a video or other direct evidence demonstrating a defendant's guilt. If the
State's proffered video evidence is inconclusive, the court should subtract that
evidence from the equation and consider whether the State's remaining evidence
nonetheless suffices to support the indictment.
A-4924-17T3 5 Because the State presented at least some direct or circumstantial evidence
against Robinson to satisfy each element of the charged offense of aggravated
assault, either as a principal or an accomplice, we reverse the order dismissing
the indictment against Robinson. In his Grand Jury presentation, the prosecutor
admitted that Robinson and Miles resembled each other, and that the videos were
blurry and did not clearly indicate whether Robinson or Miles was involved in
assaulting the victims. After watching security videos of the incident, the trial
judge agreed that the videos were blurry and unhelpful, and on that basis he
concluded that the State did not present a prima facie case that Robinson
assaulted either victim.
We will not second-guess the trial judge's evaluation of the video
evidence, which even the State described as less than clear on the issue of
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-4924-17T3
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
KAWON ROBINSON and MAURICE J. MILES,
Defendants-Respondents,
and
TONY J. MARTINEZ, KATTRELL TRENT, and DARRION K. TRENT,
Defendants. ________________________________________
Submitted September 13, 2018 – Decided October 9, 2018
Before Judges Alvarez and Reisner.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Hudson County, Indictment No. 17-11-0775
Esther Suarez, Hudson County Prosecutor, attorney for appellant (David S. Feldman, Assistant Prosecutor, Charles C. Cho, Assistant Prosecutor, and Erin M. Campbell, Assistant Prosecutor, on the brief). Grigaite & Abdelsayed, LLC, attorneys for respondent Kawon Robinson (Shokry G. Abdelsayed, on the letter brief).
Michael R. Shulman, attorney for respondent Maurice J. Miles.
PER CURIAM
By leave granted, the State appeals from a May 7, 2018 order dismissing
the indictments against defendants Kawon Robinson and Maurice J. Miles. With
respect to Kawon Robinson, we reverse and vacate the order dismissing the
indictment. The trial court, perhaps inadvertently, failed to issue a statement of
reasons for its decision with respect to Maurice Miles. Accordingly, we remand
the Miles case to the trial court for reconsideration of the merits in light of the
guidance provided in this opinion, and for a statement of the trial court's reasons
for whatever disposition it reaches on the remand.
We begin by defining the scope of this appeal. By way of background,
defendants were accused of participating in an incident arising from a
confrontation between two groups of young men. During the confrontation, a
victim named Corbin was shot and wounded, and he was then otherwise
physically assaulted. A second victim named Gordon was brutally beaten and
stomped, and was then shot to death as he lay on the ground. The indictment
charged both defendants with aggravated assault. The indictment charged two
A-4924-17T3 2 other co-defendants, respectively, with the murder of Gordon and the attempted
murder of Corbin. During the Grand Jury presentation, the prosecutor
repeatedly told the Grand Jurors that the two other co-defendants – not Robinson
or Miles – were responsible for the shootings, and the Grand Jury heard
testimony consistent with the State's theory. The Grand Jury returned an
indictment against defendants for aggravated assault.
Both defendants moved to dismiss the indictment for aggravated assault.
During the oral argument of the motion, the State confirmed to the trial court
that neither Robinson nor Miles was indicted in connection with the shooting
and that the indictment was limited to the fistfight and beating of the two
victims. The State defended the indictment on that basis, and the trial judge
reviewed the Grand Jury record based on the State’s representation. The judge
concluded there was insufficient evidence that Robinson assaulted either victim.
The judge dismissed the indictment against Miles without a statement of
reasons.
When we granted leave to appeal, it was limited to a review of the trial
court's order, which in turn was based on the State's representations about the
scope of the indictment. As a result, our decision here will permit the State to
try Robinson for aggravated assault, limited to the allegations of physical
A-4924-17T3 3 beating of either or both victims, but not with respect to the shootings. Likewise,
the remand of Miles’ motion is limited to the aggravated assault charges related
to the fistfight and beatings. Absent a superseding indictment, the State has
waived the right to try either of these two defendants for the shootings.
Having defined what is properly before us, we turn to the merits of
Robinson's appeal. Our review is governed by well-established legal principles.
In deciding whether to indict, "the grand jury must determine whether the State
has established a prima facie case that a crime has been committed and that the
accused has committed it." State v. Hogan, 144 N.J. 216, 227 (1996).
A grand jury may base an indictment on the evidence the State has produced, as well as any reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that evidence. In a grand jury proceeding, hearsay is admissible. In considering a motion to dismiss an indictment, the court should consider whether “there is some evidence establishing each element of the crime[,]” and should view that evidence in the light most favorable to the State.
[State v. Tringali, 451 N.J. Super. 18, 26 (App. Div. 2017) (citations omitted).]
See also State v. Morrison, 188 N.J. 2, 12-13 (2006). "[A]n indictment should
be disturbed only on the clearest and plainest ground." Hogan, 144 N.J. at 228
A-4924-17T3 4 (citations omitted). We review the trial court's decision to dismiss an indictment
for abuse of discretion. Id. at 229.
The pertinent elements of the crime of aggravated assault require evidence
that the defendant: "[a]ttempt[ed] to cause serious bodily injury to another, or
cause[d] such injury purposely or knowingly or under circumstances
manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life recklessly cause[d]
such injury." N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(1). The State may establish a defendant's
culpability by proving the defendant personally committed the aggravated
assault as a principal, or that the defendant was liable as an accomplice to the
crime. N.J.S.A. 2C:2-6(b)(3). Accomplice liability can be proven by evidence
that the defendant, with the purpose of promoting or facilitating commission of
the crime, aided or attempted to aid someone else in committing the crime.
N.J.S.A. 2C:2-6(c)(1)(b).
The State may prove its case by direct or circumstantial evidence. See
State v. Reyes, 50 N.J. 454, 458-59 (1967). It is not necessary that the State
present a video or other direct evidence demonstrating a defendant's guilt. If the
State's proffered video evidence is inconclusive, the court should subtract that
evidence from the equation and consider whether the State's remaining evidence
nonetheless suffices to support the indictment.
A-4924-17T3 5 Because the State presented at least some direct or circumstantial evidence
against Robinson to satisfy each element of the charged offense of aggravated
assault, either as a principal or an accomplice, we reverse the order dismissing
the indictment against Robinson. In his Grand Jury presentation, the prosecutor
admitted that Robinson and Miles resembled each other, and that the videos were
blurry and did not clearly indicate whether Robinson or Miles was involved in
assaulting the victims. After watching security videos of the incident, the trial
judge agreed that the videos were blurry and unhelpful, and on that basis he
concluded that the State did not present a prima facie case that Robinson
assaulted either victim.
We will not second-guess the trial judge's evaluation of the video
evidence, which even the State described as less than clear on the issue of
whether Robinson personally assaulted anyone. However, the trial judge did not
address the State's other evidence against Robinson. That evidence, to which
the State's police witness testified, included Robinson's brother's statement to
the police, incriminating Robinson. As briefly summarized by the police
witness, the brother told the police that he "realized" Robinson was involved in
A-4924-17T3 6 a fight and ran to participate in the fight also. 1 Viewed most favorably to the
State, the brother personally observed Robinson fighting with the victims.
Corbin told the police that Robinson was present at the scene of the assault, and
he saw Robinson holding a gun in his hand. As recounted by the police witness,
Corbin told the police that he did not see who was hitting him, because "after he
was being assaulted after being shot at some point, he put[] his head down and
he kind of just [took] it." There was also evidence that Robinson left the scene
along with the other co-defendants.
Evidence that Robinson was armed and holding the gun in plain sight
would support an inference that he shared the co-defendants' intent to inflict
serious bodily injury of some type. Based on evidence that Robinson was
present at the scene of the assaults, armed with a gun, and participated in fighting
with at least one of the victims, a jury could conclude that he shared his co-
defendants' intent to beat up and seriously injure both victims. While the State's
1 We acknowledge that the State's Grand Jury presentation could have been more thorough. The State's motion papers to the trial judge included police reports, including the brother's entire statement, that were not presented to the Grand Jury. The trial judge properly noted that those papers were irrelevant to the decision of the motion. However, solely for future reference, we note that the reports contained more specific incriminating evidence against Robinson, and had the prosecutor made a more careful presentation to the Grand Jury, this motion might have been avoided. A-4924-17T3 7 Grand Jury presentation against Robinson might not convince a jury beyond a
reasonable doubt, it was sufficient to meet the lower threshold required to obtain
an indictment.
Accordingly, we reverse the May 7, 2018 order insofar as it dismissed the
indictment against Robinson, and we remand the case for trial. We remand the
May 7, 2018 order for reconsideration insofar as it dismissed the indictment
against Miles.
Reversed and remanded. We do not retain jurisdiction.
A-4924-17T3 8