NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-5194-17T3
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
JULIO E. MARTINEZ,
Defendant-Appellant. ______________________________
Submitted May 6, 2019 – Decided July 17, 2019
Before Judges Sabatino and Susswein.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Camden County, Indictment No. 13-03-0736.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Mark Zavotsky, Designated Counsel, on the brief).
Mary Eva Colalillo, Camden County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Linda Anne Shashoua, Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM Defendant Julio E. Martinez appeals from the denial of his petition for
post-conviction relief (PCR). Defendant pled guilty pursuant to a negotiated
plea agreement to aggravated manslaughter for stabbing his former girlfriend to
death. He was sentenced in accordance with the plea agreement to a prison term
of twenty-eight years subject to the No Early Release Act (NERA), N.J.S.A.
2C:43-7.2(a). His homicide sentence was ordered to run concurrently with the
sentence defendant was already serving for a drug conviction.
Defendant’s PCR petition claims that he received ineffective assistance of
counsel. Specifically, defendant contends that his trial attorney failed to
investigate whether medication defendant claims to have been taking while
incarcerated inhibited his ability to enter a knowing and voluntary guilty plea.
We affirm substantially for the reasons set forth by the PCR judge in his
thorough and well-reasoned oral decision denying relief without an evidentiary
hearing.
I.
Defendant was indicted for knowing-purposeful murder, felony murder,
burglary, unlawful possession of a weapon, possession of a weapon for an
unlawful purpose, two counts of endangering the welfare of a child, and stalking .
Those charges stemmed from a tragic domestic violence episode during which
A-5194-17T3 2 defendant broke into his former girlfriend’s apartment, fatally stabbed her with
a knife, and fled the scene with the blade still in his victim’s back. Before
succumbing to her wounds, the victim managed to call 9-1-1 and told police
what defendant had done.
Defendant’s counsel negotiated a plea agreement in which the State
agreed that in exchange for defendant’s guilty plea to aggravated manslaughter,
the State would dismiss the murder charge and all other counts of the indictment.
The State also agreed that the sentence would run concurrently to the narcotics -
conviction sentence defendant was already serving.
On September 8, 2014, defendant appeared before the Hon. John T.
Kelley, J.S.C., to enter his guilty plea to the reduced charge of aggravated
manslaughter. During the plea colloquy, the judge asked defendant, "[a]s you
stand before me this afternoon, sir, are you under the influence of any drugs,
alcohol, or any medicines that would affect your judgment?" Defendant, who
was under oath, replied "[n]o, sir." The judge then asked, "[a]s you stand before
me do you have a clear head and understand what you’re doing?" Defendant
replied, "[y]es sir."
Prior to sentencing, defendant was interviewed by court staff as part of
the process of preparing the Adult Presentence Report (PSR). According to the
A-5194-17T3 3 PSR, defendant "described his health as good and denied any physical or mental
disorders." The PSR does not indicate that defendant was taking any
medications.
On October 10, 2014, defendant was sentenced by Judge Kelley in
accordance with the plea agreement. Defendant filed a direct appeal, only
challenging his sentence. On June 1, 2015, an excessive sentence panel of this
court granted defendant’s request for a remand to consider the proper number of
jail credits that should have been awarded, and the Judgment of Conviction was
thereafter amended to reflect the correct number of credits. The sentence was
otherwise left undisturbed.
Two years later, defendant filed a PCR petition contending that his trial
counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to inquire about medications
defendant claims he was taking at the time of his guilty plea. The PCR judge,
who had previously accepted defendant’s plea and sentenced him, denied
defendant relief without an evidentiary hearing.
II.
Defendant appeals, arguing:
DEFENDANT WAS DENIED EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL FOR COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO INVESTIGATE DEFENDANT'S CLAIM THAT THE MEDICATION HE WAS BEING
A-5194-17T3 4 ADMINISTERED WHILE INCARCERATED INHIBITED HIS ABILITY TO ENTER INTO A KNOWING AND INTELLIGENT PLEA.
III.
To show ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant must meet the two-
part test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984), which
was adopted by our Supreme Court in State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42 (1987). "'First,
the defendant must show that counsel’s performance was deficient.'" Fritz, 105
N.J. at 52 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. 687); see also State v. Tacetta, 200 N.J.
183, 193 (2009). "'Second, the defendant must show that the deficient
performance prejudiced the defense.'" Ibid. When the claim of ineffective
assistance relates to a guilty plea, a defendant must satisfy a modified Strickland
standard:
When a guilty plea is part of the equation, . . . 'a defendant must show that (i) counsel’s assistance was not "within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases"; and (ii) "that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, [the defendant] would not have pled guilty and would have insisted on going to trial."'
[State v. Nuñez-Valdez, 200 N.J. 129, 139 (2009) (quoting State v. DiFrisco, 137 N.J. 434, 457 (1994) (citations omitted) (second alteration in original)).]
A-5194-17T3 5 Furthermore, to obtain relief under the second prong, "a petitioner must
convince the court that a decision to reject the plea bargain would have been
rational under the circumstances." Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 372
(2010) (citing Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 480, 486 (2000)).
An evidentiary hearing for PCR is only required when the defendant has
made a prima facie showing of entitlement to such relief by demonstrating "a
reasonable likelihood that his or her claim will ultimately succeed on the
merits." State v. Marshall, 148 N.J. 89, 158 (1997) (citing State v. Preciose, 129
N.J. 451, 463 (1992)). A petitioner must establish the right to relief by a
preponderance of the evidence. Preciose, 129 N.J. at 459.
Bald assertions of ineffective assistance are not enough. State v.
Cummings, 321 N.J. Super. 154, 170 (App. Div. 1999). A petitioner "must
allege facts sufficient to demonstrate counsel’s alleged substandard
performance[,]" and the court must view the facts alleged in the light most
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-5194-17T3
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
JULIO E. MARTINEZ,
Defendant-Appellant. ______________________________
Submitted May 6, 2019 – Decided July 17, 2019
Before Judges Sabatino and Susswein.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Camden County, Indictment No. 13-03-0736.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Mark Zavotsky, Designated Counsel, on the brief).
Mary Eva Colalillo, Camden County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Linda Anne Shashoua, Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM Defendant Julio E. Martinez appeals from the denial of his petition for
post-conviction relief (PCR). Defendant pled guilty pursuant to a negotiated
plea agreement to aggravated manslaughter for stabbing his former girlfriend to
death. He was sentenced in accordance with the plea agreement to a prison term
of twenty-eight years subject to the No Early Release Act (NERA), N.J.S.A.
2C:43-7.2(a). His homicide sentence was ordered to run concurrently with the
sentence defendant was already serving for a drug conviction.
Defendant’s PCR petition claims that he received ineffective assistance of
counsel. Specifically, defendant contends that his trial attorney failed to
investigate whether medication defendant claims to have been taking while
incarcerated inhibited his ability to enter a knowing and voluntary guilty plea.
We affirm substantially for the reasons set forth by the PCR judge in his
thorough and well-reasoned oral decision denying relief without an evidentiary
hearing.
I.
Defendant was indicted for knowing-purposeful murder, felony murder,
burglary, unlawful possession of a weapon, possession of a weapon for an
unlawful purpose, two counts of endangering the welfare of a child, and stalking .
Those charges stemmed from a tragic domestic violence episode during which
A-5194-17T3 2 defendant broke into his former girlfriend’s apartment, fatally stabbed her with
a knife, and fled the scene with the blade still in his victim’s back. Before
succumbing to her wounds, the victim managed to call 9-1-1 and told police
what defendant had done.
Defendant’s counsel negotiated a plea agreement in which the State
agreed that in exchange for defendant’s guilty plea to aggravated manslaughter,
the State would dismiss the murder charge and all other counts of the indictment.
The State also agreed that the sentence would run concurrently to the narcotics -
conviction sentence defendant was already serving.
On September 8, 2014, defendant appeared before the Hon. John T.
Kelley, J.S.C., to enter his guilty plea to the reduced charge of aggravated
manslaughter. During the plea colloquy, the judge asked defendant, "[a]s you
stand before me this afternoon, sir, are you under the influence of any drugs,
alcohol, or any medicines that would affect your judgment?" Defendant, who
was under oath, replied "[n]o, sir." The judge then asked, "[a]s you stand before
me do you have a clear head and understand what you’re doing?" Defendant
replied, "[y]es sir."
Prior to sentencing, defendant was interviewed by court staff as part of
the process of preparing the Adult Presentence Report (PSR). According to the
A-5194-17T3 3 PSR, defendant "described his health as good and denied any physical or mental
disorders." The PSR does not indicate that defendant was taking any
medications.
On October 10, 2014, defendant was sentenced by Judge Kelley in
accordance with the plea agreement. Defendant filed a direct appeal, only
challenging his sentence. On June 1, 2015, an excessive sentence panel of this
court granted defendant’s request for a remand to consider the proper number of
jail credits that should have been awarded, and the Judgment of Conviction was
thereafter amended to reflect the correct number of credits. The sentence was
otherwise left undisturbed.
Two years later, defendant filed a PCR petition contending that his trial
counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to inquire about medications
defendant claims he was taking at the time of his guilty plea. The PCR judge,
who had previously accepted defendant’s plea and sentenced him, denied
defendant relief without an evidentiary hearing.
II.
Defendant appeals, arguing:
DEFENDANT WAS DENIED EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL FOR COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO INVESTIGATE DEFENDANT'S CLAIM THAT THE MEDICATION HE WAS BEING
A-5194-17T3 4 ADMINISTERED WHILE INCARCERATED INHIBITED HIS ABILITY TO ENTER INTO A KNOWING AND INTELLIGENT PLEA.
III.
To show ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant must meet the two-
part test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984), which
was adopted by our Supreme Court in State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42 (1987). "'First,
the defendant must show that counsel’s performance was deficient.'" Fritz, 105
N.J. at 52 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. 687); see also State v. Tacetta, 200 N.J.
183, 193 (2009). "'Second, the defendant must show that the deficient
performance prejudiced the defense.'" Ibid. When the claim of ineffective
assistance relates to a guilty plea, a defendant must satisfy a modified Strickland
standard:
When a guilty plea is part of the equation, . . . 'a defendant must show that (i) counsel’s assistance was not "within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases"; and (ii) "that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, [the defendant] would not have pled guilty and would have insisted on going to trial."'
[State v. Nuñez-Valdez, 200 N.J. 129, 139 (2009) (quoting State v. DiFrisco, 137 N.J. 434, 457 (1994) (citations omitted) (second alteration in original)).]
A-5194-17T3 5 Furthermore, to obtain relief under the second prong, "a petitioner must
convince the court that a decision to reject the plea bargain would have been
rational under the circumstances." Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 372
(2010) (citing Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 480, 486 (2000)).
An evidentiary hearing for PCR is only required when the defendant has
made a prima facie showing of entitlement to such relief by demonstrating "a
reasonable likelihood that his or her claim will ultimately succeed on the
merits." State v. Marshall, 148 N.J. 89, 158 (1997) (citing State v. Preciose, 129
N.J. 451, 463 (1992)). A petitioner must establish the right to relief by a
preponderance of the evidence. Preciose, 129 N.J. at 459.
Bald assertions of ineffective assistance are not enough. State v.
Cummings, 321 N.J. Super. 154, 170 (App. Div. 1999). A petitioner "must
allege facts sufficient to demonstrate counsel’s alleged substandard
performance[,]" and the court must view the facts alleged in the light most
favorable to the petitioner. Ibid. Of particular note for purposes of the case
before us on this appeal, PCR petitions must be "accompanied by an affidavit or
certification by the defendant, or by others, setting forth with particularity the
facts that he wished to present." State v. Jones, 219 N.J. 298, 312 (2014).
A-5194-17T3 6 Guided by these principles, we find no merit to defendant’s contentions
and we affirm substantially for the reasons set forth by Judge Kelley in his oral
decision. The PCR court correctly characterized defendant’s claims as "bald"
assertions because defendant provided no support for his claim that he was
taking medications. Defendant’s claims are belied by his sworn statement at the
time of the plea colloquy that he was not taking any medications that might
affect his judgment and by his acknowledgement that he had a "clear head" and
understood what was happening during the plea hearing. His unsupported claim
also flies in the face of the information he provided to probation staff as they
were preparing the PSR.
Furthermore, the PCR court noted that defendant has failed to supply
records from the Camden County Correctional Facility concerning any
medications he was taking at the time of the guilty plea. Indeed, as the PCR
court aptly noted, "[h]e has not specified the medications he purportedly took
and has not identified how they would affect his judgment. He has not even set
forth a medical condition, which would have required medication."
Finally, defendant has not presented any colorable argument that the
decision to reject the plea agreement – which allowed him to avoid a mandatory
thirty-year parole ineligibility term, if not a substantially longer life prison
A-5194-17T3 7 sentence – would have been rational under the circumstances. Padilla, 559 U.S.
at 372. As the judge who entered the plea, sentenced defendant, and heard the
PCR petition noted, the State’s evidence in this case is overwhelming.
Affirmed.
A-5194-17T3 8