STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. JOMAS K. ARRINGTON (11-08-1289 AND 13-03-0348, MIDDLESEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)

CourtNew Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division
DecidedNovember 20, 2019
DocketA-3057-17T1
StatusUnpublished

This text of STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. JOMAS K. ARRINGTON (11-08-1289 AND 13-03-0348, MIDDLESEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. JOMAS K. ARRINGTON (11-08-1289 AND 13-03-0348, MIDDLESEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. JOMAS K. ARRINGTON (11-08-1289 AND 13-03-0348, MIDDLESEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE), (N.J. Ct. App. 2019).

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-3057-17T1

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

JOMAS K. ARRINGTON, a/k/a JONAS ARRINGTON, and JAY DEE,

Defendant-Appellant. _____________________________

Submitted September 23, 2019 – Decided November 20, 2019

Before Judges Ostrer and Susswein.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Middlesex County, Indictment Nos. 11-08- 1289 and 13-03-0348.

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Michele Erica Friedman, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, of counsel and on the brief).

Christopher L.C. Kuberiet, Acting Middlesex County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Patrick F. Galdieri, II, Special Deputy Attorney General/Acting Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief). Appellant filed a pro se supplemental brief.

PER CURIAM

Defendant, Jomas Arrington, claims in this appeal that he was improperly

denied jail credits for the 1031 days he was incarcerated in the Middlesex

County Corrections Center awaiting trial on State charges while a federal

detainer was pending for a violation of his federal supervised release. The

question concerning these jail credits was not litigated before the trial court.

Rather, the judge, prosecutor, and defense counsel accepted a statement in the

Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) that, "[a]ccording to jail credit

guidelines[,] 1 the def[endant] is not entitled to jail credit because he was being

held by a 'foreign jurisdiction.'"

It is not clear to us what guidelines the PSR was referring to, but the record

shows that defendant was not being held by a foreign jurisdiction. Rather, he

was being detained in a New Jersey jail facing New Jersey charges for which he

was unable to make bail. In accordance with prevailing case law and the

1 Defendant has moved to expand the record in an effort to locate the "guidelines" referred to in the PSR. Because we are deciding this appeal based on our interpretation and application of the relevant Court Rule and case law, there is no need for us to review the guidelines. Accordingly, defendant's motion is moot in light of the court's disposition of the underlying appeal on the existing record. A-3057-17T1 2 unambiguous terms of the Court Rule that governs the award of jail credit, Rule

3:21-8, we hold that defendant is entitled to credit for the 1031 days he was

incarcerated in the Middlesex County Corrections Center while the federal

detainer was active.

I.

Defendant was arrested and placed in pretrial custody in the Middlesex

County Corrections Center on criminal drug charges on March 31, 2011. On

August 25, 2011, a Middlesex County grand jury returned a twenty-three count

indictment charging defendant with various drug-related crimes, including

Leader of Narcotics Trafficking Network, first-degree possession of heroin with

intent to distribute, and second-degree conspiracy to distribute narcotics. In

2013 a Middlesex County grand jury returned a separate indictment charging

defendant with conspiracy to tamper with a witness, hinder apprehension, and

obstruct the administration of law.

On April 11, 2011, while defendant was in custody in the Middlesex

County Corrections Center awaiting resolution of the initial charges, the federal

government lodged a detainer pertaining to an alleged violation of federal

A-3057-17T1 3 "probation." 2 On January 31, 2014, a federal judge sentenced defendant to time

served, resolving the federal allegation, and lifted the federal detainer o n

February 5, 2014.

On March 20, 2014, defendant pled guilty to the second-degree conspiracy

count charged in the 2011 Middlesex County indictment and to the third -degree

witness tampering count charged in the 2013 Middlesex County indictment. He

was sentenced on December 11, 2017, pursuant to the persistent offender statute,

N.J.S.A. 2C:44-3(a), to a twelve-year prison term during which he must serve 3

years, six months without the possibility of parole. The sentencing court

2 As noted at the outset of this opinion, the issue concerning the 1031 days of jail credits at the center of this appeal was not fully litigated and the record concerning the federal detainer is scant. The PSR used the term "probation" in reference to the federal detainer. The State has moved to expand the record in order to establish that defendant had been charged with violating federal "supervised release," not "federal probation," and also that supervised release under federal law is the functional equivalent of parole under New Jersey law and practice. In the alternative, the State seeks to have this case remanded to allow the trial court to address the proper characterization and impact of the federal detainer. For reasons we explain later in this opinion, there is no need for us to compare and contrast the characteristics of supervised release under federal law with the characteristics of parole under New Jersey law. In the particular circumstances of defendant's pretrial detention, the resolution of this appeal does not depend on whether defendant's violation of federal supervised release is tantamount to a violation of parole, but rather on whether defendant was detained in New Jersey on state charges during the pendency of the federal detainer. A-3057-17T1 4 awarded 493 days of jail credit. The 493 days of jail credit does not include the

time defendant spent in the Middlesex County Corrections Center between April

11, 2011, and February 5, 2014—the 1031 days during which the federal

Defendant on appeal contends that:

POINT I

MR. ARRINGTON IS ENTITLED TO 1[]031 DAYS OF ADDITIONAL JAIL CREDIT FOR HIS PRETRIAL CUSTODY IN THE MIDDLESEX COUNTY JAIL, IRRESPECTIVE OF THE FEDERAL DETAINER LODGED AGAINST HIM DURING THAT IN-STATE INCARCERATION.

A. MR. ARRINGTON REMAINED INCARCERATED AT THE MIDDLESEX COUNTY CORRECTIONAL FACILITY THROUGHOUT THE TIMEFRAME IN QUESTION. HE WAS NOT INCARCERATED IN A "FOREIGN JURISDICTION" SIMPLY BECAUSE A FEDERAL DETAINER WAS LODGED AGAINST HIM WHILE HE WAS IN CUSTODY AT THE COUNTY JAIL.

B. NEITHER STATE V. JOE [3] NOR STATE V. HERNANDEZ [4] SUPPORT DEPRIVING MR. ARRINGTON OF THE JAIL CREDIT IN QUESTION.

3 228 N.J. 125 (2017). 4 208 N.J. 24 (2011). A-3057-17T1 5 C. MR. ARRINGTON'S CREDIT SHOULD NOT DEPEND UPON HAPPENSTANCE.

II.

Rule 3:21-8 provides that, "[t]he defendant shall receive credit on the term

of a custodial sentence for any time served in custody in jail or in a state hospital

between arrest and the imposition of sentence." Such credit for pre-sentence

custody is commonly referred to as "jail credits." Richardson v. Nickolopoulos,

110 N.J. 241, 242 (1988). When Rule 3:21-8 applies, these credits are

mandatory, not discretionary. Hernandez, 208 N.J. at 37. These credits have a

constitutional foundation, moreover, and "were conceived as a matter of equal

protection or fundamental fairness and as a means of avoiding the double

punishment that would result if no such credits were not granted." Id. at 36.

Furthermore, Rule 3:21-8 expresses the public policy of this State and should be

liberally construed. See State v. Beatty, 128 N.J. Super. 488, 491 (App. Div.

1974).

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State v. Black
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State v. Carreker
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Richardson v. Nickolopoulos
540 A.2d 1246 (Supreme Court of New Jersey, 1988)
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STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. JOMAS K. ARRINGTON (11-08-1289 AND 13-03-0348, MIDDLESEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE), Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-of-new-jersey-vs-jomas-k-arrington-11-08-1289-and-13-03-0348-njsuperctappdiv-2019.