NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-4942-18T2
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
JOHN RICHARDSON,
Defendant-Appellant. _______________________
Submitted January 11, 2021 – Decided February 4, 2021
Before Judges Gooden Brown and DeAlmeida.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Essex County, Indictment No. 00-01-0167.
John Richardson, appellant pro se.
Theodore N. Stephens II, Acting Essex County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Frank J. Ducoat, Special Deputy Attorney General/Acting Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM Defendant John Richardson appeals from the April 29, 2019 order of the
Law Division denying his motion for a new trial on his 2001 convictions of first-
degree murder and related offenses. We affirm.
I.
The following facts are derived from the record. In 1999, defendant was
eighteen years old when he shot and killed Joseph Clair and shot and injured
Terry Anderson. In 2001, a jury convicted defendant of first-degree murder,
N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1) and (2); fourth-degree aggravated assault, N.J.S.A.
2C:12-1(b)(4); unlawful possession of a weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b); and
possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a). He was
sentenced to an aggregate term of thirty years of imprisonment, with a thirty -
year period of parole ineligibility.
In 2004, we affirmed defendant's convictions and sentence. State v.
Richardson, No. A-3667-01 (App. Div. Nov. 8, 2004). The Supreme Court
denied certification. State v. Richardson, 182 N.J. 429 (2005). In 2009, we
affirmed the Law Division's denial of defendant's petition for post-conviction
relief. State v. Richardson, No. A-3521-07 (App. Div. Apr. 30, 2009). The
Supreme Court denied review. State v. Richardson, 200 N.J. 549 (2009). In
2013, the United States District Court denied defendant's petition for a writ of
A-4942-18T2 2 habeas corpus. Richardson v. Ricci, Civ. No. 10-4954 (KM) (D.N.J. Jul. 24,
2013).
On October 30, 2018, defendant filed in the Law Division what he
described as a motion for a new trial based on "newly discovered evidence of
underdeveloped brains in those who are late teens." According to defendant,
"[t]here is significant evidence and a growing medical consensus that key areas
of the brain relevant to decision-making and judgment continue to develop into
the early twenties." He argues that if this science had been known at the time
of his trial "he could have had the jury so instructed on the relevance of the
science" to his proffered diminished capacity defense. Defendant contends that
admission of this evidence would have changed the outcome of his trial because
if presented with this evidence "no reasonable jury would have found defendant
guilty of first[-]degree murder, but of a lesser offense."
Defendant did not include a copy of his trial court motion in his appendix.
However, his appendix includes: (1) a copy of a February 2018 report to the
House of Delegates of the American Bar Association urging the organization to
oppose imposition of a death sentence on any person who was twenty-one or
younger at the time of their offense; (2) a 2016 Fordham Law Review article
entitled "Young Adulthood as a Transitional Legal Category: Science, Social
A-4942-18T2 3 Change, and Justice Policy;" (3) a 2016 Temple Law Review article entitled
"When Does a Juvenile Become an Adult? Implications for Law and Policy[;]"
and (4) the transcript of a 2017 evidentiary hearing in a federal district court
matter in which defendant was not a party. These documents identify scientific
evidence relating to brain development in young adults. It is not clear from the
record whether the items in defendant's appendix were submitted to the trial
court.
In its April 29, 2019 written opinion, the trial court described defendant's
filing as an "application for resentencing pursuant to Miller v. Alabama, 5[6]7
U.S. 460 (2012); assignment of counsel, and grant of an evidentiary hearing for
newly discovered evidence." As the trial court noted, in Miller, the United
States Supreme Court held that mandatory life without parole for those who
were under eighteen at the time of their crimes violates the Eighth Amendment's
prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments. To satisfy the Constitution, a
sentencing court must consider a juvenile offender's youth and attendant
characteristics prior to imposition of sentence. Id. at 476-77. The trial court
concluded that defendant did not fall under the holding in Miller because he was
eighteen when he committed his offenses and because he was not sentenced to
a mandatory life term without parole.
A-4942-18T2 4 The trial court denied defendant's request for a new trial because it was
not supported by a certification or affidavit detailing the evidence on which he
intended to rely. In addition, the court found that any evidence with respect to
defendant's brain development as a young man would be speculative, given that
he was thirty-seven at the time the court decided the motion. The court noted
that the jury considered evidence of defendant's purported diminished capacity,
which it rejected, and that the original trial court considered defendant's age at
sentencing. The court summarily denied defendant's request for the appointment
of counsel. An April 29, 2019 order memorializes the court's decision.
This appeal follows. Defendant raises the following argument for our
consideration.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL BASED ON NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE OF BRAIN SCIENCE FOR LATE ADOLESCENCE AS A CLASS OF OFFENDERS HAVING LESS CULPABILITY COMPARED TO MATURE ADULTS PURSUANT TO N.J.S.A. 2C:1-2(B)(7), THEREFORE, THE ORDER SHOULD BE REVERSED AND THE MATTER SHOULD BE REMANDED FOR CONSIDERATION OF THE DEFENDANT'S CLAIMS.
A-4942-18T2 5 II.
Defendant argues that the trial court misconstrued his motion as one
seeking resentencing. He concedes that the holding in Miller does not apply to
him because he was eighteen at the time of his offenses and because he was not
sentenced to a mandatory life term without parole. He argues instead that he is
entitled to a new trial because newly discovered evidence regarding brain
development in people age eighteen to twenty-one, evidence similar to that
which lead to the holding in Miller and related cases, suggests he could not have
formed the necessary mens rea for first-degree murder.
"The trial judge on defendant's motion may grant the defendant a new trial
if required in the interest of justice." R. 3:20-1. Motions for a new trial are
"addressed to the sound discretion of the trial judge" and "shall not be reversed
unless it clearly appears that there was a miscarriage of justice under the law."
State v. Armour, 446 N.J. Super. 295, 305-06 (App. Div. 2016) (quotations
omitted). We review trial court decisions denying a motion for a new trial for
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-4942-18T2
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
JOHN RICHARDSON,
Defendant-Appellant. _______________________
Submitted January 11, 2021 – Decided February 4, 2021
Before Judges Gooden Brown and DeAlmeida.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Essex County, Indictment No. 00-01-0167.
John Richardson, appellant pro se.
Theodore N. Stephens II, Acting Essex County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Frank J. Ducoat, Special Deputy Attorney General/Acting Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM Defendant John Richardson appeals from the April 29, 2019 order of the
Law Division denying his motion for a new trial on his 2001 convictions of first-
degree murder and related offenses. We affirm.
I.
The following facts are derived from the record. In 1999, defendant was
eighteen years old when he shot and killed Joseph Clair and shot and injured
Terry Anderson. In 2001, a jury convicted defendant of first-degree murder,
N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1) and (2); fourth-degree aggravated assault, N.J.S.A.
2C:12-1(b)(4); unlawful possession of a weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b); and
possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a). He was
sentenced to an aggregate term of thirty years of imprisonment, with a thirty -
year period of parole ineligibility.
In 2004, we affirmed defendant's convictions and sentence. State v.
Richardson, No. A-3667-01 (App. Div. Nov. 8, 2004). The Supreme Court
denied certification. State v. Richardson, 182 N.J. 429 (2005). In 2009, we
affirmed the Law Division's denial of defendant's petition for post-conviction
relief. State v. Richardson, No. A-3521-07 (App. Div. Apr. 30, 2009). The
Supreme Court denied review. State v. Richardson, 200 N.J. 549 (2009). In
2013, the United States District Court denied defendant's petition for a writ of
A-4942-18T2 2 habeas corpus. Richardson v. Ricci, Civ. No. 10-4954 (KM) (D.N.J. Jul. 24,
2013).
On October 30, 2018, defendant filed in the Law Division what he
described as a motion for a new trial based on "newly discovered evidence of
underdeveloped brains in those who are late teens." According to defendant,
"[t]here is significant evidence and a growing medical consensus that key areas
of the brain relevant to decision-making and judgment continue to develop into
the early twenties." He argues that if this science had been known at the time
of his trial "he could have had the jury so instructed on the relevance of the
science" to his proffered diminished capacity defense. Defendant contends that
admission of this evidence would have changed the outcome of his trial because
if presented with this evidence "no reasonable jury would have found defendant
guilty of first[-]degree murder, but of a lesser offense."
Defendant did not include a copy of his trial court motion in his appendix.
However, his appendix includes: (1) a copy of a February 2018 report to the
House of Delegates of the American Bar Association urging the organization to
oppose imposition of a death sentence on any person who was twenty-one or
younger at the time of their offense; (2) a 2016 Fordham Law Review article
entitled "Young Adulthood as a Transitional Legal Category: Science, Social
A-4942-18T2 3 Change, and Justice Policy;" (3) a 2016 Temple Law Review article entitled
"When Does a Juvenile Become an Adult? Implications for Law and Policy[;]"
and (4) the transcript of a 2017 evidentiary hearing in a federal district court
matter in which defendant was not a party. These documents identify scientific
evidence relating to brain development in young adults. It is not clear from the
record whether the items in defendant's appendix were submitted to the trial
court.
In its April 29, 2019 written opinion, the trial court described defendant's
filing as an "application for resentencing pursuant to Miller v. Alabama, 5[6]7
U.S. 460 (2012); assignment of counsel, and grant of an evidentiary hearing for
newly discovered evidence." As the trial court noted, in Miller, the United
States Supreme Court held that mandatory life without parole for those who
were under eighteen at the time of their crimes violates the Eighth Amendment's
prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments. To satisfy the Constitution, a
sentencing court must consider a juvenile offender's youth and attendant
characteristics prior to imposition of sentence. Id. at 476-77. The trial court
concluded that defendant did not fall under the holding in Miller because he was
eighteen when he committed his offenses and because he was not sentenced to
a mandatory life term without parole.
A-4942-18T2 4 The trial court denied defendant's request for a new trial because it was
not supported by a certification or affidavit detailing the evidence on which he
intended to rely. In addition, the court found that any evidence with respect to
defendant's brain development as a young man would be speculative, given that
he was thirty-seven at the time the court decided the motion. The court noted
that the jury considered evidence of defendant's purported diminished capacity,
which it rejected, and that the original trial court considered defendant's age at
sentencing. The court summarily denied defendant's request for the appointment
of counsel. An April 29, 2019 order memorializes the court's decision.
This appeal follows. Defendant raises the following argument for our
consideration.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL BASED ON NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE OF BRAIN SCIENCE FOR LATE ADOLESCENCE AS A CLASS OF OFFENDERS HAVING LESS CULPABILITY COMPARED TO MATURE ADULTS PURSUANT TO N.J.S.A. 2C:1-2(B)(7), THEREFORE, THE ORDER SHOULD BE REVERSED AND THE MATTER SHOULD BE REMANDED FOR CONSIDERATION OF THE DEFENDANT'S CLAIMS.
A-4942-18T2 5 II.
Defendant argues that the trial court misconstrued his motion as one
seeking resentencing. He concedes that the holding in Miller does not apply to
him because he was eighteen at the time of his offenses and because he was not
sentenced to a mandatory life term without parole. He argues instead that he is
entitled to a new trial because newly discovered evidence regarding brain
development in people age eighteen to twenty-one, evidence similar to that
which lead to the holding in Miller and related cases, suggests he could not have
formed the necessary mens rea for first-degree murder.
"The trial judge on defendant's motion may grant the defendant a new trial
if required in the interest of justice." R. 3:20-1. Motions for a new trial are
"addressed to the sound discretion of the trial judge" and "shall not be reversed
unless it clearly appears that there was a miscarriage of justice under the law."
State v. Armour, 446 N.J. Super. 295, 305-06 (App. Div. 2016) (quotations
omitted). We review trial court decisions denying a motion for a new trial for
an abuse of discretion. Id. at 306. Questions of law are reviewed de novo. State
v. Miles, 229 N.J. 83, 90 (2017).
"[T]o qualify as newly discovered evidence entitling a party to a new trial,
the new evidence must be (1) material to the issue and not merely cumulative or
A-4942-18T2 6 impeaching or contradictory; (2) discovered since the trial and not discoverable
by reasonable diligence beforehand; and (3) of the sort that would probably
change the jury's verdict if a new trial were granted." State v. Carter, 85 N.J.
300, 314 (1981). "All three tests must be met before the evidence can be said to
justify a new trial." Ibid.
Defendant's argument must be examined in the context of recent legal
developments concerning juvenile offenders. The United States Supreme Court
has established, through a series of decisions issued between 2005 and 2016,
that juveniles are developmentally different from adults and individualized
consideration of these differences is necessary prior to imposing the harshest
punishments available under law. See e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551,
578 (2005) (holding that imposing the death penalty on defendants convicted as
juveniles violates the Eighth Amendment); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 82
(2010) (holding that imposing life term without parole on juveniles convicted of
non-homicide offenses is unconstitutional); and Miller, 567 U.S. at 465 (holding
that mandatory life term without parole for juveniles convicted of homicide is
unconstitutional). The Court's holdings in each of these cases were predicated
on "scientific and sociological notions about the unique characteristics of youth
A-4942-18T2 7 and the progressive emotional and behavioral development of juveniles." State
in Interest of C.K., 233 N.J. 44, 68 (2018).
In State v. Zuber, 227 N.J. 422, 446-47 (2017), our Supreme Court held
that "Miller's command that a sentencing judge 'take into account how children
are different, and how those differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing
them to a lifetime in prison,' applies with equal strength to a sentence that is the
practical equivalent of life without parole." (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 480)
(citation omitted).
Defendant argues that the scientific evidence that underpins the holding
in these precedents has advanced to include the development of post-adolescent
brains. He contends that he is entitled to a new trial in which he is able to present
evidence of delayed brain development in eighteen-year-olds, as he was at the
time of his offenses, to establish his lack of culpability for first-degree murder.
Our careful review of the record reveals no abuse of the trial court's
discretion. Defendant has not provided a precise description of the evidence he
intends to introduce at a new trial. The record does not clearly identify what
defendant presented to the trial court in support of his motion. The documents
in defendant's appendix, assuming they were submitted with his motion, detail
a number of scientific studies and other evidence from a variety of sources.
A-4942-18T2 8 Defendant does not explain which, if any, of the experts identified in those
sources would serve as witnesses at his trial or whether their opinions would
apply to defendant's circumstances.
In addition, the sources in defendant's appendix date from around the time
the Court issued its opinion in Zuber. They contain evidence similar to that on
which the Court relied to reach its holding in that case. Yet, there is no
indication in Zuber, or the precedents on which the Court relied, that the
constitutional protections established in recent precedents apply to defendants
who commit offenses after they have reached the age of majority. See United
States v. Marshall, 736 F.3d 492, 600 (6th Cir. 2013) (noting that, for Eighth
Amendment purposes, an individual's eighteenth birthday marks the bright line
separating juveniles from adults; "In short, Marshall is at the very most an
immature adult. An immature adult is not a juvenile. Regardless of the source
of the immaturity, an immature adult is still an adult.").
Nor do Miller, Zuber, or the precedents on which they rely suggest a
constitutional right for an adult defendant to introduce evidence of scientific
studies of brain development to negate mens rea. Those precedents concern
sentencing, in particular life sentences and their equivalent, which defendant is
not serving, and not proofs relating to the elements of the crimes charged.
A-4942-18T2 9 Finally, as the trial court noted, defendant had an opportunity at trial to
present evidence that he did not form the requisite mens rea for first-degree
murder. The jury found otherwise. He has made no convincing argument that
the verdict would have been different had he presented scientific evidence of the
type he describes in general terms as warranting a new trial.
Affirmed.
A-4942-18T2 10