RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-0928-16T3
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
J.A.M.,
Defendant-Appellant. ___________________________
Submitted September 13, 2018 - Decided September 26, 2018
Before Judges Koblitz and Mayer.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Union County, Indictment No. 13-11-0950.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Daniel S. Rockoff, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, of counsel and on the brief).
Michael A. Monahan, Acting Union County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Meredith L. Balo, Special Deputy Attorney General/Acting Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM Defendant J.A.M. appeals from the sentence imposed after his conviction
for two counts of first-degree aggravated sexual assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(a)(2);
two counts of second-degree sexual assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(c)(1); two counts
of second-degree sexual assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(c)(4); and two counts of
second-degree endangering the welfare of a child, N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a).1
Defendant was convicted of sexually assaulting his two daughters repeatedly
and was sentenced to thirty years with an eighty-five percent parole disqualifier
pursuant to the No Early Release Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2. Defendant also
appeals from denial of his motion to suppress his statements to the police. We
affirm the convictions, but vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing.
Defendant challenges the denial of his motion to suppress statements he
gave to the police after the victims' mother reported that he was sexually abusing
his daughters. Defendant contends he requested an attorney prior to police
questioning and that his request was not honored.
Defendant's interview at the police station was conducted in Spanish by
Detective Alfredo Beltran. The interview was videotaped and the questions and
1 The jury acquitted defendant of one count of second-degree sexual assault of a victim less than thirteen years old, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(b). A-0928-16T3 2 responses were compiled in a written transcript, with the English translation
immediately following the Spanish.
The judge hearing the suppression motion watched the videotaped
interview of defendant. Before the interview began, the judge observed
defendant was given a Miranda2 rights form in Spanish and the detective read
each right to him in Spanish. On the videotape, the judge saw defendant express
that he understood his rights, place his initials after each warning, and sign his
name at the bottom of the Miranda form prior to questioning. When defendant
had difficulty understanding the detective's explanation of the Miranda form,
the judge noted defendant read the form on his own and "continuously indicated
that he understood his rights." Based on his observations from the videotape,
the judge remarked the detective "informed the defendant that he had to
understand his rights before any questions were asked," found defendant was
not "hesitant about speaking to the officers," and did not "ask for an attorney to
be provided."
The judge also read the transcript of defendant's interview translated into
English. Based on the transcript, the judge determined defendant waived his
rights knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently before speaking with the police.
2 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). A-0928-16T3 3 According to the transcript, while initialing the Miranda form, defendant asked
(in Spanish) "the court can give me an attorney?" The officer said "yes ," and
defendant replied "perfecto." Defendant never expressed a desire to have an
attorney present during the police questioning. Defendant's consent to speak to
the police and respond to questions was verified by a supervising officer, who
asked defendant "you want to talk to us still or you want an attorney now."
Defendant responded "Oh, no, I already talked to you. . . . . For me no problem
I cooperate with you."
On appeal, defendant raises the following arguments:
Point I
BECAUSE INTERROGATORS FAILED TO SCRUPULOUSLY HONOR OR CLARIFY APPELLANT'S REQUEST FOR AN ATTORNEY, THE LOWER COURT ERRED BY ADMITTING APPELLANT'S SUBSEQUENT STATEMENT AT TRIAL. U.S. CONST., AMENDS. V, XIV.
Point II
THE LOWER COURT MISAPPLIED SENTENCING PRINCIPLES WHEN IMPOSING AN AGGREGATE [THIRTY]-YEAR PRISON SENTENCE WITH AN [EIGHTY-FIVE] PERCENT PAROLE DISQUALIFIER. HENCE THIS COURT SHOULD REMAND FOR A NEW SENTENCING HEARING.
A-0928-16T3 4 A. The Sentencing Court Erroneously Double-Counted Elements of N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(a)(2) As Support For Aggravating Factors N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(1) and (2).
B. The Sentencing Court Erroneously Cited Acquitted Conduct As Support For Aggravating Factors N.J.S.A. 2C:44-(a)(1) and (2).
In reviewing a motion to suppress evidence, we defer to the factual and
credibility findings of the trial court, "so long as those findings are supported by
sufficient credible evidence in the record." State v. Handy, 206 N.J. 39, 44
(2011) (quoting State v. Elders, 192 N.J. 224, 243 (2007)). "[A]n appellate
tribunal must defer to the factual findings of the trial court when that court has
made its findings based on the testimonial and documentary evidence presented
at an evidentiary hearing or trial." State v. Hubbard, 222 N.J. 249, 269 (2015).
We accord deference to the trial court "because the 'findings of the trial
judge . . . are substantially influenced by his opportunity to hear and see the
witnesses and to have the "feel" of the case, which a reviewing court cannot
enjoy.'" State v. Reece, 222 N.J. 154, 166 (2015) (alteration in original) (quoting
State v. Locurto, 157 N.J. 463, 471 (1999)).
On appeal, defendant argues his question to Detective Beltran was a
request for counsel, and the detective was required to stop the interrogation.
A-0928-16T3 5 According to defendant, at a minimum, the detective should have sought a
clarification from defendant as to his request for an attorney.
The State responds defendant's question regarding the appointment of an
attorney was not an invocation of the right to counsel. According to the State,
defendant never expressed that he wanted an attorney during the police
questioning. The State notes the detective's supervising sergeant spoke to
defendant regarding invocation of a request for a lawyer. Defendant responded
that he wanted to talk to a lawyer before any court appearance, but did not need
a lawyer before signing the Miranda form.
In reviewing a waiver of a defendant's Miranda rights, the State "must
'prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the . . . waiver [of rights] was knowing,
intelligent, and voluntary.'" State v. A.M. 452 N.J. Super. 587, 596 (App. Div.
2018) (second alteration in original) (quoting State v. Yohnnson, 204 N.J. 43,
59 (2010)). A court reviews a Miranda waiver under the "totality of the
circumstances." State v. Nyhammer, 197 N.J.
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RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-0928-16T3
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
J.A.M.,
Defendant-Appellant. ___________________________
Submitted September 13, 2018 - Decided September 26, 2018
Before Judges Koblitz and Mayer.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Union County, Indictment No. 13-11-0950.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Daniel S. Rockoff, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, of counsel and on the brief).
Michael A. Monahan, Acting Union County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Meredith L. Balo, Special Deputy Attorney General/Acting Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM Defendant J.A.M. appeals from the sentence imposed after his conviction
for two counts of first-degree aggravated sexual assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(a)(2);
two counts of second-degree sexual assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(c)(1); two counts
of second-degree sexual assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(c)(4); and two counts of
second-degree endangering the welfare of a child, N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a).1
Defendant was convicted of sexually assaulting his two daughters repeatedly
and was sentenced to thirty years with an eighty-five percent parole disqualifier
pursuant to the No Early Release Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2. Defendant also
appeals from denial of his motion to suppress his statements to the police. We
affirm the convictions, but vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing.
Defendant challenges the denial of his motion to suppress statements he
gave to the police after the victims' mother reported that he was sexually abusing
his daughters. Defendant contends he requested an attorney prior to police
questioning and that his request was not honored.
Defendant's interview at the police station was conducted in Spanish by
Detective Alfredo Beltran. The interview was videotaped and the questions and
1 The jury acquitted defendant of one count of second-degree sexual assault of a victim less than thirteen years old, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(b). A-0928-16T3 2 responses were compiled in a written transcript, with the English translation
immediately following the Spanish.
The judge hearing the suppression motion watched the videotaped
interview of defendant. Before the interview began, the judge observed
defendant was given a Miranda2 rights form in Spanish and the detective read
each right to him in Spanish. On the videotape, the judge saw defendant express
that he understood his rights, place his initials after each warning, and sign his
name at the bottom of the Miranda form prior to questioning. When defendant
had difficulty understanding the detective's explanation of the Miranda form,
the judge noted defendant read the form on his own and "continuously indicated
that he understood his rights." Based on his observations from the videotape,
the judge remarked the detective "informed the defendant that he had to
understand his rights before any questions were asked," found defendant was
not "hesitant about speaking to the officers," and did not "ask for an attorney to
be provided."
The judge also read the transcript of defendant's interview translated into
English. Based on the transcript, the judge determined defendant waived his
rights knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently before speaking with the police.
2 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). A-0928-16T3 3 According to the transcript, while initialing the Miranda form, defendant asked
(in Spanish) "the court can give me an attorney?" The officer said "yes ," and
defendant replied "perfecto." Defendant never expressed a desire to have an
attorney present during the police questioning. Defendant's consent to speak to
the police and respond to questions was verified by a supervising officer, who
asked defendant "you want to talk to us still or you want an attorney now."
Defendant responded "Oh, no, I already talked to you. . . . . For me no problem
I cooperate with you."
On appeal, defendant raises the following arguments:
Point I
BECAUSE INTERROGATORS FAILED TO SCRUPULOUSLY HONOR OR CLARIFY APPELLANT'S REQUEST FOR AN ATTORNEY, THE LOWER COURT ERRED BY ADMITTING APPELLANT'S SUBSEQUENT STATEMENT AT TRIAL. U.S. CONST., AMENDS. V, XIV.
Point II
THE LOWER COURT MISAPPLIED SENTENCING PRINCIPLES WHEN IMPOSING AN AGGREGATE [THIRTY]-YEAR PRISON SENTENCE WITH AN [EIGHTY-FIVE] PERCENT PAROLE DISQUALIFIER. HENCE THIS COURT SHOULD REMAND FOR A NEW SENTENCING HEARING.
A-0928-16T3 4 A. The Sentencing Court Erroneously Double-Counted Elements of N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(a)(2) As Support For Aggravating Factors N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(1) and (2).
B. The Sentencing Court Erroneously Cited Acquitted Conduct As Support For Aggravating Factors N.J.S.A. 2C:44-(a)(1) and (2).
In reviewing a motion to suppress evidence, we defer to the factual and
credibility findings of the trial court, "so long as those findings are supported by
sufficient credible evidence in the record." State v. Handy, 206 N.J. 39, 44
(2011) (quoting State v. Elders, 192 N.J. 224, 243 (2007)). "[A]n appellate
tribunal must defer to the factual findings of the trial court when that court has
made its findings based on the testimonial and documentary evidence presented
at an evidentiary hearing or trial." State v. Hubbard, 222 N.J. 249, 269 (2015).
We accord deference to the trial court "because the 'findings of the trial
judge . . . are substantially influenced by his opportunity to hear and see the
witnesses and to have the "feel" of the case, which a reviewing court cannot
enjoy.'" State v. Reece, 222 N.J. 154, 166 (2015) (alteration in original) (quoting
State v. Locurto, 157 N.J. 463, 471 (1999)).
On appeal, defendant argues his question to Detective Beltran was a
request for counsel, and the detective was required to stop the interrogation.
A-0928-16T3 5 According to defendant, at a minimum, the detective should have sought a
clarification from defendant as to his request for an attorney.
The State responds defendant's question regarding the appointment of an
attorney was not an invocation of the right to counsel. According to the State,
defendant never expressed that he wanted an attorney during the police
questioning. The State notes the detective's supervising sergeant spoke to
defendant regarding invocation of a request for a lawyer. Defendant responded
that he wanted to talk to a lawyer before any court appearance, but did not need
a lawyer before signing the Miranda form.
In reviewing a waiver of a defendant's Miranda rights, the State "must
'prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the . . . waiver [of rights] was knowing,
intelligent, and voluntary.'" State v. A.M. 452 N.J. Super. 587, 596 (App. Div.
2018) (second alteration in original) (quoting State v. Yohnnson, 204 N.J. 43,
59 (2010)). A court reviews a Miranda waiver under the "totality of the
circumstances." State v. Nyhammer, 197 N.J. 383, 402 (2009).
During the hearing on defendant's motion, the trial judge viewed the
videotaped statement and read the English translation of defendant's statement.
The judge found defendant read, understood, and signed a form waiving his
A-0928-16T3 6 Miranda rights. The judge concluded defendant's statements were voluntary
and did not violate his Miranda rights.
Having reviewed the record, we conclude the judge's denial of defendant's
motion to suppress his statement was based upon sufficient, credible evidence.
After considering the evidence, specifically, defendant's videotaped interview
and accompanying English translation of the interview, the judge properly found
defendant knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his rights, including
the right to counsel.
We next consider defendant's request for a remand for resentencing.
Defendant argues the matter should be remanded for resentencing because the
sentencing judge erroneously double-counted elements related to aggravating
factors one and two. N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(1) to (2). In addition, defendant
challenges the judge's reliance on acquitted conduct in support of the same
aggravating factors in sentencing.
We review a trial judge's sentencing determination "'under a deferential
standard of review.'" State v. Grate, 220 N.J. 317, 337 (2015) (quoting State v.
Lawless, 214 N.J. 594, 606 (2013)). We will affirm a sentence "'as long as the
trial court properly identifies and balances aggravating and mitigating factors
that are supported by competent credible evidence in the record.'" Ibid.
A-0928-16T3 7 However, "established elements of a crime for which a defendant is being
sentenced should not be considered as aggravating circumstances in determining
that sentence." State v. Kromphold, 162 N.J. 345, 353 (2000). In addition,
"[t]he sentencing court must not only ensure that facts necessary to establish that
elements of the defendant's offense are not double-counted for purposes of
sentencing," but the court's analysis must be "clearly explained so that an
appellate court may be certain that the sentencing court has refrained from
double-counting the elements of the offense." State v. Fuentes, 217 N.J. 57, 76
(2014).
In this case, the blood relationship between victims and defendant is an
element of the crime of aggravated sexual assault. N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(a).
Similarly, another established element of aggravated sexual assault is that the
victim was "at least [thirteen] years old but less than [sixteen] years old."
N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(a)(2). Clearly, the ages of the victims and their relationship
to defendant were elements of the offenses for which defendant was convicted.
Although the judge stated several times he was not double-counting, the judge
did not adequately explain the factual basis for his finding of aggravating factors
one and two. Therefore, we are unable to determine if the judge engaged in
impermissible double-counting of the factors.
A-0928-16T3 8 Moreover, defendant was acquitted on the charge of sexual assault of a
victim less than thirteen years old. N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(b). However, in his
finding of aggravating factors one and two, the judge stated more than once that
one daughter was approximately eleven years old when defendant committed
the sexual assaults. While the judge may have believed the jury's acquittal of
defendant on certain counts was flawed, the judge may not include conduct for
which defendant was acquitted as part of his consideration in sentencing. State
v. Pineda, 119 N.J. 621, 628 (1990) (remanding for resentencing if a trial court
considers an aggravating factor that is inappropriate to a particular defendant or
to the offense at issue).
Based on the foregoing, we remand to the sentencing court to determine
defendant's sentence anew, giving "full consideration to all relevant evidence and all
relevant sentencing factors as of the day defendant stands before the court." State v.
Case, 220 N.J. 49, 70 (2014) (citing State v. Randolph, 210 N.J. 330, 354 (2012)).
We imply no view as to the appropriate sentence to be imposed on remand.
Affirmed as to defendant's conviction and denial of his motion to suppress;
the sentence is vacated and remanded for resentencing. We do not retain jurisdiction.
A-0928-16T3 9