STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. DONNELL S. PERRY (16-02-0138, MERCER COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)

CourtNew Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division
DecidedAugust 13, 2018
DocketA-4922-16T3
StatusUnpublished

This text of STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. DONNELL S. PERRY (16-02-0138, MERCER COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. DONNELL S. PERRY (16-02-0138, MERCER COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. DONNELL S. PERRY (16-02-0138, MERCER COUNTY AND STATEWIDE), (N.J. Ct. App. 2018).

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-4922-16T3

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

DONNELL S. PERRY,

Defendant-Appellant. ______________________________

Submitted July 3, 2018 – Decided August 13, 2018

Before Judges O'Connor and Moynihan.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Mercer County, Indictment No. 16-02-0138.

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Cody T. Mason, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, of counsel and on the brief).

Angelo J. Onofri, Mercer County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Olivia M. Mills, Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM Defendant Donnell S. Perry appeals his conviction for second-

degree robbery as an accomplice, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1(a)(1) and 2C:2-

6(a) (count one, amended from a first-degree robbery), contending:

POINT I

THE MOTION TO SUPPRESS IDENTIFICATIONS SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED BECAUSE THE INCLUSION OF DEFENDANT'S PICTURE IN TWO ARRAYS WHERE HE WAS THE ONLY PERSON WITH A FACE MARK OR TATTOO, COUPLED WITH OTHER FACTORS, CREATED AN IRREPARABLE RISK OF MISTAKEN IDENTIFICATION.

A. THE IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURE WAS IMPERMISSIBLY SUGGESTIVE BECAUSE THE WITNESS WAS SHOWN TWO ARRAYS IN WHICH DEFENDANT WAS THE ONLY PERSON WITH VISIBLE FACE MARKINGS OR TATTOOS.

B. THE SUGGESTIVENESS OF THE IDENTIFICATION COULD NOT BE CURED BY THE WITNESS'S LIMITED AND VAGUE PRIOR INTERACTIONS WITH THE SUSPECT, PARTICULARLY GIVEN THE CROSS-RACIAL NATURE OF THE IDENTIFICATION AND THE WITNESS'S DRUG USE.

POINT II

THE MATTER SHOULD BE REMANDED FOR RESENTENCING BECAUSE THE COURT DID NOT ADEQUATELY EXPLAIN ITS FINDINGS OF AGGRAVATING FACTORS THREE AND NINE, AND DID NOT HOLD A HEARING REGARDING THE IMPOSITION OF RESTITUTION.

A. A REMAND FOR RESENTENCING IS REQUIRED BECAUSE THE COURT DID NOT EXPLAIN ITS FINDINGS OF AGGRAVATING FACTORS THREE AND NINE.

B. A REMAND IS REQUIRED BECAUSE THE COURT IMPOSED $300 IN RESTITUTION WITHOUT HOLDING A HEARING TO DETERMINE THE EXTENT OF

2 A-4922-16T3 DAMAGES OR DEFENDANT'S ABILITY TO PAY RESTITUTION.

We agree defendant's motion to suppress the identification of his

photograph – the only one showing facial tattoos – should have

been granted, and reverse.

Following a Wade1 hearing the trial court judge admitted Eric

Hewitt's identification of defendant from a photo array – conceded

by the State to have been suggestive because defendant's was the

only photograph in which facial tattoos were depicted — finding

it "reliable." The judge credited the testimony of both Hewitt

and the detective who compiled the array, and determined Hewitt's

prior encounters with defendant on five to eight occasions over a

three to four week period – during which defendant drove in

Hewitt's car and once played cards with Hewitt – provided

"sufficient knowledge of both the physical characteristics of the

defendant to [enable Hewitt] to identify him in a photo array even

if that photo array [was] somewhat suggestive."

"Our standard of review on a motion to bar an out-of-court-

identification . . . is no different from our review of a trial

court's findings in any non-jury case." State v. Wright, 444 N.J.

Super. 347, 356 (App. Div. 2016) (citing State v. Johnson, 42 N.J.

1 United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967).

3 A-4922-16T3 146, 161 (1964)). "We are bound to uphold a trial court's factual

findings in a motion to suppress provided those 'findings are

supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record.'" State

v. Watts, 223 N.J. 503, 516 (2015) (quoting State v. Elders, 192

N.J. 224, 243-44 (2007)). "Those factual findings are entitled

to deference because the motion judge, unlike an appellate court,

has the 'opportunity to hear and see the witnesses and to have the

"feel" of the case, which a reviewing court cannot enjoy.'" State

v. Gonzalez, 227 N.J. 77, 101 (2016) (quoting Johnson, 42 N.J. at

161). A "trial court's findings at the hearing on the [reliability

and] admissibility of identification evidence are 'entitled to

very considerable weight.'" State v. Adams, 194 N.J. 186, 203

(2008) (quoting State v. Farrow, 61 N.J. 434, 451 (1972)).

However, we do not defer to a trial court's interpretation of the

law, which is reviewed de novo. State v. Shaw, 213 N.J. 398, 411

(2012).

The judge rejected defendant's contentions that, besides the

suggestive construction of the photo arrays – a system variable2

2 System variables are factors "within the control of the criminal justice system." State v. Henderson, 208 N.J. 208, 218 (2011). They are: (1) whether a detective uninvolved in the investigation — a "blind" administrator — was used; (2) whether pre- identification instructions were given to the witness; (3) whether the array was constructed of a sufficient number of fillers that look like the suspect; (4) whether the witness was given feedback

4 A-4922-16T3 — the estimator variables3 of lighting, physical features and

cross-racial identification rendered the identification

unreliable. Countering defendant's argument about lighting, the

judge found that although some encounters may have taken place

after dark, Hewitt also viewed defendant during daylight hours.

Considering defendant's contention he was identified because his

was the only photograph in which tattoos were depicted, the judge

compared the arrays viewed by Hewitt. The judge noted defendant's

picture in the first array – which Hewitt did not select – "looks

like there is some marking but I can't tell by my view of the

picture whether that's something beyond a tattoo." He found the

photo in the second array was "more definitive insofar as the

either during or after the procedure; (5) whether the witness was exposed to multiple viewings of the suspect; (6) whether the lineup was presented sequentially versus simultaneously; (7) whether a composite sketch was used; (8) whether the procedure was a show- up where "a single suspect is presented to a witness to make an identification." Id. at 248-61. 3 "[E]stimator variables are factors beyond the control of the criminal justice system," id. at 261, and include: (1) the witness's stress level; (2) whether a visible weapon was used during the crime; (3) the amount of time the witness viewed the suspect; (4) the lighting and the witness's distance from the perpetrator; (5) the witness's age and level of intoxication; (6) whether the perpetrator wore a disguise or changed physical features; (7) the amount of time that passed between the crime and the identification; (8) whether the witness and perpetrator were of different races; (9) whether the witness was exposed to co- witness feedback; and (10) the speed with which the witness made the identification, id. at 261-72.

5 A-4922-16T3 tattoos that are visible on . . . defendant's face." The judge

concluded, "the characteristics are somewhat unique in the sense

that this individual does have facial tattoos which was clearly

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

United States v. Wade
388 U.S. 218 (Supreme Court, 1967)
State v. Adams
943 A.2d 851 (Supreme Court of New Jersey, 2008)
United Advertising Corp. v. Borough of Metuchen
198 A.2d 447 (Supreme Court of New Jersey, 1964)
State v. Farrow
294 A.2d 873 (Supreme Court of New Jersey, 1972)
State v. Elders
927 A.2d 1250 (Supreme Court of New Jersey, 2007)
State v. Antoine D. Watts(074556)
126 A.3d 1216 (Supreme Court of New Jersey, 2015)
State of New Jersey v. Stephon G. Wright
133 A.3d 656 (New Jersey Superior Court App Division, 2016)
State v. Xiomara Gonzales(075911)
148 A.3d 407 (Supreme Court of New Jersey, 2016)
State v. Henderson
27 A.3d 872 (Supreme Court of New Jersey, 2011)
State v. Shaw
64 A.3d 499 (Supreme Court of New Jersey, 2012)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. DONNELL S. PERRY (16-02-0138, MERCER COUNTY AND STATEWIDE), Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-of-new-jersey-vs-donnell-s-perry-16-02-0138-mercer-county-and-njsuperctappdiv-2018.