NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-3172-16T1
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
CHRISTOPH C. JONES, a/k/a CHRISTOPHER C. JONES,
Defendant-Appellant. _____________________________
Submitted May 16, 2018 – Decided June 25, 2018
Before Judges Alvarez and Currier.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Essex County, Indictment No. 15- 09-1952.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Michael T. Denny, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, of counsel and on the brief).
Robert D. Laurino, Acting Essex County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Stephen A. Pogany, Special Deputy Attorney General, Acting Assistant Prosecutor, on the brief).
PER CURIAM Defendant Christoph Jones appeals from the March 14, 2016
order denying his motion to suppress evidence seized following an
investigatory stop of his vehicle. After a review of the
contentions in light of the record and applicable principles of
law, we affirm.
We derive the facts from testimony presented at the
suppression hearing. While on patrol, Newark police officer
Gregory Brooks received a dispatch that an anonymous female caller
was threatened by "a man who pulled a gun out on her" at a specific
location the officer described as "plagued by a lot of gun violence
and drugs." The caller also stated that the assailant was "in a
black Acura TL, no plate."
Brooks and his partner arrived at the location with their
lights and sirens activated and pulled behind a blue Acura Integra.
The officers approached the vehicle, one officer on each side.
Through the driver's side window, Brooks observed defendant
attempting to put a firearm into a blue nylon bag. Despite only
seeing the handle of the gun, Brooks recognized the object as a
handgun due to his "[twenty] years of experience as a police
officer."
Once Brooks recognized the object as a gun, he yelled "Gun,"
and directed the driver to get out of the vehicle. As this
occurred, another officer arrived at the scene and parked in front
2 A-3172-16T1 of the Acura. Defendant dropped the gun onto the floor of the
driver's side and exited the car. Brooks described the weapon as
an "automatic handgun with a brown handle."
Defendant was charged with second-degree unlawful possession
of a weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b). He later moved to suppress the
handgun. Following a hearing, the trial judge concluded, given
"the totality of th[e] circumstances, that the officer had
reasonable suspicion to perform an investigatory stop, and
approach the driver, and to interact further." The judge also
found "the observations of the officer at the time from the side
of the car where he was lawfully standing, because it is a public
street, supports application of the plain view doctrine." The
motion to suppress was denied.
Defendant pled guilty to the sole count of the indictment.
He was sentenced to a forty-two month custodial term with a forty-
two month period of parole ineligibility, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(c).
Defendant raises the following issues on appeal:
POINT ONE: BECAUSE THE ANONYMOUS CALLER'S TIP WAS INSUFFICIENT TO PROVIDE THE REASONABLE SUSPICION NECESSARY FOR THE INVESTIGATORY DETENTION OF JONES, THE HANDGUN MUST BE SUP[P]RESSED.
POINT TWO: THE PLAIN VIEW EXCEPTION TO THE WARRANT REQUIREMENT DOES NOT APPLY IN THIS CASE BECAUSE THE DISCOVERY OF THE EVIDENCE WAS NOT INADVERT[E]NT.
3 A-3172-16T1 A trial court's factual findings in a suppression hearing are
afforded great deference. State v. Gonzales, 227 N.J. 77, 101
(2016). In reviewing a motion to suppress, we defer to the
findings of fact and credibility determinations of the trial judge,
recognizing that he or she has had an "opportunity to hear and see
the witnesses and to have the 'feel' of the case, which a reviewing
court cannot enjoy." State v. Elders, 192 N.J. 224, 244 (2007)
(citing State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 161 (1964)). We will uphold
the trial judge's decision so long as it is "supported by
sufficient credible evidence" and not "so clearly mistaken 'that
the interests of justice demand intervention and correction.'"
State v. Scriven, 226 N.J. 20, 32-33 (2016) (quoting Elders, 192
N.J. at 243-44).
Defendant contends the anonymous caller's "wildly inaccurate"
tip did not provide sufficient reasonable and articulable
suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop. Therefore, the trial
judge erred in denying his suppression motion.
As the United States and New Jersey Constitutions' guarantee
an individual's right to be free from "unreasonable searches and
seizures," U.S. Const. amend. IV; N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 7, a
"warrantless search is presumed invalid unless it falls within one
of the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement." State
v. Wilson, 178 N.J. 7, 12 (2003) (quoting State v. Cooke, 163 N.J.
4 A-3172-16T1 657, 664 (2000)). "A lawful stop of an automobile must be based
on reasonable and articulable suspicion that an offense . . . has
been or is being committed." State v. Carty, 170 N.J. 632, 639-
40 (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979)).
In determining whether an investigatory stop of an automobile
was reasonable, a court must consider the "specific reasonable
inferences" that an officer is entitled to draw based on the facts
available to him at the moment of the stop and in light of his
experience. State v. Md., 167 N.J. 471, 487 (2001) (quoting State
v. Arthur, 149 N.J. 1, 8 (1997)). "[I]narticulate hunches" and
"subjective good faith" are insufficient to justify a warrantless
search and seizure. Ibid. (quoting Arthur, 149 N.J. at 8).
"Rather, the officer 'must be able to point to specific and
articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences
from those facts, reasonably warrant [the] intrusion.'" Ibid.
(alteration in original) (quoting Arthur, 149 N.J. at 8).
"[A]n anonymous tip of criminal activity, standing alone, is
not sufficient to establish a reasonable [and] articulable"
suspicion. State v. Privott, 203 N.J. 16, 26 (2010) (citing Fla.
v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 271 (2000)). To satisfy the reasonable
suspicion standard, the anonymous tip must be "reliable in its
assertion of illegality" by providing predictive information about
criminal activity. Id. at 27 (quoting J.L., 529 U.S. at 272).
5 A-3172-16T1 Thus, "[t]he police must verify that the tip is reliable by some
independent corroborative effort." Id. at 26 (citing Ala. v.
White, 496 U.S. 325, 329-30 (1990)).
A court must consider the totality of the circumstances in
considering whether there was a reasonable and articulable
suspicion that an individual was involved in criminal activity.
Id. at 26-27. An anonymous tip is but one factor under this
analysis. State v. Gamble, 218 N.J. 412, 433-34 (2014).
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-3172-16T1
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
CHRISTOPH C. JONES, a/k/a CHRISTOPHER C. JONES,
Defendant-Appellant. _____________________________
Submitted May 16, 2018 – Decided June 25, 2018
Before Judges Alvarez and Currier.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Essex County, Indictment No. 15- 09-1952.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Michael T. Denny, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, of counsel and on the brief).
Robert D. Laurino, Acting Essex County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Stephen A. Pogany, Special Deputy Attorney General, Acting Assistant Prosecutor, on the brief).
PER CURIAM Defendant Christoph Jones appeals from the March 14, 2016
order denying his motion to suppress evidence seized following an
investigatory stop of his vehicle. After a review of the
contentions in light of the record and applicable principles of
law, we affirm.
We derive the facts from testimony presented at the
suppression hearing. While on patrol, Newark police officer
Gregory Brooks received a dispatch that an anonymous female caller
was threatened by "a man who pulled a gun out on her" at a specific
location the officer described as "plagued by a lot of gun violence
and drugs." The caller also stated that the assailant was "in a
black Acura TL, no plate."
Brooks and his partner arrived at the location with their
lights and sirens activated and pulled behind a blue Acura Integra.
The officers approached the vehicle, one officer on each side.
Through the driver's side window, Brooks observed defendant
attempting to put a firearm into a blue nylon bag. Despite only
seeing the handle of the gun, Brooks recognized the object as a
handgun due to his "[twenty] years of experience as a police
officer."
Once Brooks recognized the object as a gun, he yelled "Gun,"
and directed the driver to get out of the vehicle. As this
occurred, another officer arrived at the scene and parked in front
2 A-3172-16T1 of the Acura. Defendant dropped the gun onto the floor of the
driver's side and exited the car. Brooks described the weapon as
an "automatic handgun with a brown handle."
Defendant was charged with second-degree unlawful possession
of a weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b). He later moved to suppress the
handgun. Following a hearing, the trial judge concluded, given
"the totality of th[e] circumstances, that the officer had
reasonable suspicion to perform an investigatory stop, and
approach the driver, and to interact further." The judge also
found "the observations of the officer at the time from the side
of the car where he was lawfully standing, because it is a public
street, supports application of the plain view doctrine." The
motion to suppress was denied.
Defendant pled guilty to the sole count of the indictment.
He was sentenced to a forty-two month custodial term with a forty-
two month period of parole ineligibility, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(c).
Defendant raises the following issues on appeal:
POINT ONE: BECAUSE THE ANONYMOUS CALLER'S TIP WAS INSUFFICIENT TO PROVIDE THE REASONABLE SUSPICION NECESSARY FOR THE INVESTIGATORY DETENTION OF JONES, THE HANDGUN MUST BE SUP[P]RESSED.
POINT TWO: THE PLAIN VIEW EXCEPTION TO THE WARRANT REQUIREMENT DOES NOT APPLY IN THIS CASE BECAUSE THE DISCOVERY OF THE EVIDENCE WAS NOT INADVERT[E]NT.
3 A-3172-16T1 A trial court's factual findings in a suppression hearing are
afforded great deference. State v. Gonzales, 227 N.J. 77, 101
(2016). In reviewing a motion to suppress, we defer to the
findings of fact and credibility determinations of the trial judge,
recognizing that he or she has had an "opportunity to hear and see
the witnesses and to have the 'feel' of the case, which a reviewing
court cannot enjoy." State v. Elders, 192 N.J. 224, 244 (2007)
(citing State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 161 (1964)). We will uphold
the trial judge's decision so long as it is "supported by
sufficient credible evidence" and not "so clearly mistaken 'that
the interests of justice demand intervention and correction.'"
State v. Scriven, 226 N.J. 20, 32-33 (2016) (quoting Elders, 192
N.J. at 243-44).
Defendant contends the anonymous caller's "wildly inaccurate"
tip did not provide sufficient reasonable and articulable
suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop. Therefore, the trial
judge erred in denying his suppression motion.
As the United States and New Jersey Constitutions' guarantee
an individual's right to be free from "unreasonable searches and
seizures," U.S. Const. amend. IV; N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 7, a
"warrantless search is presumed invalid unless it falls within one
of the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement." State
v. Wilson, 178 N.J. 7, 12 (2003) (quoting State v. Cooke, 163 N.J.
4 A-3172-16T1 657, 664 (2000)). "A lawful stop of an automobile must be based
on reasonable and articulable suspicion that an offense . . . has
been or is being committed." State v. Carty, 170 N.J. 632, 639-
40 (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979)).
In determining whether an investigatory stop of an automobile
was reasonable, a court must consider the "specific reasonable
inferences" that an officer is entitled to draw based on the facts
available to him at the moment of the stop and in light of his
experience. State v. Md., 167 N.J. 471, 487 (2001) (quoting State
v. Arthur, 149 N.J. 1, 8 (1997)). "[I]narticulate hunches" and
"subjective good faith" are insufficient to justify a warrantless
search and seizure. Ibid. (quoting Arthur, 149 N.J. at 8).
"Rather, the officer 'must be able to point to specific and
articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences
from those facts, reasonably warrant [the] intrusion.'" Ibid.
(alteration in original) (quoting Arthur, 149 N.J. at 8).
"[A]n anonymous tip of criminal activity, standing alone, is
not sufficient to establish a reasonable [and] articulable"
suspicion. State v. Privott, 203 N.J. 16, 26 (2010) (citing Fla.
v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 271 (2000)). To satisfy the reasonable
suspicion standard, the anonymous tip must be "reliable in its
assertion of illegality" by providing predictive information about
criminal activity. Id. at 27 (quoting J.L., 529 U.S. at 272).
5 A-3172-16T1 Thus, "[t]he police must verify that the tip is reliable by some
independent corroborative effort." Id. at 26 (citing Ala. v.
White, 496 U.S. 325, 329-30 (1990)).
A court must consider the totality of the circumstances in
considering whether there was a reasonable and articulable
suspicion that an individual was involved in criminal activity.
Id. at 26-27. An anonymous tip is but one factor under this
analysis. State v. Gamble, 218 N.J. 412, 433-34 (2014).
Despite inconsistencies in the details of the Acura, the
trial judge found that Brooks's observations corroborated the tip.
The judge found the officer's description of the events leading
to defendant's arrest credible. Mindful of our deferential
standard, we are satisfied that the police had reasonable and
articulable suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop of
defendant.
Here, an anonymous caller advised she had been threatened
with a gun. She provided a specific location and a color, make,
and model of the assailant's car. Although the description was
not entirely accurate as to the exact color and model of the
vehicle, Brooks observed a car, of the make and similar appearance
described by the caller, parked in front of the specific location,
known to police as a high-crime area. As the Court stated in
State v. Tucker, 136 N.J. 158, 168 (1994), "under circumstances
6 A-3172-16T1 demonstrating particularized suspicion . . . such as a high crime
location . . . police would have greater latitude to subject a
citizen to an investigatory stop."
The trial judge also found the gun was lawfully seized under
the plain view doctrine. To justify the seizure of contraband
left in plain view, the State must demonstrate (1) the officer
observed the contraband during a legal intrusion; (2) the discovery
was inadvertent1; and (3) there was probable cause to associate
the items with a crime. Tex v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 739-40 (1983).
Defendant contends the inadvertent prong was not met because
Brooks "approach[ed] the car specifically to find evidence of
weapon possession concerning the people in the car he had just
detained." Although Brooks approached the vehicle because of the
tip that the occupant might be armed with a handgun, Brooks saw
it as soon as he approached the driver's side of the car. As the
trial judge noted, "[Brooks] did not know exactly where within the
car [the handgun] was, thereby satisfying inadvertence." See
State v. Johnson, 171 N.J. 192, 212-13 (2002) (finding inadvertence
is narrowly construed and requires the officer to have very
specific information as to where the contraband is located). There
1 In Gonzales, the Court eliminated the inadvertence element of the plain view analysis. 227 N.J. at 101. However, that decision applies prospectively and therefore is not applicable to this case. See ibid.
7 A-3172-16T1 was no evidence that Brooks knew in advance where the handgun was
located or that he intended to seize it without a warrant. See
State v. Damplias, 282 N.J. Super. 471, 478-79 (App. Div. 1995).
Brooks, with his twenty years of experience as a police
officer, immediately recognized the object that defendant was
attempting to hide as a handgun and communicated that observation
to his partner. The elements of the plain view doctrine are met.
We are, therefore, satisfied the trial judge's denial of
defendant's motion to suppress is supported by sufficient credible
evidence in the record. See Scriven, 226 N.J. at 32-33.
Affirmed.
8 A-3172-16T1