RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-0485-18T4
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
ANTHONY IRIZARRY, a/k/a TONE, ANTHONY IRAZZARRY, and ANTHONY IRRIZARRY,
Defendant-Appellant. ____________________________
Submitted February 24, 2020 – Decided March 20, 2020
Before Judges Sabatino and Geiger.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Passaic County, Indictment No. 12-08-0619.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Michael A. Priarone, Designated Counsel, on the brief).
Camelia M. Valdes, Passaic County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Ali Y. Ozbek, Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM This case arises out of an incident in which defendant Anthony Irizarry
engaged in sexual activity with an adult woman, P.R.1 The State alleged
defendant threatened P.R. at knifepoint, drove her to a desolate location, and
forced her to engage in oral and anal sexual acts. P.R. was unable to identify
her assailant, but a specimen obtained during an examination of P.R. matched
defendant's DNA to that found on her. Defendant, who testified at trial in his
own defense, asserted that P.R. had offered to have sex with him in exchange
for crack cocaine, and that their ensuing sexual relations were consensual.
Defendant has been tried twice for the sexual assault of P.R. Following a
nine-day trial, a jury acquitted defendant of kidnapping, terroristic threats, and
various weapons charges but found him guilty of aggravated sexual assault and
aggravated criminal sexual contact. Defendant was sentenced to an extended
custodial term of thirty-five years with periods of parole ineligibility and parole
supervision following his release from prison, as prescribed by the No Early
Release Act (NERA), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2. On direct appeal, we reversed and
remanded for a new trial because defendant's constitutional right to remain silent
post-arrest was violated. State v. Irizarry, Docket No. A-1518-14 (App. Div.
June 12, 2017) (slip op. at 23-25). The State's petition for certification was
1 We use initials to protect the privacy of the victim. R. 1:38-3(c)(12). A-0485-18T4 2 denied, State v. Irizarry, 213 N.J. 527 (2017), as was defendant's cross-petition
for certification. State v. Irizarry, 213 N.J. 540 (2017).
Defendant was retried in 2018. Prior to the retrial, defendant moved to
bar the "while armed" aspects of both charges in light of his acquittal of the
weapons charges at the first trial. The court denied defendant's motion but
reserved on whether the charges might be amended to include the allegation that
defendant was "armed with a knife or some object that in the manner which it
was fashioned appeared to be a weapon or a knife." The parties stipulated that
defendant's DNA was found on P.R.
A second jury convicted defendant of second-degree sexual assault by
physical force, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(c)(1), and fourth-degree criminal sexual
contact by physical force/coercion, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-3(b). Following merger,
defendant was sentenced as a persistent offender to an extended twenty-year
NERA term. He was also sentenced to parole supervision for life, N.J.S.A.
2C:43-6.4, and ordered to comply with the registration requirements imposed by
Megan's Law, N.J.S.A. 2C:7-1 to -23.
Defendant now appeals his second conviction and sentence, contending
there were errors at the second trial that warranted a reversal of his conviction
A-0485-18T4 3 and his sentence is excessive. For the reasons that follow, we affirm his
conviction and sentence.
I.
We derive the facts from the testimony and evidence presented at the
second trial. The jury heard testimony from Detective Edward Valentin of the
City of Passaic Police Department; Massiel De La Cruz, a Sexual Assault
Forensic Examiner (SAFE); P.R.; and defendant.
Valentin testified that while working on May 20, 2011, he was called to
Mountainside Hospital to interview an alleged victim of sexual assault. After
Valentin arrived at the hospital, he met with the SAFE "nurse," De La Cruz, who
had just examined P.R. During trial, the following colloquy took place:
Q. Did anything happen when you spoke to the nurse? A. No. They[2] just said that she was a victim of a sexual assault.
Defense counsel objected immediately. The court then issued two limiting
instructions to the jury. However, defense counsel wanted to be heard further;
the court excused the jury. Defense counsel moved for a mistrial "[b]ecause
now, according to [Valentin's] testimony the nurse has given the [j]ury the
2 Defendant contends Valentin's use of the word "they" refers to both De La Cruz and the sexual assault victim advocate. A-0485-18T4 4 information that there was a sexual assault." The court denied the motion and
instead issued a curative instruction stating in relevant part, "[De La Cruz] was
not expressing an opinion, nor can she express an opinion."
Next the State called De La Cruz. De La Cruz testified that in 2011 she
was employed as an independent contractor, working as a SAFE for the Essex
County Prosecutor's Office. She explained that a SAFE differs from a Sexual
Assault Nurse Examiner (SANE) because she is a physician assistant as opposed
to a nurse. She then explained her educational background and qualifications.
The court qualified De La Cruz as an expert in the field of sexual assault forensic
examination. The court informed the jury that "an expert witness . . . may give
her opinion as to any matter in which she is versed which is material to the
case."3
De La Cruz testified she was called to Mountainside Hospital to perform
an examination on P.R. There, she conducted P.R.'s examination in Spanish
because P.R. does not speak English. She also explained that there was an
"advocate" in the room to "help the patient in case . . . they need representation."
During her testimony, De La Cruz recounted various statements P.R. made
to her, including the cause of her injuries, the ethnicity of her attacker, what
3 This conflicted with the court's earlier instruction and was not clarified at trial. A-0485-18T4 5 occurred during the attack, and that she was in fear for her life. Defense counsel
objected to these statements. The court overruled defendant's objections,
explaining that the statements were admissible under N.J.R.E. 803(c)(4) as
statements for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment, because "[t]hese are
details a medical person has to have." The court also noted that under N.J.R.E.
803(c)(3), "then existing mental, emotional or physical condition . . . is also an
exception."
The State then called P.R. who testified through an interpreter. She stated
that on May 20, 2011, she left her home in Passaic at 5:30 a.m. to go to work.
As she was walking down Harrison Street, towards the bus stop, she heard a car
stop behind her. Suddenly, she was grabbed from behind; when she tried to run
away her attacker4 caught up to her and "told [her] not to move." He then placed
a knife5 to her hip area and stated, "if you move, I'm going to kill you."
4 P.R. never definitively identified defendant as her attacker. 5 Subsequent to P.R.'s testimony that her assailant was armed with a knife— contrary to the acquittal on that charge in the first trial—the court appropriately reconsidered its decision prior to submitting the case to the jury. It ultimately entered a judgment of acquittal on the "while armed" elements of both counts, submitting only the lesser-included second-degree sexual assault by physical force and fourth-degree criminal sexual contact by physical force/coercion for the jury's consideration. A-0485-18T4 6 P.R. stated she was then forced into the front-passenger seat of her
attacker's car; the two drove on Route 21, towards Newark, until the attacker
parked in "a rural area where there were trees" surrounded by construction
equipment. There, while still inside of the car, the attacker made P.R. perform
oral sex by grabbing her head and pushing it downward. Then the attacker
pulled P.R.'s pants and underwear off and sodomized her.
P.R. testified that after the attacker ejaculated, he gave P.R. a glove to
"clean up." The attacker then told P.R. that he was driving her back to Passaic
and that she should not contact "the police or anyone else." After arriving in
Passaic, the attacker stopped suddenly on Main Street and pushed P.R. out of
the car while reiterating not to contact anyone about the rape or else he would
kill her.
P.R. stated that she cried as she walked down Main Street until a man
asked her if she was alright. She then told the man about the rape. The police
were called and soon arrived around 6:00 a.m. In the responding officer's report,
he indicated that P.R. stated initially that she was robbed and did not mention
being sexually assaulted. Eventually, however, she informed him that she was
sexually assaulted. The officer and his partner then drove P.R. to the location
where she said the assault took place.
A-0485-18T4 7 Subsequently, the responding officers transported P.R. to Saint Mary's
Hospital. However, she was then driven to Mountainside Hospital because Saint
Mary's was unable to perform a sexual assault examination.
On May 24, 2011, P.R. drove with Valentin to where she believed she was
assaulted; the address, later ascertained, was 110 Riverside Avenue, Newark.
P.R. was later informed by Valentin that security camera footage from 110
Riverside Avenue did not show any cars being parked there on the morning of
May 20, 2011.
On cross-examination, defense counsel asked P.R. if her testimony was
"different today than it was back in 2014." In response, P.R. stated she would
be willing to take a polygraph. Defense counsel requested a curative instruction
which the court provided. P.R. later exclaimed that "[p]eople don't believe
Hispanics." Defense counsel requested a mistrial. The court provided a curative
instruction to this comment later in the trial. P.R. also denied telling the police,
initially, that she had been robbed and not sexually assaulted. The State rested
following P.R.'s testimony.
Defendant elected to testify. During direct-examination, defendant stated
that on the morning of May 20, 2011, he was selling crack cocaine on Passaic
Street. Defendant testified that around 5:00 or 5:30 a.m., P.R. approached him
A-0485-18T4 8 and asked if he had drugs, to which defendant responded affirmatively.
According to defendant, P.R. then proposed that defendant give her crack
cocaine in exchange for sex. Defendant accepted.
Defendant testified that he and P.R. then "walked down Third Street to an
alleyway, between Passaic and South" and had unprotected anal sex. Following
the encounter, defendant reneged on their agreement and simply walked away
without providing P.R. the crack cocaine. Defendant denied placing P.R. into a
car.
On cross-examination, the State confronted defendant with his motor
vehicle abstract that showed he received a summons for driving with a
suspended license on July 21, 2011, two months after the alleged rape. Defense
counsel objected and moved for a mistrial because she had not been provided
with the motor vehicle abstract prior to the State using it to impeach defendant.
However, the court denied the motion and instead issued a curative instruction
to the jury.
Also, on cross-examination, the State questioned defendant about certain
aspects of his crack cocaine dealing. The questions included how much crack
cocaine he possessed and whom he would sell to. No instruction was requested
A-0485-18T4 9 by defendant regarding his crack cocaine dealing and the court did not provide
a limiting instruction.
The jury convicted defendant of second-degree sexual assault by physical
force and fourth-degree criminal sexual contact by physical force/coercion. The
judge merged the criminal sexual contact count into the sexual assault count and
granted the State's motion to sentence defendant to an extended term, as a
persistent offender.
The judge found aggravating factors three (risk of re-offense); six (extent
of prior record); and nine (need to deter) applied. N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(3), (6),
(9). The judge noted defendant's work history was a mitigating factor but
declined to find that incarceration would cause an excessive hardship on
defendant's son. N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(11). The judge concluded that the
aggravating factors substantially outweighed the one mitigating factor. As we
have already noted, the judge imposed a twenty-year NERA term,6 parole
supervision for life, and Megan's Law registration. This appeal followed.
Defendant raises these points for our consideration:
6 The judgment of conviction incorrectly stated defendant was subject to a five- year period of mandatory parole supervision under NERA. See N.J.S.A. 2C:43- 7.2(c) (requiring imposition of a three-year term of parole supervision for conviction of a second-degree crime). The judgment of conviction was subsequently amended to reflect a three-year period of mandatory parole supervision. A-0485-18T4 10 I. DEFENDANT WAS DENIED A FAIR TRIAL BY THE STATE'S DISCOVERY VIOLATION AND THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A MISTRIAL.
II. DEFENDANT WAS DENIED A FAIR TRIAL WHEN A POLICE OFFICER TESTIFIED THAT THE PERSONNEL WHO PERFORMED A SEXUAL ASSAULT EXAMINATION OF THE ALLEGED VICTIM HAD CONCLUDED THAT SHE "WAS THE VICTIM OF A SEXUAL ASSAULT".
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY ADMITTED MS. DE LA CRUZ'S TESTIMONY OF WHAT HAD ALLEGEDLY OCCURRED IN HER ENCOUNTER WITH DEFENDANT AS STATEMENTS IN AID OF MEDICAL DIAGNOSIS PURSUANT TO EVIDENCE RULE 803(c)(4).
IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY THAT THEY COULD NOT INFER THAT DEFENDANT WAS MORE LIKELY TO COMMIT CRIMES BECAUSE OF DEFENDANT'S TESTIMONY THAT HE HAD BEEN DEALING DRUGS AT THE TIME OF THE INCIDENT.
V. CUMULATIVE ERROR DEPRIVED DEFENDANT OF A FAIR TRIAL AND REQUIRES THAT DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION AND SENTENCE BE REVERSED.
VI. DEFENDANT'S SENTNCE TO AN EXTENDED TERM OF TWENTY YEARS IN STATE PRISON SUBJECT TO NERA FOR HIS CONVICTION FOR SECOND DEGREE SEXUAL ASSAULT IS EXCESSIVE AND INCONSISTENT WITH THE SENTENCE IMPOSED ON DEFENDANT AFTER
A-0485-18T4 11 HIS FIRST TRIAL AT WHICH HE WAS CONVICTED OF FIRST-DEGREE SEXUAL ASSAULT AND SENTENCED TO AN EXTENDED TERM OF THIRTY-FIVE YEARS.
II.
"Traditional rules of appellate review require substantial deference to a
trial court's evidentiary rulings." State v. Morton, 155 N.J. 383, 453 (1998). We
uphold the trial court's rulings "absent a showing of an abuse of discretion, i.e.,
there has been a clear error of judgment." State v. Perry, 225 N.J. 222, 233
(2016) (quoting State v. Brown, 170 N.J. 138, 147 (2001)). "An appellate court
applying this standard should not substitute its own judgment for that of the trial
court, unless 'the trial court's ruling was so wide of the mark that a manifest
denial of justice resulted.'" Ibid. (quoting State v. Marrero, 148 N.J. 469, 484
(1997) (internal quotations omitted)). If an abuse of discretion is found, "we
must then determine whether any error found is harmless or requires reversal."
State v. Prall, 231 N.J. 567, 581 (2018). However, appellate review of a trial
court's legal conclusions is plenary. State v. Handy, 206 N.J. 39, 45 (2011).
"Whether an event at trial justifies a mistrial is a decision 'entrusted to the
sound discretion of the trial court.'" State v. Smith, 224 N.J. 36, 47 (2016)
(quoting State v. Harvey, 151 N.J. 117, 205 (1997)). We "will not disturb a trial
court's ruling on a motion for a mistrial, absent an abuse of discretion that results
A-0485-18T4 12 in a manifest injustice." State v. Jackson, 211 N.J. 394, 407 (2012) (quoting
Harvey, 151 N.J. at 205). When deciding whether to grant a motion for a
mistrial, a trial court considers the "unique circumstances of the case." Smith,
224 N.J. at 47. Where an appropriate alternative exists, such as "a curative
instruction, a short adjournment or continuance, or some other remedy," a
mistrial may not be necessary. Ibid. "A court's failure to take appropriate action
to remedy a discovery violation can implicate the defendant's right to a fair
trial." Id. at 48 (quoting State v. Clark, 347 N.J. Super. 497, 507, 510 (App.
Div. 2002)).
A. IMPEACHING DEFENDANT'S TESTIMONY WITH A MOTOR VEHICLE ABSTRACT NOT PROVIDED IN DISCOVERY
Defendant contends the prosecutor withheld defendant's motor vehicle
abstract in "bad faith" during discovery and the court abused its discretion by
denying his motion for a mistrial. During direct-examination, defendant denied
abducting P.R. and placing her in a car. On cross-examination, the following
colloquy took place:
Q. [Y]ou didn't own a car on May 20, 2011? A. No. Q. But, you had a driver's license; didn't you? A. No. Q. But, you did drive a car; didn't you? A. No. Q. So, you're telling us that you've never driven a car?
A-0485-18T4 13 A. Nope. Q. Okay. So, let me ask you about this. July 21, 2011. Did you get pulled over in the City of Passaic? A. Yes. Q. You were driving a car, weren't you? A. I was.
....
Q. Okay. But, on July 21, 2011, you were driving a car in the City of Passaic; right? A. Yes. Q. And you were stopped by the police, while you were driving a car; right? A. Yeah.
At this point defense counsel objected and the jury was excused. The
prosecutor explained that she was impeaching defendant with his motor vehicle
abstract that demonstrated he was issued a summons for driving with a
suspended license on July 21, 2011. Defense counsel argued that it was a
discovery violation, stating: "I don't have this information. This was not given
to me. I never had that for the first trial." The document indicated it was faxed
to the prosecutor that morning, June 4, 2018, at 9:35 a.m. Defense counsel
argued the prosecutor did not advise that she had received the abstract and used
it by surprise. The prosecutor responded that she did not deliberately fail to
provide it and was not trying to mislead anyone. Rather, she told the court that
A-0485-18T4 14 she believed the abstract was given to defense counsel during defendant's prior
trial.
Defense counsel moved for a mistrial "because the jury has already heard
it. There's nothing that can unring that bell." The court then excused the jury
for the day. Ultimately, the court could not determine whether the motor vehicle
abstract had been provided to defense counsel during discovery. The court
stated it would provide a curative instruction following defense counsel's
redirect.
Defendant was called back to the stand. Following redirect regarding his
driving on July 21, 2011, the court issued the following curative instruction:
[Y]ou heard brief testimony from the defendant on cross examination in response to the Prosecutor's question that the defendant was stopped while driving in Passaic some months after May 20, 2011. The defendant had testified that he was not driving at the time of the alleged offenses, on May 20, 2011.
Now, I'm first going to indicate to you that this stop was for a minor motor vehicle offense, and the charge was later dismissed. I am telling you this so you -- you do not speculate that it was any more serious than that. Now, having said this, I'm going to strike this testimony from the record, since it has no relevance in the case, which alleges an offense on May 20, 2011, months earlier.
You are not to consider, in your thoughts or discussions, any reference to this testimony, it cannot
A-0485-18T4 15 play any part in your verdicts. So, any testimony surrounding this topic is not to be considered by you, in any way.
The court issued a thorough curative instruction by striking that portion
of testimony and informing the members of the jury that they must not consider
it at all. It is presumed the jurors followed these instructions. State v. Loftin,
146 N.J. 295, 390 (1996) (citing State v. Manley, 54 N.J. 259, 271 (1969)). "The
presumption is '[o]ne of the foundations of our jury system.'" State v. Herbert,
457 N.J. Super. 490, 504 (App. Div. 2019) (quoting State v. Burns, 192 N.J.
312, 335 (2007)).
Further, prior to the trial court issuing the curative instruction, defendant
was able to explain to the jury why the summons was not relevant on redirect.
We conclude the denial of defendant's motion for a mistrial was not an abuse of
discretion.
B. HEARSAY TESTIMONY RELATING TO CONCLUSIONS THAT P.R. WAS THE VICTIM OF A SEXUAL ASSAULT
Valentin testified that De La Cruz and the sexual assault advocate
concluded that P.R. "was a victim of sexual assault." Immediately after Valentin
made this statement the court instructed the jury:
[O]bviously it is up to you hearing all the evidence to determine your assessment of the facts. The detective, and you evaluate his testimony, is indicating that that
A-0485-18T4 16 was said to him. You evaluate that too. But whether the person was a victim or not is entirely for you to decide.
In response, defense counsel requested an instruction that the SAFE "just
collects samples and articles" without opining "whether or not someone is a
victim of a sexual assault." The court then instructed the jury that
it is entirely up to you to determine what occurred in this case. I agree that the person who does the medical evaluation does a medical evaluation. But what occurred prior to that, or didn't occur prior to that is entirely up to you.
Defense counsel moved for a mistrial, contending the "[j]ury will be
thinking that someone has made a diagnosis that there was a sexual assault in
this case." The court denied the motion and stated it could "either strike the
comment, or [it could] again instruct [the jury] that the nurse is indicating what
the alleged victim told her." Defense counsel opted for a curative instruction ;
the court provided the following:
It may have appeared from what the detective said that the nurse examiner was expressing an opinion that a sexual assault occurred. That is not the case. The sex -- it is agreed that the nurse examiner was called to the hospital based upon an allegation of sexual assault, and was there to perform an appropriate medical evaluation, such as observing if there are any physical injuries, and taking appropriate physical specimens from the alleged victim. She was not expressing an opinion, nor can she express an opinion. And there's no question she had no
A-0485-18T4 17 personal knowledge of what had allegedly occurred earlier. . . . It was not an expression of an opinion.
Later on, however, the court qualified De La Cruz as an expert in the field
of physician assistant/forensic sexual assault examination and issued a standard
instruction that she "may give her opinion as to any matter in which she is versed
which is material to the case."
Defendant argues that the curative instruction was inadequate and
inconsistent with the court's later instruction that admitted De La Cruz as an
expert who could testify as to her opinions. He contends the denial of his motion
for a mistrial was error. We disagree.
"Evidence that bears directly on the ultimate issue before the jury may be
less suitable to curative or limiting instructions than evidence that is indirect and
that requires additional logical linkages." Herbert, 457 N.J. Super. at 505.
"'[P]olice testimony essentially vouching for' the [State's] version of events" is
particularly problematic. State v. Sui Kam Tung, 460 N.J. Super. 75, 102 (App.
Div. 2019) (quoting State v. Frisby, 174 N.J. 583, 595 (2002)).
The following factors should be considered when determining the
adequacy of a curative instruction: (1) "the nature of the inadmissible evidence
the jury heard, and its prejudicial effect"; (2) "an instruction's timing and
A-0485-18T4 18 substance affect its likelihood of success"; and (3) a court's "tolerance for the
risk of imperfect compliance." Herbert, 457 N.J. Super. at 505-08.
Here, Valentin, a law enforcement officer, informed the jury that De La
Cruz concluded P.R. was sexually assaulted. The trial court promptly instructed
the jury that "whether the person was a victim or not is entirely for you to
decide." The court reiterated this point by further instructing the jury that " it is
entirely up to you to determine what occurred in this case." The court also
instructed the jury that "there's no question [De La Cruz] had no personal
knowledge of what had allegedly occurred earlier."
The jury had the benefit of being instructed three times that it was not to
consider Valentin's comment. The instructions were sufficiently timely and
substantively adequate. Again, we presume that the jury abided by these
instructions and conclude that the risk of jury non-compliance was minimal. We
are therefore satisfied that Valentin's testimony did not result in a manifest
denial of justice that deprived defendant of a fair trial. Accordingly, the denial
of defendant's motion for a mistrial was not reversible error.
C. HEARSAY TESTIMONY RELATING TO P.R.'S DESCRIPTION OF HER ATTACKER AND HIS CONDUCT
We next address defendant's argument that the trial court erred by
admitting De La Cruz's testimony relating to P.R.'s hearsay statements
A-0485-18T4 19 describing her attacker and what had been done to her as statements "reasonably
pertinent to diagnosis or treatment" under N.J.R.E. 803(c)(4). The hearsay
statements include P.R. telling De La Cruz that: (1) her assailant had "smacked
her in the lips"; (2) she was assaulted by one Hispanic male actor, who was a
stranger to her; (3) he grabbed her hair, put his arm around her torso, and
threatened to stab her; (4) the actor kissed her and forced her to perform oral
sex; and (5) she was afraid the actor was "going to kill her."
The court overruled defendant's objections and stated that De La Cruz's
testimony was proper as statements for purposes of medical diagnosis or
treatment because "[t]hese are details a medical person has to have." The court
also noted the hearsay exception for then existing mental, emotional or physical
condition under N.J.R.E. 803(c)(3). The court offered to give a limiting
instruction that "the expert is indicating what the alleged victim said to her and
how she reacted to it in terms of medical procedures." This instruction was not
requested or given.
Hearsay is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while
testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the
matter asserted. N.J.R.E. 801(c). Statements made for the purpose of medical
diagnosis or treatment are exceptions to the hearsay rule. N.J.R.E. 803(c)(4).
A-0485-18T4 20 To be admissible, the statements must "describe medical history, or past
or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or general character
of the cause or external source thereof to the extent that the statements are
reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment." State v. Pillar, 359 N.J. Super.
249, 289 (App. Div. 2003) (quoting N.J.R.E. 803(c)(4)). However, "ordinarily
statements made as to the cause of the symptoms or conditions" are not
admissible because they are not relevant to the patient's treatment. Cestero v.
Ferrara, 57 N.J. 497, 501 (1971).
In Pillar, we stated if a doctor's examination "was conducted for evidence
gathering purposes," the hearsay statements in the medical history would be
inadmissible under N.J.R.E. 803(c)(4). 359 N.J. Super. at 289. It is the State's
burden to establish admissibility under this rule. See ibid.
De La Cruz acknowledged that her "job is to collect evidence." However,
she also testified that she took P.R.'s medical history in order to guide her
medical decision making and collected oral and rectal swabs. Despite our
conclusion that the examination performed by De La Cruz was for medical
diagnosis and potential treatment, several of P.R.'s statements were improperly
admitted under N.J.R.E. 803(c)(4).
A-0485-18T4 21 De La Cruz's testimony that P.R. had edema, or swelling, around her
mouth was admissible. But P.R.'s statement to De La Cruz that her assailant had
"smacked her in the lips" was inadmissible. N.J.R.E. 803(c)(4) is "limited to
descriptions of present condition, and therefore it excludes description of past
pain or symptoms, as well as accounts of the events furnishing the cause of the
condition." McCormick on Evidence § 273, at 405 (Mosteller ed., 8th ed. 2020)
(footnotes omitted). De La Cruz should not have been permitted to testify about
what P.R. said caused the injury to her mouth.
Regarding P.R.'s statement that she was afraid the actor was "going to kill
her," this was admissible under N.J.R.E. 803(c)(3). This rule provides in
relevant part, "[a] statement made in good faith of the declarant's then existing
state of mind, emotion, sensation or physical condition (such as intent, plan,
motive, design, mental feeling, pain, or bodily health)" is admissible. N.J.R.E.
803(c)(3).
"[T]he victim's emotional state may permit the inference of some fact of
consequence, such as lack of consent where the prosecution charges that the
killing occurred during the commission of either a kidnapping or rape."
McCormick on Evidence § 276 at 426-27 (footnote omitted). However, a
limiting instruction should be provided to the jury regarding how to use a
A-0485-18T4 22 victim's statement of fear during its deliberations. See State v. Scharf, 225 N.J.
547, 581 (2016) ("A limiting instruction is required . . . to guard against the risk
that the jury will consider the victim's statements of fear as evidence of the
defendant's intent or actions."). The court did not provide a limiting instruction.
P.R.'s statements that her assailant grabbed her hair, put his arm around
her torso, threatened to stab her, kissed her, forced her to perform oral sex, and
that he was a Hispanic male, would not be admissible under any hearsay
exceptions. No limiting or curative instruction was provided for these
statements.
While these statements may have been inadmissible, we discern no
harmful error resulting in a manifest denial of justice. Defendant did not deny
having sexual relations with P.R. but rather maintained that it was consensu al.
Moreover, P.R.'s out-of-court statements to De La Cruz about what had occurred
were amplified more extensively during her trial testimony and subjected to
rigorous cross-examination. At worst, the admission of this hearsay was merely
cumulative evidence.
D. P.R.'S COMMENTS REGARDING THE BELIEVABILITY OF HISPANIC PEOPLE AND HER WILLINGNESS TO TAKE A POLYGRAPH
A-0485-18T4 23 P.R. is Hispanic. When her credibility was attacked by defense counsel
during cross-examination, P.R. made an unsolicited statement that "[p]eople
don't believe Hispanics." Defense counsel requested a curative instruction. The
court promptly issued the following curative instruction:
You may recall that, when [P.R.] testified, she made a comment or a remark that people don't believe Spanish people or Hispanic people. I'm going to indicate to you that . . . you should not consider that remark during your deliberations. Your deliberations should focus on the evidence. Whether the State has proven beyond a reasonable doubt or not that the defendant committed the offenses. The defendant has pleaded not guilty. But, that remark should not, in any way, affect your deliberations.
P.R. also stated that she was willing to take a polygraph. Once again, the
comment was unsolicited. Defense counsel moved for a mistrial, which the
court denied. Instead, the court provided the following curative instruction:
Both attorneys have every right to vigorously conduct direct and cross-examination, so there was nothing inappropriate about the cross-examination. The witness indicated that [she] would take a lie detector test. Now the testimony of this witness, as with any other witness, is entirely up to you to evaluate. We just all agree that lie detector tests are virtually never used and they're not admissible in court, so we just want you to know that. Okay? The credibility, again, of this witness or any other witness is entirely up to you.
A-0485-18T4 24 These firm and clear curative instructions identified the particular
testimony they were meant to address and were provided without undue delay.
The instructions effectively remedied the potential prejudice caused by P.R.'s
unsolicited comments regarding the believability of Hispanic people and her
willingness to take a polygraph. See State v. Vallejo, 198 N.J. 122, 134-37
(2009) (noting that a curative instruction may remedy potential prejudice if it is
"firm, clear, and accomplished without delay" and identifies the specific
testimony it is meant to address). We discern no error or abuse of discretion by
the trial court.
E. FAILURE TO PROVIDE A LIMITING INSTRUCTION UNDER N.J.R.E. 404(b) CONCERNING DEFENDANT'S TESTIMONY THAT HE WAS DEALING DRUGS AT THE TIME OF THE INCIDENT
Defendant argues the trial court committed plain error when it failed to
provide, sua sponte, a limiting instruction under N.J.R.E. 404(b) to assist the
jury in evaluating his admission that he was a crack cocaine dealer. We disagree.
Defendant did not request such a limiting instruction or otherwise object
to the jury charge pursuant to Rule 1:7-2. Therefore, we consider this issue
under the plain error standard and disregard any error or omission by the trial
court "unless it is of such a nature as to have been clearly capable of producing
an unjust result." R. 2:10-2; see also State v. Hock, 54 N.J. 526, 538 (1969)
A-0485-18T4 25 (noting the "legal impropriety in the charge" must be "sufficiently grievous . . .
to convince the court that of itself the error possessed a clear capacity to bring
about an unjust result").
On direct examination, defendant testified P.R. approached him and
proposed he give her crack cocaine in exchange for consensual sex. On cross-
examination, the following colloquy occurred:
Q. Sir, you testified on direct that you were selling drugs at 5:00 a.m. on Passaic Street; is that right? A. Yes. Q. And you said that you were out all night working, selling drugs? A. Yes. Q. And is this what you did for a living? A. Something like that. Q. Okay. So, this is the only job you had was selling drugs; right? A. Yes. Q. And you would sell drugs to whoever came by on Passaic Street? A. Yes. Q. So, if it was a man or a woman, you'd sell them drugs; right? A. Yes. Q. If it was a young person or an older person, you'd sell them drugs; right? A. Yes.
Q. All right. . . . I want to take you back to your testimony on direct. You indicated that on May 20, 2011, you were selling drugs that morning; is that right?
A-0485-18T4 26 A. Yes. Q. How long had you been selling drugs that day? A. Ten, eleven hours. Q. Okay. So, ten, eleven hours. A long stretch of time; right? A. Yes. Q. What kind of drugs were you selling? A. Crack cocaine.
Despite defendant's lack of request for a limiting instruction, the court
instructed the jury that "[y]ou may not conclude that the defendant committed
the crimes charged in this case, or is more likely to have committed the crimes
charged, simply because [he] has committed a crime on another occasion." This
typical anti-propensity charge sufficiently informed the jury that it could not
find defendant guilty because he was selling crack cocaine that day.
In addition, defendant does not deny he was a drug dealer but rather
claimed this was a "sex-for-drugs" situation. Under this defense strategy, the
jury would have to know about his drug dealing anyway.
We discern no plain error that was "clearly capable of producing an unjust
result." R. 2:10-2.
F. CUMULATIVE ERROR
Defendant claims that cumulative prejudicial effect of the objectionable
testimony and discovery violation deprived him of a fair trial, thus requiring his
conviction and sentence to be vacated. We are unpersuaded by this argument.
A-0485-18T4 27 Our Supreme Court has "recognized . . . that even when an individual error
or series of errors does not rise to reversible error, when considered in
combination, their cumulative effect can cast sufficient doubt on a verdict to
require reversal." State v. Jenewicz, 193 N.J. 440, 473 (2008). This argument
was not raised below so defendant must show plain error. R. 2:10-2.
We are satisfied that any potential for prejudice was cured by the judge 's
clear and firm instructions. Vallejo, 198 N.J. at 134-35. The judge promptly
addressed the matters raised by defendant, clearly identified the testimony at
issue, and firmly communicated to the jury its role in determining credibility,
the limited use of certain evidence, and to disregard the stricken evidence. There
is nothing in the record to indicate that the jury was unable to follow the judge's
curative instructions or jury charges. See State v. Winder, 200 N.J. 231, 256
(2009) ("We presume that the jury followed the instruction accurately." (Citing
Manley, 54 N.J. at 271)).
Based on the foregoing analysis of the issues raised by defendant, we find
that any cumulative impact does not "cast sufficient doubt on a verdict to require
reversal." Jenewicz, 193 N.J. at 473. We are satisfied, therefore, that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in declining to grant a mistrial, as any alleged
A-0485-18T4 28 errors, in toto, were not "clearly capable of producing an unjust result." R. 2:10-
2.
III.
Defendant argues that his sentence was excessive and inconsistent with
the sentence imposed after his first trial. He contends his sentence must be
vacated and he should be resentenced "to a term not to exceed seventeen and
one-half years, one half of the thirty-five[-]year term imposed after the first
trial." We disagree.
"[Our] review of sentencing decisions is relatively narrow and is governed
by an abuse of discretion standard." State v. Blackmon, 202 N.J. 283, 297
(2010). We consider whether the trial court has made findings of fact grounded
in "reasonably credible evidence"; whether the factfinder applied "correct legal
principles in exercising . . . discretion"; and whether "application of the facts to
the law [has resulted in] such a clear error of judgment that it shocks the judicial
conscience." State v. Roth, 95 N.J. 334, 363-64 (1984) (citations omitted). We
review a trial judge's findings to determine whether the aggravating and
mitigating factors are based on competent, credible evidence in the record. Id.
at 364.
A-0485-18T4 29 "In sentencing, trial judges are given wide discretion so long as the
sentence imposed is within the statutory framework." State v. Dalziel, 182 N.J.
494, 500 (2005). Once the trial court has balanced the aggravating and
mitigating factors set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a) and (b), it "may impose a term
within the permissible range for the offense." State v. Bieniek, 200 N.J. 601,
608 (2010); see also State v. Case, 220 N.J. 49, 63 (2014).
The judge first noted defendant was twenty-six years old at the time of the
sexual assault. She then determined that defendant had been "previously
convicted on at least two separate occasions of two crimes, committed at
different times, when he was at least 18 years of age . . . within 10 years of the
date of the crime for which the defendant is being sentenced." N.J.S.A. 2C:44-
3(a). Based upon these facts, the court granted the State's motion to sentence
defendant to an extended term as a persistent offender.
The court then considered the sentencing range for a second-degree
extended term, which is ten to twenty years. N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7(a)(3). The court
sentenced defendant to the maximum twenty-year NERA term. Accordingly,
defendant is required to serve seventeen years before he is eligible for parole.
N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2.
A-0485-18T4 30 Defendant's argument that his sentence is inconsistent with the sentence
imposed for first-degree sexual assault after his first trial is without sufficient
merit to warrant extended discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2).
"The general rule is that a sentence may not be increased after retrial
following a successful appeal." Cannel, N.J. Criminal Code Annotated, cmt. 7
on N.J.S.A. 2C:1-9 (2019) (citing North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711
(1969), overruled on other grounds by Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794 (1989);
State v. Young, 379 N.J. Super. 498, 507 (App. Div. 2005)). Here, however,
defendant was convicted on retrial of a different offense. Moreover, defendant's
aggregate sentence was not increased.
"[A] defendant who appeals his substantive conviction along with the
corresponding sentence has no legitimate expectation of finality in either the
underlying conviction or the corresponding sentence." State v. Haliski, 140 N.J.
1, 21 (1995) (citing State v. Rodriguez, 97 N.J. 263 (1984)). Defendant's
sentence "did not violate his double jeopardy rights, since [his] only expectation
was that his original aggregate sentence would not be increased." Young, 379
N.J. Super. at 508 (citing State v. Espino, 264 N.J. Super. 62, 72 (App. Div.
1993)). Similarly, "[t]he fact that the [aggregate] resentence was not greater
than the original sentence also satisfies the legitimate due-process-
A-0485-18T4 31 vindictiveness concern that flows from defendant's original appeal." Ibid.
(citing Espino, 264 N.J. Super. at 73). Put simply, defendant's sentence was not
unconstitutional or illegal.
We are also satisfied that the judge appropriately applied the statutory
aggravating and mitigating factors and did not abuse her discretion or stray from
the governing law. The application of aggravating factors three, six, and nine is
fully supported by the record, as is the finding that the aggravating factors
substantially outweighed the sole mitigating factor. Defendant was properly
classified as a persistent offender based upon his age at the time of the offense
and previous convictions. Accordingly, his sentence was within the statutory
range. The sentence was not manifestly excessive or unduly punitive. It does
not shock our judicial conscience. Accordingly, we discern no abuse of
discretion and affirm defendant's sentence.
Affirmed.
A-0485-18T4 32