NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-2757-15T1
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
ALBERT J. FIELDS, JR.,
Defendant-Appellant.
______________________________
Submitted October 17, 2017 – Decided November 2, 2017
Before Judges Yannotti and Mawla.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Salem County, Municipal Appeal No. 09-15.
Albert J. Fields, Jr., appellant pro se.
John T. Lenahan, Salem County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Derrick Diaz, Assistant Prosecutor, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant Albert J. Fields, Jr. appeals from an order entered
by the Law Division on February 29, 2016, which found him guilty of crossing no-passing lanes, in violation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-86.
We affirm.
The following facts are taken from the record. On July 10,
2015, defendant was traveling southbound on Broadway in
Pennsville. Two cars in front of him was an automobile traveling
slower than the speed limit. Defendant crossed the double yellow
lines on the roadway, entering the northbound lane, passed the two
automobiles in front of him, and returned to the southbound lane.
Patrolman James Endres of the Pennsville Police Department was two
vehicles behind defendant's vehicle. He observed defendant
execute the maneuver, stopped defendant, and issued him a summons
for violation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-86.
A trial ensued in the municipal court. Patrolman Endres
testified for the State, recounting the details of defendant's
infraction and the motor vehicle stop. Defendant also testified
and did not dispute the essential facts. He conceded he crossed
the double yellow lines because the vehicle in front of him was
traveling slowly. The municipal court considered the testimony
and also reviewed the State's dashboard camera evidence of the
incident. Defendant was adjudicated guilty of violating N.J.S.A.
39:4-86 and required to pay a fine of $60 and $33 court costs.
Defendant appealed from the municipal court judgment. He
argued that because the vehicle in front of him had decreased its
2 A-2757-15T1 speed so dramatically, was approaching the passing zone, and the
roadway was clear, he had license to pass. Specifically, defendant
argued the slow pace of the vehicle constituted an obstruction.
Therefore, he could not be found guilty of N.J.S.A. 39:4-86.
After a de novo review of the record, the Law Division judge
found defendant guilty. The judge noted N.J.S.A. 39:4-86 requires
the road must be both obstructed and impassable. The judge held
impassable meant "[i]mpossible to travel over or across." The
judge concluded, though "[a] vehicle moving slower than the speed
limit may disturb or even obstruct the flow of traffic, it does
not render the roadway impossible to travel across."
Defendant now appeals the Law Division adjudication. He
asserts the following arguments.
I. THE COURT'S DECISION CONSTITUTED A CLEAR ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHERE THE COURT ACTED UNDER A MISCONCEPTION OF THE APPLICABLE LAW.
a. The Court's Definition Of Obstruct And Impassible As Applied In This Action Was Error Because The Court Required The Road To Be Both Obstructed And Impassable, In Essence Adding Language That The Legislature Omitted. DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 492 (2005).
b. When The Court's Concept Of Slow Drivers Is A Stated Policy, As Is The Case Here, Then The Statute's Goal Cannot Be Achieved Because The Decision Has Been Made Before
3 A-2757-15T1 Consideration Of The Defendant's Right To Qualify For The Exception Identified Within The Statute, Additionally, A Per Se Rule On Slow Drivers Precluded The Court From Considering Relevant Factors Outside The Policy.
c. The Trial De Novo Court Evaluation Of Obstruct And Impassable Conflict[s] With The Holding Of The Appellate Court In Cruz v. Trotta, 363 N.J. Super. 353, 359 (App. Div. 2003).
II. THE STATE PRESENTED NO EVIDENCE IN ITS CASE ON THE MERITS. THE STATE HAD THE BURDEN OF PROOF. DEFENDANT WAS NOT OBLIGED TO PUT ON A DEFENSE. THUS, THE RECORD EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE FINDING OF GUILT.
We begin by reciting our scope of review. In reviewing a
trial court's decision on municipal appeal, we determine whether
sufficient credible evidence in the record supports the Law
Division's decision. State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 162 (1964).
Unlike the Law Division, which conducts a trial de novo on the
record pursuant to Rule 3:23-8(a)(2), we do not independently
assess the evidence. State v. Locurto, 157 N.J. 463, 471 (1999).
In addition, under the two-court rule, only "a very obvious and
exceptional showing of error[]" will support setting aside the Law
Division and municipal court's "concurrent findings of facts[.]"
Id. at 474. However, when issues on appeal turn on purely legal
determinations, our review is plenary. State v. Adubato, 420 N.J.
4 A-2757-15T1 Super. 167, 176 (App. Div. 2011), certif. denied, 209 N.J. 430
(2012). "We do not weigh the evidence, assess the credibility of
witnesses, or make conclusions about the evidence." State v.
Barone, 147 N.J. 599, 615 (1997). We defer to the trial court's
credibility findings. State v. Cerefice, 335 N.J. Super. 374, 383
(App. Div. 2000).
I.
Defendant argues the trial court abused its discretion
because it misconstrued N.J.S.A. 39:4-86. He asserts the statute
does not require the road to be both obstructed and impassable,
and that the trial court's interpretation of the statute added
language the Legislature did not intend. Defendant's argument has
no merit.
The primary goal of statutory interpretation is to interpret
a statute in accordance with the Legislature's intent, and "the
best indicator of that intent is the statutory language."
DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 492 (2005) (citing Frugis v.
Bracigliano, 177 N.J. 250, 280 (2003)). The court must interpret
the words in the enactment in accordance with "their ordinary
meaning and significance." Ibid. (citing Lane v. Holderman, 23
N.J. 304, 313 (1957)).
If the statute is clear and unambiguous, the court's role "is
to construe and apply the statute as enacted." Ibid. (quoting In
5 A-2757-15T1 re Closing of Jamesburg High Sch., 83 N.J. 540, 548 (1980)).
However, if there is any ambiguity in the statutory language that
leads to more than one plausible interpretation, the court may
consider extrinsic evidence, including the legislative history.
Id. at 492–93 (citing Cherry Hill Manor Assocs. v. Faugno, 182
N.J. 64, 75 (2004)).
N.J.S.A. 39:4-86, in pertinent part, states:
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-2757-15T1
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
ALBERT J. FIELDS, JR.,
Defendant-Appellant.
______________________________
Submitted October 17, 2017 – Decided November 2, 2017
Before Judges Yannotti and Mawla.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Salem County, Municipal Appeal No. 09-15.
Albert J. Fields, Jr., appellant pro se.
John T. Lenahan, Salem County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Derrick Diaz, Assistant Prosecutor, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant Albert J. Fields, Jr. appeals from an order entered
by the Law Division on February 29, 2016, which found him guilty of crossing no-passing lanes, in violation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-86.
We affirm.
The following facts are taken from the record. On July 10,
2015, defendant was traveling southbound on Broadway in
Pennsville. Two cars in front of him was an automobile traveling
slower than the speed limit. Defendant crossed the double yellow
lines on the roadway, entering the northbound lane, passed the two
automobiles in front of him, and returned to the southbound lane.
Patrolman James Endres of the Pennsville Police Department was two
vehicles behind defendant's vehicle. He observed defendant
execute the maneuver, stopped defendant, and issued him a summons
for violation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-86.
A trial ensued in the municipal court. Patrolman Endres
testified for the State, recounting the details of defendant's
infraction and the motor vehicle stop. Defendant also testified
and did not dispute the essential facts. He conceded he crossed
the double yellow lines because the vehicle in front of him was
traveling slowly. The municipal court considered the testimony
and also reviewed the State's dashboard camera evidence of the
incident. Defendant was adjudicated guilty of violating N.J.S.A.
39:4-86 and required to pay a fine of $60 and $33 court costs.
Defendant appealed from the municipal court judgment. He
argued that because the vehicle in front of him had decreased its
2 A-2757-15T1 speed so dramatically, was approaching the passing zone, and the
roadway was clear, he had license to pass. Specifically, defendant
argued the slow pace of the vehicle constituted an obstruction.
Therefore, he could not be found guilty of N.J.S.A. 39:4-86.
After a de novo review of the record, the Law Division judge
found defendant guilty. The judge noted N.J.S.A. 39:4-86 requires
the road must be both obstructed and impassable. The judge held
impassable meant "[i]mpossible to travel over or across." The
judge concluded, though "[a] vehicle moving slower than the speed
limit may disturb or even obstruct the flow of traffic, it does
not render the roadway impossible to travel across."
Defendant now appeals the Law Division adjudication. He
asserts the following arguments.
I. THE COURT'S DECISION CONSTITUTED A CLEAR ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHERE THE COURT ACTED UNDER A MISCONCEPTION OF THE APPLICABLE LAW.
a. The Court's Definition Of Obstruct And Impassible As Applied In This Action Was Error Because The Court Required The Road To Be Both Obstructed And Impassable, In Essence Adding Language That The Legislature Omitted. DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 492 (2005).
b. When The Court's Concept Of Slow Drivers Is A Stated Policy, As Is The Case Here, Then The Statute's Goal Cannot Be Achieved Because The Decision Has Been Made Before
3 A-2757-15T1 Consideration Of The Defendant's Right To Qualify For The Exception Identified Within The Statute, Additionally, A Per Se Rule On Slow Drivers Precluded The Court From Considering Relevant Factors Outside The Policy.
c. The Trial De Novo Court Evaluation Of Obstruct And Impassable Conflict[s] With The Holding Of The Appellate Court In Cruz v. Trotta, 363 N.J. Super. 353, 359 (App. Div. 2003).
II. THE STATE PRESENTED NO EVIDENCE IN ITS CASE ON THE MERITS. THE STATE HAD THE BURDEN OF PROOF. DEFENDANT WAS NOT OBLIGED TO PUT ON A DEFENSE. THUS, THE RECORD EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE FINDING OF GUILT.
We begin by reciting our scope of review. In reviewing a
trial court's decision on municipal appeal, we determine whether
sufficient credible evidence in the record supports the Law
Division's decision. State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 162 (1964).
Unlike the Law Division, which conducts a trial de novo on the
record pursuant to Rule 3:23-8(a)(2), we do not independently
assess the evidence. State v. Locurto, 157 N.J. 463, 471 (1999).
In addition, under the two-court rule, only "a very obvious and
exceptional showing of error[]" will support setting aside the Law
Division and municipal court's "concurrent findings of facts[.]"
Id. at 474. However, when issues on appeal turn on purely legal
determinations, our review is plenary. State v. Adubato, 420 N.J.
4 A-2757-15T1 Super. 167, 176 (App. Div. 2011), certif. denied, 209 N.J. 430
(2012). "We do not weigh the evidence, assess the credibility of
witnesses, or make conclusions about the evidence." State v.
Barone, 147 N.J. 599, 615 (1997). We defer to the trial court's
credibility findings. State v. Cerefice, 335 N.J. Super. 374, 383
(App. Div. 2000).
I.
Defendant argues the trial court abused its discretion
because it misconstrued N.J.S.A. 39:4-86. He asserts the statute
does not require the road to be both obstructed and impassable,
and that the trial court's interpretation of the statute added
language the Legislature did not intend. Defendant's argument has
no merit.
The primary goal of statutory interpretation is to interpret
a statute in accordance with the Legislature's intent, and "the
best indicator of that intent is the statutory language."
DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 492 (2005) (citing Frugis v.
Bracigliano, 177 N.J. 250, 280 (2003)). The court must interpret
the words in the enactment in accordance with "their ordinary
meaning and significance." Ibid. (citing Lane v. Holderman, 23
N.J. 304, 313 (1957)).
If the statute is clear and unambiguous, the court's role "is
to construe and apply the statute as enacted." Ibid. (quoting In
5 A-2757-15T1 re Closing of Jamesburg High Sch., 83 N.J. 540, 548 (1980)).
However, if there is any ambiguity in the statutory language that
leads to more than one plausible interpretation, the court may
consider extrinsic evidence, including the legislative history.
Id. at 492–93 (citing Cherry Hill Manor Assocs. v. Faugno, 182
N.J. 64, 75 (2004)).
N.J.S.A. 39:4-86, in pertinent part, states:
Except when otherwise directed by a duly constituted traffic or police officer or when the lane in which he is operating is obstructed and impassable, the driver of a vehicle shall not cross an appropriately marked "No Passing" line in a "No Passing" zone duly established pursuant to a duly promulgated regulation of the State Highway Commissioner or an ordinance or resolution duly adopted by a municipal governing body or a board of chosen freeholders, whichever has jurisdiction over the highway.
Thus, the plain language of the statute permits passing in a no
passing zone only where the road is both obstructed and impassable.
The legislative intent is clear from the statute and the trial
judge did not add language to it, as defendant claims.
II.
Defendant next argues the trial court misinterpreted the word
"obstructed" in N.J.S.A. 39:4-86 to exclude slow vehicles. He
asserts the trial court ignored our holding in Cruz v. Trotta, 363
N.J. Super. 353, 360-61 (App. Div. 2003), a personal injury matter
6 A-2757-15T1 where we held a slow moving vehicle may constitute an obstruction
in violation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-86. However, defendant misconstrues
the holding in Cruz. There, the plaintiff who had been a passenger
on a slow moving scooter, which collided with a truck causing
plaintiff substantial injuries, appealed from jury verdict in
favor of the defendant. Plaintiff argued the trial court erred
by submitting the question of whether a slow moving vehicle
constitutes an obstruction to the jury. We stated that "[s]ince
there are virtually endless possible variations that might or
might not constitute obstructions," the trial court was correct
to submit the question to the jury as trier of fact. Id. at 361.
Relying on Cruz, the trial judge here stated:
In the instant case, this Court is the finder of fact. At trial, the Defendant testified only that the vehicle, "started to slow down," and that the vehicle's speed was inconsistent with, in his opinion, the flow of traffic. A vehicle moving slowly does not render the roadway impassable. While a vehicle moving slower than the speed limit may disturb or even obstruct the flow of traffic, it does not render the roadway impossible to travel across. Therefore, this Court finds that the Defendant was not allowed to legally pass the vehicle in front of him in the no passing zone. His actions were in violation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-86, and this Court finds him guilty.
The trial judge's findings are support by sufficient and credible
evidence in the record.
7 A-2757-15T1 III.
Finally, defendant argues there was "insufficient evidence
in the record to find [him] guilty of the violation beyond a
reasonable doubt." Specifically, defendant asserts the municipal
court did not find his testimony incredible or his arguments
unpersuasive. Thus, he claims the Law Division was not bound by
the municipal court's findings, nor are we.
As we noted above, the Law Division's review is de novo. The
suggestion that the trial judge did not undertake an independent
review and make independent findings is unsupported by the law or
the record. Contrary to defendant's claims, the trial judge
independently addressed his testimony, which the judge relied upon
in part to adjudicate him in violation of the statute. The judge
did not need to find defendant's testimony incredible when the
testimony he provided on both direct and cross-examination
supported a finding of guilt. Defendant's guilt was proved beyond
a reasonable doubt, and we are satisfied the adequate, substantial,
and credible evidence in the record supports the trial judge's
conclusion defendant was guilty of violating N.J.S.A. 39:4-86.
Affirmed.
8 A-2757-15T1