NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-4238-19
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
AARON REID,
Defendant-Appellant. ________________________
Submitted October 4, 2021 – Decided December 8, 2021
Before Judges Rothstadt and Natali.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Burlington County, Accusation No. 19-04- 0382.
Rosenberg Perry & Associates, LLC, attorneys for appellant (Robert M. Perry and Stephen J. Bodnar, on the brief).
Scott A. Coffina, Burlington County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Alexis R. Agre, Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM After his motion to suppress a weapon found during a credentials check
based search of a car he had been driving, defendant Aaron Reid pled guilty to
second-degree unlawful possession of a weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)(1), and
received a sentence in accordance with his plea agreement to one year non-
custodial probation. On appeal from his conviction, he challenges the February
25, 2020 denial of his suppression motion and asserts the following arguments:
POINT I
THE HANDGUN WAS SEIZED PURSUANT TO AN ILLEGAL WARRANTLESS SEARCH AND THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS.
A. WARRANTLESS SEARCHES ARE PRESUMPTIVELY INVALID.
B. THE PLAIN VIEW EXCEPTION REQUIRES THE OFFICER BE LAWFULLY IN THE VIEWING AREA.
C. THE CREDENTIALS EXCEPTION TO THE WARRANT REQUIREMENT REQUIRES THE OPERATOR BE AFFORDED A "MEANINGFUL" AND "REASONABLE" OPPORTUNITY TO PRODUCE THE CREDENTIALS.
D. THE CREDENTIALS EXCEPTION PERMITS ONLY A "LIMITED, PINPOINTED SEARCH."
2 A-4238-19 E. THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN FINDING THE CREDENTIALS EXCEPTION APPLICABLE.
i. THE DEFENDANT WAS NOT AFFORDED A REASONABLE AND MEANINGFUL OPPORTUNITY TO PRODUCE HIS DRIVING CREDENTIALS.
ii. THE SEARCH WAS UNLAWFUL AS IT WAS NOT LIMITED AND PINPOINTED IN SCOPE.
POINT II
THE CREDENTIALS SEARCH EXCEPTION IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL. (NOT RAISED BELOW).
We have considered defendant's contentions in light of the record and the
applicable principles of law. We conclude that while there is no merit to
defendant's constitutional challenge to the credentials search exception to the
warrant requirement, here the procedures necessary to justify that type of search
were not followed and for that reason we reverse the denial of defendant's
motion, vacate his conviction, and remand for further proceedings.
I.
The facts found by the trial court at the suppression hearing based on the
testimony of the arresting officer are summarized as follows. During the
evening of May 25, 2019, Officer Joseph Devlin of the Willingboro Police
3 A-4238-19 Department attempted to stop a motor vehicle after observing that it was being
operated with illegally tinted windows. Before he had the opportunity to
effectuate the stop, the car was driven into a home's driveway. The four
occupants then exited the vehicle and headed towards the house; three walked
to the backyard and one went into the house. At some point prior to the
occupants entering the home, the officer activated his vehicle's overhead lights
and ordered the occupants to return to the vehicle. 1 Devlin testified that,
although it could not be heard on his body cam video, one of the occupants
responded by yelling "No, fuck you." All of them ignored his command. 2
Devlin remained outside the residence and waited for additional officers to
arrive, which took about one minute.
After about one minute, the homeowner emerged from the house and
spoke to the officer. The officer told the homeowner that the four occupants had
1 Devlin testified at the suppression hearing to three different scenarios regarding his activation of his vehicle's lights: he activated them (1) as the vehicle turned into the driveway; (2) prior to the occupants exiting the motor vehicle; and (3) after the occupants exited the motor vehicle. As discussed infra, the trial court found that the lights were already activated when the officer directed the fleeing occupants to return to the car. 2 The officer's body cam recording did not pick up the quoted response or anything else said by the vehicle's occupants.
4 A-4238-19 to either come outside or he would tow the car. A few seconds later, Officer
Stefan Kowalski arrived, and he also spoke with the homeowner who then
walked away from him.
As Kowalski spoke to the homeowner and, before the homeowner walked
away, Devlin announced that he was going to "run the vehicle registration."
After Devlin started to walk away, another responding officer, Officer Hankey,
asked if "the car is locked." Devlin then stopped and opened the unlocked car
without stating to anyone that he was going to search for credentials. Once he
opened the car's door, he confirmed to Hankey that it had not been locked and
immediately, without ever looking in the vehicle's glove compartment or center
console, Devlin called out, "Got a gun in the driver['s] door."
A conversation between Hankey and Devlin then ensued about whether a
search warrant was necessary for the discovery of the gun, whether the plain
view exception applied, and whether a credentials search was allowed. In the
end, Hankey replied, it is "sometimes better to be safe than sorry." Shortly after,
Devlin ran a registration inquiry on the car that identified the owner of the
vehicle as Alvin Reid, defendant's father.
Prior to opening the vehicle's door, Devlin never asked defendant or any
of the vehicle's passengers to produce any vehicle credentials. Nor did he inform
5 A-4238-19 any of them of his intention to search the car for credentials. In addition, Devlin
calculated that one minute and fourteen seconds elapsed from his first
interaction with the homeowner until he opened the car door. Moreover, within
less than four minutes after his first interaction with the homeowner asking that
he direct the vehicle occupants to return to the car, defendant and another of the
vehicle's occupants, exited the house in accordance with Devlin's request.
Before Devlin arrested defendant, he requested defendant's consent to
search the vehicle, which defendant refused. The vehicle was impounded and,
eventually, Devlin obtained a warrant to further search the vehicle.
Defendant was later charged with second-degree possession of a weapon
for unlawful purposes, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a)(1), second-degree unlawful
possession of a weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)(1), fourth-degree prohibited
weapons and devices, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-3(f)(2), fourth-degree prohibited weapons
and devices, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-3(j), third-degree receiving stolen property,
N.J.S.A. 2C:20-7(a), and fourth-degree obstruction of the administration of law,
N.J.S.A. 2C:29-1(a).
After his arrest, defendant filed his suppression motion. The trial court
conducted a two-day suppression hearing at which Devlin and Kowalski
testified. After the hearing, on February 24, 2020, the court issued a
6 A-4238-19 comprehensive ten-page written decision explaining its reasons for denying
defendant's motion to suppress. The next day the trial court entered an order
memorializing its decision.
The trial court initially concluded that the "traffic stop was valid" after
finding that Devlin's testimony was credible because "he reasonably believed
that he observed a [traffic] violation." The court then determined that because
the traffic stop was valid, "the officer was entitled to conduct an investigative
detention" and that a "reasonable person would realize that his right to move has
been restricted." He reasoned that because the "marked patrol car's overhead
lights were on when [the officer], in uniform, instructed the defendant to return
to the vehicle" that "defendant should have been aware that his right to freely
move had been restricted at this point."
The court held the "warrantless search of defendant's car was valid under
the credentials exception to the warrant requirement." It reasoned that the
"defendant was given reasonable opportunity to present his registration
information, but showed his unwillingness to provide such information by
refusing to comply with his lawful detention" and instead "chose to ignore the
officer," who despite his demand for defendant to return to the vehicle and his
advice to the homeowner that defendant "needed to come outside," "received no
7 A-4238-19 indication that" he would. According to the court, "[b]y ignoring the officer's
instructions to return to the vehicle, . . . defendant [could not] so easily nullify
the opportunity that the officer provided."
"Under the circumstances," the court found that "it was not unreasonable
for [the officer] to conduct a limited credentials search after defendant was given
reasonable opportunity, but, by his unresponsive conduct, indicated his
unwillingness to provide those credentials," and that the "search was objectively
reasonable . . . because it was the least intrusive method to obtain the
registration information."
In reaching its decision, the court cited to State v. Watts, 223 N.J. 503,
514 (2015), for the proposition that "[t]he test is not whether there were other
reasonable or even better ways to execute the search, for hindsight and
considered reflection often permit more inspired after-the-fact decision
making." According to the trial court:
the officers on the scene had no indication that the defendant would exit the home in any reasonable amount of time, especially after leaving the scene of a traffic stop. From his vantage point, [the officer] had no way of knowing that the occupants of the vehicle had not simply left the area after entering the [backyard] of the home.
A limited credentials search was an expedient, safe, and unobtrusive option under the circumstances. Obtaining
8 A-4238-19 a search warrant for a vehicle registration to issue a traffic ticket would be labor and time intensive. Entering the curtilage or home itself to locate the defendant would be highly intrusive and potentially dangerous for the officer. Impounding the vehicle was another possibility. However, this is an intrusive, expensive, and time-consuming option.
[(Emphasis added).]
Turning to the discovery of the weapon, the court found the officer's
search in the driver's door pocket was permissible under State v. Terry, 232 N.J.
218, 246 (2018) and State v. Patino, 83 N.J. 1, 12 (1980) because the credentials
search was "confined to the glove compartment or other area where a registration
might normally be kept in a vehicle." After finding that "a pocket compartment
in the side of the driver's door is an area where a registration might normally be
kept," the court held that "the search was appropriately limited in scope." Under
the plain view doctrine exception to the warrant requirement, the court
concluded the officer "was lawfully in the viewing area under the credentials
exception" when he "observed a [gun] almost immediately upon opening the
driver's side door."
Afterward, as already noted, defendant pled guilty to the one offense and
was sentenced in accordance with his plea agreement. This appeal followed.
9 A-4238-19 II.
Our review of a denial of a motion to suppress is limited. State v. Gamble,
218 N.J. 412, 424-25 (2014). We defer to the trial court's factual findings on
the motion unless they are "clearly mistaken" or "so wide of the mark" that the
interests of justice require appellate intervention. State v. Elders, 192 N.J. 224,
245 (2007). "A trial court's interpretation of the law, however, and the
consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to special
deference." State v. Hubbard, 222 N.J. 249, 263 (2015) (citations omitted). As
such, "[a] trial court's legal conclusions are reviewed de novo." Ibid.
We begin our review by rejecting defendant's constitutional challenge,
raised for the first time on appeal, to a warrantless credentials search and
conclude his argument in that regard is without sufficient merit to warrant
discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2). Suffice it to say, we will not
consider his argument because it was not raised before the trial court, see State
v. Witt, 223 N.J. 409, 419 (2015) ("For sound jurisprudential reasons, with few
exceptions, our appellate courts will decline to consider questions or issues not
properly presented to the trial court when an opportunity for such a presentation
is available."), and, in any event, our Supreme Court has repeatedly concluded
that such searches under limited circumstances are valid. Terry, 232 N.J. at 222.
10 A-4238-19 We turn to defendant's contentions that the limited circumstances where
credential searches are permitted did not exist in this case. We agree.
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I of
the New Jersey State Constitution protect people from "unreasonable searches."
U.S. Const. amend. IV; N.J. Const. art. I, § 7. The hallmark of these
constitutional provisions is reasonableness. State v. Bruzzese, 94 N.J. 210, 217
(1983). A warrantless search is presumed to be unreasonable, and therefore
invalid; "[h]ence, the State must prove the overall reasonableness and validity
of [a warrantless] search." State v. Valencia, 93 N.J. 126, 133 (1983). A
warrantless search may be found reasonable if the State proves, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that the search falls within one of the "well-
delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement." Elders, 192 N.J. at 246
(quoting State v. Pineiro, 181 N.J. 13, 19 (2004)).
One such exception is known as the "credentials search" exception, that
permits a police officer to conduct a limited search of the areas in a vehicle
where registration and insurance information is normally kept to verify a
vehicle's credentials for public safety purposes. Terry, 232 N.J. at 222. In Terry,
the Court "reaffirm[ed its] decision in [State v. Keaton, 222 N.J. 438, 450
(2015)] that, when a driver is unwilling or unable to present proof of a vehicle's
11 A-4238-19 ownership, a police officer may conduct a limited search for the registration
papers in the areas where they are likely kept in the vehicle." Terry, 232 N.J. at
223.
In analyzing and reaffirming the "limited registration exception" to the
Fourth Amendment's requiring a valid warrant prior to conducting a search, the
Court stated:
The authority to conduct a warrantless registration search is premised on a driver's lesser expectation of privacy in his vehicle and on the need to ensure highway and public safety. A motorist must be given a meaningful opportunity to produce ownership credentials, but if he is either unable or unwilling to do so, an officer may conduct a brief and targeted search of the area where the registration might normally be kept in the vehicle.
[Id. at 238-39 (citing Keaton, 222 N.J. at 448).]
"The test is not what thoughts were in defendant's mind. Rather, the test
is whether the officers acted in an objectively reasonable manner in light of
the . . . situation confronting them." Id. at 225. At the same time, the Court
warned that "a warrantless search for proof of ownership will not be justified"
"[w]hen a police officer can readily determine that the driver or passenger is the
lawful possessor of the vehicle[]despite an inability to produce the registration."
Id. at 223 (emphasis added). If that determination cannot be made, the credential
12 A-4238-19 search is "permissible if confined to the glove compartment or other area where
a registration might normally be kept in a vehicle." Id. at 236-37 (quoting
Patino, 83 N.J. at 12).
Though the Court has not precisely defined "unwilling[ness]," the line of
cases on the topic suggest that a motorist "unwilling[ness]" is derived from an
officer asking for credentials and then receiving an express refusal or a non-
verbal response, such as a shrug, before the officer can conduct a limited search
for credentials. See id. at 237-238, 245.
In Terry, officers pursued a vehicle after the driver disobeyed a stop sign,
almost collided with the police cruiser, failed to stop despite the officer
activating the lights and siren of his patrol car, and zigzagged in traffic, before
the motorist came to a stop. Id. at 224-25. After the driver exited the vehicle,
the officers asked him three times for his credentials, and he was either non-
responsive, stared blankly at the officers, and one occasion "shrugged his
shoulders." Ibid. The Court held that officers gave the motorist a "meaningful
opportunity" to present the vehicle's credentials. Id. at 246. The Court reasoned
that the officers' "objectively reasonable viewpoint," the motorist's actions—i.e.,
non-responsiveness, blank stare, and shrug—signaled that he "was unwilling or
unable to produce proof of ownership." Ibid.
13 A-4238-19 In Keaton, emergency medical technicians (EMTs) attended to the
operator of an overturned vehicle when the officer came to the scene. 222 N.J.
at 443-44. After securing the scene, and without asking the driver for his
credentials, the officer went into the vehicle to get credentials for his report and
found evidence of criminal activity. Ibid.
The Court upheld our reversal of the trial court's decision to deny the
motion to suppress because it found that the officer never provided the motorist
with the opportunity to provide his credentials. Id. at 442-43, 450. In its
opinion, the Court outlined the number of other actions the officer could have
taken—speak to the motorist, request the EMT's assistance, or ask the motorist
for the credentials at the hospital—before denying the motorist the opportunity
to provide the credentials. Id. at 450. It also held that an officer's "convenience
and expediency" does not invalidate the officer's requirement to provide a
motorist the opportunity to present credentials. See ibid.
In this case, the State failed to demonstrate that the officer gave defendant
a "meaningful opportunity" to provide his credentials or that he was "unable or
unwilling" to provide such credentials. Indeed, the officer's testimony does not
reflect that he ever asked defendant for his credentials before he opened the car
door.
14 A-4238-19 Even more significant, consistent with the Court's instruction in Terry,
and evident here from the officer securing information by running the vehicle's
plates, the officer could have easily employed a minimal investigatory effort
before he needed to conduct a warrantless credentials search that could be
deemed reasonable. Id. at 243 (If the "officer can readily determine that either
[the driver or passenger] is the lawful possessor, then a warrantless search for
proof of ownership is not justified."). For example, the officer could have
confirmed defendant was a "lawful possessor of the vehicle" by simply running
the vehicle's plates, as he later did after he opened the car's door. Id.
The evidence established that the officer had no problem with quickly
running the car's plates and determining that defendant's father was the
registered owner of the vehicle with the illegal tinted windows. Had the officer
taken that simple step before opening the vehicle's car door, there would have
been no need for a credentials search at all and a summons for violation of
N.J.S.A. 39:3-75 could have been issued to defendant who appeared within
minutes of Devlin's conversation with the homeowner.
Contrary to the trial court's conclusion here, it is of no consequence that
these actions would or would not have been "labor and time intensive," as the
exception does not allow officers, for expediency's sake, to search for
15 A-4238-19 credentials without providing a motorist the opportunity to present them.
Keaton, 222 N.J. at 450. Moreover, without ever being asked for the credentials,
a defendant's refusal to comply with the officer's command to return to the
vehicle cannot equate to "unresponsive conduct" or an "unwillingness to provide
[credentials]," leaving an officer free to conduct a credentials search while the
motorist is away from the car. See Terry, 232 N.J. at 238-39; Keaton, 222 N.J.
at 442-44. Here, the State failed to demonstrate that defendant was given a
"meaningful opportunity" to provide his credentials and that he was "unable or
unwilling" to provide such credentials.
Because we conclude that the officer was not legally authorized to enter
the vehicle where the seized weapon was located, we need not address
defendant's remaining arguments.
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with our
opinion.
16 A-4238-19