State of New Jersey v. Zeng L. Chen

• Court: New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division
• Decided: July 2, 2026
• Docket: A-2168-23
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-2168-23

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

ZENG L. CHEN, a/k/a ZENG CHEN and ZENG B. CHEN,

Defendant-Appellant. _________________________

Submitted May 27, 2026 – Decided July 2, 2026

Before Judges Susswein and Chase.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Monmouth County, Indictment No. 10-10- 1964.

Jennifer N. Sellitti, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Steven M. Gilson and Ruth E. Hunter, Designated Counsels, on the briefs).

Bradley D. Billhimer, Ocean County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Shiraz Deen, Special Deputy Attorney General, on the briefs).

PER CURIAM Defendant Zeng L. Chen appeals the January 6, 2026 Law Division order

denying his petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) without an evidentiary

hearing. We affirm.

I.

In 2015, defendant was convicted by a jury on two counts of felony

murder, a single count of knowing/purposeful murder, armed robbery, burglary,

and possession of a knife for an unlawful purpose, and was sentenced to life

imprisonment. On direct appeal, we affirmed the convictions and sentence,

State v. Chen, No. A-4929-14 (App. Div. Apr. 12, 2018) (Chen I), and the New

Jersey Supreme Court denied certification. State v. Chen, 235 N.J. 449 (2018).

We presume the parties are fully familiar with the facts and procedural

history from Chen I and defendant's first PCR. State v. Zeng Chen, No. A-2050-

20 (App. Div. Feb. 1, 2022) (Chen II). However, to put the current arguments

in context, we recount the pertinent facts and procedural history.

"On June 16, 2010, defendant and his co-defendant, Dong B. Lin, broke

into the home of a former employer, . . . intending to steal money and other

valuables. The victims, Yun Chen [(Yun)], and her brother, Yao Chen

A-2168-23 2 [(Yao)],[1] were unexpectedly at home that afternoon." Chen II, (slip op. at 3).

Upon entering, defendant and Lin, armed with "brass knuckles" and a "white-

handled knife" respectively, spotted Yao, who they instructed to return to his

room and "be quiet." Chen II, (slip op. at 3-4).

Lin then gave the white-handled knife to defendant, who used it to

threaten Yao, while Lin searched for something to detain Yao with. Id. (slip op.

at 4). While defendant kept Yao quiet, Lin went upstairs "to search for

valuables"; upon finding Yun lying in bed, Lin "stabb[ed] her seventy-nine times

in the" neck, chest, torso, abdomen, arms, and wrists. Ibid.

When defendant heard Yun screaming, "'[he] was pretty sure she was

being killed.'" Chen I, (slip op. at 10); Chen II, (slip op. at 4). Yao, after hearing

his sisters' screams, began to struggle and attempted to get free; to subdue Yao,

defendant "repeatedly punched him in the head with brass knuckles[]" and

"stuffed cloth in [his] mouth." Chen II, (slip op. at 3-4). Since he was struggling

with Yao, defendant yelled up to Lin to come help. Id. (slip op. at 4-5).

When Lin returned downstairs, he stabbed Yao with the white-handled

knife—which broke. Id. (slip op. at 5). Lin then "grabbed [a] kitchen knife and

1 Because the victims share a common surname, they are hereinafter identified by their first names for the sake of clarity. No disrespect is intended.

A-2168-23 3 stabbed Yao seventy-four times in the face, neck, shoulder, chest, abdomen, and

buttocks." Ibid.

Yao, resiliently, managed to exit the home and get onto South Street,

where he eventually collapsed. Ibid. He was spotted by a motorist who called

9-1-1. An ambulance arrived and transported Yao to Jersey Shore University

Medical Center, "where he died within the hour." Ibid.

Around 5:15 p.m., Freehold Police Department Lieutenant Todd "heard a

report about a stabbing" where the suspects were described as "two-oriental

males between 20 and 25 years old." Chen I, (slip op. at 2). Pursuant to that

report, Lt. Todd "proceeded to Williams Street where he saw two persons

matching the [suspects'] description." Id. at 2-3. At this time, defendant and

Lin were "apparently walking toward the bus station." Chen II, (slip op. at 5-

6). After observing that the suspects had blood on their pants and hands, Lt.

Todd took them to the police station to be interrogated. Chen I, (slip op. at 3).

During interrogation, defendant admitted to punching Yao and threatening

him with a knife; however, he "denied knowing Lin was going to kill the

victims[.]" Chen II, (slip op. at 6); see also Chen I, (slip op. at 11) (denying

killing anyone but admitting to punching Yao with brass knuckles, holding him

down, and covering his mouth). Instead, defendant maintained that he and Lin

A-2168-23 4 only intended to "'threaten'" the victims. Chen II, (slip op. at 6). Lin's testimony

confirmed that he and defendant discussed using the knife to threaten someone

who may be in the house. Id. (slip op. at 12). Lin further testified that when he

began stabbing Yao, defendant held Yao down but "slowly walked behind" Lin

after. Ibid.

Defendant and Lin were indicted by a Monmouth County grand jury in

October 2010. Lin then moved to suppress his statement. Defendant also moved

to dismiss certain counts of the indictment, but the court denied defendant 's

motion. In April 2012, defendant moved to sever the proceedings between

himself and Lin; this motion was granted and the State opted to try Lin first.

During this time, defendant retained a clinical psychologist as an expert

concerning the defenses of duress and diminished capacity.

In December 2013, defendant moved to suppress his confession pursuant

to Miranda.2 In April 2014, the court denied defendant's motion, after hearing

testimony on three dates.

In May 2014, the case, for the fourth time, was reassigned to a different

judge. See Chen II, (slip op. at 2-3) (noting four reassignments). In December

2 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). A-2168-23 5 2014, defendant moved for dismissal of his counsel and assignment of new

counsel.

On January 13, 2015, the court entered an order dismissing count three—

first-degree murder of Yun—from the indictment and denied defendant's attempt

to dismiss his counsel. Thereafter, between January 20 and February 5, 2015, a

trial was held on the remaining counts in the indictment.

Defendant then filed a direct appeal alleging the trial court: (1) erred in

denying his motions to suppress, present expert testimony, and acquit; (2) issued

improper jury instructions; and (3) imposed an excessive sentence. Chen I, (slip

op. at 3). We affirmed. Ibid.

In December 2018, defendant filed a self-represented PCR petition

asserting that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to move

to dismiss the charges based on the four-and-a-half-year delay between his arrest

and trial. After he appealed the denial of his PCR, we "vacate[d] and remand[ed]

for the PCR court to make specific findings of fact and law under the Barker3

test for speedy trial violations in the context of the two-pronged Strikland 4 test

for PCR." Chen II, (slip op. at 2).

3 Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 515 (1972). 4 Strikland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). A-2168-23 6 On remand, defendant's PCR was denied. On appeal, we again remanded

the matter for the PCR court to make additional factual and legal findings

concerning defendant's claim that the delay violated his constitutional right to a

speedy trial. State v. Zeng L. Chen, No. A-2168-23 (App. Div. Oct. 1, 2025)

(Chen III).

On remand, on January 6, 2026, the PCR court issued a written order

denying defendant's petition without an evidentiary hearing. In doing so, the

court catalogued the various events it found caused the delays in this case. The

court then determined that the delays attributable to the State were justified or

excusable given the complex nature of the case, defendant's introduction of

expert testimony, and the need to review forensic analysis. The court found that

the delays attributable to the court were excusable because of the delays related

to either judicial reassignments or scheduling conflicts. Importantly, the court

found that most of the delay in trial was attributable to defendant, and his co -

defendant, filing numerous motions. The court then concluded defendant had

not shown that his counsel's performance, in not seeking dismissal, was so

deficient that it violated the Sixth Amendment, or that he was prejudiced by the

counsel's failure to file a speedy trial motion.

A-2168-23 7 On appeal, defendant raises the following contention for our

consideration:

POINT I

THE PCR COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL CLAIM ON SPEEDY TRIAL GROUNDS WITHOUT HOLDING AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING AFTER THIS COURT REMANDED TWICE FOR ADDITIONAL FINDINGS. THE PCR COURT'S ADDITIONAL FINDINGS WERE NOT SUPPORTED BY OBJECTIVE EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD AND THEREFORE, AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING BEFORE A DIFFERENT JUDGE IS NECESSARY IN ORDER TO MAKE CONCLUSIONS SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD AND TO RESOLVE MATERIAL ISSUES OF DISPUTED FACTS.

II.

"[PCR] is New Jersey's analogue to the federal writ of habeas corpus."

State v. Pierre, 223 N.J. 560, 576 (2015) (quoting State v. Preciose, 129 N.J.

451, 459 (1992)); State v. Afanador, 151 N.J. 41, 49 (1997). PCR provides "a

built-in 'safeguard that ensures that a defendant was not unjustly convicted.'"

State v. Nash, 212 N.J. 518, 540 (2013) (quoting State v. McQuaid, 147 N.J.

464, 482 (1997)). Because the court did not hold an evidentiary hearing, we

review both the factual inferences drawn by the judge from the record and the

judge's legal conclusions de novo. State v. Aburoumi, 464 N.J. Super. 326, 338

A-2168-23 8 (App. Div. 2020) (citing State v. Jackson, 454 N.J. Super. 284, 291 (App. Div.

2018)).

To prevail on his ineffective assistance of counsel claim, defendant has

the burden of satisfying the Strickland/Fritz test. See State v. Nunez-Valdez,

200 N.J. 129, 139-40 (2009); State v. Buonadonna, 122 N.J. 22, 41 (1991).

Pursuant to Strickland, defendant must prove that: (1) counsel's performance

was deficient to the extent they were not functioning as counsel guaranteed by

the Sixth Amendment; and (2) counsel's deficient performance prejudiced

defendant. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); see also State

v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42 (1987) (adopting the Strickland test); State v. Savage, 120

N.J. 594, 612-13 (1990) ("to evaluate [ineffective assistance of counsel], we turn

first to the constitutional standards set forth in [Strickland][] and adopted by this

Court in [Fritz]"); State v. Castagna, 187 N.J. 293, 313-14 (2006) (explaining

the Strickland/Fritz test).

A defendant can satisfy the first prong of the Strickland/Fritz test by

"showing that counsel's acts or omissions fell outside the wide range of

professional competent assistance." State v Allegro, 193 N.J. 352, 366 (2008)

(quoting Castagna, 187 N.J. at 314). Furthermore, where counsel's performance

A-2168-23 9 prejudices a defendant and deprives them of a fair trial, the second

Strickland/Fritz prong is satisfied. Fritz, 105 N.J. at 58.

To satisfy his burden and "establish a prima facie claim, [defendant] must

do more than make bald assertions . . . ." State v. Cummings, 321 N.J. Super.

154, 170 (App. Div. 1999). Instead, "defendant must demonstrate a reasonable

likelihood that his . . . claim . . . will ultimately succeed on the merits." R. 3:22-

10(b); see also State v. Brewster, 429 N.J. Super. 387, 392 (App. Div. 2013)

(quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985)). Further underpinning this

analysis is the presumption that an attorney's conduct "constituted reasonable

professional assistance." State v. Petrozelli, 351 N.J. Super. 14, 21-22 (App.

Div. 2002). Nevertheless, Rule 3:22-10(b) stipulates the facts of the record are

viewed in the light most favorable to defendant.

Here, defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim is predicated on

an alleged infringement of his right to a speedy trial—which is protected by the

Sixth Amendment. State v. May, 362 N.J. Super. 572, 595 (App. Div. 2003)

(quoting State v. Long, 119 N.J. 439, 469 (1990)); see also Barker, 407 U.S. at

515 ("[t]he right to a speedy trial is 'fundamental' and is imposed by the Due

Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment on the States").

In Barker, the United States Supreme Court announced a four-part test to determine when a delay infringes

A-2168-23 10 upon a defendant's due process rights. Courts must consider and balance the "[l]ength of delay, the reasons for the delay, the defendant's assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant."

[State v. Tsetsekas, 411 N.J. Super. 1, 8 (App. Div. 2009) (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 530) (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (internal citation omitted).]

See also State v. Szima, 70 N.J. 196, 200-01 (1976) (adopting the Barker four-

part test). In conducting this analysis, courts must remain cognizant that "[n]o

single factor is a necessary or sufficient condition to the finding of a deprivation

of the right to a speedy trial"; conversely, each factor "must be considered in

light of the relevant circumstances of each particular case." Tsetsekas, 411 N.J.

Super. at 10 (citing Barker, 407 U.S. at 533); see also State v. Cahill, 213 N.J.

253, 271 (2013) ("facts of an individual case are the best indicators of whether

a right to a speedy trial has been violated").

In Cahill, the New Jersey Supreme Court expressed that "once the delay

exceeds one year, it is appropriate to engage in the analysis of the remaining

Barker factors." Cahill, 213 N.J. at 265-66 (citing State v. Smith, 131 N.J.

Super. 354, 361-70 (App. Div. 1974), aff'd o.b., 70 N.J. 213 (1976); Hakeem v.

Beyer, 990 F.2d 750, 760 (3d Cir. 1993)). However, "the question of how long

is too long 'cannot be answered by sole reference to the lapse of a specified

A-2168-23 11 amount of time . . . .'" State v. Detrick, 192 N.J. Super. 424, 426 (App. Div.

1983) (quoting Smith, 131 N.J. Super. at 360) (omission in original).

The State, in delaying completion of prosecution, can violate a defendant's

right to a speedy trial. State v. Farrell, 320 N.J. Super. 425, 445-46 (App. Div.

1999) (citing State v. Gallegan, 117 N.J. 345, 354-55 (1989)); see also State v.

Merlino, 153 N.J. Super. 12, 17 (App. Div. 1977) ("[a] defendant has no duty to

bring himself to trial; the State has that duty[.]" (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at

527)). Indeed, the State cannot employ purposeful delay tactics. Barker, 407

U.S. at 531.

That said, reasonable delays—"however great the delay"—will not

infringe the right to a speedy trial to the extent defendant cannot show prejudice.

Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 656 (1992). That principle is premised

on the notion that extended delays are more "tolerated for serious offenses or

complex prosecutions." Cahill, 213 N.J. at 265-66. Moreover, delays caused

by the defense cannot evidence a violation of the right to a speedy trial. See

State v. Long, 119 N.J. 439, 470 (1990) ("Any delay that defendant caused or

requested would not weigh in favor of finding a speedy trial violation" (quoting

Gallegan, 117 N.J. at 355)).

A-2168-23 12 Lastly, if a defendant's right to a speedy trial is violated, "[t]he only

remedy that will address this violation is dismissal of the charge." Cahill, 213

N.J. at 276. Determinations regarding an allegation of a speedy trial violation

are typically upheld insofar as the PCR court's decision was not "clearly

erroneous." Tsetsekas, 411 N.J. Super. at 10 (citing Merlino, 153 N.J. Super. at

17). But see State v. Handy, 206 N.J. 39, 45 (2011) ("appellate review of legal

determinations is plenary" (citing Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of

Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995))).

Defendant's assertion that the PCR court's findings about the causes of

delay were made without any support in the record is without merit. The PCR

court was tasked with "catalog[ing] the delay periods, acknowledg[ing] any

dates, [and] attribut[ing] the specific delay periods to the prosecution, the

defense, or the court." Chen III, (slip op. at 4). The PCR court accomplished

this task.

Defendant's challenge that eleven periods of delay decided by the PCR

court failed to comport with our remand instructions is also without merit.

Regarding these delays, the PCR court specifically analyzed each delay using

credible evidence in the record to determine whom the delay would be

A-2168-23 13 attributable to and whether the delay was reasonable. For example, the court

found:

Between [d]efendant's arrest on June 16, 2010, and indictment on October 18, 2010, the delay would be attributable to the prosecution but is excusable, as those roughly four months were spent gathering sufficient evidence for presentment to a grand jury as well as convening a grand jury . . . . From October 18, 2010[,] to November 10, 2010, it appears Lin and his attorney had decided to file a motion to suppress . . . . Because [d]efendant and Lin remained co-defendants, . . . this period of delay would be attributable to the defense . . . .

Between November 10, 2010[,] and February 25, 2011, this approximately three and a half month period of delay would be attributable to the defense for a number of reasons. First, Lin's motion to suppress . . . would have required[] . . . a briefing schedule set by the court with counsel's input . . . . Because [d]efendant and Lin were still intended to be tried together . . ., this period of delay is attributable to the defense because the defense filed that motion, thereby causing the delay.

The same type of analysis was completed for each of the other periods of delay.

Contrary to defendant's claims, the findings about the causes of the delay were

based on evidence in the record.

Moreover, the PCR court did not err regarding its analysis of Barker; the

PCR court properly analyzed the reasons for each delay. Primarily: (1) delays

attributable to the State were pursuant to the complex nature of the charges

A-2168-23 14 against defendant, the need to review expert testimony, and forensic analysis;

(2) delays attributable to the court were either justified or excusable considering

multiple reassignments and conflicts between trial counsel's and the court's

schedule; and (3) much of the delay was attributable to the defendant, and his

co-defendant pre-severance, filing multiple motions. Those findings comport

with our instruction to consider: "(1) the seriousness of the crimes; (2) the

complexity and logistical challenges of an investigation that required forensic

analysis; (3) the number of judges assigned to preside over various events; and

(4) numerous pretrial motions defendant filed, including his successful

severance motion." Chen II, (slip op. at 15-16).

With respect to the third Barker prong, defendant provided no evidence

that he had ever asked to accelerate the trial date or asserted his speedy trial

rights on the record. Although counsel mentioned at PCR oral argument that

defendant himself asserted his right to a speedy trial, this is not competent

evidence to support a prima facie case on this matter. See R. 3:22-10(c).

Defendant also argues the court erred by not having an evidentiary hearing

to determine issues of material fact, such as why four different judges were

assigned to the case. Entitlement to an evidentiary hearing requires a: (1) prima

facie case; (2) court's determination that material facts are in dispute; and (3)

A-2168-23 15 determination that an evidentiary hearing is necessary to resolve the claim. R.

3:22-10(b); State v. Marshall, 148 N.J. 89, 158 (1997); Preciose, 129 N.J. at 462.

Where the facts of a PCR petition lie outside the record and may require a

previous attorney's testimony, the petition is more likely to warrant an

evidentiary hearing. Preciose, 129 N.J. at 462. We are satisfied the PCR court

properly denied defendant's petition for PCR without conducting an evidentiary

hearing.

Defendant engaged in substantial motion practice which caused the bulk

of the trial delay. In addition, as the court correctly determined, defendant failed

to establish prejudice caused by the delay. "The failure to raise unsuccessful

legal arguments does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel." State v.

Worlock, 117 N.J. 596, 625 (1990).

To the extent we have not addressed any remaining arguments, it is

because they lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R.

2:11-3(e)(2).

Affirmed.

A-2168-23 16