RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-1572-23
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
U.Y.A.,1
Defendant-Appellant. __________________________
Submitted November 13, 2024 – Decided February 27, 2025
Before Judges Gooden Brown and Vanek.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Cumberland County, Docket No. FO-06-0065-24.
Linwood A. Jones, attorney for appellant.
Jennifer Webb-McRae, Cumberland County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Stephen C. Sayer, Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).
1 We use initials to protect the parties' privacy and the confidentiality of these proceedings in accordance with Rule 1:38-3(d)(10). PER CURIAM
Defendant, U.Y.A., appeals from the December 15, 2023, Family Part
order finding her guilty of the disorderly persons offense of criminal contempt
for violating a temporary restraining order (TRO) issued pursuant to the
Prevention of Domestic Violence Act of 1991 (PDVA), N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17 to
‑35. Following a bench trial, the judge found beyond a reasonable doubt that
defendant sent text messages to her ex-boyfriend, J.C., violating the TRO
prohibiting any contact with him. The judge imposed financial penalties totaling
$225. Because there was sufficient credible evidence supporting the
adjudication, we affirm.
We glean these facts from the record. Defendant and J.C. had a short-
lived relationship. After the relationship ended, J.C. asked defendant to return
his personal items, and she refused, apparently viewing the items as gifts.
Shortly thereafter, each party obtained a TRO against the other, barring any
"oral, written, personal, electronic, or other form of contact or communication"
with the other. Subsequently, through the police, J.C. again asked defendant to
return the items. Defendant told the officers she had none of J.C.'s personal
belongings. About two hours later, J.C. received a series of threatening,
insulting text messages from an unknown number stating he was not getting the
A-1572-23 2 gifts back. Believing defendant sent the messages, J.C. reported the
communication to the police, and defendant was charged with criminal
contempt, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:29-9(b)(2).
At a December 15, 2023, bench trial, the parties stipulated to the validity
of J.C.'s TRO, defendant's knowledge of its terms, and proper service of
defendant. The judge admitted the text messages into evidence, which read in
pertinent part:2
First of all, your jewelry, your T.V., and your pots are mine now. So, stop it. I truly do forgive you even without an apology. Everything is a learning experience. Like, I really have to get you smoked. Like, you should really kill yourself. I got what I wanted from you. You're ugly . . . .
You can call [the police] all you want. They're f[***]ing stupid. . . .
I already called you're [sic] job, and sent them that pic of your d[***] so it doesn't matter anyway.
....
Drop your [TRO], and I'll drop mine obviously. You can have all your stuff back and I'll let you in[.]
2 We have redacted the messages to maximize privacy, minimize obscenity, and improve readability. Otherwise, we have reproduced them exactly as written. A-1572-23 3 I'm trying to call you, but it's not going through. You really blocked my number in front of [the police station]? Listen, I'll call you from this number. If anything happens to me . . . , I'll really do anything and everything to really jam you the f*** up. Whatever it takes.
J.C. testified he believed defendant sent the text messages based on their
timing and content. However, he acknowledged that only he or defendant could
have sent them. Defendant denied sending the text messages and claimed J.C.
sent them to himself using an anonymous texting application. According to
defendant, it did not make sense for her to have sent the messages, and she
believed J.C. was retaliating against her for ending the relationship.
In an oral decision placed on the record the same day, the judge credited
J.C.'s testimony and concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant sent
the messages in violation of the restraining order. Given the parties' stipulations,
the judge explained the State only had to prove defendant sent the text messages
and agreed only defendant or J.C. could have done so. After conducting a line-
by-line analysis of the text messages, while considering the messages' "timing
and . . . substance," the judge was convinced that defendant was the culprit.
In assessing credibility, the judge relied upon his observations of the
parties while testifying. Although the judge found J.C. "a little confrontational"
during cross-examination, he saw nothing that "rose to the level of [a] . . .
A-1572-23 4 devious, pre-planned nature" to support defendant's contention that J.C. sent the
texts. After making credibility assessments and "carefully" parsing through
each statement in the text messages, the majority of which the judge found made
no sense coming from J.C. but "[made] sense coming from . . . defendant," the
judge found defendant guilty of contempt, and this appeal followed.
On appeal, defendant raises the following single point for our
consideration:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING DEFENDANT GUILTY OF CONTEMPT BECAUSE THE STATE FAILED TO PROVE DEFENDANT GUILTY OF CONTEMPT BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT[.]
Our review of a finding of guilt in a contempt proceeding is generally
limited to determining "whether the record contains sufficient evidence to
support the judge's conclusion." State v. J.T., 294 N.J. Super. 540, 544 (App.
Div. 1996) (citing State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 161 (1964)). In that regard,
"we defer to the trial judge's findings particularly with respect to the testimony
of the parties," State v. Krupinski, 321 N.J. Super. 34, 45 (App. Div. 1999)
(citing Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 413 (1998)), and "we do not disturb the
factual findings and legal conclusions of the trial judge unless we are convinced
that they are so manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent,
A-1572-23 5 relevant and reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interests of justice,"
Mountain Hill, L.L.C. v. Twp. of Middletown, 399 N.J. Super. 486, 498 (App.
Div. 2008) (quoting Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Invs. Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J.
474, 484 (1974)).
Because a violation of a restraining order is punishable as a quasi-criminal
act, a defendant is entitled to the rights of all criminal defendants. We must,
therefore, ensure the State has carried its burden of proving the defendant's guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt. See N.J.S.A. 2C:1-13(a); Krupinski, 321 N.J. Super.
at 45. To be guilty of the disorderly persons offense of contempt of a restraining
order under N.J.S.A. 2C:29-9(b)(2), the State must prove beyond a reasonable
doubt: (1) there was an order entered under the PDVA; (2) defendant knew of
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-1572-23
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
U.Y.A.,1
Defendant-Appellant. __________________________
Submitted November 13, 2024 – Decided February 27, 2025
Before Judges Gooden Brown and Vanek.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Cumberland County, Docket No. FO-06-0065-24.
Linwood A. Jones, attorney for appellant.
Jennifer Webb-McRae, Cumberland County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Stephen C. Sayer, Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).
1 We use initials to protect the parties' privacy and the confidentiality of these proceedings in accordance with Rule 1:38-3(d)(10). PER CURIAM
Defendant, U.Y.A., appeals from the December 15, 2023, Family Part
order finding her guilty of the disorderly persons offense of criminal contempt
for violating a temporary restraining order (TRO) issued pursuant to the
Prevention of Domestic Violence Act of 1991 (PDVA), N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17 to
‑35. Following a bench trial, the judge found beyond a reasonable doubt that
defendant sent text messages to her ex-boyfriend, J.C., violating the TRO
prohibiting any contact with him. The judge imposed financial penalties totaling
$225. Because there was sufficient credible evidence supporting the
adjudication, we affirm.
We glean these facts from the record. Defendant and J.C. had a short-
lived relationship. After the relationship ended, J.C. asked defendant to return
his personal items, and she refused, apparently viewing the items as gifts.
Shortly thereafter, each party obtained a TRO against the other, barring any
"oral, written, personal, electronic, or other form of contact or communication"
with the other. Subsequently, through the police, J.C. again asked defendant to
return the items. Defendant told the officers she had none of J.C.'s personal
belongings. About two hours later, J.C. received a series of threatening,
insulting text messages from an unknown number stating he was not getting the
A-1572-23 2 gifts back. Believing defendant sent the messages, J.C. reported the
communication to the police, and defendant was charged with criminal
contempt, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:29-9(b)(2).
At a December 15, 2023, bench trial, the parties stipulated to the validity
of J.C.'s TRO, defendant's knowledge of its terms, and proper service of
defendant. The judge admitted the text messages into evidence, which read in
pertinent part:2
First of all, your jewelry, your T.V., and your pots are mine now. So, stop it. I truly do forgive you even without an apology. Everything is a learning experience. Like, I really have to get you smoked. Like, you should really kill yourself. I got what I wanted from you. You're ugly . . . .
You can call [the police] all you want. They're f[***]ing stupid. . . .
I already called you're [sic] job, and sent them that pic of your d[***] so it doesn't matter anyway.
....
Drop your [TRO], and I'll drop mine obviously. You can have all your stuff back and I'll let you in[.]
2 We have redacted the messages to maximize privacy, minimize obscenity, and improve readability. Otherwise, we have reproduced them exactly as written. A-1572-23 3 I'm trying to call you, but it's not going through. You really blocked my number in front of [the police station]? Listen, I'll call you from this number. If anything happens to me . . . , I'll really do anything and everything to really jam you the f*** up. Whatever it takes.
J.C. testified he believed defendant sent the text messages based on their
timing and content. However, he acknowledged that only he or defendant could
have sent them. Defendant denied sending the text messages and claimed J.C.
sent them to himself using an anonymous texting application. According to
defendant, it did not make sense for her to have sent the messages, and she
believed J.C. was retaliating against her for ending the relationship.
In an oral decision placed on the record the same day, the judge credited
J.C.'s testimony and concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant sent
the messages in violation of the restraining order. Given the parties' stipulations,
the judge explained the State only had to prove defendant sent the text messages
and agreed only defendant or J.C. could have done so. After conducting a line-
by-line analysis of the text messages, while considering the messages' "timing
and . . . substance," the judge was convinced that defendant was the culprit.
In assessing credibility, the judge relied upon his observations of the
parties while testifying. Although the judge found J.C. "a little confrontational"
during cross-examination, he saw nothing that "rose to the level of [a] . . .
A-1572-23 4 devious, pre-planned nature" to support defendant's contention that J.C. sent the
texts. After making credibility assessments and "carefully" parsing through
each statement in the text messages, the majority of which the judge found made
no sense coming from J.C. but "[made] sense coming from . . . defendant," the
judge found defendant guilty of contempt, and this appeal followed.
On appeal, defendant raises the following single point for our
consideration:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING DEFENDANT GUILTY OF CONTEMPT BECAUSE THE STATE FAILED TO PROVE DEFENDANT GUILTY OF CONTEMPT BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT[.]
Our review of a finding of guilt in a contempt proceeding is generally
limited to determining "whether the record contains sufficient evidence to
support the judge's conclusion." State v. J.T., 294 N.J. Super. 540, 544 (App.
Div. 1996) (citing State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 161 (1964)). In that regard,
"we defer to the trial judge's findings particularly with respect to the testimony
of the parties," State v. Krupinski, 321 N.J. Super. 34, 45 (App. Div. 1999)
(citing Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 413 (1998)), and "we do not disturb the
factual findings and legal conclusions of the trial judge unless we are convinced
that they are so manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent,
A-1572-23 5 relevant and reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interests of justice,"
Mountain Hill, L.L.C. v. Twp. of Middletown, 399 N.J. Super. 486, 498 (App.
Div. 2008) (quoting Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Invs. Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J.
474, 484 (1974)).
Because a violation of a restraining order is punishable as a quasi-criminal
act, a defendant is entitled to the rights of all criminal defendants. We must,
therefore, ensure the State has carried its burden of proving the defendant's guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt. See N.J.S.A. 2C:1-13(a); Krupinski, 321 N.J. Super.
at 45. To be guilty of the disorderly persons offense of contempt of a restraining
order under N.J.S.A. 2C:29-9(b)(2), the State must prove beyond a reasonable
doubt: (1) there was an order entered under the PDVA; (2) defendant knew of
the existence of the order; and (3) defendant purposefully or knowingly violated
the order. State v. Chenique-Puey, 145 N.J. 334, 341-42 (1996) (citing N.J.S.A.
2C:29-9(b)).
As noted by the trial judge, only the third factor is at issue here. "[T]he
evidence must allow at least a reasonable inference that a defendant charged
with violating a restraining order knew his [or her] conduct would bring about a
prohibited result." State v. S.K., 423 N.J. Super. 540, 547 (App. Div. 2012).
Based on our review of the record, we are satisfied there is sufficient credible
A-1572-23 6 evidence to support the judge's finding of guilt. Although the evidence
establishing defendant's guilt is circumstantial, in our view, it is compelling.
"To be sure, circumstantial evidence often can be as persuasive and powerful as
direct evidence and sufficient to support a conviction." State v. Lodzinski, 249
N.J. 116, 146-47 (2021); see also State v. Mayberry, 52 N.J. 413, 437 (1968)
("[I]ndeed in many situations circumstantial evidence may be more forceful and
more persuasive than direct evidence." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
The judge relied heavily on his credibility determinations. Although he
did not "specifically articulate detailed findings of credibility in the record, the
reasons supporting [his] determinations of the witnesses' relative credibility may
be inferred from, and are well-supported by, the account of the facts and
witnesses' testimony presented in [his] decision." State v. Locurto, 157 N.J.
463, 474 (1999). "Appellate courts should defer to trial courts' credibility
findings that are often influenced by matters such as observations of the
character and demeanor of witnesses and common human experience that are
not transmitted by the record." Ibid. The judge credited J.C.'s account and
observed nothing in J.C.'s demeanor suggesting he was devious, deceitful, or
calculating enough to concoct the messages and send them to himself. See State
A-1572-23 7 v. Jamerson, 153 N.J. 318, 341 (1998) (noting a witness's demeanor and
character are instructive in making a credibility determination).
The totality of the circumstances, particularly the timing and content of
the text messages, convincingly supports this finding. The messages were a
direct reply to J.C.'s communication through the police for the return of the items
shortly after the request was made. It was rational for the judge to infer that
defendant's emotions and motive made it much more likely that she sent the
flurry of insulting, threatening text messages. The factfinder "may draw an
inference from a fact whenever it is more probable than not that the inference is
true, and . . . the veracity of each inference need not be established beyond a
reasonable doubt." Lodzinski, 249 N.J. at 144 (internal quotation marks
omitted). "Because the entire case was premised on disputed testimony and the
credibility of witnesses," we defer to the judge's findings as they are based on
sufficient, credible evidence in the record, Cesare, 154 N.J. at 416, and we
discern no legal or factual basis to intervene.
To the extent we have not specifically addressed any of defendant 's
remaining arguments, we deem them to be without sufficient merit to warrant
discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2).
Affirmed.
A-1572-23 8