NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-0196-20
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
TRAMAIN L. WILLIAMS, a/k/a TRAMAIN WILLIAMS, and TREMAIN WILLIAMS,
Defendant-Appellant. _________________________
Submitted January 12, 2022 – Decided April 1, 2022
Before Judges Gilson and Gooden Brown.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Union County, Municipal Appeal No. 6259.
Galantucci & Patuto, attorneys for appellant (S. Emile Lisboa, IV, of counsel and on the brief).
Daniel A. William, Union County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Milton S. Leibowitz, Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM Defendant Tramain Williams pled guilty to driving while intoxicated
(DWI) on July 28, 2019, in violation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50. He was sentenced in
accordance with the version of the DWI statute that was in effect on July 28,
2019. Because it was defendant's second DWI conviction, his sentence included
a mandatory two-year suspension of his driver's license.
Defendant appeals from his sentence, arguing that he should have been
sentenced under amendments to N.J.S.A. 39:4-50 that became effective on
December 1, 2019, shortly before he was sentenced. He contends that his two-
year license suspension should be shorter as permitted under the 2019
amendments. We hold that the amendments do not apply retroactively and
affirm defendant's sentence.
I.
In the early morning of July 28, 2019, the vehicle defendant was driving
was stopped when a police officer observed that the vehicle's headlights were
off, and the vehicle was swerving. When the officer went to speak with
defendant, she smelled alcohol and had defendant perform several field sobriety
tests. The officer then transported defendant to the police station, where he
submitted to a breath alcohol test that disclosed defendant had a blood alcohol
content of 0.15%.
A-0196-20 2 Defendant was charged with DWI and several other driving violations.
On January 16, 2020, defendant pled guilty in municipal court to DWI and to
obstruction of traffic, N.J.S.A. 39:4-67.
On the DWI conviction, the municipal court sentenced defendant as a
second offender to a two-year license suspension with the requirement that
defendant install an ignition interlock device on his vehicle for two years during
the suspension and one year thereafter. Defendant was also sentenced to
community service, jail time, and payments of various fines and penalties. On
the obstruction of traffic conviction, the municipal court ordered defendant to
pay fines and court costs.
Defendant informed the municipal court that he intended to seek a de novo
review and the court granted him a stay of the license suspension. Thereafter,
defendant filed for a de novo review by the Law Division.
In the Law Division, defendant challenged only his DWI sentence and
argued that he was entitled to pipeline retroactivity of the 2019 amendments to
the DWI statute. In that regard, he argued that he was not subject to a mandatory
two-year suspension of his driver's license but could be considered for a
suspension between one and two years. On August 28, 2020, the Law Division
issued an order and written opinion rejecting defendant's retroactivity argument.
A-0196-20 3 Thereafter, on September 16, 2020, the Law Division sentenced defendant to the
same DWI sentence that he had received in the municipal court with minimal
changes in penalty and fine amounts. Accordingly, defendant's sentence still
imposed the two-year license suspension and ignition interlock requirement.
Defendant requested a stay of his license suspension, but the Law Division
denied that request in an order dated September 16, 2020.
The Law Division did not enter a separate order or judgment of conviction
concerning the DWI sentence. Instead, that sentence is set forth in the transcript
of defendant's sentencing, which took place on September 16, 2020. Defendant
now appeals from the August 28, 2020 order entered by the Law Division that
rejected his argument for the pipeline retroactive application of the 2019
amendments to the DWI statute.
II.
On this appeal, defendant only challenges his DWI sentence and makes
one argument:
THE DECEMBER 1, 2019 AMENDMENTS TO THE DRIVING WHILE INTOXICATED STATUTE SHOULD BE AFFORDED PIPELINE RETROACTIVITY.
The question of whether a law applies retroactively "is a purely legal
question of statutory interpretation" based on legislative intent. State v. J.V.,
A-0196-20 4 242 N.J. 432, 442 (2020) (quoting Johnson v. Roselle EZ Quick LLC, 226 N.J.
370, 386 (2016)). "To determine the Legislature's intent, we look to the statute's
language and give those terms their plain and ordinary meaning." Ibid. (citing
DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 492 (2005)). If the language of the statute
clearly reflects the Legislature's intent, then courts apply the law as written,
affording the terms their plain meaning. Id. at 443. "If, however, the statutory
text is ambiguous," courts may "resort to 'extrinsic interpretative aids, including
legislative history,' to determine the statute's meaning." Ibid. (quoting State v.
S.B., 230 N.J. 62, 68 (2017)).
The law generally favors prospective application of new legislation.
James v. N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Co., 216 N.J. 552, 563 (2014). To determine if a statute
should be applied retroactively, courts use a two-part test: (1) whether the
Legislature intended to give the statute retroactive application; and (2) whether
retroactive application "will result in either an unconstitutional interference with
vested rights or a manifest injustice." Ibid. (quoting In re D.C., 146 N.J. 31, 50
(1996)). Under the first prong of that test, there are three circumstances that
will justify the retroactive application of a statute:
(1) the Legislature provided for retroactivity expressly, either in the language of the statute itself or its legislative history, or implicitly, by requiring retroactive effect to "make the statute workable or to
A-0196-20 5 give it the most sensible interpretation"; (2) "the statute is ameliorative or curative"; or (3) the parties' expectations warrant retroactive application.
[J.V., 242 N.J. at 444 (quoting Gibbons v. Gibbons, 86 N.J. 515, 522-23 (1981)).]
An ameliorative statute "refers only to criminal laws that effect a
reduction in a criminal penalty." Perry v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 459 N.J. Super.
186, 196 (App. Div. 2019) (quoting State v. Universal Mar., 300 N.J. Super.
578, 582 (App. Div. 1997)). To be afforded retroactive application, an
ameliorative statute "must be aimed at mitigating a legislatively perceived undue
severity in the existing criminal law." State in the Interest of J.F., 446 N.J.
Super. 39, 55 (App. Div. 2016) (quoting Kendall v. Snedeker, 219 N.J. Super.
283, 286 n.1 (App. Div. 1987)).
A curative change to a statute is limited to actions that "remedy a
perceived imperfection in or misapplication of" the statute. Pisack v.
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-0196-20
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
TRAMAIN L. WILLIAMS, a/k/a TRAMAIN WILLIAMS, and TREMAIN WILLIAMS,
Defendant-Appellant. _________________________
Submitted January 12, 2022 – Decided April 1, 2022
Before Judges Gilson and Gooden Brown.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Union County, Municipal Appeal No. 6259.
Galantucci & Patuto, attorneys for appellant (S. Emile Lisboa, IV, of counsel and on the brief).
Daniel A. William, Union County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Milton S. Leibowitz, Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM Defendant Tramain Williams pled guilty to driving while intoxicated
(DWI) on July 28, 2019, in violation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50. He was sentenced in
accordance with the version of the DWI statute that was in effect on July 28,
2019. Because it was defendant's second DWI conviction, his sentence included
a mandatory two-year suspension of his driver's license.
Defendant appeals from his sentence, arguing that he should have been
sentenced under amendments to N.J.S.A. 39:4-50 that became effective on
December 1, 2019, shortly before he was sentenced. He contends that his two-
year license suspension should be shorter as permitted under the 2019
amendments. We hold that the amendments do not apply retroactively and
affirm defendant's sentence.
I.
In the early morning of July 28, 2019, the vehicle defendant was driving
was stopped when a police officer observed that the vehicle's headlights were
off, and the vehicle was swerving. When the officer went to speak with
defendant, she smelled alcohol and had defendant perform several field sobriety
tests. The officer then transported defendant to the police station, where he
submitted to a breath alcohol test that disclosed defendant had a blood alcohol
content of 0.15%.
A-0196-20 2 Defendant was charged with DWI and several other driving violations.
On January 16, 2020, defendant pled guilty in municipal court to DWI and to
obstruction of traffic, N.J.S.A. 39:4-67.
On the DWI conviction, the municipal court sentenced defendant as a
second offender to a two-year license suspension with the requirement that
defendant install an ignition interlock device on his vehicle for two years during
the suspension and one year thereafter. Defendant was also sentenced to
community service, jail time, and payments of various fines and penalties. On
the obstruction of traffic conviction, the municipal court ordered defendant to
pay fines and court costs.
Defendant informed the municipal court that he intended to seek a de novo
review and the court granted him a stay of the license suspension. Thereafter,
defendant filed for a de novo review by the Law Division.
In the Law Division, defendant challenged only his DWI sentence and
argued that he was entitled to pipeline retroactivity of the 2019 amendments to
the DWI statute. In that regard, he argued that he was not subject to a mandatory
two-year suspension of his driver's license but could be considered for a
suspension between one and two years. On August 28, 2020, the Law Division
issued an order and written opinion rejecting defendant's retroactivity argument.
A-0196-20 3 Thereafter, on September 16, 2020, the Law Division sentenced defendant to the
same DWI sentence that he had received in the municipal court with minimal
changes in penalty and fine amounts. Accordingly, defendant's sentence still
imposed the two-year license suspension and ignition interlock requirement.
Defendant requested a stay of his license suspension, but the Law Division
denied that request in an order dated September 16, 2020.
The Law Division did not enter a separate order or judgment of conviction
concerning the DWI sentence. Instead, that sentence is set forth in the transcript
of defendant's sentencing, which took place on September 16, 2020. Defendant
now appeals from the August 28, 2020 order entered by the Law Division that
rejected his argument for the pipeline retroactive application of the 2019
amendments to the DWI statute.
II.
On this appeal, defendant only challenges his DWI sentence and makes
one argument:
THE DECEMBER 1, 2019 AMENDMENTS TO THE DRIVING WHILE INTOXICATED STATUTE SHOULD BE AFFORDED PIPELINE RETROACTIVITY.
The question of whether a law applies retroactively "is a purely legal
question of statutory interpretation" based on legislative intent. State v. J.V.,
A-0196-20 4 242 N.J. 432, 442 (2020) (quoting Johnson v. Roselle EZ Quick LLC, 226 N.J.
370, 386 (2016)). "To determine the Legislature's intent, we look to the statute's
language and give those terms their plain and ordinary meaning." Ibid. (citing
DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 492 (2005)). If the language of the statute
clearly reflects the Legislature's intent, then courts apply the law as written,
affording the terms their plain meaning. Id. at 443. "If, however, the statutory
text is ambiguous," courts may "resort to 'extrinsic interpretative aids, including
legislative history,' to determine the statute's meaning." Ibid. (quoting State v.
S.B., 230 N.J. 62, 68 (2017)).
The law generally favors prospective application of new legislation.
James v. N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Co., 216 N.J. 552, 563 (2014). To determine if a statute
should be applied retroactively, courts use a two-part test: (1) whether the
Legislature intended to give the statute retroactive application; and (2) whether
retroactive application "will result in either an unconstitutional interference with
vested rights or a manifest injustice." Ibid. (quoting In re D.C., 146 N.J. 31, 50
(1996)). Under the first prong of that test, there are three circumstances that
will justify the retroactive application of a statute:
(1) the Legislature provided for retroactivity expressly, either in the language of the statute itself or its legislative history, or implicitly, by requiring retroactive effect to "make the statute workable or to
A-0196-20 5 give it the most sensible interpretation"; (2) "the statute is ameliorative or curative"; or (3) the parties' expectations warrant retroactive application.
[J.V., 242 N.J. at 444 (quoting Gibbons v. Gibbons, 86 N.J. 515, 522-23 (1981)).]
An ameliorative statute "refers only to criminal laws that effect a
reduction in a criminal penalty." Perry v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 459 N.J. Super.
186, 196 (App. Div. 2019) (quoting State v. Universal Mar., 300 N.J. Super.
578, 582 (App. Div. 1997)). To be afforded retroactive application, an
ameliorative statute "must be aimed at mitigating a legislatively perceived undue
severity in the existing criminal law." State in the Interest of J.F., 446 N.J.
Super. 39, 55 (App. Div. 2016) (quoting Kendall v. Snedeker, 219 N.J. Super.
283, 286 n.1 (App. Div. 1987)).
A curative change to a statute is limited to actions that "remedy a
perceived imperfection in or misapplication of" the statute. Pisack v. B & C
Towing, Inc., 240 N.J. 360, 371 (2020) (quoting James, 216 N.J. at 564). A
curative change does not "alter the act in any substantial way, but merely
clarifie[s] the legislative intent behind the [previous] act." Ibid. (alterations in
original) (quoting James, 216 N.J. at 564).
On August 23, 2019, the Legislature passed, and the Governor signed into
law, amendments to certain drunk driving offenses. See L. 2019, c. 248. Among
A-0196-20 6 other things, the amendments expanded the use of ignition interlock devices and
reduced the duration of license forfeitures. Ibid. Accordingly, the penalties for
second offenders of DWI were amended so that forfeiture of the right to operate
a motor vehicle is "for a period of not less than one year or more than two years
upon conviction." See id. at § 2. That amendment replaced the mandatory two-
year period of forfeiture for second offenders. Compare L. 2014, c. 54, § 2
(requiring two-year period of forfeiture) with L. 2019, c. 248, § 2 (allowing one
to two years of forfeiture); see also N.J.S.A. 39:4-50(a)(2).
The amendment also expanded the use of ignition interlock devices. See
L. 2019, c. 248, § 4. In that regard, the amendment required the device to remain
installed for "not less than two years or more than four years ," beyond the
installation during the period of license forfeiture. Ibid. That amendment
increased the statutory minimum for use of an ignition interlock device for
second offenders after the period of license forfeiture from one year to two
years. Compare L. 2009, c. 201, § 2 (requiring use of ignition interlock device
for at least one year) with L. 2019, c. 248, § 4 (mandating use of ignition
interlock device for at least two years); see also N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.17(b). The
amendment also increased the statutory maximum for the use of an ignition
interlock device for second offenders after the period of license forfeiture from
A-0196-20 7 three to four years. Compare L. 2009, c. 201, § 2 (permitting use of ignition
interlock device for up to three years) with L. 2019, c. 248, § 4 (allowing use of
ignition interlock device for up to four years); see also N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.17(b).
Most significantly for this appeal, all the 2019 amendments to the DWI
statute were to "take effect on the first day of the fourth month after enactment
and shall apply to any offense occurring on or after that date." L. 2019, c. 248,
§ 7. This statement by the Legislature "unequivocally" expresses an intent to
apply the new statute prospectively. State v. Scudieri, 469 N.J. Super. 507, 520
(App. Div. 2021). Consequently, since the 2019 amendments were signed into
law in August 2019, they became effective on December 1, 2019. In short, the
plain language of the 2019 amendments expresses the Legislature's intent to
apply the amendment prospectively. Scudieri, 469 N.J. Super. at 520. That ends
the inquiry.
Nevertheless, because the Legislature amended the DWI statute to
effectuate its determination that interlock devices serve as a greater deterrent to
drunk driving than a period of license forfeiture, any ameliorative or curative
nature of the amendments do not warrant retroactive application. Scudieri, 469
N.J. Super. at 515-16; see also Administrative Directive #25-19 (Dec. 4, 2019)
https://www.njcourts.gov/notices/2019/n191206a.pdf (explaining that "the new
A-0196-20 8 sentencing provisions apply only to defendants charged with a DWI or refusal
on or after December 1, 2019"); State v. Morales, 390 N.J. Super. 470, 472 (App.
Div. 2007) (explaining a directive issued by the Administrative Office of the
Courts is "unquestionably binding on all trial courts").
Despite the clear language of the Legislature, defendant argues that the
2019 amendments shifted the focus from license suspension to ignition interlock
devices. He, therefore, argues that the statute is ameliorative and should be
given pipeline retroactivity. The short rebuttal to that argument is the clear
language of the Legislature provides for prospective application and an
examination of the focus on interlock devices not as ameliorative to penalties
for DWI but rather as a recognition that the devices may be more effective. In
that regard, the Legislature found that ignition interlock devices are more
effective in deterring unlawful driving than license suspension because drunk
drivers often drive with suspended licenses. See L. 2019, c. 248, §1(b).
Defendant also argues that the term "offense" used to explain the
amendment's effective date is not defined in the statute. He then contends that
an offense does not appear on a driver's abstract until it is adjudicated and,
therefore, the offense refers to when defendant pled guilty or is convicted. We
have already rejected this argument. See Scudieri, 469 N.J. Super. at 525-28.
A-0196-20 9 In Scudieri, this court rejected a defendant's claim that the amendment to the
refusal statute, which was part of the 2019 DWI amendments, should be applied
retroactively. Id. at 520. In reaching that decision, the Scudieri court addressed
the meaning of "offense." Id. at 525. The court rejected the concept that offense
referred to the time of the conviction. Ibid. Instead, the Scudieri court held that
a plain reading of the 2019 legislation leads to the reasonable interpretation that
an "offense" is committed on the day of the motor vehicle violation. Id. at 526.
The Scudieri court's interpretation is also consistent with the plain and
accepted meaning of offense. The term "offense" is defined in dictionaries as
"a transgression of law" and "applies to the infraction of any law, rule, or code."
Offense, Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriamwebster.com/ dictionary/
offense (last visited Mar. 23, 2022); see also Black's Law Dictionary 1300 (11th
ed. 2019) (defining offense as "[a] violation of the law; a crime, often a minor
one").
Accordingly, we hold that the 2019 amendments to the DWI statute do not
apply retroactively. The amendments only apply to offenses that occur on or
after December 1, 2019. Defendant's DWI sentence was correct and included
the mandatory two-year license suspension for a second offense.
A-0196-20 10 Affirmed.
A-0196-20 11