State of New Jersey v. Sean Gallagher

• Court: New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division
• Decided: December 24, 2025
• Docket: A-0610-24
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-0610-24

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

SEAN GALLAGHER,

Defendant-Appellant. _________________________

Argued November 19, 2025 – Decided December 24, 2025

Before Judges Currier, Smith and Jablonski.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Monmouth County, Municipal Appeal No. 24-015.

John Menzel argued the cause for appellant.

Melinda A. Harrigan, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for respondent (Raymond S. Santiago, Monmouth County Prosecutor, attorney; Melinda A. Harrigan, of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM I.

On October 7, 2023, defendant was driving near Laurel Avenue in

Holmdel, New Jersey, when he was pulled over by a Holmdel Township police

officer due to a license plate violation. After stepping out of the car to perform

a field sobriety test, defendant failed it. His performance was captured on video,

giving the officer probable cause to arrest defendant for driving under the

influence of alcohol (DWI), N.J.S.A. 39:4-50. At the police station, defendant

refused to submit breath samples. Defendant was charged with DWI, refusal to

submit breath samples, reckless driving, careless driving, and other traffic-

related charges.

On April 24, 2024, defendant, represented by counsel, informed the court

he would plead guilty to the refusal charge. As part of a plea deal, the State

agreed to merge or dismiss the remaining charges. At sentencing, defendant's

driver's abstract revealed a 2003 DWI conviction and a February 1990 DWI

conviction. Defendant acknowledged the 2003 conviction but disavowed any

knowledge of the 1990 conviction, which took place in Garfield.

After placing the terms of the plea on the record, the municipal court

adjourned sentencing to resolve the question of whether the 1990 conviction on

defendant's abstract was his. On June 5, 2024, the municipal court heard

A-0610-24 2 argument on defendant's sentence. Defendant contended that the State had the

burden to prove the accuracy of the 1990 conviction listed in his driver's

abstract. He further argued there were no records which corroborated a 1990

DWI conviction. Defendant sought to testify that the 1990 conviction was not

his. Counsel stated defendant would testify he was living in Florida for a period

of time between 1989 and 1990. However, when the court directly asked

defendant about his proofs, defendant said he did not have anything to show he

was in Florida such as a change in driver's license or address or tax return. He

thought he returned to New Jersey in April 1990. The court noted that defendant

paid the surcharges associated with the 1990 conviction and questioned why

defendant would not contact the New Jersey Motor Vehicle Commission (MVC)

sooner to inquire about charges related to an offense he did not commit. The

court once more adjourned sentencing, to permit further briefing from the parties

on the issue.

On June 19, 2024, sentencing resumed, and defendant moved to be

sentenced as a first offender. Trial counsel informed the court that defendant

was ready to testify. When the court declined to hear defendant's testimony,

trial counsel proffered that defendant was in Florida at the time of the 1990

offense and conviction, but that he returned to New Jersey a few months later.

A-0610-24 3 Counsel also represented that the City of Garfield Municipal Court, where the

1990 DWI conviction emanated from, could not readily locate records tying

defendant to the 1990 conviction, although they reported the records could be in

storage. Based on the record before it, the municipal court found defendant was

present in New Jersey in 1990. Giving a presumption of validity to defendant's

driver's abstract, the court determined defendant's challenge to the 1990

conviction should be properly addressed through a motion for post-conviction

relief (PCR). The court denied defendant's motion to be sentenced as a first

offender.

Defendant then pled guilty to the refusal charge, and the court dismissed

the remaining charges. According to the terms of the plea agreement, the

municipal court sentenced defendant to a one-year license suspension, 48 hours

in the Intoxicated Driver Resource Center, along with penalties, fines and a

credit for 124 days for use of the interlock device. The court denied defendant's

motion to stay the sentence, and defendant surrendered his license.

Defendant next moved for a stay pending appeal to the Law Division,

which the Honorable Michael A. Guadagno, J.A.D. (ret.) granted on July 8,

2024. During the argument before Judge Guadagno, defense counsel requested

the court accept defendant's proffers regarding his assertion he was not living in

A-0610-24 4 New Jersey at the time of the 1990 convicted listed on his abstract. Thereafter,

Judge Guadagno concluded that a motion for PCR in Garfield Municipal Court

was the sole remedy for defendant's challenge to the 1990 DWI conviction listed

on his abstract. The judge affirmed defendant's sentence based on the 1990

conviction as a second offense, and ordered a credit for the days the interlock

device was installed and used in defendant's car, and for the days he did not have

his license because of the municipal court order. Defendant appealed.

On appeal, defendant argues the Law Division erred because: it did not

afford him the opportunity to be heard regarding the challenge to the accuracy

of the driver's abstract; a motion for PCR is not the appropriate recourse for this

matter; and the State retained the burden to prove the accuracy of the 1990

conviction on the driver's abstract.

II.

We summarized our "two-court" standard of review in State v. Triosi:

Our review of a de novo decision in the Law Division is limited. State v. Clarksburg Inn, 375 N.J. Super. 624, 639 (App. Div. 2005). We do not independently assess the evidence as if we were the court of first instance. State v. Locurto, 157 N.J. 463, 471 (1999). Rather, we focus our review on "whether there is 'sufficient credible evidence . . . in the record' to support the trial court's findings." State v. Robertson, 228 N.J. 138, 148 (2017) (alteration in

A-0610-24 5 original) (quoting State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 162 (1964)).

Deference is especially appropriate when, as here, two separate courts have examined the facts and reached the same conclusion. Under the two-court rule, we do not ordinarily alter concurrent findings of fact and credibility determinations made by two prior courts absent a very obvious and exceptional showing of error. Locurto, 157 N.J. at 474 (citation omitted).

The trial court's legal rulings, however, are considered de novo. Robertson, 228 N.J. at 148. A "trial court's interpretation of the law and the consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to any special deference." Rowe v. Bell & Gossett Co., 239 N.J. 531, 552 (2019) (quoting Manalapan Realty, LP v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995)).

[471 N.J. Super. 158, 164 (App. Div. 2022).]

III.

N.J.S.A. 39:4-50(a) provides:

A person who has been convicted of a previous violation of this section need not be charged as a second or subsequent offender in the complaint made against the person in order to render the person liable to the punishment imposed by this section on a second or subsequent offender, but if the second offense occurs more than 10 years after the first offense, the court shall treat the second conviction as a first offense for sentencing purposes and if a third offense occurs more than 10 years after the second offense, the court shall treat the third conviction as a second offense for sentencing purposes.

A-0610-24 6 [(Emphasis added.)]

A.

We begin with defendant's assertion that the Law Division erred in relying

on the driver's abstract as presumptively valid. It is well-settled that in quasi-

criminal matters such as DWI and refusal to submit a breath sample, the State

bears the burden of proving their case beyond a reasonable doubt. State v.

Cummings, 184 N.J. 84, 89 (2005). We have held that a driver's abstract is

sufficiently reliable and prima facie evidence of motor vehicle offenses, like

DWI. State v. Luzhak, 445 N.J. Super. 241, 249 (App. Div. 2016); see also State

v. Pitcher, 379 N.J. Super. 308, 319 (App. Div. 2005); State v. Zalta, 217 N.J.

Super. 209, 214 (App. Div. 1987). It follows, on this record, that as the State

supplied defendant's driver's abstract demonstrating three offenses, with the last

occurring at least ten years prior, the State met its burden of proof to convict

and sentence defendant as a second offender.

Defendant argues the 1990 conviction's presumption of validity only

stands if not challenged, contending that this challenge is an affirmative defense

under N.J.S.A. 2C:1-13(b). We are unpersuaded, as this proceeding is not

governed by New Jersey's Criminal Code. We have recently held that

affirmative defenses applicable in criminal cases are not applicable to motor

A-0610-24 7 vehicle violations. State v. Baverov, 482 N.J. Super. 344, 350 (App. Div. 2025)

(citing State v. Federico, 414 N.J. Super. 321, 326-27 (App. Div. 2010)).

Defendant next relies on Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000),

and Erlinger v. United States, 602 U.S. 821 (2024). Defendant offers these cases

to support his contention that any fact which increases the penalty for a crime

must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. We disagree, as Apprendi expressly

states, "[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the

penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted

to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt." 530 U.S. at 490 (emphasis

added). Similarly, Erlinger concluded the State has the same burden but in a

wholly different set of circumstances. Erlinger was a criminal case where the

Court found a jury must decide whether a crime was committed on separate

occasions or all at once for sentencing purposes, for which the State must have

proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 602 U.S. at 827-29. While additional

offenses factored into sentencing in Erlinger, as here, we conclude the

constitutional differences in the stakes between a criminal case and a municipal

court motor vehicle offense are too significant to consider Erlinger precedential.

Next, defendant claims his driver's abstract resembles a Shepard

document, outlined in Erlinger as documents a court may use to determine where

A-0610-24 8 a crime occurred and the legal elements that must be proven to secure the

conviction for the crime. Id. at 839. We reject this argument.

Our jurisprudence has established that a driver's abstract is prima facie

evidence of prior offenses and convictions. Luzhak, 445 N.J. Super. at 249. The

State properly offered defendant's abstract to show defendant had two prior

offenses to consider when sentencing him for the 2024 DWI. This proffer

comports with N.J.S.A. 39:4-50's requirements and our case law.

Notwithstanding defendant's bald assertion challenging the validity of the 1990

DWI conviction in Garfield, we conclude the State has satisfied its burden of

proof on the question of defendant's prior DWI history. Any facts which may

exist in the record on this question are in the control of Garfield and its

municipal court, not Holmdel Township and its municipal court. We conclude

the Law Division did not commit error when it assigned a presumption of

validity to defendant's abstract.

We next turn to defendant's argument, whether PCR is an appropriate

forum to address the question of whether defendant was in fact convicted of

DWI in Garfield municipal court in 1990.

A-0610-24 9 B.

Rule 7:10-2(a) states, "[a] person convicted of an offense may, pursuant

to this rule, file with the municipal court administrator of the municipality in

which the conviction took place, a petition for [PCR] captioned in the action in

which the conviction was entered."

Rule 7:10-2(b)(3) states, "[a] petition for [PCR] shall be the exclusive

means of challenging a judgment of conviction, except as otherwise required by

the Constitution of New Jersey. . . ."

Grounds for PCR include:

(1) [S]ubstantial denial in the conviction proceedings of defendant's rights under the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution or laws of New Jersey;

(2) [L]ack of jurisdiction of the court to impose the judgment rendered on defendant's conviction;

(3) [I]mposition of sentence in excess of or otherwise not in accordance with the sentence authorized by law; or

(4) [A]ny ground previously available as a basis for collateral attack on a conviction by habeas corpus or any other common law or statutory remedy.

[R. 7:10-2(c).]

A-0610-24 10 Motions for PCR must be filed within five years of the date of conviction

unless it is a petition to correct an illegal sentence, or it alleges facts showing

that the delay in filing was due to defendant's excusable neglect. R. 7:10-2(b)(1)

to (2).

Defendant's assertion is simple. He contends the 1990 Garfield Municipal

Court DWI conviction was not him but belongs to another Sean Gallagher. He

argues this despite the record showing that: he was convicted of another crime

in New Jersey in 1990, demonstrating his presence in this state during that year;

paid insurance surcharges for the 1990 DWI sentence; and took over thirty years

to challenge his driver's abstract, despite the presence of numerous other traffic

offenses over the years. Defendant offers no evidence, merely his unsupported

assertion. The record also shows that Garfield has not stated the 1990 conviction

records do not exist, just that they were not readily available and would take an

additional search.

Understanding the clear contours of the record before us, as well as the

plain language of Rule 7:10-2, we agree with the Law Division that defendant

must file a PCR motion challenging his 1990 conviction with Garfield Municipal

Court, not Holmdel. We discern no error in its conclusion that a PCR application

in Garfield was the appropriate forum.

A-0610-24 11 We express no opinion as to the outcome of defendant's PCR application

in Garfield, either as to the jurisdictional threshold for bringing such an action,

or the merits of such a motion.

To the extent that we have not addressed any remaining arguments by

defendant, it is because they lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a

written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2).

Affirmed.

A-0610-24 12