State of New Jersey v. Ronald J. Krier

• Court: New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division
• Decided: June 27, 2025
• Docket: A-1527-24
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-1527-24

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

RONALD J. KRIER,

Defendant-Appellant. ________________________

Argued June 4, 2025 – Decided June 27, 2025

Before Judges Rose and Puglisi.

On appeal from an interlocutory order of the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Monmouth County, Indictment No. 22-09-1386.

Patricia Colligan, Designated Counsel, argued the cause for appellant (Jennifer N. Sellitti, Public Defender, attorney; Patricia Colligan, on the briefs).

Alexandra E. Harrigan, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for respondent (Raymond S. Santiago, Monmouth County Prosecutor, attorney; Alexandra E. Harrigan, of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM By leave granted, defendant Ronald J. Krier appeals from a December 19,

2024 Law Division order denying his motion to dismiss count one of a two-

count Monmouth County indictment on jurisdictional grounds. 1 In count one,

the State alleges defendant committed third-degree endangering the welfare of

a child (EWC), N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)(1), by sending sexually explicit social

media communications to A.C.,2 a seventeen-year-old resident of Howell, New

Jersey.

On appeal, defendant reprises the following contentions for our

consideration:

POINT I

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT[]'S MOTION TO DISMISS COUNT ONE OF THE INDICTMENT FOR LACK OF TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION.

A. The trial court erred in finding defendant[]'s reliance on State v. Ferguson[, 238 N.J. 78 (2019)] to be misplaced.

B. The trial court erred in finding defendant[]'s reliance on [the exception to jurisdiction set forth in] N.J.S.A. 2C:1-3(b) to be misplaced.

1 Defendant did not move to dismiss the second count of the indictment, charging him with third-degree obscenity, N.J.S.A. 2C:34-3(b)(1). 2 Consistent with the indictment, we use initials to protect the privacy of the alleged victim. See R. 1:38-3(c)(9); see also N.J.S.A. 2A:82-46. A-1527-24 2 Unpersuaded, we affirm.

I.

The facts underpinning defendant's charges are straightforward,

accurately set forth in the motion judge's written decision, and for purposes of

this appeal, undisputed. We summarize the pertinent facts from the testimony

adduced at the grand jury hearing through the State's sole witness, Detective

Nicholas Saltzman of the Howell Township Police Department (HTPD).

On December 8, 2021, A.C., in the presence of her parents, reported to the

HTPD she received "sexual messages along with a short video of a man laying

on a bed naked [and] masturbating." The messages were sent through Facebook

messenger from a profile with the username "Ron Krier."

A police database search revealed Ron Krier was a forty-seven-year-old

male who resided in Morrisville, Pennsylvania. Police matched the photograph

of Ron Krier from the database to the Facebook profile picture. Later in the

investigation, law enforcement subpoenaed records from defendant's internet

provider and confirmed the messages emanated from defendant's Facebook

account.

Police reviewed the messages on A.C.'s phone, including a conversation

initiated by defendant on November 22, 2021, asking if A.C. was a "naughty

A-1527-24 3 girl." A.C. told defendant she was under the age of eighteen; defendant

responded, "[h]ow under?" A.C. said she was "young enough that [she would]

bring these messages to the Morrisville Police." Defendant asked whether A.C.

was in Morrisville. A.C. responded, "[n]o, I lived there for three years."

Defendant later asked A.C., "Where do you live now?" A.C. did not respond.

Defendant sent A.C. a photograph of her on a bike when she was thirteen

years old, apparently taken from her Instagram account. Defendant asked

whether A.C. had cycled around Morrisville and whether her mother worked at

the Dollar Tree. A.C. confirmed she lived in Morrisville when she was younger

and her mother had been so employed. A.C. told police she and her family

"moved back to New Jersey in 2019" and were living there at the time of the

incidents.

Immediately following argument on defendant's ensuing motion to

dismiss count one of the indictment, the judge issued an oral decision denying

his application. After we granted defendant's motion for leave to appeal, the

judge issued a written statement of reasons, largely similar to her oral decision.3

3 Defendant included the judge's written decision in his appellate appendix; the judge did not issue an amplification statement pursuant to Rule 2:5-1(d).

A-1527-24 4 The judge squarely addressed the issues raised in view of the principles

governing the sufficiency of an indictment and territorial jurisdiction.

Emphasizing the second prong of N.J.S.A. 2C:1-3(a)(1), the judge recognized

territorial jurisdiction is properly laid when "[e]ither the conduct which is an

element of the offense or the result which is such an element occurs within this

[s]tate." The judge therefore rejected defendant's argument that no evidence was

presented to the grand jury showing "he engaged in any conduct within New

Jersey that constitutes an element of the [EWC] offense." Citing the grand jury

transcript, the judge recognized, "[d]efendant is alleged to have impaired or

debauched the morals of the victim when [he] sent videos of himself naked and

masturbating . . . . Although . . . [d]efendant was in Pennsylvania at the time of

the offense, the victim was in New Jersey."

Next, the judge addressed defendant's claim that the exception to

territorial jurisdiction set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:1-3(b) "applies because his out of

state conduct was designed or likely to occur only in Pennsylvania where such

conduct would not constitute an[] offense." In doing so, the judge rejected

defendant's reliance on our Supreme Court's decision in Ferguson, where the

Court held this state "lacked territorial jurisdiction because the conduct charged

A-1527-24 5 was not an offense in the state where the result of the conduct occurred." The

judge reasoned:

Contrary to Ferguson[,] where the conduct and the result were both out of state and did not occur in New Jersey, the . . . result of [defendant's] conduct occurred in New Jersey. Further, the State presented evidence to the [g]rand [j]ury that the victim was harmed in New Jersey by showing that the victim lived in Howell . . . at the time she received explicit videos of . . . [d]efendant from . . . [d]efendant.

Citing our decision in State v. Tringali, 451 N.J. Super. 18, 28 (App. Div. 2017),

the motion judge was satisfied the State clearly demonstrated "a direct nexus

between the offense and New Jesey when it established . . . [d]efendant sent

sexually explicit messages to a minor who lived in Howell."

Further, assuming arguendo the exception applied, the motion judge found

unavailing "[d]efendant's argument that he only intended for his actions to occur

in Pennsylvania." The judge elaborated:

The utilization of the internet by individuals provides extensive reach and exposure to others all over the world. . . . Defendant used an online social media platform to send sexually explicit messages to a minor victim who used to reside near him. [As a m]atter of fact, as indicated by . . . [d]efendant['s] asking the victim if she was the girl on the bike and asking where she currently lived, . . . [d]efendant did not know where the victim resided. . . . Accordingly, . . . [d]efendant had no concrete idea where the victim was present and

A-1527-24 6 was contacting the victim over the internet where she could be anywhere.

II.

Seminal principles guide our review. An appellate court reviews a trial

court's decision on a motion to dismiss an indictment for abuse of discretion.

See State v. Saavedra, 222 N.J. 39, 55 (2015). However, a trial judge's legal

interpretations are subject to de novo review. State v. Grate, 220 N.J. 317, 329

(2015). We therefore conduct a de novo review of issues concerning statutory

construction, including the meaning of a statute's terms. See State v. Olivero,

221 N.J. 632, 638 (2015).

"At the grand jury stage, the State is not required to present enough

evidence to sustain a conviction." State v. Feliciano, 224 N.J. 351, 380 (2016).

"As long as the State presents 'some evidence establishing each element of the

crime to make out a prima facie case,' a trial court should not dismiss an

indictment." Ibid. (quoting Saavedra, 222 N.J. at 57).

The "first principle of any criminal prosecution is that a State must have

territorial jurisdiction to enforce the authority of its laws." State v. Denofa, 187

N.J. 24, 36 (2006). The court must therefore "consider whether there was some

evidence presented to the grand jury establishing that New Jersey has territorial

jurisdiction over the crime charged in the indictment." State v. Aloi, 458 N.J.

A-1527-24 7 Super. 234, 239 (App. Div. 2019). Courts broadly interpret the territorial

jurisdiction statute "to apply 'to offenses committed partly outside of the State.'"

Ibid. (quoting State v. Sumulikoski, 221 N.J. 93, 102 (2015)). There must be a

"direct nexus" between the criminal offense and this State in order to establish

jurisdiction. See Sumulikoski, 221 N.J. at 102.

As the motion judge recognized, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:1-3(a)(1), "a

person may be convicted under the law of this State of an offense committed by

his own conduct . . . if . . . [e]ither the conduct which is an element of the offense

or the result which is such an element occurs within this State." An "element of

the offense" is contained within the "description of the forbidden conduct in the

definition of the offense." N.J.S.A. 2C:1-14(h)(3)(a). Further, "[w]hen the

result which is an element of an offense consists of inflicting a harm upon a

resident of this State or depriving a resident of this State of a benefit, the result

occurs within this State, even if the conduct occurs wholly outside this State."

N.J.S.A. 2C:1-3(g). Therefore, "if a defendant's conduct or the result of his

conduct are elements of the crime charged and if either the conduct or result

occurred in New Jersey, the crime is prosecutable in this State, unless one of the

exceptions to territorial jurisdiction delineated in N.J.S.A. 2C:1-3 applies."

Ferguson, 238 N.J. at 94.

A-1527-24 8 In Tringali, we upheld an indictment against a Florida defendant for

cyberattacks that harmed a New Jersey company. 451 N.J. Super. at 22. The

defendant moved to dismiss the indictment for lack of jurisdiction, arguing his

conduct occurred in Florida and the purpose of the cyberattack was to target a

computer server in Utah. Id. at 25-26. Although the defendant and the server

were located out of state, we found a "direct nexus" between the defendant's

conduct and the resulting harm caused to the New Jersey company. Id. at 30.

We noted "one of the intended and actual end results of the conduct" was to

harm the New Jersey victim's internet service. Id. at 29.

Similarly, in Aloi, we concluded territorial jurisdiction was established

over a Maryland defendant who attempted to extort property from a New York

resident by contacting the victim's attorney in New Jersey. 458 N.J. Super. at

236-37. We noted all communications between the defendant and the attorney

occurred while the attorney was present in New Jersey. Id. at 237. We held the

"defendant's alleged attempted extortion was complete upon his delivery of his

threats to the attorney in New Jersey," as this conduct constituted the "purposely

threatening" element of the crime of attempted theft by extortion, N.J.S.A.

2C:20-5. Id. at 241-42. We therefore concluded sufficient evidence was

A-1527-24 9 presented to demonstrate the Maryland defendant "engaged in conduct

constituting an element of the crime charged in New Jersey." Id. at 242-43.

In the present matter, the State presented sufficient evidence to the grand

jury that, although defendant's conduct occurred in Pennsylvania when he

allegedly sent sexually explicit communications via Facebook messenger to

A.C., the resulting harm occurred in New Jersey because those messages were

received by a minor in this state. The State thus presented prima facie evidence

that defendant "knowingly engaged in sexual conduct with [A.C.] which would

impair or debauch the morals of a child" in New Jersey. See Model Jury Charges

(Criminal), "Endangering the Welfare of a Child, Sexual Conduct (Third

Degree) (N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)(1))" (rev. Apr. 7, 2014). Similar to the

circumstances presented in Tringali, there exists a "direct nexus" between

defendant's conduct and the harm caused to A.C., a New Jersey resident. See

451 N.J. Super. at 30.

We further conclude, as did the motion judge, defendant failed to satisfy

the exception to territorial jurisdiction under N.J.S.A. 2C:1-3(b), which provides

N.J.S.A. 2C:1-3(a)(1):

does not apply when either causing a specified result or a purpose to cause or danger of causing such a result is an element of an offense and the result occurs or is designed or likely to occur only in another jurisdiction

A-1527-24 10 where the conduct charged would not constitute an offense, unless a legislative purpose plainly appears to declare the conduct criminal regardless of the place of the result.

[(Emphasis added).]

The Legislature enacted this exception "to combat 'the danger of injustice

[that arises] in situations where the conduct occurs in one jurisdiction, the result

in another, and the . . . result is lawful in one and criminal in the other. '"

Ferguson, 238 N.J. at 97 (alterations in original) (quoting Model Penal Code and

Commentaries, cmt. 3 on § 1.03 at 43). "When [the] result [prohibited in the

forum state] is caused . . . in another jurisdiction that does not share the policy

of seeking its prevention, generally the interests of the state where the conduct

takes place are not significant enough to warrant application of its penal law."

Id. at 96-97 (alterations in original) (quoting Model Penal Code and

Commentaries, cmt. 3 on § 1.03 at 44).

Defendant maintains even if the resulting harm occurred in New Jersey,

the jurisdictional exception under N.J.S.A. 2C:1-3(b) applies because the result

of his conduct was "designed or likely to occur" only in Pennsylvania. He argues

the evidence presented to the grand jury established he believed the victim was

a Pennsylvania resident and the State presented no evidence to show he knew

the victim resided in New Jersey. Defendant further argues the exception in

A-1527-24 11 N.J.S.A. 2C:1-3(b) applies because Pennsylvania lacks a comparable

endangering statute and N.J.S.A. 2C:1-3(g) does not nullify the exception under

N.J.S.A. 2C:1-3(b).

We have considered defendant's contentions in view of the governing law

and conclude they lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written

opinion, R. 2:11-3(e)(2), beyond the comments that follow. We affirm

substantially for the reasons set forth by the motion judge in her well -reasoned

decision.

Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:1-3(b), N.J.S.A. 2C:1-3(a)(1) does not apply

when "the result occurs or is designed or likely to occur only in another

jurisdiction where the conduct charged would not constitute an offense."

(Emphasis added). Based on the plain reading of the statute, the exception is

not applicable in cases such as this one where the result occurred in this

jurisdiction. See State v. Lane, 251 N.J. 84, 94 (2022) (explaining statutes are

"given their plain and ordinary meaning").

As the State argues, the EWC statute does not require a defendant know

the victim's location. The evidence presented to the grand jury established

defendant did not know where the victim resided. The State presented evidence

to the grand jury that defendant asked the victim if she lived in Morrisville and

A-1527-24 12 she responded, "no." Defendant later asked A.C. where she lived when he sent

the messages and she did not respond. This evidence demonstrates "the result"

of defendant's conduct was not "likely to occur only in [Pennsylvania]" as

defendant asserts. See N.J.S.A. 2C:1-3(b). We therefore discern no error in the

motion judge's conclusion that defendant knew his conduct could reach an

individual in another jurisdiction because he communicated with A.C. via

Facebook messenger, an online platform capable of reaching individuals across

the country.

Affirmed.

A-1527-24 13