NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-3301-23
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
RASHEEN GLASPIE,
Defendant-Appellant. ________________________
Submitted July 29, 2025 – Decided September 2, 2025
Before Judges Bishop-Thompson and Walcott- Henderson.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Essex County, Indictment No. 16-03-0731.
Jennifer N. Sellitti, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Suzannah Brown, Designated Counsel, on the brief).
Theodore N. Stephens II, Essex County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Matthew E. Hanley, Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM Defendant Rasheen Glaspie appeals from the June 7, 2024 Law Division
order denying his second petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) from his
judgment of conviction without an evidentiary hearing. After reviewing the
facts and applicable law, we affirm for substantially the reasons stated in Judge
John I. Gizzo's well-reasoned opinion.
I.
In May 2015, following an investigation by the Essex County Prosecutor's
Office Homicide Task Force, defendant was arrested for shooting a victim
multiple times with a handgun. After the victim fell to the ground, defendant
and co-defendant Shaquan Leaks stood over him firing more shots from point
blank range, resulting in his death. Defendant and Leaks then fled the scene on
foot. When Leaks was arrested, he was found in possession of a handgun whose
ballistics matched evidence recovered at the crime scene. Defendant was
subsequently indicted on murder and weapons related charges.
On March 2, 2017, defendant pleaded guilty to first-degree aggravated
manslaughter, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4(a)(1), amended from first-degree murder,
N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1) and (2); and second-degree unlawful possession of a
weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b). The plea transcript reflects that before entering
his guilty plea, defendant acknowledged that he reviewed the plea form with his
trial counsel, signed each page, and was satisfied with the services of his trial
A-3301-23 2 counsel. He testified that he understood the terms of his guilty plea, understood
the consequences of his guilty plea. In response to the trial court's question of
whether defendant understood that he reserved the right to argue at sentencing
for a lower sentence than thirteen years, defendant replied: "Yes." Defendant
also acknowledged that he understood the court could not make a determination
on that day regarding whether he would be sentenced in accordance with the
State's recommendation. The court further explained to defendant that he was
subject to a maximum sentence of thirty-years' incarceration subject to the No
Early Release Act (NERA), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2, and the Graves Act, N.J.S.A.
2C:43-6(c).
Following defendant's plea allocution, the court accepted defendant's
guilty plea, satisfied that he entered the plea knowingly and voluntarily. In
exchange for defendant's guilty plea, the State agreed to recommend an
aggregate thirteen-year prison term subject to NERA. The sentences on each
conviction were to run concurrently, with the understanding that defendant
would be permitted to argue for a lesser sentence at sentencing.
Defendant was subsequently sentenced on April 21, in accordance with
the negotiated plea agreement. Defendant did not challenge his conviction or
sentence on direct appeal.
A-3301-23 3 Over a year later, in November 2018, defendant filed his first PCR
petition. The petition was dismissed without prejudice in January 2019.
Thereafter, defendant filed a self-represented motion to reconsider his
sentence based on mitigating factor fourteen, regarding his youthful age.
Defendant's motion was denied.
On October 3, 2022, defendant, then self-represented, filed a second PCR
petition, asserting claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and the imposition
of an illegal sentence. He also claimed the trial court abused its discretion. PCR
counsel subsequently filed a letter brief in further support of defendant's
petition. Defendant asserted his trial counsel: (1) was ineffective during plea
negotiations; (2) pressured him to accept the plea agreement; and (3) stated that
he would withdraw his representation if defendant did not accept the plea offer.
Consequently, defendant sought to withdraw his guilty plea.
According to defendant, his trial counsel informed him that on a "fourth
page" of the plea form the judge had agreed to impose a ten-year sentence,
despite the plea forms listing a thirteen-year term of incarceration. The plea
transcript does not mention this fourth page. Defendant claimed he would not
have accepted the plea offer had he known the fourth page did not exist and the
court did not agree to sentence him to ten years.
A-3301-23 4 Lastly, defendant argued his trial counsel was ineffective during
sentencing because counsel failed to object to the sentencing court's improper
consideration of the aggravating factors. He also contends trial counsel failed
to address the sentencing court's failure to have his manslaughter and weapons
sentences run concurrently with two other indictments, which were part of the
plea deal.
In a June 7, 2024 order accompanied by a written opinion, Judge Gizzo
denied defendant's petition. The judge first noted the procedural deficiency in
defendant's petition, concluding that it was time-barred pursuant to Rule 3:22-
12 because it was filed on October 3, 2022, six months after the filing deadline.
The judge further determined no exceptional circumstances existed to relax the
time bar.
As to the merits of defendant's petition, the judge concluded defendant
failed to satisfy the two-prong test articulated in Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668, 687 (1984) and State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 58 (1987). The judge
reasoned that defendant offered only bare assertions that he was pressured by
trial counsel and the plea agreement was not sufficiently explained to him.
Citing the plea transcript, the judge noted defendant affirmed his satisfaction
with trial counsel's representation and acknowledged the court explained the
terms of the plea agreement.
A-3301-23 5 In regard to defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim related to
sentencing, that claim was likewise barred under Rule 3:22-5, as the issue was
previously adjudicated in defendant's motion for reconsideration in May 2021.
Nonetheless, the judge considered the merits of defendant's claim and concluded
trial counsel's arguments at sentencing were "reasonable'' and "well-made."
The judge analyzed defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea under
State v. Slater, 198 N.J. 145 (2009), finding none of the factors weighed in his
favor. He concluded defendant failed to demonstrate that a denial of his motion
to withdraw his guilty plea would perpetuate a fundamental injustice. The judge
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-3301-23
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
RASHEEN GLASPIE,
Defendant-Appellant. ________________________
Submitted July 29, 2025 – Decided September 2, 2025
Before Judges Bishop-Thompson and Walcott- Henderson.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Essex County, Indictment No. 16-03-0731.
Jennifer N. Sellitti, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Suzannah Brown, Designated Counsel, on the brief).
Theodore N. Stephens II, Essex County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Matthew E. Hanley, Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM Defendant Rasheen Glaspie appeals from the June 7, 2024 Law Division
order denying his second petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) from his
judgment of conviction without an evidentiary hearing. After reviewing the
facts and applicable law, we affirm for substantially the reasons stated in Judge
John I. Gizzo's well-reasoned opinion.
I.
In May 2015, following an investigation by the Essex County Prosecutor's
Office Homicide Task Force, defendant was arrested for shooting a victim
multiple times with a handgun. After the victim fell to the ground, defendant
and co-defendant Shaquan Leaks stood over him firing more shots from point
blank range, resulting in his death. Defendant and Leaks then fled the scene on
foot. When Leaks was arrested, he was found in possession of a handgun whose
ballistics matched evidence recovered at the crime scene. Defendant was
subsequently indicted on murder and weapons related charges.
On March 2, 2017, defendant pleaded guilty to first-degree aggravated
manslaughter, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4(a)(1), amended from first-degree murder,
N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1) and (2); and second-degree unlawful possession of a
weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b). The plea transcript reflects that before entering
his guilty plea, defendant acknowledged that he reviewed the plea form with his
trial counsel, signed each page, and was satisfied with the services of his trial
A-3301-23 2 counsel. He testified that he understood the terms of his guilty plea, understood
the consequences of his guilty plea. In response to the trial court's question of
whether defendant understood that he reserved the right to argue at sentencing
for a lower sentence than thirteen years, defendant replied: "Yes." Defendant
also acknowledged that he understood the court could not make a determination
on that day regarding whether he would be sentenced in accordance with the
State's recommendation. The court further explained to defendant that he was
subject to a maximum sentence of thirty-years' incarceration subject to the No
Early Release Act (NERA), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2, and the Graves Act, N.J.S.A.
2C:43-6(c).
Following defendant's plea allocution, the court accepted defendant's
guilty plea, satisfied that he entered the plea knowingly and voluntarily. In
exchange for defendant's guilty plea, the State agreed to recommend an
aggregate thirteen-year prison term subject to NERA. The sentences on each
conviction were to run concurrently, with the understanding that defendant
would be permitted to argue for a lesser sentence at sentencing.
Defendant was subsequently sentenced on April 21, in accordance with
the negotiated plea agreement. Defendant did not challenge his conviction or
sentence on direct appeal.
A-3301-23 3 Over a year later, in November 2018, defendant filed his first PCR
petition. The petition was dismissed without prejudice in January 2019.
Thereafter, defendant filed a self-represented motion to reconsider his
sentence based on mitigating factor fourteen, regarding his youthful age.
Defendant's motion was denied.
On October 3, 2022, defendant, then self-represented, filed a second PCR
petition, asserting claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and the imposition
of an illegal sentence. He also claimed the trial court abused its discretion. PCR
counsel subsequently filed a letter brief in further support of defendant's
petition. Defendant asserted his trial counsel: (1) was ineffective during plea
negotiations; (2) pressured him to accept the plea agreement; and (3) stated that
he would withdraw his representation if defendant did not accept the plea offer.
Consequently, defendant sought to withdraw his guilty plea.
According to defendant, his trial counsel informed him that on a "fourth
page" of the plea form the judge had agreed to impose a ten-year sentence,
despite the plea forms listing a thirteen-year term of incarceration. The plea
transcript does not mention this fourth page. Defendant claimed he would not
have accepted the plea offer had he known the fourth page did not exist and the
court did not agree to sentence him to ten years.
A-3301-23 4 Lastly, defendant argued his trial counsel was ineffective during
sentencing because counsel failed to object to the sentencing court's improper
consideration of the aggravating factors. He also contends trial counsel failed
to address the sentencing court's failure to have his manslaughter and weapons
sentences run concurrently with two other indictments, which were part of the
plea deal.
In a June 7, 2024 order accompanied by a written opinion, Judge Gizzo
denied defendant's petition. The judge first noted the procedural deficiency in
defendant's petition, concluding that it was time-barred pursuant to Rule 3:22-
12 because it was filed on October 3, 2022, six months after the filing deadline.
The judge further determined no exceptional circumstances existed to relax the
time bar.
As to the merits of defendant's petition, the judge concluded defendant
failed to satisfy the two-prong test articulated in Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668, 687 (1984) and State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 58 (1987). The judge
reasoned that defendant offered only bare assertions that he was pressured by
trial counsel and the plea agreement was not sufficiently explained to him.
Citing the plea transcript, the judge noted defendant affirmed his satisfaction
with trial counsel's representation and acknowledged the court explained the
terms of the plea agreement.
A-3301-23 5 In regard to defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim related to
sentencing, that claim was likewise barred under Rule 3:22-5, as the issue was
previously adjudicated in defendant's motion for reconsideration in May 2021.
Nonetheless, the judge considered the merits of defendant's claim and concluded
trial counsel's arguments at sentencing were "reasonable'' and "well-made."
The judge analyzed defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea under
State v. Slater, 198 N.J. 145 (2009), finding none of the factors weighed in his
favor. He concluded defendant failed to demonstrate that a denial of his motion
to withdraw his guilty plea would perpetuate a fundamental injustice. The judge
further concluded defendant was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing.
II.
Defendant raises three points on appeal for our consideration:
POINT I – THE PCR COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT [DEFENDANT'S] PETITION FOR [PCR] WAS TIME-BARRED AND IN FAILING TO RELAX THE TIME-BAR DUE TO EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES.
POINT II – THE PCR COURT ERRED IN DENYING [DEFENDANT'S] PCR WITHOUT AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING ON HIS CLAIM THAT HIS GUILTY PLEA WAS THE RESULT OF INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF TRIAL COUNSEL.
POINT III – THE PCR COURT ERRED IN DENYING [DEFENDANT'S] CLAIM THAT TRIAL COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE AT SENTENCING.
A-3301-23 6 Having considered defendant's arguments, we affirm substantially for the
reasons expressed by the PCR judge. We add the following comments.
We apply a de novo standard of review when a PCR court does not conduct
an evidentiary hearing. State v. Walker, 478 N.J. Super. 553, 560 (App. Div.
2024). However, a PCR court's decision to proceed without an evidentiary
hearing is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Vanness, 474 N.J. Super.
609, 623 (App. Div. 2023) (citing State v. Brewster, 429 N.J. Super. 387, 401
(App. Div. 2013)). When petitioning for PCR, a defendant must establish he is
entitled "to PCR by a preponderance of the evidence." State v. O'Donnell, 435
N.J. Super. 351, 370 (App. Div. 2014) (citing State v. Preciose, 129 N.J. 451,
459 (1992)).
Rule 3:22-12 prescribes the time limitations for filing a PCR petition. In
relevant part, the Rule provides no PCR petition "shall be filed more than [five]
years after the date of . . . the judgment of conviction that is being challenged."
R. 3:22-12(a)(1). This five-year time limitation runs from either the date of
conviction or sentencing, whichever defendant is challenging. State v. Milne,
178 N.J. 486, 491 (2004); State v. Goodwin, 173 N.J. 583, 594 (2002).
We agree with the judge that defendant's PCR petition was untimely under
Rule 3:22-12(a)(4). Defendant's first PCR petition was filed in November 2018
and dismissed without prejudice on January 2, 2019; however, the record
A-3301-23 7 provides no basis for the dismissal. We do not consider the petition filed on
October 3, 2022 timely because it was not amended or refiled within ninety days
after the dismissal, or within five years from the April 21, 2021 sentencing or
the May 4, 2017 judgment of conviction. Therefore, defendant's petition is
barred, having been filed out of time.
Defendant's PCR petition was similarly untimely filed under Rule 3:22-
12(a)(2). To avoid dismissal of a second PCR petition, a defendant must present
evidence to satisfy one of three enumerated exceptions: a new rule of law, newly
discovered evidence, or ineffective assistance of prior PCR counsel. R. 3:22-
4(b)(2). Even when a defendant's PCR contentions fit within these exceptions,
a second or subsequent PCR petition must be timely filed. R. 3:22-4(b)(1).
Defendant's second petition did not plead, on its face, one of the three
criteria under Rule 3:22-12(a)(2) and was not timely filed within one year after
the latest of one of the criteria. We are, therefore, satisfied that defendant's
second PCR was properly denied under Rule 3:22-4(b).
We further agree with the judge that defendant's petition fails on the
merits. We add that "[p]ost-conviction relief is neither a substitute for direct
appeal, . . . nor an opportunity to relitigate cases already decided on the merits."
Preciose, 129 N.J. at 459 (citation omitted). The merits of defendant's
sentencing have already been adjudicated, which "ordinarily constitutes a
A-3301-23 8 procedural bar to the reassertion of the same ground as a basis for post -
conviction review." Id. at 476 (citing R. 3:22-5). Finally, defendant is
precluded from raising an issue on PCR that could have been raised on direct
appeal. State v. McQuaid, 147 N.J. 464, 483 (1997).
Affirmed.
A-3301-23 9