State of New Jersey v. Quadir Snell

• Court: New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division
• Decided: June 22, 2026
• Docket: A-2837-25
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-2837-25

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

QUADIR SNELL,

Defendant-Respondent.

Argued June 1, 2026 – Decided June 22, 2026

Before Judges Sabatino and Walcott-Henderson.

On appeal from an interlocutory order of the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Essex County, Indictment Nos. 24-10-2047 and 24-10-2048.

Hannah Kurt, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for appellant (Theodore N. Stephens, II, Essex County Prosecutor, attorney; Hannah Kurt, of counsel and on the briefs).

Rachel A. Neckes, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for respondent (Jennifer N. Sellitti, Public Defender, attorney; Rachel A. Neckes, of counsel and on the brief). PER CURIAM

On leave granted, the State appeals the trial court's February 12, 2025,

order granting defendant Quadir Snell's motion to suppress a gun that police

officers seized without a warrant from the back seat floor of his parked car. For

the reasons that follow, we affirm.

I.

The following relevant facts appear in the motion record.

On July 26, 2024, at 1:32 a.m., a Newark resident, who happened to be an

off-duty police officer, observed a car parked on the side of the street with the

engine still running. The observer noted defendant appeared to be asleep in the

driver's seat. Defendant was sprawled across the driver's side in such a way that

his left leg was extended out through the open window, and his right leg was

bent with his knee leaning against the horn, creating a disturbance. The off -duty

officer had been awakened by this noise and called the police.

Body worn camera ("BWC") footage from an arresting officer shows that

police approached the car and shined a flashlight in defendant's face. There is

no audio during this portion of the recording, so it is unclear whether police

verbally attempted to rouse defendant at that moment. Additionally, it is unclear

from the record whether the off-duty officer had made any unsuccessful attempts

A-2837-25 2 to rouse defendant. After defendant did not respond to the flashlight shining,

the officer with the body camera stuck his hand through the car's open window

and illuminated the back passenger compartment of the car with his flashlight.

Although the camera does not depict the same view as the officer, he seemingly

spotted something on the floor of the car. At this moment, the officer activated

the audio of his BWC and informed the other officers he saw a "firearm." After

attempting to open several of the car's doors, the officer successfully opened the

driver's side rear door and removed a handgun from the floor underneath the

driver's seat. Aside from shining the light from the flashlight in defendant's

face, no officers verbally addressed defendant or attempted to rouse him at this

point.

After removing the gun from the car, the officer with the BWC stated,

"[l]et's get him out the car alright" and opened the driver's side door. This action

moved defendant's foot and woke him up. The officer asked defendant if he was

alright and said the police were trying to "help him."

Defendant was removed from the car and the police handcuffed him and

searched his person. He was not aggressive while being detained but was

evidently groggy and incoherent.

A-2837-25 3 Defendant was placed in the back of a police car and informed he was

under arrest for driving under the influence ("DUI"). The police examined the

handgun at the scene and observed that it was loaded with hollow nose bullets.

Additionally, police discovered a bottle of Hennessey liquor in defendant's car.

Defendant denied drinking and any knowledge of the handgun.

Defendant was indicted for second-degree unlawful possession of a

handgun without a permit, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b) and fourth-degree unlawful

possession of hollow point bullets, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-3(f). Because he had been

previously convicted of conspiracy to commit aggravated assault, he was also

indicted for second-degree possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, N.J.S.A.

2C:39-7(b) and first-degree possession of a firearm by a felon convicted of a No

Early Release Act 1 offense, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(j).2

Defendant filed a motion to suppress the handgun. Oral argument was

heard on the motion on January 6, 2026. 3 The State argued that police had

lawfully searched defendant's car as part of their community caretaking

1 N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2 2 The DUI, if it was charged at all, is not pertinent to our analysis. 3 The parties elected not to present testimony of any witnesses. However, the motion judge was provided with the BWC and various other exhibits. A-2837-25 4 function, and after the handgun was "observed in plain view," they were

authorized to remove it "for the safety of defendant himself" as well as the safety

of the police.

The motion judge questioned the State's reliance on the community

caretaking doctrine since the BWC footage reflected that police, apart from the

initial flashlight shining in his face, did not attempt to communicate with or

rouse defendant until after the gun was retrieved. The prosecutor at oral

argument acknowledged that police "did not initially ask if [defendant] was ok,"

but argued that the intention of shining the flashlight in defendant's face was to

"see what condition the defendant is in."

Defendant emphasized that the officer with the BWC breached the car's

front window to view the gun on the floor by sticking his hand through the open

window to shine the flashlight in the back seat, a finding explicitly adopted by

the court. He additionally underscored the fact that, on the BWC footage, there

was apparently "no urgency" from the police to check on defendant's well-being

prior to searching the car, undercutting the State's community caretaking

argument.

Both parties asserted that there was no factual dispute and consented to

the judge making a decision without an evidentiary hearing and testimony. The

A-2837-25 5 State did not make other arguments to justify the warrantless search apart from

the "plain view" and "community caretaking" exceptions.

On February 12, 2026, the Honorable Lori E. Grifa, J.S.C. granted

defendant's motion to suppress in a written decision. Regarding the State's plain

view argument, the judge determined that the handgun, although it "undoubtably

gave the police cause for further inquiry," was not immediately recognizable as

"evidence of a crime." She further noted that cars are a space "where the

occupant has a legitimate expectation of privacy" and concluded that this

expectation was violated when the officer breached the front window with his

flashlight while conducting an investigatory search.

Although the judge observed that the State did not argue this case

presented exigent circumstances,4 she concluded that the circumstances here

were not exigent. The judge noted that from defendant's "supine position" he

had "no immediate access to the gun, located on the floor behind the driver's

seat." She also observed that "police were closer to the gun and were clearly

positioned to thwart any efforts to reach for it."

With regard to the State's community caretaking argument, the judge

4 The prosecutor at the motion argument did argue that an unsecured gun potentially created a dangerous situation for both defendant and the police officers. A-2837-25 6 found that police "expressed absolutely no interest or concern for the

[defendant]" and, in fact, allowed him to continue lying in the car -- with his

knee against the horn creating a nuisance -- while they prioritized seizing the

gun. The judge noted "[t]here is no doubt the police could have used their

observations to immediately remove the man from the car. Then, they could

have turned their attention to the gun."

On this interlocutory appeal, the State argues the handgun should not have

been suppressed for the following reasons:

POINT I

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO SUPPRESS.

A. THE HANDGUN WAS SEIZABLE UNDER THE PLAIN VIEW DOCTRINE.

B. THE COMMUNITY CARETAKING DOCTRINE JUSTIFIED THE SEARCH.

For substantially the same reasons as discussed in the motion judge's

detailed written opinion, we affirm the suppression of the handgun, although we

add the following commentary.

II.

A trial judge's decision to suppress evidence is reviewed for an abuse of

A-2837-25 7 discretion. State v. Amang, 481 N.J. Super. 355, 374 (App. Div. 2025) (quoting

State v. Nyema, 249 N.J. 509, 526 (2022)). In general, appellate courts must

"uphold the factual findings underlying the trial court's decision so long as those

findings are 'supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record.'" Nyema,

249 N.J. at 526 (quoting State v. Ahmad, 246 N.J. 592, 609 (2021)). "[F]indings

should be disturbed only if they are so clearly mistaken 'that the interests of

justice demand intervention and correction.'" State v. Elders, 192 N.J. 224, 244

(2007) (quoting State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 162 (1964)). Although factual

findings are reviewed deferentially, the trial court's application of the law and

"consequences that flow from established facts" are subject to de novo review.

State v. Hubbard, 222 N.J. 249, 263 (2015).

Both the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article

I, Paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution protect people from unreasonable

searches and seizures by requiring warrants issued upon probable cause.

Nyema, 249 N.J. at 527. "Searches and seizures conducted without warrants

issued upon probable cause are presumptively unreasonable and invalid." State

v. Goldsmith, 251 N.J. 384, 398 (2022) (quoting Elders, 192 N.J. at 246). To

overcome this presumption, "the State must show by a preponderance of the

evidence that the search falls within one of the well-recognized exceptions to

A-2837-25 8 the warrant requirement." State v. Smart, 253 N.J. 156, 165 (2023) (citing State

v. Manning, 240 N.J. 308, 329 (2020)).

A. Plain View

The State first argues in its brief the "plain view" exception applies to this

case. The plain view doctrine recognizes that a police officer "need not 'close

his eyes to suspicious evidence in plain view.'" State v. Reninger, 430 N.J.

Super. 517, 535 (App. Div. 2013) (quoting State v. Bruzzese, 94 N.J. 210, 237

(1983)). The exception authorizes officers to seize contraband they can plainly

see, or otherwise sense, so long as the following two prongs are met: (1) "the

officer must lawfully be in the area where he observed and seized the

incriminating item or contraband"; and (2) "it must be immediately apparent that

the seized item is evidence of a crime." State v. Gonzales, 227 N.J. 77, 101

(2016) (emphasis added). For it to be "immediately apparent" that an object is

evidence of a crime, "a police officer must have 'probable cause to associate the

[item] with criminal activity,'" and that probable cause is determined by looking

to "'what the police officer reasonably knew at the time of the seizure.'"

Reninger, 430 N.J. Super. at 536 (quoting Bruzzese, 94 N.J. at 237).

We need not consider whether an unsecured firearm located on the floor

of a car is immediately recognizable as contraband because the State has not

A-2837-25 9 demonstrated that the firearm was viewed from a lawful area. At the trial level,

defendant principally relied on State v. Mandel, 455 N.J. Super. 109, 112 (App.

Div. 2018), to demonstrate that police here had not viewed the gun from a lawful

area.

In Mandel, a police officer leaned his head into the open driver's side

window during a traffic stop to hear the driver over the sound of traffic, after

placing his head inside the vehicle, he smelled marijuana and subsequently

searched the car and discovered contraband.5 Ibid. The defendant in that case

argued that, but for physically intruding the interior of the car, the officer would

not have been in a position to smell the marijuana. Id. at 115. Although we

determined that this minimal physical intrusion into the vehicle constituted a

search, we found that the plain view, or "plain smell," exception still applied

because the purpose of the intrusion (i.e., hearing the driver over busy traffic)

was reasonable, and non-investigatory. Id. at 116.

The same justifications are not present in this appeal. It is undisputed that

the BWC officer only spotted the handgun, beneath the driver's seat, after he put

5 After the enactment of the Cannabis Regulatory, Enforcement Assistance, and Marketplace Modernization Act ("CREAMMA"), the Supreme Court has acknowledged that the smell of marijuana alone no longer constitutes probable cause of criminal activity. State v. Cohen, 254 N.J. 308, 328 (2023). However, CREAMMA was not enacted when Mandel was decided. A-2837-25 10 his hand, holding his flashlight, through the car's window in order to get a better

view of the rear passenger compartment. Additionally, neither party contends

that the gun was otherwise visible from the car's exterior.

The State characterized the purpose of this intrusion, however brief, as a

"survey" of defendant's car to see if there was anything within that might pose a

risk to defendant and the officers. Although we are appreciative of officer safety

concerns, the purpose here, unlike in Mandel, was manifestly investigative. At

the time the officer examined the rear passenger compartment of the car, there

had been no communication with defendant that established probable cause that

there was a weapon or some other potentially dangerous contraband in the car's

rear compartment. Because the police officer only saw the firearm after he

physically breached the car to conduct an investigation, he did not demonstrably

view the handgun from a lawful viewing area. Nor did the officer, as the

exception requires, seize it from a lawful area. Gonzales, 227 N.J. at 101. Prong

one of the plain view exception was not met.

At oral argument on appeal, defendant called our attention to Collins v.

Virginia, 584 U.S. 586, 596 (2018), and State v. Ingram, 474 N.J. Super. 522,

538-39 (App. Div. 2023) for the principle that even if an officer is within the

lawful viewing area, if the officer does not have a right of access to the visible

A-2837-25 11 contraband, he cannot enter a constitutionally protected area without a warrant

to seize it. Both of these cases dealt with incriminating items visible in plain

view from a lawful area but confined within the curtilage of a private residence.

We recognize that a vehicle is not subject to the same stringent constitutional

protections as a private residence. See State v. Witt, 223 N.J. 409, 450 (2015).

However, a vehicle is still a private space, and the officer required justification

for his entrance into the space that allowed him to see the handgun. See State

v. Keaton, 222 N.J. 438, 450 (2015) (suppressing evidence seen in plain view

after an officer entered the defendant's overturned car to retrieve registration

information).

With regard to the State's suggestion that exigent circumstances justified

the intrusion, we agree with the motion judge's factual findings. The gun was

not within defendant's reach, police outnumbered him, and he was unconscious

and unresponsive.

B. Community Caretaking

The State alternatively argues that the search of defendant's car was

justified under the community caretaking doctrine as, it asserts, the primary

objective of police was to aid an unresponsive individual who was potentially

in need of medical intervention.

A-2837-25 12 "Courts have allowed certain warrantless searches under the Fourth

Amendment when police officers have acted not in their law enforcement or

criminal investigatory role, but rather in a community caretaking function ."

State v. Bogan, 200 N.J. 61, 73 (2009) (finding police had lawfully entered an

apartment without a warrant when they were trying to assist an unsupervised

young boy and inadvertently found a suspected child molester). Local police

"engage in what, for want of a better term, may be described as community

caretaking functions, totally divorced from the detection, investigation or

acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal statute." Id. at 73-

74 (quoting Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441 (1973)). These functions

include "protecting the vulnerable from harm and preserving property." State v.

Edmonds, 211 N.J. 117, 141 (2012).

In situations where the community caretaker doctrine applies, the actions

of police are reviewed with "a standard of reasonableness" and the police do not

need to establish probable cause or reasonable suspicion. State v. Diloreto, 180

N.J. 264, 276 (2004).

As recognized by both counsel at oral argument, the police's investigatory

and caretaking functions contribute to overall public safety. Therefore, police

action is not automatically encompassed within the community caretaking

A-2837-25 13 exception merely because it is undertaken for the purpose of ensuring public

safety.

The State argues that the primary purpose of police approaching defendant

in this case was to ensure his well-being, particularly because he was completely

unresponsive. The State asserts that the gun needed to be secured to ensure the

safety of both the police and defendant, who may have potentially awoken in a

panicked or aggressive condition. The State draws particular attention to the

fact that, after seizing the gun, the police turned their attention to rousing

defendant only moments later.

Although we do not question that the police had public safety 6 concerns,

the motion judge soundly concluded that the BWC footage does not support the

State's characterization of this interaction as being primarily concerned with

defendant's medical well-being. On arriving at the scene, officers did not

attempt to communicate with or rouse defendant prior to investigating the back

seat of the car other than to shine a flashlight in his face. The police did not

attempt to physically examine defendant or check for a pulse until after the gun

was retrieved. Police also did not communicate with defendant about his

6 Defendant does not contest that applicable firearms regulations do not allow an unsecured handgun to be on the floor of a car's interior while the engine is running. N.J.S.A. 2C:58-4.6(b)(1) A-2837-25 14 physical and mental condition until he was informed that he was under arrest,

handcuffed, and secured in the back of a police vehicle.

Although without a testimonial hearing, one cannot know for certain

exactly what the police knew about the situation before they arrived, the totality

of the circumstances suggest that they attributed defendant's condition to

intoxication and initially investigated the car to confirm this suspicion. While

deterring drunk driving certainly contributes to overall public safety, that

concern is not sufficiently related to ensuring this particular defendant's well-

being and is more closely related to the police's investigative functions. We

therefore concur with the trial judge's characterization of these facts, and the

ultimate conclusion that the community caretaking doctrine does not apply here.

III.

Because neither of the two exceptions to the warrant requirement invoked

by the state are availing, we affirm the trial court's grant of defendant's motion

to suppress the handgun.

Affirmed.

A-2837-25 15