NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-1215-23
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
ONE 2004 INFINITY G35, CLAIMANT – JARVIS MCCLOUD (R/O),
Defendant-Appellant.
Submitted April 30, 2025 – Decided July 2, 2025
Before Judges Marczyk and Paganelli.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Middlesex County, DC-008108-17.
Jarvis McCloud, appellant pro se.
Yolanda Ciccone, Middlesex County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Susan L. Berkow, Special Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM This appeal stems from a civil forfeiture matter. Claimant, Jarvis
McCloud, appeals from the trial court's October 26, 2023 order denying his
motion to vacate the default judgment entered in favor of the State. We affirm.
I.
Claimant was arrested and charged with various offenses in April 2017.
In June 2017, the State filed a complaint for forfeiture regarding claimant's 2004
Infinity automobile pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:64-1 to -13.1 The court served
claimant with the complaint later that month. On July 27, 2017, the court
entered an order of conditional dismissal without prejudice subject to
reinstatement upon the conclusion of claimant's criminal proceedings. 2
Claimant pled guilty to numerous crimes including robbery and weapon offenses
in November 2017.
In October 2018, the State requested the stay be lifted and the forfeiture
matter reinstated as claimant's criminal proceedings had been resolved. The
matter was subsequently reinstated; however, the State acknowledges "service
1 The vehicle was valued at $2,800. 2 The State asserts it requested the conditional dismissal after it was served with a copy of claimant's answer. A-1215-23 2 of the order reinstating [the] matter may have been mailed to [claimant] at the
wrong address." Shortly after the stay was lifted, default was entered.
While preparing a motion for final default judgment, the State noticed
claimant had not filed his answer with the court. The State forwarded claimant's
answer to the court in January and March 2019. However, the court did not
accept the answer. In April 2019, the court granted the State's application to
enter final default judgment against claimant.
According to claimant, he reached out to the State on May 30, 2021,
"requesting an update of the case." Although he asserts he never received the
order entering default judgment, he acknowledged he was advised on June 15,
2021, that default judgment was entered against him.
On December 6, 2022, claimant filed a motion to vacate the default
judgment.3 The State opposed the motion. On February 15, 2023, the court
entered an order denying claimant's motion to vacate the default judgment. The
court reasoned that since claimant "was aware of the judgment in June of 2021,
3 Claimant filed requests to reinstate in November 2021 and again in March 2022. The applications were not properly filed. The court responded on March 10, 2022, with a deficiency notice rejecting claimant's pleading as he did not submit a filing fee and was in default. He was further directed he could "file a motion to vacate the default with [his] answer."
A-1215-23 3 but did not file his motion until December of 2022, the motion to vacate default
judgment [was] denied as untimely pursuant to R[ule] 4:50-2."
Instead of moving to reconsider or appeal the February 15, 2023 order,
claimant submitted a notice of motion to file as within time on April 20, 2023.
On July 25, 2023, claimant re-filed the same documents, attempting to vacate
the default judgment. The State opposed the application. On October 26, 2023,
the court again denied claimant's motion as untimely "pursuant to R[ule] 4:50-
2."4
II.
Claimant asserts he was incarcerated, denied due process, and his property
was taken without him having a chance to present his defense in court. He
further contends the State sought to seize his property without showing a prima
facie case. Claimant broadly claims the COVID-19 pandemic made it difficult
to correspond and communicate from prison on his forfeiture case. He also
argues the default judgment violated the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth
Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment.
4 Claimant is appealing only from the October 26, 2023 order, not the February 15, 2023 order. A-1215-23 4 The State counters that even if we accept the date claimant advises he
received actual notice of the default judgment—June 15, 2021—and the date he
filed his first motion to vacate default—December 6, 2022—claimant is "clearly
outside of the proscribed time limit" imposed by Rule 4:50-2. It asserts claimant
did not move to reconsider or appeal from the February 15, 2023 order, but
instead, "[five] months afterwards," on April 20, 2023, filed a second motion to
vacate default. The State contends this was "merely an attempt to bypass the
court's order denying his motion to vacate the default judgment, by attempting
to rectify his failure to file an answer to the complaint as within time," even
though the court clerk notified him a year earlier regarding the appropriate
procedure to file an answer. As to claimant's substantive arguments regarding
the forfeiture, the State notes this matter only concerns a default judgment and
two motions to vacate that default judgment, not the appropriateness of the
underlying forfeiture.
"We review a motion under Rule 4:50-1 to vacate final judgment under an
abuse of discretion standard." 257-261 20th Ave. Realty, LLC v. Roberto, 477
N.J. Super. 339, 366 (App. Div. 2023) (citing U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n v.
Guillaume, 209 N.J. 449, 467 (2012)). "Generally, a decision to vacate a default
judgment lies within the sound discretion of the trial court, guided by principles
A-1215-23 5 of equity." Coryell, LLC v. Curry, 391 N.J. Super. 72, 79 (App. Div. 2006).
"Although the ordinary 'abuse of discretion' standard defies precise definition,
it arises when a decision is 'made without a rational explanation, inexplicably
departed from established policies, or rested on an impermissible basis.'" Flagg
v. Essex Cnty. Prosecutor, 171 N.J. 561, 571 (2002) (quoting Achacoso-Sanchez
v. Immigr. & Naturalization Serv., 779 F.2d 1260, 1265 (7th Cir. 1985)). "[A]
functional approach to abuse of discretion examines whether there are good
reasons for an appellate court to defer to the particular decision at issue." Ibid.
"However, if a judge makes a discretionary decision but acts under a
misconception of the applicable law or misapplies the applicable law to the
facts," we "need not extend deference." Johnson v. Johnson, 320 N.J. Super.
371, 378 (App. Div. 1999).
A judgment of default may be "set . . . aside in accordance with R[ule]
4:50." R. 4:43-3. Under Rule 4:50-1, "[o]n motion . . . the court may relieve a
party . . .
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-1215-23
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
ONE 2004 INFINITY G35, CLAIMANT – JARVIS MCCLOUD (R/O),
Defendant-Appellant.
Submitted April 30, 2025 – Decided July 2, 2025
Before Judges Marczyk and Paganelli.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Middlesex County, DC-008108-17.
Jarvis McCloud, appellant pro se.
Yolanda Ciccone, Middlesex County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Susan L. Berkow, Special Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM This appeal stems from a civil forfeiture matter. Claimant, Jarvis
McCloud, appeals from the trial court's October 26, 2023 order denying his
motion to vacate the default judgment entered in favor of the State. We affirm.
I.
Claimant was arrested and charged with various offenses in April 2017.
In June 2017, the State filed a complaint for forfeiture regarding claimant's 2004
Infinity automobile pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:64-1 to -13.1 The court served
claimant with the complaint later that month. On July 27, 2017, the court
entered an order of conditional dismissal without prejudice subject to
reinstatement upon the conclusion of claimant's criminal proceedings. 2
Claimant pled guilty to numerous crimes including robbery and weapon offenses
in November 2017.
In October 2018, the State requested the stay be lifted and the forfeiture
matter reinstated as claimant's criminal proceedings had been resolved. The
matter was subsequently reinstated; however, the State acknowledges "service
1 The vehicle was valued at $2,800. 2 The State asserts it requested the conditional dismissal after it was served with a copy of claimant's answer. A-1215-23 2 of the order reinstating [the] matter may have been mailed to [claimant] at the
wrong address." Shortly after the stay was lifted, default was entered.
While preparing a motion for final default judgment, the State noticed
claimant had not filed his answer with the court. The State forwarded claimant's
answer to the court in January and March 2019. However, the court did not
accept the answer. In April 2019, the court granted the State's application to
enter final default judgment against claimant.
According to claimant, he reached out to the State on May 30, 2021,
"requesting an update of the case." Although he asserts he never received the
order entering default judgment, he acknowledged he was advised on June 15,
2021, that default judgment was entered against him.
On December 6, 2022, claimant filed a motion to vacate the default
judgment.3 The State opposed the motion. On February 15, 2023, the court
entered an order denying claimant's motion to vacate the default judgment. The
court reasoned that since claimant "was aware of the judgment in June of 2021,
3 Claimant filed requests to reinstate in November 2021 and again in March 2022. The applications were not properly filed. The court responded on March 10, 2022, with a deficiency notice rejecting claimant's pleading as he did not submit a filing fee and was in default. He was further directed he could "file a motion to vacate the default with [his] answer."
A-1215-23 3 but did not file his motion until December of 2022, the motion to vacate default
judgment [was] denied as untimely pursuant to R[ule] 4:50-2."
Instead of moving to reconsider or appeal the February 15, 2023 order,
claimant submitted a notice of motion to file as within time on April 20, 2023.
On July 25, 2023, claimant re-filed the same documents, attempting to vacate
the default judgment. The State opposed the application. On October 26, 2023,
the court again denied claimant's motion as untimely "pursuant to R[ule] 4:50-
2."4
II.
Claimant asserts he was incarcerated, denied due process, and his property
was taken without him having a chance to present his defense in court. He
further contends the State sought to seize his property without showing a prima
facie case. Claimant broadly claims the COVID-19 pandemic made it difficult
to correspond and communicate from prison on his forfeiture case. He also
argues the default judgment violated the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth
Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment.
4 Claimant is appealing only from the October 26, 2023 order, not the February 15, 2023 order. A-1215-23 4 The State counters that even if we accept the date claimant advises he
received actual notice of the default judgment—June 15, 2021—and the date he
filed his first motion to vacate default—December 6, 2022—claimant is "clearly
outside of the proscribed time limit" imposed by Rule 4:50-2. It asserts claimant
did not move to reconsider or appeal from the February 15, 2023 order, but
instead, "[five] months afterwards," on April 20, 2023, filed a second motion to
vacate default. The State contends this was "merely an attempt to bypass the
court's order denying his motion to vacate the default judgment, by attempting
to rectify his failure to file an answer to the complaint as within time," even
though the court clerk notified him a year earlier regarding the appropriate
procedure to file an answer. As to claimant's substantive arguments regarding
the forfeiture, the State notes this matter only concerns a default judgment and
two motions to vacate that default judgment, not the appropriateness of the
underlying forfeiture.
"We review a motion under Rule 4:50-1 to vacate final judgment under an
abuse of discretion standard." 257-261 20th Ave. Realty, LLC v. Roberto, 477
N.J. Super. 339, 366 (App. Div. 2023) (citing U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n v.
Guillaume, 209 N.J. 449, 467 (2012)). "Generally, a decision to vacate a default
judgment lies within the sound discretion of the trial court, guided by principles
A-1215-23 5 of equity." Coryell, LLC v. Curry, 391 N.J. Super. 72, 79 (App. Div. 2006).
"Although the ordinary 'abuse of discretion' standard defies precise definition,
it arises when a decision is 'made without a rational explanation, inexplicably
departed from established policies, or rested on an impermissible basis.'" Flagg
v. Essex Cnty. Prosecutor, 171 N.J. 561, 571 (2002) (quoting Achacoso-Sanchez
v. Immigr. & Naturalization Serv., 779 F.2d 1260, 1265 (7th Cir. 1985)). "[A]
functional approach to abuse of discretion examines whether there are good
reasons for an appellate court to defer to the particular decision at issue." Ibid.
"However, if a judge makes a discretionary decision but acts under a
misconception of the applicable law or misapplies the applicable law to the
facts," we "need not extend deference." Johnson v. Johnson, 320 N.J. Super.
371, 378 (App. Div. 1999).
A judgment of default may be "set . . . aside in accordance with R[ule]
4:50." R. 4:43-3. Under Rule 4:50-1, "[o]n motion . . . the court may relieve a
party . . . from a final judgment or order for" a multitude of reasons, including
"(a) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; . . . (d) the judgment
or order is void; . . . or (f) any other reason justifying relief from the operation
of the judgment or order." Rule 4:50-1 is "designed to reconcile the strong
interests in finality of judgments and judicial efficiency with the equitable
A-1215-23 6 notion that courts should have authority to avoid an unjust result in any given
case." Guillaume, 209 N.J. at 467 (quoting Mancini v. EDS, 132 N.J. 330, 334
(1993)).
"Rule 4:50-2 provides the time frame within which a motion seeking relief
under Rule 4:50-1 must be filed." Romero v. Gold Star Distrib., LLC, 468 N.J.
Super. 274, 296 (App. Div. 2021). Any such "motion shall be made within a
reasonable time," and if a party brings the motion for the reasons set forth in
Rule 4:50-1(a), (b), or (c), said motion "shall be made . . . not more than one
year after the judgment, order or proceedings was entered or taken." R. 4:50-2.
"[A] reasonable time is determined based upon the totality of the
circumstances," and the one-year time limit for motions brought under Rule
4:50-1(a), (b), or (c), "'represents . . . the outermost time limit for the filing of a
motion.'" Romero, 468 N.J. Super. at 296 (quoting Orner v. Liu, 419 N.J. Super.
431, 437 (App. Div. 2011)).
Motions to vacate default judgment are "viewed with great liberality, and
every reasonable ground for indulgence is tolerated to the end that a just result
is reached." Marder v. Realty Constr. Co., 84 N.J. Super. 313, 319 (App. Div.
1964). However, "[t]he party seeking to vacate a default judgment has the
'overall burden of demonstrating that its failure to answer or otherwise appear
A-1215-23 7 and defend should be excused.'" Romero, 468 N.J. Super. at 294 (quoting
Jameson v. Great Alt. & Pac. Tea Co., 363 N.J. Super. 419, 425-26 (App. Div.
2003)).
Claimant learned of the default judgment in June 2021, and did not
successfully file his first motion to vacate until December 2022, nearly eighteen
months later. Furthermore, claimant knew the forfeiture action was to be
reinstated upon the completion of his criminal proceedings. He pled guilty in
November 2017, and default judgment was entered against him in April 2019.
However, claimant did not reach out to the State for an update on his case until
May 2021, over three years after his guilty plea. Thereafter, he waited another
year and a half before moving to vacate the default judgment.
Although claimant does not specify the subsection of Rule 4:50-1 upon
which he relies, and the trial court did not identify the subsection which it
believed governed claimant's application, we are satisfied it was well within the
trial court's discretion to deny the motion given the extensive time period
claimant was on notice of the default judgment.
Claimant's failure to act more promptly after learning that default
judgment had been entered was appropriately considered by the court, and there
was ample support in the record for the court's decision. Assuming claimant
A-1215-23 8 was proceeding under Rule 4:50-1(a), (b), or (c), he failed to file his application
within one year as set forth in Rule 4:50-2. Moreover, to the extent he sought
to rely on any other section under Rule 4:50-2, we determine the court did not
misapply its discretion in denying the motion to vacate default judgment, as the
motion was not filed within a reasonable time, given that it was not filed until a
year and a half after claimant learned of the entry of default judgment. We
discern no basis to disturb the court's order.
To the extent we have not addressed any other arguments raised by
claimant, we are satisfied they are without sufficient merit to warrant further
discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
Affirmed.
A-1215-23 9