State of New Jersey v. N.C.

• Court: New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division
• Decided: October 3, 2025
• Docket: A-1790-24
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

RECORD IMPOUNDED

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-1790-24

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

N.C.,

Defendant-Respondent. _____________________________

Submitted September 23, 2025 – Decided October 3, 2025

Before Judges Gilson and Vinci.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Cape May County, Indictment No. 24-08- 0379.

Jeffrey Sutherland, Cape May County Prosecutor, attorney for appellant (James E. Moore, Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the briefs).

Klineburger & Nussey, attorneys for respondent (Richard F. Klineburger, III, on the brief).

PER CURIAM Pursuant Rule 2:2-3(b)(1), the State appeals from a February 14, 2025

order enrolling defendant N.C.1 into the pretrial intervention program (PTI) over

its objection. Having reviewed the record and applicable law, we reverse.

The State alleges that on June 26, 2024, at approximately 10:50 p.m.

Patrolman Christopher Rudy of the Middle Township police department was

traveling south on County Road 657 in Cape May Court House when he

observed defendant's vehicle passing cars at a high rate of speed. Defendant

began driving behind Patrolman Rudy, at times dangerously close to his vehicle.

Patrolman Rudy allowed defendant to pass and conducted a motor vehicle stop.

Defendant pulled over but refused to identify herself. After Patrolman

Rudy attempted to open defendant's locked driver's side door, she fled.

Defendant stopped again a short distance from the original stop. Patrolman

Rudy approached the vehicle, ordered defendant out of the vehicle, and informed

her she was under arrest. Defendant failed to comply and, after another officer

arrived, again fled the scene. The officers did not pursue defendant's vehicle.

Sergeant Jonas McInnis of the Middle Township police department

subsequently observed defendant's vehicle traveling at an excessive rate of

1 We use initials to protect medical, psychiatric, and psychological records, reports, and evaluations. R. 1:38-3(a)(2). A-1790-24 2 speed in a reckless manner southbound on Route 9 in Cape May Court House.

He followed defendant onto the Garden State Parkway and initiated a motor

vehicle stop. Defendant exited the highway and pulled over. County dispatch

advised Patrolman McInnis the same vehicle had just fled from a traffic stop.

Sergeant McInnis approached defendant's vehicle and ordered defendant

to exit the vehicle. After defendant refused and Sergeant McInnis attempted to

open the locked driver's side door, defendant fled in a reckless manner at a high

rate of speed. Sergeant McInnis did not pursue the vehicle.

Sergeant McInnis contacted the vehicle's registered owner, defendant's

father, who informed him that he and defendant were at a hotel in North

Wildwood. After he arrived at the hotel, defendant refused to come out of her

room. Defendant's father invited Sergeant McInnis into the hotel room where

he found defendant lying in bed and informed her she was being arrested for

eluding a lawful traffic stop on two occasions. Defendant argued with Sergeant

McInnis, advised him that she would not submit to arrest, and began removing

an unknown item from a bag. After a brief struggle, defendant was taken into

custody.

The State moved for pretrial detention, which was denied. On July 1,

2024, defendant was released on pre-trial monitoring level three conditions.

A-1790-24 3 Among other conditions, she was ordered "not [to] commit any offense" and to

"undergo a mental health evaluation" to be scheduled within seven days of her

release.

On August 5, 2024, pre-trial services filed a violation of monitoring

(VOM). The VOM alleged defendant was arrested in Pennsylvania while on

pretrial release for harassment, possession of drug paraphernalia, criminal

trespass, and simple assault, and failed to schedule a mental health evaluation

as required.

On August 6, 2024, a Cape May County grand jury returned an indictment

charging defendant with two counts of second-degree eluding, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-

2(b), and one count of third-degree resisting arrest, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2(a)(3)(b).

That same day, the State filed a motion to revoke defendant's release based on

the VOM, which was granted on September 4, 2024.

On November 20, 2024, defendant submitted an application for admission

to PTI, accompanied by a statement of extraordinary and compelling

circumstances that justify consideration of the application as required by Rule

3:28-3(b)(1). Defendant argued "essentially this matter involves a situation

whereby her reaction to the stop triggered her [p]ost[-][t]raumatic [s]tress

A-1790-24 4 [d]isorder (PTSD) which stems from her being abducted by the ring leader of a

sex trafficking ring in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania."

In support of that claim, she attached a news article from October 2019

that reported defendant and her friend left home "on the afternoon of

Sept[ember] 21[,] and took a train to Philadelphia late the next night, according

to information [defendant] provided to police. [Defendant] . . . relayed that the

girls met some people in the city that they did not know" and defendant "left on

the morning of Sept[ember] 23 to return home, but [her friend] stayed behind."

She also attached a press release regarding the sentencing of an individual from

Philadelphia who, in September 2019, "knowingly harbored, maintained, and

advertised a minor, knowing the minor would be caused to engage in a

commercial sex act."

Defendant provided medical records establishing she was diagnosed with

PTSD and other mental illnesses, received inpatient behavioral health treatment

on two occasions in 2024, and that her parents reported her involvement in a sex

trafficking matter to healthcare providers.2 Defendant argued "[t]his was clearly

a mental health episode triggered by [her] prior encounters with men in

2 The medical records relating to her parents' report are not included in the record on appeal. A-1790-24 5 authority." She "has severe mental health issues and if not for same, this

incident would not have occurred. It is both probable and likely that under

proper supervision with a mental health treatment component that this behavior

. . . would not happen again."

On January 8, 2025, defendant moved to compel her admission to PTI.

On February 3, 2025, the State objected to defendant's application finding she

failed to show extraordinary and compelling circumstances justifying her

admission. It specifically considered each of the factors set forth in N.J.S.A.

2C:43-12(e). The State acknowledged defendant's mental health history and

noted her inpatient "admissions resulted from defendant's violent attack of her

roommate . . . and her family members" and concluded her "'continuing pattern

of anti-social behavior' is quantifiable and continuing, [as] outlined in her own

exhibits."

It determined "defendant's explanation for her behavior is a stretch at best"

and she "present[ed] no evidence besides her parents' belief regarding her

involvement in that sex trafficking matter." "There simply is no justification for

her criminality in the present matter[,]" and she was "afforded multiple

opportunities to obtain treatment, most notably, when she was released after her

arrest" but "squandered that opportunity as she has done in the past."

A-1790-24 6 On February 5, the court heard oral argument. On February 14, it entered

an order granting defendant's motion, supported by a written opinion. The court

determined "[t]he State did consider each factor," but disagreed with its

evaluation and weighing of the relevant factors. As to factors one, N.J.S.A.

2C:43-12(e)(1), the "nature of the offense," and two, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-12(e)(2),

the "facts of the case," it disagreed with the State's evaluation because

"[d]efendant was in her vehicle alone, not under the influence, not involved in

any motor vehicle or pedestrian accident, and the law enforcement officer was

not seriously injured." Also, "the State regularly permits defendants charged

with [second-]degree crimes admission into PTI with a plea."

The court concluded "it is clear . . . the State does not believe defendant

was abducted and gives no weight to that claim." "However, even if the

abduction did not occur, that would speak to the fragility of defendant's mental

health and her subsequent psychiatric hospitalizations, which the State also

appears to discount."

As to factor three, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-12(e)(3), the "motivation and age of

defendant," the court conceded "[i]t is clear that defendant did not perform well

while on pretrial release. In fact, this court granted the State's application to

revoke her release." The court disagreed with the weight the State afforded to

A-1790-24 7 factor three based on her noncompliance with mental health treatment because

"it is less clear what specifically about defendant's noncompliance during her

inpatient psychiatric hospitalization suggests she would not be motivated to

complete PTI."

The court did not agree with the State's evaluation of factors five, N.J.S.A.

2C:43-12(e)(5),3 and six, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-12(e)(6),4 because "[d]efendant

argue[d] that with proper supervision with mental health treatment it is probable

that this underlying behavior would not happen again" and "[t]he court

agree[d]."

The court disregarded the State's evaluation of factor seven, N.J.S.A.

2C:43-12(e)(7), the "needs and interests of the victim and society," because "the

court [was] unclear as to who considered this factor and to what extent, as the

prosecuting attorney was the same attorney who initially approved the charges ."

3 "The existence of personal problems and character traits which may be related to the applicant's crime and for which services are unavailable within the criminal justice system, or which may be provided more effectively through supervisory treatment and the probability that the causes of criminal behavior can be controlled by proper treatment." 4 "The likelihood that the applicant's crime is related to a condition or situation that would be conducive to change through [their] participation in supervisory treatment." A-1790-24 8 The court "suggest[ed] that failure to clearly articulate the needs and interest of

the victim and society, then weighs in favor of admittance into PTI."

As to factor nine, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-12(e)(9), the "applicant's criminal

record," it noted defendant had a prior conviction in Pennsylvania for defiant

trespass for which she was placed on probation but "[t]his fact, in and of itself,

does not preclude . . . admission into the PTI program."

As to factor ten, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-12(e)(10), "[w]hether or not the crime is

of an assaultive or violent nature, whether in the criminal act itself or in the

possible injurious consequences of such behavior," the court noted "the risk of

danger and injury was present," but discounted that because "[d]efendant

assert[ed] her conduct was the result of a mental health episode and was neither

assaultive nor violent."

It rejected the State's evaluation of factor eleven, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-

12(e)(11), "consideration of whether or not prosecution would exacerbate the

social problem that led to the defendant's criminal act[s]," because "[f]ormally

prosecuting a defendant for criminality resulting from untreated mental illness

would exacerbate the very real social problem of saddling otherwise law-abiding

citizens deserving of a second chance with a criminal record." "This runs

contrary to the public policy purpose expressly stated in the PTI statute."

A-1790-24 9 As to factor fourteen, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-12(e)(14), "[w]hether or not the

crime is of such a nature that the value of supervisory treatment would be

outweighed by the public need for prosecution," the "court [found] that there is

no public need to prosecute . . . defendant; rather, the public need is to give . . .

defendant, and others similarly situated, a second chance consistent with the

public policy purpose of PTI."

The court disagreed with the State's analysis of factor seventeen, N.J.S.A.

2C:43-12(e)(17), "[w]hether or not the harm done to society by abandoning

criminal prosecution would outweigh the benefits to society from channeling an

offender into" PTI. It concluded:

This defendant is precisely the kind of person deserving of diversion. She has recent and serious symptoms associated with untreated mental illness, including diagnosis of psychosis and personality disorder. She has been in psychiatric treatment twice within a relatively short period of time. The cycle of mental illness, much like the cycle of addiction, including diagnosis, treatment, noncompliance with treatment, and decompensation, is not unusual. With appropriate support and services society will benefit from channeling this offender to a supervisory treatment program such as PTI.

The court determined "the State's decision subverts the underlying goals

of PTI. Defendant has clearly and convincingly shown that the State's decision

was a patent and gross abuse of discretion and a clear error of judgment."

A-1790-24 10 On appeal, the State argues the court improperly found it abused its

discretion in refusing to consent to defendant's admission to PTI. We review

the court's reversal of the State's decision de novo, applying the same standard

as the trial court. State v. Waters, 439 N.J. Super. 215, 226 (App. Div. 2015).

Judicial review of a prosecutor's denial of PTI is "severely limited" and "serves

to check only the 'most egregious examples of injustice and unfairness.'" State

v. Negran, 178 N.J. 73, 82 (2003) (quoting State v. Leonardis, 73 N.J. 360, 384

(1977)).

Because defendant was charged with a second-degree crime for which

there is a presumption of incarceration, she was "ineligible for [PTI] without

prosecutor consent to consideration of the application." R. 3:28-1(d)(1). She

was therefore required to include with her application "a statement of the

extraordinary and compelling circumstances that justify consideration of the

application notwithstanding the presumption of ineligibility based on the nature

of the crime charged." R. 3:38-3(b)(1).

Deciding whether to permit diversion to PTI "is a quintessentially

prosecutorial function." State v. Wallace, 146 N.J. 576, 582 (1996).

"Prosecutorial discretion in this context is critical for two reasons. First, because

it is the fundamental responsibility of the prosecutor to decide whom to

A-1790-24 11 prosecute, and second, because it is a primary purpose of PTI to augment, not

diminish, a prosecutor's options." State v. Nwobu, 139 N.J. 236, 246 (1995)

(citation omitted).

Accordingly, courts give prosecutors "broad discretion" in determining

whether to divert a defendant into PTI. State v. K.S., 220 N.J. 190, 199 (2015).

Indeed, a prosecutor's decision to reject a PTI application should "rarely be

overturned." Wallace, 146 N.J. at 585 (1996) (quoting Leonardis, 73 N.J. at 380

n.10).

"'In order to overturn a prosecutor's rejection, a defendant must 'clearly

and convincingly establish that the prosecutor's decision constitutes a patent and

gross abuse of discretion.'" State v. Nicholson, 451 N.J. Super. 534, 553 (App.

Div. 2017) (quoting State v. Watkins, 193 N.J. 507, 520 (2008)). "A patent and

gross abuse of discretion is defined as a decision that 'has gone so wide of the

mark sought to be accomplished by PTI that fundamental fairness and justice

require judicial intervention.'" Watkins, 193 N.J. at 520 (quoting Wallace, 146

N.J. at 582-83). Such is the case only where it can be proven "that the [PTI]

denial '(a) was not premised upon a consideration of all relevant factors, (b) was

based upon a consideration of irrelevant or inappropriate factors, or (c)

A-1790-24 12 amounted to a clear error in judgment. . . .'" State v. Lee, 437 N.J. Super. 555,

563 (2014) (quoting State v. Bender, 80 N.J. 84, 93 (1979)).

The court must presume that a prosecutor considered all relevant factors,

absent a demonstration by the defendant to the contrary. Wallace, 146 N.J. at

584 (citation omitted). A court is not to assess the case "as if it stood in the

shoes of the prosecutor." Id. at 589. "[J]udicial disagreement with a prosecutor's

reasons for rejection does not equate to prosecutorial abuse of discretion so as

to merit judicial override." State v. Motley, 369 N.J. Super. 314, 323 (App. Div.

2004) (State v. DeMarco, 107 N.J. 562, 566-67 (1987)).

Based on our de novo review, we are convinced the State's decision did

not amount to a clear error of judgment or patent and gross abuse of discretion.

In its February 3, 2025 letter objecting to defendant's admission to PTI, the State

evaluated each of the relevant factors and provided an explanation including the

factual support for the weight it afforded each factor.

Instead of applying a deferential standard of review as required, the court

assessed the case as if it stood in the shoes of the State, disagreed with the weight

afforded certain factors by the State, and imposed its own subjective weighing

of the relevant factors. Furthermore, the court did not consider defendant was

required to demonstrate extraordinary and compelling circumstances that

A-1790-24 13 justified consideration of the application, and the State determined she failed to

do that.

There is no basis to conclude the State's decision was "so wide of the mark

sought to be accomplished by PTI that fundamental fairness and justice require

judicial intervention." Watkins, 193 N.J. at 520 (quotation omitted). We are

satisfied the State appropriately exercised its broad discretion to deny

defendant's PTI application, and there is no reason to disturb that decision.

Therefore, we vacate the trial court's February 14, 2025 order enrolling

defendant into PTI.

Reversed, vacated, and remanded. We do not retain jurisdiction.

A-1790-24 14