RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-3067-23
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
MICHAEL FIGUEROA, a/k/a FIGGZ,
Defendant-Appellant. _______________________
Submitted March 4, 2026 – Decided May 26, 2026
Before Judges Mayer and Jacobs.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Morris County, Indictment Nos. 23-06-0557 and 23-06-0558.
Jennifer N. Sellitti, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Michael Denny, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, of counsel and on the brief).
Jennifer Davenport, Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Kaili E. Matthews, Deputy Attorney General, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM Defendant Michael Figueroa appeals from his convictions for aggravated
sexual assault and narcotics-related crimes, contending the trial court erred in
denying his motion to suppress digital evidence seized from his cellular phone.
We affirm.
I.
In March 2023, Detective Sergeant Edward Zienowicz of the Morris
County Prosecutor's Office's Special Enforcement Unit received information
from a confidential informant (CI) regarding drug distribution. The CI informed
Zienowicz an individual named "Figs" was selling heroin and cocaine from his
residence, using his cell phone to facilitate sales. The CI provided Figs's home
address and cell phone number. Using its databases, law enforcement matched
the address provided to defendant. A search of New Jersey Motor Vehicle
Commission records produced a photograph of defendant, which was shown to
the CI, who positively identified him as the individual selling narcotics.
Police conducted three controlled buys. First, during the week of March
13, 2023, the CI, in Zienowicz's presence, called defendant at the phone number
previously provided to law enforcement. The CI spoke with defendant about
buying heroin. Defendant instructed the CI to meet defendant at his residence,
which matched the address the CI had given to police. The CI then engaged in
A-3067-23 2 a hand-to-hand transaction with defendant. Afterward, the CI met police at a
predetermined location and turned over the suspected heroin.
In the following weeks, the CI engaged in two additional controlled buys
following the same pattern. Police confirmed the phone number used to arrange
the three controlled buys matched defendant's number. Based on this
information, Zienowicz applied for a search warrant to seize evidence related to
narcotics possession and distribution. In his supporting affidavit, Zienowicz
stated:
based upon my training, education, and experience in the field of narcotics and CDS [controlled dangerous substance] distribution conspiracies, CDS distributors are known to use cellular telephone[] devices to communicate with other distributors and CDS buyers to facilitate CDS transactions. CDS distributors often use their cellular telephone devices to communicate via text messages, phone calls and third-party applications, in relation to their distribution schemes . . . .
Because the CI arranged drug transactions with defendant telephonically,
Zienowicz requested the warrant include the search of any cell phones
recovered. He believed cell phones on defendant's person or in his close
proximity recovered during the search would have been used in furtherance of
CDS crimes.
Explaining why the cell phone's entire contents would need to be searched,
A-3067-23 3 Zienowicz certified:
modern cellular telephone devices may be utilized for the storage of telephone numbers, messages, photos, and other information, and automatically store information regarding recent telephone calls, and may be utilized to store memoranda and capture information regarding messages. Cellular telephone devices, being a modern storage device, contain significant quantities of information that would be evidential in this criminal prosecution. Additionally, I believe such evidence will help to identify additional individuals who may have conspired to commit the foregoing offenses, among other items of evidential value in connection with this investigation. Therefore, I am respectfully requesting to seize, charge[,] and search, including a full computer forensic search thereof, of any and all cellular telephone devices, reasonably believed to have been used in furtherance of the aforementioned crimes, found on or in close proximity to [defendant] . . . and his residence . . . for all identifying information located on this instrument, as well as all electronic data, communications and information stored therein . . . .
He further requested authorization to search all described items on the
seized cell phones that may be "hidden, erased, compressed, password[-
]protected, encrypted data[,] or encrypted volumes." Additionally, Zienowicz
explained that the process of searching data on cell phone devices was
technically complex and requested a sufficient time frame ("within 90 days of
receipt") to conduct the search to ensure integrity of the device, data, and the
search itself.
A-3067-23 4 Judge Ralph E. Amirata authorized the requested warrant on April 17. In
executing the search of defendant's cellular photo album, police discovered two
videos and several images depicting a minor, later identified as M.J., naked
while being sexually assaulted. 1 With this evidence, police applied for a second
warrant to search the phone for any further Child Sexual Abuse Material
(CSAM). A second judge approved that warrant. The subsequent search
revealed more CSAM and metadata confirming the videos and photographs were
original to defendant's phone.
On June 28, 2023, a Morris County grand jury indicted defendant for:
second-degree unlawful possession of a weapon during a CDS offense, N.J.S.A.
2C:39-4.1(a) (counts one and two); third-degree possession of CDS (heroin and
cocaine), N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(1) (counts three and four); third-degree
possession with intent to distribute CDS (heroin and cocaine), N.J.S.A. 2C:35-
5(a)(1), (b)(3) (counts five and six); fourth-degree possession with intent to
distribute drug paraphernalia, N.J.S.A. 2C:36-3 (count seven); and second-
degree certain persons not to have a firearm, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7(b)(1) (counts
eight and nine).
The grand jury returned a second indictment for CSAM-related charges:
1 We use initials to protect the child's privacy. R. 1:38-3(c)(12). A-3067-23 5 first-degree aggravated sexual assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(a)(1) (counts one
through four); second-degree sexual assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-(2)(b) (counts five
and six); second-degree endangering the welfare of a child, N.J.S.A. 2C:24-
4(a)(1), (a)(2) (counts seven and eight); first-degree endangering the welfare of
a child, N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(b)(3) (count nine); second-degree endangering the
welfare of a child, N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(b)(4) (count ten); and third-degree
endangering the welfare of a child, N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(b)(5)(b)(iii) (count
eleven).
Defendant moved to suppress the digital evidence recovered from the
search of his cell phone, challenging the narcotics warrant and subsequent
CSAM warrant. In a January 17, 2024 oral decision, Judge Amirata denied
defendant's motion, finding both warrants supported by probable cause.
The judge found the narcotics warrant was "supported by an affidavit of
the investigating detective" that "described with particularity the places . . . and
the objects which were to be searched." In reaching his decision, the judge
distinguished the facts before him from those in State v. Missak, 476 N.J. Super.
302 (App. Div. 2023). He observed Missak is "an intensely fact specific case[,]"
concerning "a warrant authorizing the search of the entire cellular telephone
with [a] limitless time line."
A-3067-23 6 In contrast to Missak, Judge Amirata found Zienowicz "detailed at length
his training and experience and gave an extensive account of control buys which
had already been conducted." Further, the warrant sought evidence limited to
an established time frame and, thus, presented facts "substantially different"
than the facts in Missak. The judge elaborated, "Missa[]k, in its finding did not
hold that a warrant for a search of all data of a phone is per se invalid. It merely
found that probable cause . . . necessarily needs to be outlined in the search
warrant and the scope of the search warrant needs to be supported for the breadth
of same."
The judge found the search was reasonable and the CSAM discovered on
defendant's phone was admissible under the plain-view exception to the Fourth
Amendment's warrant requirement. Specifically, the judge found Zienowicz
searched defendant's phone pursuant to the narcotics warrant and "inadvertently
stumbled upon CSAM material," clearly indicative of criminal activity. He
concluded, "[b]ased on the evidence identified from the plain view of the first
search, a warrant authorizing a second extensive search for CSAM material was
necessary and supported by probable cause." The judge thus denied defendant's
suppression motion and entered an accompanying order.
A-3067-23 7 That same day defendant entered into a plea agreement. Pursuant to its
terms, he pleaded guilty to count six (possession of CDS with intent to
distribute) and count eight (certain person not to have a firearm) of the CDS
indictment and count one (aggravated sexual assault) of the CSAM indictment.
In exchange, the State agreed to recommend twenty-three years' imprisonment
with no period of parole eligibility pursuant to the Lunsford Act, N.J.S.A.
2C:14-2, for the sexual assault charge, to run concurrent to a seven-year
imprisonment term for the certain persons charge and a four-year imprisonment
term for the possession with intent to distribute charge. In May 2024, Judge
Amirata sentenced defendant in accordance with the plea agreement and
imposed the mandatory fines and penalties.
Defendant appealed, raising the following arguments:
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE GRANTED THE MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE BECAUSE THE WARRANT LACKED PROBABLE CAUSE TO ALLOW POLICE TO SEARCH THE PHOTO ALBUM ON DEFENDANT'S CELL PHONE.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE HEARD THE MOTION TO SUPPRESS BECAUSE THE SAME JUDGE ISSUED THE WARRANT IN THE FIRST INSTANCE. (Not raised below).
A-3067-23 8 II.
"Generally, on appellate review, a trial court's factual findings in support
of granting or denying a motion to suppress must be upheld when 'those findings
are supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record.'" State v. S.S., 229
N.J. 360, 374 (2017) (quoting State v. Gamble, 218 N.J. 412, 424 (2014)). This
is because the trial court had the "opportunity to hear and see the witnesses and
to have the 'feel' of the case, which a reviewing court cannot enjoy." State v.
Elders, 192 N.J. 224, 244 (2007) (quoting State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 161
(1964)). "Thus, appellate courts should reverse only when the trial court's
determination is so clearly mistaken that the interests of justice demand
intervention and correction." Gamble, 218 N.J. at 425 (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Elders, 192 N.J. at 244).
"A trial court's interpretation of the law, however, and the consequences
that flow from established facts are not entitled to any special deference. " Ibid.
(citing State v. Gandhi, 201 N.J. 161, 176 (2010)). "Therefore, a trial court's
legal conclusions are reviewed de novo." Ibid. (citing Gandhi, 201 N.J. at 176).
Such legal conclusions encompass possible violations of the Fourth
Amendment to United States Constitution and Article I, Paragraph 7 of our State
Constitution. See Missak, 476 N.J. Super. at 314 (holding the validity of a
A-3067-23 9 search warrant is a "purely legal" question) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). Even in the Fourth Amendment context, "[w]e accord
substantial deference to a trial court's determination that there was probable
cause to issue a warrant." State v. Marshall, 199 N.J. 602, 612 (2009) (citing
State v. Jones, 179 N.J. 377, 388-89 (2004)).
CDS Warrant
In his merits brief, defendant states, "[t]he overbreadth of the first CDS
warrant is the subject of this appeal." We thus focus our analysis on that
warrant.
Both the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article
I, Paragraph 7 of our State Constitution provide, "no warrant shall issue except
upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the papers and things to be seized."
Marshall, 199 N.J. at 610 (quoting N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 7). "Thus, a warrant
should not issue unless the court is satisfied that there is 'probable cause to
believe that a crime has been committed, or is being committed, at a specific
location or that evidence of a crime is at the place sought to be searched.'" Ibid.
(quoting State v. Sullivan, 169 N.J. 204, 210 (2001)). "The Fourth Amendment
governs not only physical searches but also electronic interception of phone
A-3067-23 10 conversations." State v. Feliciano, 224 N.J. 351, 367 (2016).
In the CI context, the court issuing the warrant must determine whether
the tip "establishes probable cause" and "must consider the 'veracity and basis
of knowledge' of the informant as part of its 'totality' analysis." Jones, 179 N.J.
at 389 (quoting State v. Novembrino, 105 N.J. 95, 123 (1987)). "An informant's
basis of knowledge is sufficient 'if the tip itself relates expressly or clearly how
the informant knows of the criminal activity.'" Ibid. (quoting Sullivan, 169 N.J.
at 213). "The absence of such explicit information within the tip itself, however,
is not fatal if 'the nature and details revealed in the tip . . . imply that the
informant's knowledge of the alleged criminal activity is derived from a
trustworthy source.'" Id. at 389-90 (alteration in original) (quoting Sullivan, 169
N.J. at 213).
"'Independent corroboration is necessary to ratify the informant's veracity
and validate the truthfulness of the tip' and is considered 'an essential part of the
determination of probable cause.'" Id. at 390 (quoting State v. Smith, 155 N.J.
83, 95 (1998)). "However, if the informant's tip fails to demonstrate sufficient
veracity or basis of knowledge, a search warrant issued on the basis of the tip
may still pass muster if other facts included in a supporting affidavit justify a
finding of probable cause." Ibid. (first citing Sullivan, 169 N.J. at 214; and then
A-3067-23 11 citing Novembrino, 105 N.J. at 121-22).
In other words, a CI's tip is one factor among others to be considered in
the totality of the circumstances analysis:
[T]he task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, including the veracity and basis of knowledge of persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.
[Ibid. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Smith, 155 N.J. at 93).] "The particularity requirement is uncomplicated. Generally[,] it mandates
that 'the description is such that the officer with a search warrant can with
reasonable effort ascertain and identify the place intended.'" Marshall, 199 N.J.
at 611 (quoting Steele v. United States, 267 U.S. 498, 503 (1925)).
We discern no error in Judge Amirata's decision to authorize issuance of
the CDS search warrant. Under the totality of the circumstances, there was
probable cause defendant possessed and distributed narcotics. The CI's tip
contained explicit information detailing defendant's identity, residence, and
phone number, and how defendant was purportedly involved in drug
transactions, establishing the CI's "veracity and basis of knowledge." Jones, 179
N.J. at 389. Law enforcement independently corroborated this information by
A-3067-23 12 searching databases to confirm defendant's address and identity. See id. at 390.
Based on this information, law enforcement was able to conduct three
controlled buys from defendant with the CI's assistance, further establishing
probable cause. See State v. Desir, 245 N.J. 179, 186 (2021) (affirming that a
CI's controlled purchase of narcotics from the defendant formed probable cause
for the issuance of a search warrant for the defendant's home).
The supporting affidavit recounted these facts, establishing a "fair
probability" defendant was in possession of and distributing CDS. Marshall,
199 N.J. at 610. The affidavit described specific evidence to be searched,
namely, defendant's phone. Zienowicz also described how data is stored on a
cellular phone, how it may be hidden or deleted, and why a precise time frame
was foreclosed. He nonetheless established to the satisfaction of the trial court
and this court "within the four corners of the supporting affidavit" that "evidence
of a crime w[ould] be found in a particular place." Id. at 610-611. Consistent
with our holding in Missak, where, as here, a certification "provide[s] sufficient
facts supporting the expansive search warrant for all the data and information
on the seized cellular phone," a warrant that "allows a search without limitation
of all the phone's contents, information, and data" is sufficiently particularized.
476 N.J. Super. at 322. We thus perceive no error in Judge Amirata's
A-3067-23 13 determination of probable cause or in the scope of the CDS warrant.
CSAM Warrant
Although defendant challenges only the purported overbreadth of the CDS
warrant, we nonetheless assess the validity of the CSAM warrant because it was
generated based on observations made in execution of the CDS warrant. "A
warrantless search is presumed invalid unless it falls within one of the
recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement." Gamble, 218 N.J. at 425
(quoting State v. Cooke, 163 N.J. 657, 664 (2000)). "The State bears the burden
of demonstrating that a warrantless search is justified by 'one of the "few
specifically established and well-delineated exceptions" to the warrant
requirement.'" State v. Bogan, 200 N.J. 61, 73 (2009) (quoting State v. Frankel,
179 N.J. 586, 598 (2004) (quoting Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390
(1978))).
One such exception is the plain-view doctrine. State v. Johnson, 476 N.J.
Super. 1, 20 (App. Div. 2023). To justify a warrantless search under this
doctrine, "the State must prove: (1) 'the officer [was] lawfully . . . in the area
where he observed and seized the incriminating item or contraband'; and (2) 'it
must be immediately apparent that the seized item is evidence of a crime.'" Id.
at 20-21 (alterations in original) (quoting State v. Gonzales, 227 N.J. 77, 101
A-3067-23 14 (2016)).
We determine Judge Amirata did not err in concluding the CSAM from
the search of defendant's phone pursuant to the CDS warrant was lawfully
obtained under the plain-view doctrine and that the second search warrant was
properly issued. Because the CDS warrant was properly issued, law
enforcement lawfully searched defendant's phone, satisfying the first prong of
the doctrine. The CSAM material discovered under the plain-view doctrine as
part of law enforcement's valid search conducted pursuant to the CDS warrant
was immediately indicative of a crime, satisfying the doctrine's second prong.
Based on this evidence, the second warrant was properly issued. The
CSAM established evidence of a crime, aggravated sexual assault, forming the
requisite probable cause for issuance of the second search warrant. Marshall,
199 N.J. at 611. Thus, the additional CSAM obtained from the second search
warrant was lawfully obtained.
We briefly address defendant's remaining argument that Judge Amirata
should be disqualified from hearing the motion to suppress because he reviewed
and signed the CDS warrant. The argument is without merit. We rejected the
same contention in State v. Smith, noting "[t]he action in issuing the warrant is
ex parte and merely appraises the prima facie showing of probable cause," while
A-3067-23 15 "[t]he motion proceeding is adversarial, and the judge adjudicates all questions
of law and fact posed on the challenge of the validity of the warrant." 113 N.J.
Super. 120, 137-138 (App. Div. 1971).
Affirmed.
A-3067-23 16