State of New Jersey v. Martin Martinez, Jr.

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-0153-25

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

MARTIN MARTINEZ, JR., a/k/a MARTIN MARTINEZ,

Defendant-Appellant. _________________________

Submitted May 27, 2026 – Decided July 23, 2026

Before Judges Gooden Brown and Rose.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Middlesex County, Indictment No. 18-05- 0681.

Bailey & Toraya, LLP, attorneys for appellant (Adam W. Toraya, on the brief).

Linda Estremera, Middlesex County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Hudson E. Knight, Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM Defendant Martin Martinez, Jr. appeals from the August 6, 2025 Law

Division order1 denying his petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) without an

evidentiary hearing. We affirm, but remand solely to correct the judgment of

conviction (JOC) to reflect the proper conviction.

I.

Defendant entered a negotiated guilty plea to first-degree aggravated

manslaughter, second-degree aggravated assault, and second-degree conspiracy

to commit robbery. He was sentenced in accordance with the plea agreement to

an aggregate term of twenty-five years in prison, subject to the No Early Release

Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2.

The June 21, 2017 charges stemmed from defendant concocting a plan for

his girlfriend, Cynthia Rivera, to rob an individual. The plan went awry when

defendant received a text message from Rivera stating she was at the Loop Inn

Motel in Woodbridge with two men and was "scared" because one of them

brandished a gun. Defendant secured a firearm and went to the motel to rescue

Rivera accompanied by an armed associate, John Mingo. Once inside the motel

room, Mingo shot the two men, killing one and injuring the other. Mingo

removed the gold chains from the surviving victim's neck. Thereafter,

1 The order was entered on August 6 but filed on August 7, 2025. A-0153-25 2 defendant, Mingo, Rivera, and another woman who was in the motel room and

had participated in the robbery plan fled the scene. The following day, Mingo

and defendant sold the gold chains at a pawn shop.

Subsequently, defendant was charged in a ten-count Middlesex County

indictment with first-degree conspiracy to commit murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:5-

2(a)(1), :11-3(a)(1) to (2) (count one); first-degree felony murder, N.J.S.A.

2C:11-3(a)(3), :2-6(c)(1)(b) (count two); first-degree murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-

3(a)(1) to (2), :2-6(c)(1)(b) (count three); first-degree attempted murder,

N.J.S.A. 2C:5-1(a), :11-3(a)(1) to (2), :2-6(c)(1)(b) (count four); second-degree

conspiracy to commit robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2(a)(1), :15-1(a)(1) (count five);

first-degree armed robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1(a)(1), :2-6(c)(1)(b) (count six);

second-degree unlawful possession of a handgun, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b), :2-

6(c)(1)(b) (count seven); second-degree possession of a firearm for an unlawful

purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a), :2-6(c)(1)(b) (count eight); third-degree

endangering an injured victim, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1.2, :2-6(c)(1)(b) (count nine);

and fourth-degree obstruction of the administration of law, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-1(a),

:2-6(c)(1)(b) (count ten). Mingo and Rivera were also charged in all ten counts.

At the ensuing plea hearing, defendant pled guilty to count two, as

amended to first-degree aggravated manslaughter, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4(a)(1); count

A-0153-25 3 four, as amended to second-degree aggravated assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b); and

count five. Under the terms of the plea agreement, defendant agreed to

cooperate in the prosecution of his codefendants and testify truthfully against

them at trial. In the event of a breach of the agreement, defendant would be

precluded from withdrawing his plea absent a showing it was not entered

knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. During the plea colloquy, defendant

provided a factual basis for his plea, admitting to the elements of each offense.

After ensuring defendant was pleading voluntarily, with an understanding of the

nature of the charges and the consequences of the plea, the judge accepted

defendant's guilty plea in accordance with Rule 3:9-2 (governing the

requirements for the court's acceptance of a guilty plea).

Thereafter, defendant moved to withdraw his guilty plea, arguing he was

acting in the defense of others and asserting his plea colloquy did not establish

"a factual basis[] for aggravated manslaughter." After reviewing the discovery

and applicable legal principles, the judge denied the motion. The judge

concluded the motion was "woefully inadequate" and fell "woefully short of

meeting any of the Slater2 factors, most particularly a colorable claim of

2 State v. Slater, 198 N.J. 145 (2009).

A-0153-25 4 innocence." The judge painstakingly examined Rivera's statements inculpating

defendant in concocting the robbery scheme and determined even if defendant

had made an argument for defense of others, the defense would not have been

successful because he was the initial aggressor and he and the other

codefendants 3 had set the events in motion. Moreover, according to the judge,

there was nothing indicating Rivera needed to be rescued as she could have left

the motel room or called for help, but chose not to do so. The judge also

determined by filing the motion to withdraw his guilty plea, defendant did not

violate the terms of the plea agreement.

After denying the motion, the judge sentenced defendant. In imposing

sentence, the judge found aggravating factors three and nine based on the risk

defendant would commit another offense and the need for deterrence. See

N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(3), (9). The judge found no mitigating factors, rejecting

defense counsel's argument that mitigating factor twelve, among others, applied

based on defendant's cooperation agreement with the State. See N.J.S.A. 2C:44-

1(b)(12).

The judge sentenced defendant to twenty-five years in prison, subject to

NERA, on count two as amended, and concurrent terms of ten years, each

3 The judge noted the codefendants' cases had all been resolved by guilty pleas. A-0153-25 5 subject to NERA, on count four as amended, and count five. The JOC was

entered on February 27, 2019, memorializing the sentence. The JOC correctly

reflected defendant's convictions on counts two and five. However, as to count

four, the JOC mistakenly indicated defendant was convicted of first-degree

attempted murder, the original charge, instead of the amended second-degree

aggravated assault charge.

Defendant appealed his convictions and sentence, which appeal was heard

on our sentencing oral argument (SOA) calendar. See R. 2:9-11. During

argument, appellate counsel did not address the error in the JOC, and mistakenly

stated defendant was sentenced for "first[-]degree aggravated manslaughter,

first[-]degree attempted murder[,] and second[-]degree conspiracy to commit

robbery." We affirmed defendant's convictions and sentence, rejecting counsel's

contentions defendant's withdrawal motion should have been granted and

mitigating factors were overlooked. We concluded the sentence was "not

manifestly excessive or unduly punitive" and "the court did not abuse its

discretion in weighing the [Slater] factors." State v. Martinez, No. A-3313-18

(App. Div. Feb. 11, 2020) (slip op. at 1).

Defendant filed a timely PCR petition, which was supplemented by

counsel. In his petition, among other things, defendant asserted his trial counsel

A-0153-25 6 rendered ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) by failing to effectively argue

for mitigating factor twelve at sentencing. See N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(12) ("The

willingness of the defendant to cooperate with law enforcement authorities

. . . ."). Defendant also argued his appellate counsel rendered IAC by failing to

address the error in the JOC at the SOA hearing, causing this court to

erroneously rely on the error in affirming the sentence.

Following oral argument, the PCR judge entered an order denying

defendant's petition. In an accompanying written decision, the judge recounted

the facts and procedural history of the case, applied the governing legal

principles, and concluded defendant failed to establish a prima facie case of IAC

to justify an evidentiary hearing or other relief. Specifically, the judge found no

ground to establish an IAC claim because "trial counsel argued mitigating factor

twelve in his [s]entencing [m]emorandum," notwithstanding the sentencing

judge's rejection of trial counsel's argument.

Addressing defendant's argument his appellate counsel was ineffective by

misstating his conviction on count four and causing this court to rely on the error

in affirming his sentence, the PCR judge found defendant's argument

"speculative" at best. The judge reasoned

This court finds that the error in the [JOC] was an inadvertent clerical-type error, and it will be

A-0153-25 7 amended to reflect the sentencing transcript accordingly. There is no evidence in [defendant's] record that that error led to an impairment of any substantive right, nor could there be.

On appeal, defendant reprises the arguments rejected by the PCR judge as

follows:

POINT ONE

THE [JOC] MUST BE CORRECTED BECAUSE IT INCORRECTLY STATES UNDER COUNT FOUR THAT DEFENDANT IS GUILTY OF FIRST- DEGREE ATTEMPTED MURDER RATHER THAN SECOND[-]DEGREE AGGRAVATED ASSAULT.

POINT TWO

THE [PCR] COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE DEFENDANT'S PETITION FOR [PCR] WITHOUT AFFORDING HIM AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING TO FULLY ADDRESS HIS CONTENTION THAT HE FAILED TO RECEIVE ADEQUATE LEGAL REPRESENTATION.

[A.4] Defendant Received [IAC] When His Trial Attorney Failed To Effectively Oppose The State's Argument That Mitigating Factor Twelve Did Not Apply To Him Because He Filed A Motion To Vacate His Plea.

[B]. Defendant Received [IAC] When His Appellate Attorney Improperly Conceded And Failed To Recognize That The [JOC]

4 We omit the IAC prevailing legal principles for conciseness. A-0153-25 8 Incorrectly Stated He Was Guilty Of Attempted Murder.

II.

We begin by setting out the guideposts that inform our review. "We

review the legal conclusions of a PCR judge de novo," State v. Reevey, 417 N.J.

Super. 134, 146 (App. Div. 2010), but "review under the abuse of discretion

standard the PCR court's determination to proceed without an evidentiary

hearing," State v. Brewster, 429 N.J. Super. 387, 401 (App. Div. 2013).

"[W]here . . . no evidentiary hearing was conducted," as here, "we may review

the factual inferences the [trial] court has drawn from the documentary record

de novo." State v. Blake, 444 N.J. Super. 285, 294 (App. Div. 2016) (citing

State v. Harris, 181 N.J. 391, 420-21 (2004)).

An evidentiary hearing is only required when (1) a defendant establishes

"a prima facie case in support of [PCR]," (2) the court determines that there are

"material issues of disputed fact that cannot be resolved by reference to the

existing record," and (3) the court determines that "an evidentiary hearing is

necessary to resolve the claims" asserted. State v. Porter, 216 N.J. 343, 354

(2013) (alteration in original) (quoting R. 3:22-10(b)); see also R. 3:22-10(e)(2)

(providing "[a] court shall not grant an evidentiary hearing . . . if the defendant's

allegations are too vague, conclusory[,] or speculative"). Indeed, "[i]f the court

A-0153-25 9 perceives that holding an evidentiary hearing will not aid the court's analysis of

whether the defendant is entitled to [PCR], . . . then an evidentiary hearing need

not be granted." Brewster, 429 N.J. Super. at 401 (omission in original) (quoting

State v. Marshall, 148 N.J. 89, 158 (1997)); see also State v. Cummings, 321

N.J. Super. 154, 170 (App. Div. 1999) (explaining the mere raising of a claim

for PCR does not entitle the defendant to an evidentiary hearing and the

defendant "must do more than make bald assertions").

"To establish a prima facie case, [a] defendant must demonstrate a

reasonable likelihood that his or her claim, viewing the facts alleged in the light

most favorable to the defendant, will ultimately succeed on the merits." R. 3:22-

10(b). Moreover, a defendant must make this showing "by a preponderance of

the credible evidence." State v. Goodwin, 173 N.J. 583, 593 (2002).

Rule 3:22-2 recognizes five cognizable grounds for PCR, including a

"[s]ubstantial denial in the conviction proceedings of [a] defendant's

[constitutional] rights," R. 3:22-2(a), which encompasses the Sixth Amendment

right to the effective assistance of counsel at issue in this appeal, State v. Nash,

212 N.J. 518, 541-42 (2013). To establish a prima facie claim of ineffective

assistance of trial counsel as contemplated under Rule 3:22-2(a), a defendant

must demonstrate that the performance of counsel fell below the objective

A-0153-25 10 standard of reasonableness set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,

687-88 (1984), and adopted in State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 49-58 (1987), and that

the outcome would have been different without the purported deficient

performance. Nash, 212 N.J. at 541-42. Stated differently, a defendant must

show: "(1) 'counsel's performance was deficient'; and (2) 'the deficient

performance prejudiced the defense.'" State v. Vanness, 474 N.J. Super. 609,

623 (App. Div. 2023) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687).

To satisfy the first prong, a defendant must "show[] that counsel made

errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed

[to] the defendant by the Sixth Amendment" and "that counsel's representation

fell below an objective standard of reasonableness." Strickland, 466 U.S. at

687-88. "[I]n making the evaluation, a court must indulge a strong presumption

that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional

assistance . . . ." Id. at 689. As such, a defendant "must overcome the

presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action 'might be

considered sound trial strategy.'" Ibid. (quoting Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S.

91, 101 (1955)).

"[F]ailure to present mitigating evidence or argue for mitigating factors"

at sentencing, "even within the confines of [a] plea agreement," may support a n

A-0153-25 11 IAC claim. State v. Hess, 207 N.J. 123, 154 (2011). Still, "[n]o particular set

of detailed rules for counsel's conduct can satisfactorily take account of the

variety of circumstances faced by defense counsel or the range of legitimate

decisions regarding how best to represent a criminal defendant." Strickland, 466

U.S. at 688-89. For that reason, "[t]he quality of counsel's performance cannot

be fairly assessed by focusing on a handful of issues while ignoring the totality

of counsel's performance in the context of the State's evidence of defendant's

guilt." State v. Castagna, 187 N.J. 293, 314 (2006). "The test is not whether

defense counsel could have done better, but whether he [or she] met the

constitutional threshold for effectiveness." Nash, 212 N.J. at 543.

To satisfy the second Strickland/Fritz prong, "[t]he error committed must

be so serious as to undermine the court's confidence in the jury's verdict or result

reached." State v. Chew, 179 N.J. 186, 204 (2004) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S.

at 694). This prong generally requires that a defendant establish a "reasonable

probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the

proceeding would have been different." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. "That 'is

an exacting standard.'" State v. Gideon, 244 N.J. 538, 551 (2021) (quoting State

v. Allegro, 193 N.J. 352, 367 (2008)).

A-0153-25 12 To establish the prejudice prong in the context of a guilty plea, a defendant

must show "that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors,

[the defendant] would not have pled guilty and would have insisted on going to

trial." State v. DiFrisco, 137 N.J. 434, 457 (1994) (alteration in original)

(quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985)). To that end, "a [defendant]

must convince the court that a decision to reject the plea bargain" and "insist on

going to trial" would have been "rational under the circumstances." State v.

Maldon, 422 N.J. Super. 475, 486 (App. Div. 2011) (quoting Padilla v.

Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 372 (2010)). That determination should be "based on

evidence, not speculation," ibid., and "[s]olemn declarations in open court carry

a strong presumption of verity," State v. Simon, 161 N.J. 416, 444 (1999)

(alteration in original) (quoting Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 74 (1977)).

As with trial counsel, to establish a prima facie case of ineffective

assistance of appellate counsel, a defendant must show both a "lack of

professional competence" and "that but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the

result would have been different." State v. Morrison, 215 N.J. Super. 540, 551

(App. Div. 1987). However, appellate counsel will not be found ineffective for

failing to raise meritless issues or errors an appellate court would deem

harmless. See State v. Echols, 199 N.J. 344, 361 (2009). Further, appellate

A-0153-25 13 counsel "need not advance every argument, regardless of merit, urged by the

appellant," Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 394 (1985) (emphasis omitted), but

"should bring to the court's attention controlling law that will vindicate [the

appellant]'s cause." State v. O'Neil, 219 N.J. 598, 612 (2014). Failure to do so

constitutes ineffective assistance only if there is a "reasonable probability" that

the outcome of the appeal would have been different. Id. at 611. Thus, to prove

ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, a defendant must prove an

underlying claim to relief is meritorious. Morrison, 215 N.J. Super. at 547-51.

Failure to meet either prong of the two-pronged Strickland/Fritz test

results in the denial of a petition for PCR. State v. Parker, 212 N.J. 269, 280

(2012) (citing Echols, 199 N.J. at 358). That said, "courts are permitted leeway

to choose to examine first whether a defendant has been prejudiced, and if not,

to dismiss the claim without determining whether counsel's performance was

constitutionally deficient." State v. Gaitan, 209 N.J. 339, 350 (2012) (citation

omitted) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697).

Applying these principles, we agree with the PCR judge that defendant

failed to establish a prima facie IAC claim to warrant an evidentiary hearing.

First, defendant's argument that trial counsel failed to effectively advocate for

mitigating factor twelve at sentencing is belied by the record. In the sentencing

A-0153-25 14 memorandum, trial counsel argued: "Notwithstanding the fact that [defendant]

. . . filed a motion to withdraw his plea[,] . . . he is entitled to the benefit of

mitigating factor [twelve]." Trial counsel specified defendant's "videotaped

proffer" explaining each participant's role, "cooperation agreement with the

State," and willingness "to testify at the trial of his codefendants" all weighed in

favor of finding mitigating factor twelve.

At sentencing, trial counsel reiterated:

I'd ask for [mitigating factor twelve], Judge. Although [defendant] wanted to take his plea back, . . . I don't . . . believe . . . that's a material breach of the plea agreement. It's certainly not a material breach of a cooperation agreement. And I think that [mitigating] factor [twelve] should still be found . . . . [Defendant] gives a proper statement[,] and he gives that statement about what . . . Mingo did that day. And . . . Mingo being the man who pull[ed] the trigger.

Clearly, trial counsel assiduously argued for mitigating factor twelve at

sentencing despite the sentencing judge's rejection of his arguments.

Turning to defendant's argument that his appellate counsel was

ineffective, we agree with the judge defendant failed to make a prima facie

showing of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. We are satisfied that

under the circumstances, a single mistake resulting from a clerical error that did

not impair defendant's substantive rights cannot support an IAC claim.

A-0153-25 15 Although appellate counsel mistakenly stated defendant was sentenced for first-

degree attempted murder, instead of second-degree aggravated assault, appellate

counsel otherwise effectively argued on defendant's behalf. Moreover,

defendant was not prejudiced by the error because this court's affirmance was

based on the record as a whole, including the sentencing transcript.

The PCR judge and both parties agree the JOC contains a clerical mistake

that must be corrected to accurately reflect the sentence imposed. "In the event

of a discrepancy between the court's oral pronouncement of sentence and the

sentence described in the [JOC], the sentencing transcript controls and a

corrective judgment is to be entered." State v. Abril, 444 N.J. Super. 553, 564

(App. Div. 2016). "It is firmly established that the sentencing transcript is 'the

true source of the sentence.'" State v. Walker, 322 N.J. Super. 535, 556 (App.

Div. 1999) (quoting State v. Pohlabel, 40 N.J. Super. 416, 423 (App. Div.

1956)). Accordingly, we affirm, but remand solely for the correction of the JOC

to reflect defendant was convicted of the amended second-degree aggravated

assault offense, not the original first-degree attempted murder charged in count

four.

Affirmed, but remanded solely for entry of an amended JOC consistent

with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.

A-0153-25 16