NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-3550-23
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
MARQUIS N. MOSES, a/k/a MARQUIS MOSES, and MARQUIS REN,
Defendant-Appellant. ________________________
Submitted February 5, 2026 ‒ Decided April 22, 2026
Before Judges Bishop-Thompson and Puglisi.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Hudson County, Indictment Nos. 17-04-0216 and 21-05-0408.
Jennifer N. Sellitti, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Monique Moyse, Designated Counsel, on the brief).
Wayne Mello, Hudson County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Patrick F. Galdieri, II, Assistant Prosecutor, on the brief; Melanie Zelikovsky, participating pursuant to Rule 1:21-3(a), on the brief). PER CURIAM
Defendant Marquis Moses appeals from a May 16, 2024 order denying his
petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) without an evidentiary hearing. We
affirm.
After jury selection began in February 2022, pursuant to a negotiated plea
agreement, defendant pleaded guilty to third-degree possession of a controlled
dangerous substance (heroin) with intent to distribute, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(a)(1),
and second-degree certain persons not to possess a firearm, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-
7(b)(1), under Indictment Number 17-04-00216 (0216). Defendant admitted
while in Jersey City on October 20, 2016, he was in possession of a .40-caliber
semiautomatic handgun for which he did not have a permit and seven bags of
heroin intended for sale or distribution.
The court sentenced defendant to a seven-year term of incarceration for
the heroin conviction and a concurrent five-year term for the certain persons
conviction, subject to the Graves Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(c). The remaining
counts under 0216 were dismissed. The court also dismissed Indictment
Number 21-05-00408, in which defendant was charged with two offenses while
confined in the Hudson County Correctional Facility: fourth-degree attempted
possession of an electronic communication device, N.J.S.A. 2C:5-1(a)(1),
A-3550-23 2 N.J.S.A. 2C:29-10(b); and fourth-degree conspiracy to possess an electronic
communication device, N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2(a)(1), N.J.S.A. 2C:29-10(b).
Defendant did not pursue a direct appeal of his sentence. Instead, he filed
a timely, self-represented PCR petition, asserting his sentence was illegal. In
his supplemental petition, defendant raised several allegations: misconduct and
misrepresentation by plea counsel; incorrect advice regarding COVID-19
credits; and contradictions concerning the controlling sentence, specifically the
Department of Corrections (DOC) recognizes his seven-year term while the
Parole Board applies the five-year term. Additionally, defendant requested the
judgment of conviction be amended to reflect satisfaction of seven-year
sentence, arguing he received 1,467 days (equivalent to four years and seven
days) of jail credit at sentencing.
After PCR counsel was appointed, a supplemental brief was filed in
support of defendant's petition. Defendant claimed plea counsel advised him, if
he pleaded guilty, he would receive eight months' COVID-19 credit under the
Emergency Health Powers Act, N.J.S.A. 26:13-1 to -36, 30:4-123.100; he was
pressured into accepting the plea; and he did not believe his counsel would
provide an adequate defense at trial.
A-3550-23 3 In its May 16, 2024 order, the PCR court denied defendant's petition. It
was well-acquainted with the facts of the case, having overseen both defendant's
trial and sentencing.
The court determined in a well-reasoned decision "[d]efendant had a full
understanding of the penal consequences at the time of his plea, his decision to
plead was not impacted by any misinformation, and he has not established prong
one of the [] test" articulated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687
(1984), and adopted in State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 58 (1987). It reviewed the
plea transcript and noted defendant gave affirmative responses, under oath, to
all the court's questions regarding his intent to plead guilty, the competent
assistance provided by plea counsel, his waiver of a jury trial, his voluntary
relinquishment of those rights, and no one forced or threatened him to enter the
plea. Defendant allocuted to the plea and admitted to the factual basis
supporting the charges. The court accepted his plea, satisfied defendant was
entering it freely, knowingly, and voluntarily.
The court found defendant's claims—plea counsel improperly pressured
him, withheld legal advice, and told him he had no choice but to plead guilty—
were "nothing more than mere bald assertions." These claims were contradicted
A-3550-23 4 by defendant's sworn testimony he was satisfied with counsel's services and not
coerced to enter the guilty plea.
The court rejected defendant's contention plea counsel misadvised that he
was guaranteed to receive COVID-19 credits, thereby coercing him into
accepting the plea. As reflected in the trial transcript, defendant was "fully made
aware" prior to entering his plea how COVID-19 credit system operated, and the
court expedited his sentence to give him the best chance to receive these credits.
Defendant was aware the application of the credits was within the discretion of
the DOC. Therefore, defendant's decision to plead guilty was not influenced by
any misinformation.
Defendant presents the following argument on appeal:
[DEFENDANT] IS ENTITLED TO AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING ON HIS CLAIM THAT HIS ATTORNEY RENDERED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL BY MISADVISING HIM ABOUT HIS SENTENCE AND PRESSURING HIM INTO A PLEA.
When a PCR court does not conduct an evidentiary hearing, we review de
novo "both the factual inferences drawn from the record" and the court's legal
conclusions. State v. Balbosa, 481 N.J. Super. 497, 519 (App. Div. 2025), certif.
denied, 262 N.J. 410 (2026). A PCR court's decision to proceed without an
A-3550-23 5 evidentiary hearing is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Vanness,
474 N.J. Super. 609, 623 (App. Div. 2023).
When a defendant seeks relief on the grounds of ineffective assistance of
counsel, they are required to satisfy the two-prong test enunciated in Strickland.
466 U.S. at 687. A defendant must demonstrate: (1)"counsel's performance was
deficient," and (2) "the deficient performance prejudiced the defense." Ibid.;
Fritz, 105 N.J. at 58-60.
To set aside a guilty plea, a defendant must demonstrate: (1) counsel's
performance was not "within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in
criminal cases," and (2) "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's
errors, [the defendant] would not have pled guilty and would have insisted on
going to trial." State v. DiFrisco, 137 N.J. 434, 457 (1994) (alteration in
original) (first quoting Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 266 (1973); and then
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-3550-23
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
MARQUIS N. MOSES, a/k/a MARQUIS MOSES, and MARQUIS REN,
Defendant-Appellant. ________________________
Submitted February 5, 2026 ‒ Decided April 22, 2026
Before Judges Bishop-Thompson and Puglisi.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Hudson County, Indictment Nos. 17-04-0216 and 21-05-0408.
Jennifer N. Sellitti, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Monique Moyse, Designated Counsel, on the brief).
Wayne Mello, Hudson County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Patrick F. Galdieri, II, Assistant Prosecutor, on the brief; Melanie Zelikovsky, participating pursuant to Rule 1:21-3(a), on the brief). PER CURIAM
Defendant Marquis Moses appeals from a May 16, 2024 order denying his
petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) without an evidentiary hearing. We
affirm.
After jury selection began in February 2022, pursuant to a negotiated plea
agreement, defendant pleaded guilty to third-degree possession of a controlled
dangerous substance (heroin) with intent to distribute, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(a)(1),
and second-degree certain persons not to possess a firearm, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-
7(b)(1), under Indictment Number 17-04-00216 (0216). Defendant admitted
while in Jersey City on October 20, 2016, he was in possession of a .40-caliber
semiautomatic handgun for which he did not have a permit and seven bags of
heroin intended for sale or distribution.
The court sentenced defendant to a seven-year term of incarceration for
the heroin conviction and a concurrent five-year term for the certain persons
conviction, subject to the Graves Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(c). The remaining
counts under 0216 were dismissed. The court also dismissed Indictment
Number 21-05-00408, in which defendant was charged with two offenses while
confined in the Hudson County Correctional Facility: fourth-degree attempted
possession of an electronic communication device, N.J.S.A. 2C:5-1(a)(1),
A-3550-23 2 N.J.S.A. 2C:29-10(b); and fourth-degree conspiracy to possess an electronic
communication device, N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2(a)(1), N.J.S.A. 2C:29-10(b).
Defendant did not pursue a direct appeal of his sentence. Instead, he filed
a timely, self-represented PCR petition, asserting his sentence was illegal. In
his supplemental petition, defendant raised several allegations: misconduct and
misrepresentation by plea counsel; incorrect advice regarding COVID-19
credits; and contradictions concerning the controlling sentence, specifically the
Department of Corrections (DOC) recognizes his seven-year term while the
Parole Board applies the five-year term. Additionally, defendant requested the
judgment of conviction be amended to reflect satisfaction of seven-year
sentence, arguing he received 1,467 days (equivalent to four years and seven
days) of jail credit at sentencing.
After PCR counsel was appointed, a supplemental brief was filed in
support of defendant's petition. Defendant claimed plea counsel advised him, if
he pleaded guilty, he would receive eight months' COVID-19 credit under the
Emergency Health Powers Act, N.J.S.A. 26:13-1 to -36, 30:4-123.100; he was
pressured into accepting the plea; and he did not believe his counsel would
provide an adequate defense at trial.
A-3550-23 3 In its May 16, 2024 order, the PCR court denied defendant's petition. It
was well-acquainted with the facts of the case, having overseen both defendant's
trial and sentencing.
The court determined in a well-reasoned decision "[d]efendant had a full
understanding of the penal consequences at the time of his plea, his decision to
plead was not impacted by any misinformation, and he has not established prong
one of the [] test" articulated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687
(1984), and adopted in State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 58 (1987). It reviewed the
plea transcript and noted defendant gave affirmative responses, under oath, to
all the court's questions regarding his intent to plead guilty, the competent
assistance provided by plea counsel, his waiver of a jury trial, his voluntary
relinquishment of those rights, and no one forced or threatened him to enter the
plea. Defendant allocuted to the plea and admitted to the factual basis
supporting the charges. The court accepted his plea, satisfied defendant was
entering it freely, knowingly, and voluntarily.
The court found defendant's claims—plea counsel improperly pressured
him, withheld legal advice, and told him he had no choice but to plead guilty—
were "nothing more than mere bald assertions." These claims were contradicted
A-3550-23 4 by defendant's sworn testimony he was satisfied with counsel's services and not
coerced to enter the guilty plea.
The court rejected defendant's contention plea counsel misadvised that he
was guaranteed to receive COVID-19 credits, thereby coercing him into
accepting the plea. As reflected in the trial transcript, defendant was "fully made
aware" prior to entering his plea how COVID-19 credit system operated, and the
court expedited his sentence to give him the best chance to receive these credits.
Defendant was aware the application of the credits was within the discretion of
the DOC. Therefore, defendant's decision to plead guilty was not influenced by
any misinformation.
Defendant presents the following argument on appeal:
[DEFENDANT] IS ENTITLED TO AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING ON HIS CLAIM THAT HIS ATTORNEY RENDERED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL BY MISADVISING HIM ABOUT HIS SENTENCE AND PRESSURING HIM INTO A PLEA.
When a PCR court does not conduct an evidentiary hearing, we review de
novo "both the factual inferences drawn from the record" and the court's legal
conclusions. State v. Balbosa, 481 N.J. Super. 497, 519 (App. Div. 2025), certif.
denied, 262 N.J. 410 (2026). A PCR court's decision to proceed without an
A-3550-23 5 evidentiary hearing is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Vanness,
474 N.J. Super. 609, 623 (App. Div. 2023).
When a defendant seeks relief on the grounds of ineffective assistance of
counsel, they are required to satisfy the two-prong test enunciated in Strickland.
466 U.S. at 687. A defendant must demonstrate: (1)"counsel's performance was
deficient," and (2) "the deficient performance prejudiced the defense." Ibid.;
Fritz, 105 N.J. at 58-60.
To set aside a guilty plea, a defendant must demonstrate: (1) counsel's
performance was not "within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in
criminal cases," and (2) "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's
errors, [the defendant] would not have pled guilty and would have insisted on
going to trial." State v. DiFrisco, 137 N.J. 434, 457 (1994) (alteration in
original) (first quoting Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 266 (1973); and then
quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985)).
"Plea counsel's performance will not be deemed deficient if counsel has
provided the defendant 'correct information concerning all of the relevant
material consequences that flow from such a plea.'" Vanness, 474 N.J. Super.
at 624 (quoting State v. Agathis, 424 N.J. Super. 16, 22 (App. Div. 2012)).
"Stated another way, counsel must not 'provide misleading, material information
A-3550-23 6 that results in an uninformed plea.'" Ibid. (quoting State v. Gaitan, 209 N.J. 339,
353 (2012)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The burden rests with defendant to establish entitlement to "PCR by a
preponderance of the evidence." State v. O'Donnell, 435 N.J. Super. 351, 370
(App. Div. 2014) (citing State v. Preciose, 129 N.J. 451, 459 (1992)). Guided
by these principles, we conclude defendant failed to establish a prima facie claim
of ineffective assistance of plea counsel.
Defendant presents no specific facts to support his assertion plea counsel
misadvised him by guaranteeing COVID-19 sentencing credits. Moreover, he
fails to demonstrate this alleged misadvice influenced his decision to plead
guilty or resulted in the ineffective assistance of counsel. Both the trial and plea
transcripts show defendant understood the award of COVID-19 credits was at
the discretion of the DOC, and the court made efforts to provide him with an
opportunity to obtain those credits after sentencing. The PCR court properly
determined defendant's allegations amounted to nothing more than bald
assertions of ineffective assistance of counsel. See State v. Holland, 449 N.J.
Super. 427, 435 (App. Div. 2017). Based on our de novo review, we reach the
same conclusion as the PCR court; defendant failed to establish either prong of
the Strickland/Fritz test.
A-3550-23 7 Simply "raising a claim for PCR does not entitle a defendant to an
evidentiary hearing." State v. L.G.-M., 462 N.J. Super. 357, 364 (App. Div.
2020). Defendant has not met the standard for granting a PCR hearing, which
requires "there are material issues of disputed fact that cannot be resolved by
reference to the existing record," or that "an evidentiary hearing is necessary to
resolve the claims for relief." R. 3:22-10(b); see also L.G.-M., 462 N.J. Super.
at 364-65. Accordingly, the PCR court did not abuse its discretion by denying
the petition without conducting an evidentiary hearing.
Affirmed.
A-3550-23 8